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THE FIGHT FOR THE PACIFIC

THE FIGHT FOR
THE PACIFIC

by

MARK J. GAYN

THE

BODLEY

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First published in England 1941
Reprinted 1941

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Received in	...

Printed in England by Lowe & Brydone Printers Limited, London,
for John Lane The Bodley Head Limited,
8, Bury Place, London, W.C.1

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To the Reader

THE ORIENT HAS been my stamping ground for more than two decades. There are half a dozen points on the Asiatic map which I could call my home, and there are few corners that escaped my search for a good "story." I was born at Barim, a tiny Mongol-Chinese town nestling at the foot of the Khingan Range, a bare one hundred miles north-east of the Soviet-Japanese battlefields of 1935-'39. My first memory is of a Chinese punitive expedition returning from the mountains with bandits' heads swinging by their long queues from bamboo poles. My father managed a vast lumber concession, and he would periodically disappear into the forests—sometimes alone on a sleigh, sometimes in an armored train, with a company of Chinese troops as an escort. He would come back with tales of night bandit raids, pitched battles and "tribute" paid by the firm to the bandits and soldiers alike.

In 1923—a year after the Soviet occupation of the Russian Maritime Province—I moved to Vladivostok. The Soviets had just occupied the Russian Maritime Province, and I was an interested observer of the theory of Communism and its practical application. After three years of managing another lumber concession, my father gave up. In 1926 we were in Shanghai.

Nineteen-twenty-six was an important year in Chinese history. General Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Army—directed

by Soviet officers and propaganda experts—was hewing its way north. Shanghai was a beehive of spies, Communists, international agents. The explosion came a year later, when the White Russian mercenaries of Warlord Sun Chuan-fang fought a battle with General Chiang's troops and shells scooped ragged holes around my house. Soon General Chiang came to terms with the foreign and Chinese bankers in Shanghai, and broke with the Communists. In Canton, hapless Reds were spiked on sharp bamboo stakes, and in Shanghai garroting squads worked overtime "purging" Communist suspects. It was at this time that I met the leading Soviet agents, who were continuing their dangerous and secret work even as they made plans for escape to Russia.

In 1928 I began to work for a little English daily, mainly distinguished by the number of its political enemies. My job came to an untimely end with the machine-gun assassination of my fire-eating Chinese editor by his rivals.

When the Japanese Army launched in earnest its adventure south of the Great Wall in the summer of 1934, I became special correspondent in China for *The Washington Post*. Concurrently I became Editor of the English Department of the Japanese semi-official Rengo News Agency, which later formed the nucleus of the official Japanese Domei News Agency. In the subsequent three years I traveled widely throughout the Orient. Thus I came to know intimately Chinese and Japanese politicians, militarists, bankers, spies and drug-peddlers, rubbed shoulders with Occidental diplomats, businessmen and secret agents, and met political puppets of all brands.

In December, 1934, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, the ex-warlord of Manchuria and a cured dope-addict, told me in his *yamen* in Wuchang of his belief that General Chiang Kai-shek should become China's dictator. Two years later the marshal kidnaped General Chiang and held him for the strangest ransom in Chinese history—the promise of a war on Japan. In 1935 another warlord, General Ho Chien of Honan, in an interview bristling with Confucian witticisms, pre-

dicted to me the Sino-Japanese war. He erred by only a month. In 1936 Japanese army officers in Manchuria let me glimpse their blueprints of imperial advancement.

The first bombs dropped by Chinese airplanes on Japanese warships on the Whangpoo River on August 13, 1937, exploded a hundred yards from my home. During the following event-laden ninety days, I worked eighteen to twenty hours a day, slept fitfully on the office table, heard the whistling of bullets on trips to the front lines, saw food riots and lynchings, watched headless bodies floating down once-peaceful canals and studied power politics in high-gear action. My war dispatches appeared in the leading publications in this country, England and Australia; my editorials in the fearless American-owned *China Weekly Review*, in Shanghai.

Soon after the outbreak of the war, I resigned from Domei to join *The China Press*, an American daily in Shanghai, as News Editor and editorial writer. As such I directed the news work of Asia's most alert publication, whose famed alumni include Irene Kuhn, Nathaniel Peffer, Linton Wells, Carl Crow and others. My contacts expanded, especially with Chinese officials and secret agents in Japanese-occupied China.

In July, 1939, pro-Japanese gunmen raided *The China Press* building, leaving in their wake a dead American and a dozen Chinese victims. Below my apartment windows that hot summer, patriotic Chinese assassins fought nocturnal battles with the bodyguards of Wang Ching-wei, Japan's Puppet Number One, whose fortified headquarters squatted across the street from my house.

As I passed through Japan in October, 1939, on my way to the Occident, wide-awake Japanese gendarmes in Nagoya set me aback with: "You work for *Washington Post*, no? *Washington Post* where? Maybe you spy, no?" And so perhaps indeed I was. That can best be left to the reader to decide.

St. Louis
March 31, 1941

MARK J. GAYN

Acknowledgments

IN THE TROUBLED life of a foreign correspondent, the most important factors are his "contacts." Without them he can neither keep abreast of events nor fully understand their significance. To my "contacts" throughout the Far East—association with many of whom was both an exhilarating experience and an education—I owe a debt of gratitude. Among them my thanks go especially to John Benjamin Powell, the courageous editor of *The China Weekly Review* and dean of American newspapermen in the Orient; to Robert Yoshinori Horiguchi, the brilliant Domei News Agency editor and trouble shooter of Japanese imperialism; and to Woo Kya-tang, the able Missouri-trained editor of *The China Press*, today the leading American newspaper in the Far East.

I am also deeply indebted to *The Washington Post*, for which I "covered" the Orient in the eventful years of 1934-'39, and to Felix Moiley, its editor until 1940.

I must acknowledge my debt to *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, *The Kansas City Star*, *The San Francisco Chronicle*, *Current History & Forum* and other publications in whose columns some of the background material appearing within these pages had been printed.

To Mr. Emile Herlin, cartographer of *The New York Times*, I owe thanks for the maps.

To my old friend, Mr. Frederick Gruin, of *The New York Times*, I am indebted for numerous helpful editorial and factual suggestions.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge a very heavy debt to Miss Sally Francis, without whose patient and skilful editorial assistance this book would probably never have been finished.

To all of these—and to many others not named here—I owe gratitude. For the shortcomings, the responsibility is my own.

M. J. G.

THE FIGHT FOR THE PACIFIC

The Fight Begins

THE PACIFIC OCEAN today is the setting for a bitter and portentous game of power politics. From the plains of Outer Mongolia to the jungles of Indo-China, fire and sword are already at play. Tremendous armies are on the march. New bases are being rushed to completion. Powerful fleets are maneuvering in a show of preparedness and bluff. Gigantic bombers roar over the ocean in a grim warning of tomorrow's raids.

Meanwhile, the chancelleries of each Pacific nation warn, threaten, hatch alliances and draw new political patterns. Out of the diplomatic mills emerge the moss-bound, and yet ever fresh, stereotypes of "vital" interest, "new order," "self-defense" and "non-aggression." Tokyo proclaims a grotesque Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. Washington reiterates its "hands off" policy for the southwestern Pacific. Berlin and Rome solemnly enunciate a new hemispheric doctrine, in which Asia falls to the lot of their Oriental ally and the United States is shut off within the confines of the two Americas.

But all these—war and diplomatic gestures alike—are merely local skirmishes, a prelude to a devastating international struggle which no power in the Pacific can escape. The zero hour, though hastened by World War II, is still to come.

Twenty years ago, when the delegates of nine nations met in Washington to establish a new balance of power in the Pacific, the Orient generally meant China. Both the man-in-the-street and official Washington saw China as the corner-

stone of the new political structure and America's main interest. The treaties concluded at the conference provided guaranties for her independence. The American policy in the Pacific revolved around the restoration of peace within China, development of trade and maintenance of cultural and religious ties.

The first fissure in this conception came in 1931, when the Japanese Army dealt the initial blow to the old balance of power. In 1937 came the next blow, and a growing awareness in the United States of her important stakes in the entire Pacific.

World War II caused a re-examination of the issues. The headlines brought the Pacific to the doorsteps of Main Street. For the first time in more than a generation, the news of the Pacific received the grave attention customarily reserved for Europe. Indo-China, Thailand and Java ceased to be merely synonyms for the exotic. Overnight they had become potential battlefields where the American John Does might have to clash on the morrow with the John Does of other lands. China was no longer the focus of American attention. She was now but a part of a vast and tragic picture, covering the entire Pacific.

Still more important was Japan's bid for hegemony over the western Pacific. By the beginning of 1941 she was well within sight of her goal. Her troops were in Indo-China. Her envoys dictated terms to the Netherlands Indies. Her agents pulled strings in Thailand and fomented unrest in Burma. Japanese planes were within a striking radius of Batavia, Manila and Singapore.

Japan was on the march. And especially grave to the United States was the fact that the Japanese aggression was synchronized with the Italo-German pressure in the Atlantic. The old Axis had become a nutcracker, with the Americas caught between. Menaced on two oceans, the United States had but a one-ocean Navy and a heavily beset ally, Britain.

Obviously Washington could no longer differentiate be-

tween the Atlantic and the Pacific. Both had been bound into a whole by the war. The American foreign and naval policies in the East rested upon the developments in the West. The part that the United States could play in Europe depended to a great measure upon the pace of Japan's aggression.

In the Spring of 1940 Washington began drafting a new design for the Pacific. The task was enormous. It involved the formulation of a long-range policy, seeking to re-establish a balance of power, and of a short-term yardstick for day-to-day developments. The former looked years ahead. The latter rested as much upon decisions in Washington as upon the quick judgment of nameless American officials serving in the trouble spots of the Pacific.

The long-range policy realistically ignored the doctrines shattered beyond repair by Japanese bayonets. It recognized Japan's de facto control over East Asia and sought to erect barriers to further expansion. The short-term policy rested upon the principles of Open Door, Equal Opportunity and Non-aggression. It admittedly dealt with myths. But by stoutly maintaining that these myths were realities, the State Department was gaining the breathing spell that the Navy so badly needed.

The sole aim of both policies was defense. Washington felt that war in the Pacific was inevitable and prepared for it.

The first move was a realistic re-examination of relations with Britain. Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement had driven a wide wedge between the two democracies. By the summer of 1939, Britain's unpopularity in the United States reached what was probably a record low since the war of 1812.

Hitler helped to turn the tide. His victories—complemented by active pro-British propaganda—made the American people forget the old perfidies of Albion and remember only that the British *mores*, ideals and institutions closely approximated their own. Added to this sentiment was the realization that the only barriers between the Axis and Amer-

ica were a lot of water and the British Navy. As long as the latter controlled the Atlantic, the United States Navy could be kept in the Pacific to watch Japan. Thus there developed in the Spring of 1940 a working arrangement whereby Britain and the United States each took an ocean to patrol.

In September, 1940, this understanding was formalized in the destroyers-for-bases agreement. Coupled with the agreement was Prime Minister Winston Churchill's pledge that the British Navy would neither be sunk nor surrendered. It was hinted in Washington that in case of German victory in England, the bulk of the British Navy would retire to Canada. This, of course, would permit the continued stay of the American Navy in the Pacific.

But Washington refused to rivet American destinies to Britain's fate. Circumstances could possibly arise under which the British Navy could not retreat intact across the Atlantic. There was also the possibility that with Britain's collapse, Japan, Germany, Italy—and perhaps Russia—would launch a simultaneous attack on American shores.

Thus the second move: the historic decision to build a two-ocean Navy, capable of defeating the combined forces of all potential foes. In a world gone mad, the United States was exchanging her former reliance upon international sanity for a very Big Stick.

The third move was the defense pact with Canada, concluded in 1940 after two years of planning. On the surface, the accord meant more in the Atlantic than in the Pacific. But it soon became clear that the agreement was merely the forerunner of a series of accords designed to establish a new balance of power in the Pacific.

The strategists in Washington had drawn the picture of an arch shutting off Japan in Chinese waters. Starting in the Aleutians, the arch curved off to Alaska, Canada, the United States, Hawaii, Wake, Guam and the Philippine Islands and ended in Singapore. Behind this thin line of bases lay a more solid arch, traced from San Diego to Australia across the in-

numerable British and American islands sprinkled in the South Pacific.

Almost before the ink had dried on the United States-Canadian agreement, secret negotiations were launched in Washington, London and "down under" in Canberra for similar accords. Unwilling to antagonize Japan, yet forced by political, military and economic considerations to listen to the voice of Washington, Australia became a link in the new American barrier in the fall of 1940. The British Government's tentative assent to the American use of the Singapore naval base was granted at the same time.

The process of forging the arch was greatly facilitated by the deadly peril facing the British Empire. London felt that Britain's only chance of victory rested in American support. It was also believed that sooner or later Japan would join her totalitarian friends. Thus, the British Government readily co-operated with the United States in the erection of anti-Japanese barriers.

But Washington's plans went even further: American policy sought to transform the arch into a noose. This could be achieved with the addition of China and Russia to the new defense system. In the fall of 1940 Secretary of State Cordell Hull extended aid to Chungking, in the meantime assiduously wooing Moscow. China's resistance had been visibly weakened by the Japanese hammering. The closure of the vital Indo-China route had seriously thinned the flow of military supplies. The constant aerial bombing disorganized economic activity and communications. Still, China fought on, keeping a million Japanese troops busy.

Apart from any sentiment, therefore, aid to China seemed the best insurance against new Japanese adventures in other corners of Asia. It had taken official Washington two full years to digest this axiom. It took another twelve months to translate understanding into active assistance.

The aid was at once negative and positive. The former involved an embargo on the sale of important raw materials to

Japan. When the American-Japanese trade treaty lapsed in January, 1940, Washington made no move to restrict the exports of strategical materials to Japan. The trade was obviously lucrative, and that was all that seemed to matter. The Chinese called the United States "Uncle Shylock"—and prayed for America's awakening. In July, 1940, the embargo was at last applied to aviation gasoline and some types of scrap iron. The loopholes, however, were scandalously numerous. It was only in the fall that the Government began to whittle down the sale of all raw materials but cotton. In more peaceful days, the steel and oil industries would undoubtedly have raised a storm of protest. With the United States and Britain buying heavily, however, there was little reason to regret the lost sales to Japan.

The positive assistance for China took mainly the form of loans. These by the beginning of 1941 reached the considerable total of \$180,000,000. Although these loans were partly backed by Chinese exports of tungsten and tung oil, they were obviously a poor business risk. Politics rather than profits lay behind them—and the politics, at least, were fairly sound.

Apart from credits, however, China needed a wide range of supplies, from bombers to needles. These, in 1941, could reach China only over the constantly bombed Burma Road and the so-called "Red Route" to Russia. In Haiphong \$8,000,000 worth of undelivered American trucks, machinery and gasoline greeted the eyes of the Japanese invaders in the fall of 1940. In Manila warehouses 68 American planes gathered dust at the same time because the Burma Road was temporarily barred.

This problem in transportation helped to bring to the foreground the ticklish question of American-Soviet relations. When the Pacific balance of power was decided in 1922, Moscow had remained aloof from the Washington Conference. In fact, the Soviet press assailed the concluded treaties as an "imperialist plot" to partition China and Siberia. At

that time, victorious Britain and the United States could afford to snub the Bolsheviks. They cannot do so today.

In Europe as in Asia, Russia holds the balance of power. Her agreement with Germany tipped the scales against the European democracies. A real understanding with Japan—going beyond pious treaties—would as easily tip the scales against the United States. Signs were not lacking early in 1941 that Russia was both anxious to establish peace with Japan and ill disposed to make friends with the “imperialist” United States.

There was, however, one warm spot in the frigid Soviet heart—like the United States, Russia had a sentimental and political attachment for China. Here the Comintern, in the 'twenties, had made a supreme effort to launch the Great Asiatic Revolution. Here it now fondly expected to see the burial of Japanese imperialism. On the last wish Moscow and Washington could see eye to eye. Obviously it was to Russia's advantage to join the United States in aiding China.

In the summer of 1940, three good reasons presented themselves to the State Department for wooing Russia. The first was the hope of driving a wedge between Moscow and Berlin. The second was the realization that in the triangular equilibrium in the Pacific, Russia held the balance. The last was help to China. Thus began the slow and painful process of the winning of Joseph Stalin's heart. The fury and excitement aroused by the invasion of Finland were carefully smoothed down. When Soviet troops marched into other Baltic countries, the State Department contented itself with a biting statement—and let it go at that. On the other hand, every effort was made to display American good will towards Russia. This went to the extent of quietly granting Moscow permission to import aviation gasoline and machine tools when similar licenses were demonstratively refused to Japan.

Moscow obviously enjoyed its position. It alternately flirted with Washington and Tokyo, playing trade concessions from

one against political concessions from the other. Yet, advantageous as this position was, Russia was bound sooner or later to make up her mind on aid to China. The latter's needs were becoming too pressing to allow much further delay. When that moment comes, Russia will meet the United States on a common ground. Because of Mr. Hull's forethought, no friction will mar their deliberations. And certainly no ideological differences will be allowed to interfere with any business or political arrangements for aid to China.

I

BRITAIN RETREATS

Chapter One

John Bull Muddles Through

UNTIL THE SECOND World War jarred Britain into action, her policy in the Pacific had been one of painful and inglorious "muddling through." The policy of vacillation dated back to the turn of the century. At its foundation lay fear of Russia and the unshakeable conviction that amity with Japan supplied the best anti-Russian insurance. Coupled with this was the belief that the British and Japanese interests were complementary, rather than conflicting.

Repeated shocks of disappointment failed to discredit these Tory shibboleths. The original Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902) worked well for twelve years—at the expense of Russia and China. But the First World War opened opportunities which Japan would not forego—even for an ally. Thus there occurred that delightful, if little known, race of British and Japanese warships to the German islands in the Pacific, their occupation by Japanese bluejackets in the face of vehement British protests, and London's subsequent assent—in a secret treaty—to this seizure in return for the dispatch of Japanese destroyers to Europe. Japan's aggressive acts in China generated even more bitterness—especially because Japan was poaching upon what were expressly British preserves.

Partly in revenge, partly in deference to the strong anti-

Japanese sentiment in the United States and the Dominions, Britain adroitly slipped out of the alliance with Japan at the Washington Conference in 1921-'22.

The Tories found reasons to regret this step in the next few years, when Moscow made a supreme effort to light a revolution in Asia. The Comintern failed, but not before dealing Britain a series of painful blows. Clutching at a straw, London, reversing its policy, announced its support of the new Nationalist Government in Nanking. The new Anglo-Chinese amity caused frowns in Tokyo. Japan's motto in China has always been "divide and rule." Britain's support of General Chiang Kai-shek obviously tended to unify and strengthen China to the point of resistance to Japanese pressure. The distrust of Britain, sown in Japanese hearts by the "betrayal" at the Washington Conference, was blooming into full-size hatred.

London did not reciprocate this sentiment. Russia had reappeared as a Pacific power, and Britain once again saw in Japan a likely ally. There was a sharp division of thought in Britain, the Labor-Liberal group clamoring for collaboration with China and the United States, and the Tories re-avowing their affection for Japan.

This sympathy was put to a severe test in September, 1931, when Japan embarked on a new course of conquest. The immediate reaction in London was one of bitter indignation. The status quo established at Washington a decade earlier was again being upset by Japan. The entire structure of collective security, woven into the Covenant of the League of Nations, was in peril.

Yet no positive retaliatory move was made. Sir John Simon, acting as spokesman of the pro-Japanese "Imperialist" group, effectively spiked all efforts of Colonel Henry L. Stimson and the alarmed smaller European powers to decide on punitive measures. Simon's arguments were that Britain could not count on effective American aid and that Russia alone would benefit by Japan's destruction. And among his

most enthusiastic admirers was Yosuke Matsuoka, the then head of the Japanese delegation to the League of Nations, who once admitted that he could not present Japan's case as lucidly in ten days as Simon did in half an hour.

The price of Britain's hesitation was the conquest of Manchuria. Japan had won the crucial first round in the struggle with her rivals.

ENTER LEITH-ROSS

Irresolution remained the leit motif of the British policy up to 1935. Imperial strategists in London saw but two ways to protect Britain's important interests in the Far East. One of these was large-scale aid to China, with the consequent expansion of opportunity for profitable trade and investment. Japan, however, had already become so powerful that no such assistance could be granted without her assent. The second way was to re-divide China into spheres of influence, with Japan dominating North China and Britain enjoying pre-eminence in the south and in the rich Yangtse Valley. Such an arrangement, Tory statesmen felt, would make an anti-Russian understanding possible.

Drunk with her victory over the Western World, Japan refused to enter into any agreements with Britain. The Japanese delegation had just walked out of the League. The colonization of Manchuria was proceeding smoothly. The Japanese wedge had pierced the Great Wall. Confidently, Tokyo was preparing the ground for the denunciation of all restraining treaties, starting with the Naval Limitation accord.

Despite constant rebuffs, London did not lose hope. Early in 1935, a mission of the powerful Federation of British Industries, headed by loquacious Lord Barnby, paid a visit to Japan and Manchuria. Enthusiastic statements by these missionaries of trade and goodwill vied with protestations of undying friendship from Nippon's bankers and industrialists.

His eye on Manchurian rail orders, Lord Barnby allowed words on recognition of Manchukuo to escape his undiplomatic lips. However, he promptly denied them when the Japanese rail manufacturers declined to join the European steel cartel or give the British steel interests a slice of Manchurian spoils. Disillusioned, Lord Barnby returned to London to contemplate the bankruptcy of one of his largest enterprises. The only visible results of his bid for Anglo-Japanese industrial co-operation and understanding were trade councils in London and Tokyo which met at uncertain intervals to enjoy speeches on Anglo-Japanese amity sandwiched between banquet courses.

In the summer of 1935, London made another move to win Tokyo's fickle heart. Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Adviser to the British Government, was sent to the Far East with a virtual *carte blanche* to save British interests and investments from extinction. This portly economic genius's trip was preceded by poorly veiled Tory press overtures for a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

In September, 1935, Leith-Ross arrived in Tokyo with a proposal to extend a joint loan to China. The Japanese Government promptly rejected the plan, declaring that China needed no outside financial aid. Foreign Ministry officials told me at the time that they believed Britain's star in the Pacific was on the decline; and they saw no reason for checking the fall.

The authoritative *Asahi*, Tokyo's leading newspaper, gave this summary of the official view on the subject:

Of more vital importance than Chinese finances is that Great Britain should understand the significance of the re-awakening and development of all Asiatic races—Japanese, Chinese, Siamese and others. Japan is a growing nation and it would be natural for both her goods and her emigrants to find their way into British dominions. Australia, New Zealand and Canada are, however, closed to immigration, and these and other British possessions have adopted restrictions upon Japanese exports.

Unavoidably Japan has turned to Manchukuo and China, but here Britain is also moving to limit Japan's activities in the name of the "Open Door," "Equal Opportunity," "Joint Aid for China" and "Anglo-Japanese Co-operation in China."

As long as Great Britain maintains this policy, she will find herself in conflict with the re-awakening and development of Asiatic forces, and promotion of international peace will be difficult unless Britain is willing to give a free hand to the activities of these races.

Rebuffed in Tokyo, Leith-Ross took the only other course open to him—assistance to China. Less than two months after his arrival in Shanghai, the Chinese Government announced a series of drastic financial reforms which, in effect, placed the Chinese dollar within the sterling bloc. Japan's reaction was violent. The move was described as a declaration of financial war on Japan. Both China and Britain were informed that retribution was close at hand. Japanese Army spokesmen attacked the reforms as a "betrayal of the Chinese people" and promised assistance to China against British intrigue.

Britain, however, had cast her die. Ample credits were extended to the National Government. British engineers began the construction of railways, power plants, sugar and cement factories and textile mills. Jubilant Birmingham received fat orders for machinery.

CALM BEFORE A STORM

The year 1936 found Japan in the throes of a bitter struggle between the Army and the moderates.¹ The military rebel-

1. Throughout this book the term "moderates," when applied to groups in Japan, is meant to stand for factions eschewing extremist, incautious action. Such groups include Big Business, yearning for foreign markets; politicians fearful of losing their eminence in a totalitarian state; the Elder Statesmen at the Court, combating the Army's efforts to usurp power; and the major part of the press, acting as a mouthpiece for the super-trusts. The word "moderates," therefore, is never intended to indicate that such groups or individuals are opposed to aggression. There are few Japanese who do not wish to see Nippon's flag planted in

lion of February 26 had ostensibly been put down, yet the rebels' demands had been accepted in toto by the Army command. Regimentation of the nation's economic and political life became the battle-cry of the military spokesmen. All efforts to revive parliamentary government were blocked by the Army.

Important Army factions clamored for war on Russia and Britain, separately or together. With both of these powers immersed in European woes, Japan—by synchronizing her mischief with Italy and Germany—could seemingly attain supremacy in the Pacific without much effort.

Faced by this concerted drive, Big Business started fighting back. All the organs of public opinion controlled by the super-trusts turned their venom on the Rome-Berlin Axis. The virtues of parliamentary government and unregimented economy were praised to high heaven. By indirection, domestic extremism was lambasted. Simultaneously, the traditionally pro-British Elder Statesmen at the Court and the powerful trade interests launched a subtle, well-organized campaign favoring renewed friendship with Britain.

Meanwhile, hard-pressed on all European fronts, London cast about for an ally in the Pacific. And once again Tory politicians turned to Japan. Although Leith-Ross had failed only a year earlier to win Tokyo's heart, there seemed to be hopeful indications of a changed atmosphere in Japan.

The initial move, it appears, was made by Sir Samuel Hoare, the then First Lord of the Admiralty, best known as co-author of the Hoare-Laval "peace plan." The "Hoare plan" for the Pacific was reported by the Japanese press as follows:

China, Indo-China or the Dutch East Indies. But the "moderates"—in contrast to the "extremists" and "jingoists"—wish to take no aggressive move if it entails excessive costs or military risks. The author freely admits dealing with stereotypes; but the only alternative here would be frequent digressions into long and elaborate distinctions which the current trend of events has rendered largely academic.

First, Japan would reaffirm the territorial integrity of China and pledge to respect Britain's rights and interests in China. Britain in exchange would recognize and help to develop Manchukuo. London would further acknowledge Japan's "special position" in North China.

Second, Britain and Japan would open negotiations aiming at the elimination of barriers barring the entry of Nippon-made goods into the British Empire markets. Japan would undertake to purchase more British commodities.

Britain would further co-operate with Japan in seeking a solution of the Japanese population problem and would ensure a fair distribution of the world's raw materials.

Third, Japan would approve the trilateral London Naval Treaty, without prejudicing her demand for naval parity with Britain and the United States.

Mr. Chamberlain was reported to be in favor of the "Hoare plan," in the belief that it supplied the ideal solution to major problems of the Pacific.

Both the Tories in London and the moderates in Tokyo kept the ball rolling until November, 1936; and early that month the Army browbeat the Cabinet into an acceptance of the anti-Comintern pact with Germany. The accord caused a shock in London. Ostensibly directed against the Soviets, the pact appeared to be particularly well suited for use as an anti-British instrument. Tokyo's tongue-in-cheek assurances that any anti-Communist power could join the new bloc sounded hollow.

Japan's Big Business, however, continued its bombardment of the pact. In the Diet, moderates—taking their lives in their hands—assailed Army interference in politics. The press also went on with pitiless attacks on the Axis and the anti-Comintern agreement. After a three-month interlude of ministerial crises, General Senjuro Hayashi—famed mainly for his handle-bar moustache—became Premier in February, 1937. Naotake Sato, a former ambassador to Paris and a moderate at the moment, was given the Foreign portfolio.

The coalition of super-trusts and Elder Statesmen had ap-

parently scored a victory. Japan swung back to amity with the democracies. Sato at once made new friendly overtures to England. The advances were received in London with undisguised delight. Captain Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary, told the House of Commons of the Government's "anxiety to do everything possible to secure harmonious relations with Japan." The press followed suit. The *Daily Express* displayed on its front page an editorial entitled: "And What About Japan? She Wants Colonies More Than Germany." The *Daily Mail* ecstatically praised the Japanese people for their perseverance, efficiency, frugality and kindred virtues. The *Morning Post* suggested that the Manchurian question did not have to be labored: "Whether it is recognized or not, Manchukuo exists and even China has almost come to regard it as a fait accompli."

Britain agreed to the abolition of her perpetual leases in Japan. Tokyo, in a flurry of goodwill, dispatched an economic mission to England to seek ways and means of eliminating friction in world markets. The sensational Keelung incident, in which British bluejackets were manhandled by Japanese policemen in Formosa, was settled. The chief police officer, who two months earlier had been officially described as "a man of good education and discreet temperament," was severely reprimanded.

Late in April, 1937, negotiations for the establishment of a "New Deal" in the Far East were resumed in London. But before the conversations had progressed far, Fate intervened. There was a Cabinet crisis in Japan and a change of Premiers. The pourparlers were allowed to lapse. Six weeks after Prince Konoye stepped into power, the Army struck in North China. The Sino-Japanese war was on.

THE STORM

Britain paid dearly for Japan's armed venture in China. The ambitious British program of economic aid to China was

predicated on peace. The outbreak of fighting spelled the end of industrial progress upon which London based its hope of handsome returns on investments, of a larger slice of Chinese trade, of increased shipping.

Moreover, with the Pacific applecart upset, London was compelled to seek new political alignments. Never easy, this task was especially difficult while war raged in Spain and Hitler was re-arming for a new challenge to Britain. The United States remained an uncertain ally, whose sympathy for the underdog was not at the moment matched by a readiness to stop the aggressor.

The first bomb explosions in Shanghai in August, 1937, destroyed British property, claimed British lives. The blocks upon blocks of real estate set afire by Japanese bluejackets in their desperate effort to hold off the Chinese advance were British-owned. The railways bombed by Japanese aircraft were mortgaged to British investors. London protested vigorously and often. Just as naturally, the Japanese Fighting Services refused to respect British rights and property when such restraint hindered their operations.

Soon Britain's efforts to safeguard her interests came to be regarded by Japan as deliberate obstructionism. Less than a week after the first shot was fired in Shanghai, the Japanese launched an intensive anti-British campaign. Chinese resistance was ascribed to British encouragement. Britain's protests were interpreted as anti-Japanese gestures, and in the Tokyo *Yomiuri* an ebullient publicist declared that "it's Japan and Britain who are at war; China merely supplies the theater of hostilities."

The first major crisis in Anglo-Japanese relations occurred on August 26, 1937. An automobile conveying Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador, from Nanking to Shanghai was machine-gunned by two Japanese airplanes about fifty miles from its destination. The roof of the motorcar was covered with a huge Union Jack which could not have been unseen by the raiders, who came within

twenty yards of the vehicle. The Ambassador was seriously wounded.

Aghast at the attack, London immediately filed a protest with Tokyo, demanding an official apology, the punishment of the culprits and assurances that similar attacks would not occur. Tokyo's behavior was deliberately offensive. A response to the London note was delayed. The day following the protest, Japanese aircraft raided Canton—a stone's throw from Hongkong. An obviously inspired statement in a leading jingoist daily, *Kokumin*, said:

Unlike the Foreign Office, our Army and Navy do not dread Britain. The air raids on Canton have struck terror into the British mind, for British capital is concentrated in Canton. . . . For this reason, effective raids on the city are the way to settle the China problem speedily.

The reply to the protest was not sent until four weeks after the attack. Although the note fell far below London's demands, the British Government—reputedly at Neville Chamberlain's insistence—hastened to announce its satisfaction. Knatchbull-Hugessen went to the South Seas to recuperate, and was given a solatium of £5,000 by the House of Commons. In 1941, as Ambassador to Turkey, he has become Britain's key man in the Balkans.

But Japan's war on Britain continued without a letdown. To her empire-builders the war on China had become a chapter in the wider struggle for the Pacific. An opportunity had arisen to push the British outposts in Asia far south. The Japanese armed men took full advantage of the opportunity. British vessels were denied wharfage privileges in Chinese coastal ports, delayed, detained and bombed. British cargoes were seized or allowed to perish. Britons were denied travel permits. British trade was starved out. British military outposts on the fringe of Shanghai were deliberately and repeatedly machine-gunned by Japanese aircraft. Japan apologized,

promised to pay £1,500 for each soldier, £920 for each blue-jacket wounded or killed by Nipponese bullets.

In December, 1937, British warships and merchantmen were repeatedly attacked by Japanese aircraft and field guns. On December 12—the day when the *U.S.S. Panay* was sunk by Japanese bombs—half a dozen British vessels were similarly shelled and bombed. While the apology to Washington was prompt, the usual “so sorry” notes to London were deliberately delayed for weeks.

Tokyo was obviously seeking to create a breach in the not-so-solid Anglo-American united front in China. When Japan finally apologized to London for the attacks, no mention was made of the merchantmen; and it required an additional note to Tokyo to elicit the desired apology. During these incidents, the tone of the British official utterances remained uniformly conciliatory. Tory leaders ascribed their caution to Washington's refusal to join in anti-Japanese measures.

Throughout the latter part of 1937, official Tokyo left no stone unturned in its efforts to fan anti-British sentiment. The powerful “Council on the Current Situation,” comprising the majority of the members of the Lower House, passed a resolution demanding severance of diplomatic relations with Britain, who has been “arrogant and insulting towards Japan.” Rallies sponsored by political and military leaders kept Tokyo in an uproar. At these meetings hoarse orators accused Britain of working hand in glove with the Comintern; and they demanded “retaliatory” action.

Said a British editorial wit in the Orient: “We begin to think Japan does not like us.”

TRAGICOMEDY AT GENEVA

While the Lion's tail was being twisted in the Orient, the British Government went serenely through all the gestures of indignation in Europe. On September 12, 1937, China ap-

pealed to the League of Nations for aid. A fortnight later a special committee, dominated by Britain, condemned Japan's bombardment of open towns in China and declared that "no excuse can be made for such acts, which have aroused horror and indignation throughout the world." In another ten days, the committee thoughtfully resolved that the invasion was a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris.

On October 6, the League Assembly subscribed to these views and suggested that its members should "also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China." Following conversations between London and Washington, the Belgian Government was asked to convoke in Brussels a conference of the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty. Declaring that the League resolution cast reflections upon her unstained honor, Japan righteously refused to attend the conference.

With the League machinery in full—if futile—operation, Britain continued to press for mediation rather than coercion. Although alarmed by the growing strength of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis as well as by Japan's new ventures, London still shunned resistance to aggression. Repeated overtures for joint action were made to Washington, but these at best were half-hearted. President Roosevelt's famous "quarantine" speech in Chicago on October 5, 1937, was echoed by similar professions in London, but, once public opinion was satisfied, the policy of appeasement was continued.

Captain Eden—who a year later broke with the "appeasers"—told the House of Commons on November 1 that His Majesty's Government was prepared to "go as far as the United States in full accord with them, not rushing in front, but not being left behind." The tendency to lag rather than lead, however, was obvious. The Brussels Conference opened its deliberations under the shadow of compromise, and by compromise it was smothered.

In reply to the Opposition, which demanded action, Captain Eden said hotly on December 21:

If Honorable Members opposite are advocating sanctions . . . I would remind them that there are two possible forms of sanctions—the ineffective, which are not worth putting on, and the effective, which means the risk, if not the certainty, of war.

I say deliberately that nobody could contemplate any action of that kind in the Far East unless they are convinced that they have overwhelming force to back their policy. Do Right Honorable Gentlemen opposite really think that the League of Nations today, with only two great naval powers in it, ourselves and France, have got that overwhelming force? It must be perfectly clear to everyone that that overwhelming force does not exist. . . .

A courageous stand might have checked Japanese aggression. Resistance at that moment did not necessarily have to take the form of armed action. Embargoes, boycott, financial and shipping restrictions might have sufficed to halt Japan; and the United States might very probably have joined in at this stage of the crisis. Downing Street, however, was unwilling to take risks. This attitude foredoomed the Brussels Conference. There was, therefore, little astonishment when, on November 15, 1937, the conferees, by a vote of fifteen to one (Italy), mildly slapped Japan's wrist, reminded Tokyo of its obligations, and asked for the suspension of the invasion.

Their job done, the delegates went home. Britain was still "muddling through."

Chapter Two

The Price of Appeasement

WITH EDEN'S RESIGNATION in 1938, the last brake on appeasement had been removed. Italy and Germany had been allowed to establish themselves firmly in Spain. Chamberlain flew to Munich to secure "peace for our time." Czechoslovakia, that most tragic of the appeasers' victims, had been dismembered.

These dramatic events formed an ominous background for power politics in the Pacific. Through 1938-'39 the Far East remained in flux. Political winds shifted with startling suddenness. Blocs were formed and re-formed, and vows of amity were sandwiched between sanguinary battles. The opening months of 1938 witnessed the tightening of the Japanese military stranglehold on foreign interests in China. Occidentals were driven out of the interior to a few coastal cities. Foreign shipping was barred from main waterways, subjected to capricious restrictions, often attacked by armed force. Cut off from its markets and hammered on by the Japanese Army and trusts, Western business was facing annihilation. The Japanese jingoist press and spokesmen continued to clamor for the elimination of the democracies from the Far East.

In this general anti-foreign offensive, Britain was the chief loser. Her strength was rooted in the industries of China's

coastal cities, in trade and shipping. In each of these fields Japan was rapidly extending her influence. In the face of this peril, the Tory Government could decide on no definite policy; and few were surprised when, instead of taking firm action, London gravitated to conciliation. Though the same experiment had failed with Italy, the Tories were going to try to wean Tokyo away from the Axis with concessions. Such a policy, the appeasers felt, would break up the totalitarian bloc, strengthen Japan against the hated Soviets, and tempt her to view Britain's advances with a friendlier eye.

The Tories found great comfort in Washington's continued reluctance to form a united front. The State Department seemingly had little faith in Britain's constancy and, warily, agreed to nothing but parallel action. Pointing to this caution in Washington, the Tory spokesmen pleaded there was no alternative to appeasement. And, not unhappily, Downing Street decided on appeasement.

Strange winds, meantime, were astir in Japan. The capture of Shanghai and Nanking failed to produce the expected victory. China's armies were re-formed and ready to fight anew. General Chiang's vows of resistance "to the bitter end" were assuming unexpected genuineness. Bent on war with Russia, the Army heads were beginning to realize that protracted hostilities in China were sapping Japan's strength. Memories of the *Panay* still brought shivers to the spines of Tokyo policy-makers. Japan came to the brink of war with the United States—and was happy she escaped unscathed. Encouraged by military blunders, the moderates were raising their heads. The Army seemed willing to let them assuage the ruffled tempers of the democracies.

Thus it was that white-haired, kindly General Ugaki, for whom the Army had a hard and venomous hatred, was allowed to become Foreign Minister early in 1938. Long known as an Anglophile, Ugaki promptly plunged into negotiations with the British Ambassador. His efforts won plaudits from Big Business. The press, from the staid *Oriental Economist* to

the extremist *Nichi-Nichi*, also professed to see an "improvement" in the British policy in the Pacific.

All was well. There were conciliation and goodwill to all men at both the Kasumigaseki and Downing Street. The press in England and Japan exchanged unwonted compliments. The statesmen of both nations conducted busy negotiations—which were interrupted only by the Soviet-Japanese "little war" at Changkufeng.

The goodwill season came to an end in October, 1938. Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier had just publicly demonstrated at Munich the military impotence of their nations, and German troops were marching into the Sudetenland. What Hitler had achieved in Europe, Japan could as easily do in Asia. The Army decided to strike in South China—for a century Great Britain's undisputed pasture.

General Ugaki tried to block the Army's scheme. He was backed by Premier Prince Konoye and a few of the more courageous civilian ministers. When the Army, however, indicated that it would not hesitate to overthrow the Cabinet, Prince Konoye asked for Ugaki's resignation. A few weeks later Japanese troops were landed in the shadow of Hong-kong's fortifications; and within thirteen days they had occupied Canton.

INVESTMENTS SUFFER

The Achilles' heel of British interests in China lies in a few industrialized cities. At these points rests the bulk of Britain's investments—estimated in excess of £250,000,000 (more than \$1,200,000,000 at the pre-war rate). Here rise the imposing edifices of her banks, her trading concerns, her mills. Here a huge fleet of British merchantmen load and discharge their cargoes. A blow at any of these cities—Tientsin, Shanghai and Canton along the coast, Hankow on the Yangtse River—threatens British lives and property, automatically puts the complicated machinery of Whitehall into rumbling operation.

The occupation of Hankow and Canton in October, 1938, gave the Japanese control over the termini of two major arteries, the navigable Yangtse River and the British-financed Canton-Hankow Railway. The entire British economic structure in China was in peril. Gone were the hopes of an Anglo-Japanese understanding. Immediate and energetic action was necessary. London protested.

The remonstrances covered a wide field. There were more than a hundred major points of friction alone. Among them were the enforced circulation of worthless puppet currency in North China, the seizure of British-financed railways, the continued closure of industrial portions of the Shanghai International Settlement, Japanese-encouraged smuggling, the Japanese coastal blockade, restrictions on British shipping and the closure of the Yangtse River. Each of these meant the loss of millions of pounds to British interests. Together, they represented the accumulated returns on a century of endeavor.

In December, 1938, Downing Street valiantly restated its continued adherence to the principles outdated by the invasion of China. It also decided to grant credits to China and vetoed—after half-hearted consideration by the Board of Trade—economic retaliation against Japan. But the talk of reprisals, either economic or naval, quickly died down when Japan's spokesmen indicated that any step in this direction would meet with prompt retaliation. Australia's pleas for the reinforcement of the naval units in Singapore likewise remained unanswered. In the light of the upheaval in Europe, the crisis in the Pacific receded to the background. The Lion gnashed its teeth but did not leap.

JAPAN MISCALCULATES

All remained quiet on the Anglo-Japanese front through the winter and spring of 1938-'39. Newspaper headlines depicted steady Japanese encroachment upon British rights and interests, and Britain's retreat. Editorials in British news-

papers harped on the need of Anglo-Japanese rapprochement and recalled the comforting refrain that "Britain loses all battles save the last one."

British inaction tempted Japanese military firebrands to emulate Hitler's successful escapades in Europe. The testing ground chosen for a new blow to Britain was the International Settlement at Kulangsu, a little island off the city of Amoy, roughly midway between Shanghai and Hongkong. Taking advantage of a conveniently timed terrorist act against a puppet official in May, 1939, the Japanese demanded a virtual surrender of the tiny settlement.

The move, however, was an error. Kulangsu being an international settlement, the Japanese were stepping on American toes as much as on British. Neither the State Department nor the United States Navy was in a conciliatory mood. As soon as Japanese bluejackets were landed at Kulangsu, Admiral Yarnell, the fiery Commander of the United States Asiatic Fleet, ordered an American landing party ashore. Pleasantly surprised, the British and French commands followed suit.

There were no illusions at Washington, London or Paris. Retreat at Kulangsu would have meant Japanese action in other foreign-administered areas in China. Shanghai was going through its periodical jitters, with the Japanese clamoring for "reforms" in the International Settlement's government. Japanese spokesmen made it clear that refusal to meet these demands would invite military occupation of the Settlement.

Washington struck back. In a pointed note, which unmistakably covered the situation in Kulangsu, the American Government declared it would tolerate no unilateral changes in the status of the settlement in Shanghai. The note further demanded immediate restoration of the Settlement areas seized by the Japanese on the outbreak of the hostilities. London followed with a similar *démarche*. The Japanese promptly realized the dangers of the situation. Further pressure at either Kulangsu or Shanghai would have helped to

forge a united democratic front—the only real threat to Japanese imperial progress. The strategy had to be revised. Britain alone was to suffer the next blow.

CRUSADE IN TIENTSIN

Tientsin in the summer of 1939 presented ideal conditions for an anti-British crusade. It had a British Concession, an attack on which would have been a purely Anglo-Japanese issue. Sharp friction supplied the British authorities and the puppet régime with a plethora of *casus-bellorum*. And finally, in Tientsin there was a man capable and willing to direct an anti-British campaign.

The man was General Gen Sugiyama, the burly Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces in North China. In his immediate past a War Minister and Supreme War Councillor, Sugiyama harbored Napoleonic ambitions. Responsible to no one but the Emperor, General Sugiyama knew that all his moves, however unpalatable, would have to be sanctioned by the War Office. From his headquarters in Tientsin this master intriguer could dictate his nation's policy.

General Sugiyama's program of Asiatic conquest listed the elimination of British influence as the first step. His success in Tientsin would have given Japan a powerful lever for exacting valuable concessions from John Bull. It would also have made General Sugiyama Japan's most popular and influential policy maker. On the eve of the second anniversary of the beginning of an exhausting war, the people craved a hero. Victory over Britain, even though bloodless, would have made General Sugiyama that hero.

The baiting of Britain continued through the spring. The true and tried technique of magnifying trivial incidents into major international disputes was exploited to the full. The posting of anti-Japanese placards by a frightened Chinese schoolboy, the refusal to admit a puppet policeman into the British Concession, an unfriendly statement by an embittered

"city father"—each elicited verbal blasts against Britain's "insincerity" and "lack of co-operation."

In April, 1939, a puppet official was shot in a theater in the British Concession. The assassins escaped, but four Chinese were subsequently arrested as suspects. Surrendered to the Japanese, they made a confession. On their return to British custody, however, they claimed the admission was exacted under torture. The British police re-examined the men, found them guiltless. Therefore, when the Japanese issued an ultimatum for the men's surrender within ten days, the British authorities turned it down. The result was a series of outbursts, during the next month, by Japanese spokesmen. One of such statements declared:

To protect the assassins of the leaders of the Provisional Government and Japanese soldiers is an indirect hostile attitude on the part of the British and French Concession authorities against our Army authorities and a challenge to the creation of a new order in East Asia. If the Concession authorities do not mend their present attitude, the Japanese Army would be compelled to take measures which they deem appropriate in self-defense and for the maintenance of peace and order in North China.

The statement blithely accused the British authorities of working hand in glove with Chinese Communists. The humor of this charge is best apparent to those who know of the cold hatred with which British officialdom in China regards Communism.

The tension continued through May. The four men, declared not guilty by the British police, languished in jail. On the first of June the Japanese command issued another ultimatum, demanding "satisfaction" within a week. The British authorities announced that in the future terrorists would be "expelled" (colloquial for surrendered to the Japanese), but declined to give up the four Chinese.

On June 8, 1939, there was a third ultimatum, setting a

forty-eight-hour deadline for compliance. All the Japanese and Chinese establishments in the British Concession were ordered to move immediately to Japanese-controlled portions of the city. Japanese warehouses in the Concession asked their customers to remove their cargoes. With official inspiration; the Japanese residents held what was described as an "indignation rally," at which action against foreign concessions was demanded. The British remained silent.

On June 12 the Japanese command announced it would begin a blockade of the British and French Concessions within forty-eight hours. Both areas were to be surrounded by charged barbed wire and all persons entering them were to be examined. The American Consulate-General was informed of the move and assurances were made that food would be given free access. There were then 450 Americans and 1,700 Britons (including about 800 soldiers) in the two Concessions. On the same day, the Japanese Commander in Tientsin told Oriental newspapermen:

The situation has developed in full protest against Britain's pro-Chiang Kai-shek policy. Therefore, it is no more a local issue, and settlement of the question will be difficult unless Britain abandons her present attitude.

General Sugiyama's little scheme for browbeating John Bull was about to undergo its test.

THE CAMPAIGN SPREADS

The blockade of Tientsin was not an isolated episode. It was merely a part of a well-organized anti-British campaign conducted with military verve and precision throughout the Japanese-occupied territory. In North China the drive was directed from General Sugiyama's headquarters. Elsewhere it was guided by other commanders, anxious to share in Sugiyama's glory.

Late in May, 1939, Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Spear, military attaché to the British Embassy in China (and thus enjoying diplomatic immunity), was arrested in Inner Mongolia as he attempted to pass through Japanese lines on his way from guerilla territory to Peiping. A British officer sent to Kalgan to see Spear was also arrested and held for two weeks. Lieutenant-Colonel Spear was not released until many months later.

In Shanghai Japanese agitators organized a strike in a huge British textile mill. The Japanese naval command undertook the protection of the plant. On June 6 a band of strikers was admitted to the mill by a Japanese bluejacket who—according to testimony presented later before the British Court—climbed over the fence and unbolted the main gate. When the workers, armed with poles, rushed to the power plant, they were dispersed by British employees. In the wake of the strikers came a Japanese naval patrol. A British official remonstrating—a little too excitedly—with a Japanese officer was hit by a Japanese bluejacket with a rifle butt. As the Briton crumpled to the ground, other sailors stabbed him with bayonets, beat him with their rifles.

Through the hot day the Briton lay there with his numerous wounds, only one or two of which had been superficially dressed. A call for foreign medical aid was not made until twelve hours later. The man died. The Japanese later explained that they did not know the Briton's injuries were serious.

In Tsingtao, Chinese hoodlums, paid thirty cents each for their efforts, stoned the British Consulate-General and business firms. The rioters were led by Japanese plainclothesmen, and Japanese guards at the Consulate made no effort to stop the attack. In Swatow British bluejackets were landed to stop riots. When a Chinese attacker was injured by a sailor, the Japanese compelled the British to apologize. In Shanghai Chinese school children, escorted by Japanese soldiers and a

brass band, distributed anti-British pamphlets. In Tangku, near Tientsin, offices of leading British concerns were wrecked by mobs in what was described by a Japanese spokesman as a "spontaneous" demonstration.

In numerous cities British goods were burned at puppet meetings of protest against Britain's efforts to block "Japan's mission in China." At Hsuechow perplexed demonstrators chanted a Japanese-composed song, which ran something like this:

For a century since the Opium War,
Britain has been forcing us to pay an indemnity
And open our ports to her ships.
Now we shall stop Britain's inroads
Into this prosperous land;
We shall strengthen our anti-British front.

In many instances the illiterate but zealous Army Special Service agents lumped Americans with Britons, directing their campaign against both with admirable impartiality. British and American protests were rejected by Tokyo on the ground that this was China's internal affair and could best be discussed with the new "independent" régimes.

Under the guidance of the Special Service Sections, in mid-March the puppet newspapers throughout the invaded territory opened a bitter anti-British campaign which lasted well into 1940. The papers prominently displayed such elevating slogans as "Root Out England's Evil Power," "Tear Off England's False Mask," "Expel the Terrible, Poisonous British," and the terrifying "Drive Out the Bloodsucking Englishmen." An official Japanese spokesman in Shanghai, who a week earlier had assailed the "British-dominated" Municipal Council for its failure to suppress the anti-Japanese movement, now declared that no steps would be taken to check the anti-British campaign, "as it does not lead to a breach of peace and order."

JAPAN DEMONSTRATES

The goal of the campaign in China was to blackmail Britain into political concessions by striking in the most vulnerable spot—her trade. The objective of a similar drive, launched simultaneously in Japan, was purely domestic. On July 7, 1939, the nation was to begin the third year of its war with China. On that day the Japanese Fighting Services had to give an accounting to the people of its sacrifices in blood and yen. Morale was at a low ebb. For many months there had been no major victories. Instead there were a ceaseless flow of men to China and unending appeals for new sacrifices.

The situation demanded convincing explanations from the military leaders. What, in the circumstances, could be better than a gloomy picture of isolated Japan, surrounded by jealous and powerful foes aiding General Chiang Kai-shek? Large-scale hostilities between Soviet and Japanese troops raging in the Mongolian plains since May, 1939, were the best proof of Russia's hostile intentions. The blockade of Tientsin and the Army-directed anti-British agitation in China and Japan were designed to show Great Britain's opposition to Nippon's holy crusade on the mainland.

The official point of view was frankly outlined by the *Japan Times*, a mouthpiece of the Foreign Ministry, as follows:

Today no Japanese is ignorant of the nature of the military and constructive programs embarked on in China. Fishwives of Hakodate know as well as naturalized aborigines of Taiwan that these hostilities in China would have been wound up long ere this but for some countries that aid and support Chiang Kai-shek's forces. Even school children have been told to fill questionnaires which left them in no doubt as to the countries their own is fighting in addition to the Nationalist China, because these questionnaires had to be answered with the help of their parents, big brothers and sisters.

Apart from the universality of the current feeling against Britain, there is reason to know that the tide today runs with greater depth than it may appear on the surface. There is no dearth of factors making for this situation. There have been heavy drains on the prime manhood of the country. It takes little imagination to see that the fronts in China only would never have called for such large-scale mobilizations. The effects of these countrywide mobilizations are evident on all sides. The effects of deadly fighting have darkened many sides of everyday life.

Outside the field of heavy or wartime industries where labor forces have been concentrated, there is a growing scarcity of male labor. There are rural communities in which almost every family has gone into mourning. There are few sections in urban centers but had to hear of young men killed or disabled through fighting. The number of young widows may be only equaled by that of mothers whose sons have laid down their lives for the cause dearest to their loyal hearts.

When all these aggrieved hearts learn that they might have been spared the greatest sorrows in their life but for certain countries covertly fighting with the Nationalist forces of China, they can hardly be expected to be charitable in judgment of those countries. It would be inhuman to expect that they should be otherwise than they are. There are scarcely any school children whose big brothers are not "somewhere" away from their homes. They remember that they saw their brothers clad in uniforms go away to the tune of cheers and the strains of the "Patriotic March." *They know, they all know, that but for some third countries helping Chiang Kai-shek in China, his government would have crumbled a long time ago* and their brothers would have come home to go afield with ploughs on their shoulders or to mills with their fathers.

Such is the atmosphere in which the present tide of anti-British feeling has been created, nursed and developed. When the general feeling is raised to this tenor it has assumed form more of a passion than cool calculating minds. All nations at one time or another in their history have risen to such heights of national sentiment. Japan today has. Anyone who mistakes its nature or force is apt to make miscalculations.¹

1. The italics, in both cases, are mine.

The artificially created hysteria was not without its economic motivation. The Army intended to continue the regimentation of the nation's economy. Together with the Navy, it also planned to pour billions of yen into a vast expansion of armaments. Both of these objectives were fought by Big Business. The most effective way to overcome this opposition was to fan patriotic fervor and fear of Japan's rivals to a pitch recognizing no reason.

With these incentives the Army gave the anti-British campaign at home its undivided and enthusiastic attention. In the words of a statement issued by the Army on the second anniversary of the war in China, "never in history have the Japanese people borne in their hearts such hatred for Britain as exists today."

The press, for once, rivalled the Army's belligerence. As if by dictation from the War Office, the newspapers in describing British diplomacy employed the adjective *ro-kwai*—*ro* meaning "hoary" and *kwai* meaning anything from "cunning" to "treacherous." Similarly, editorial opinion displayed a singular unanimity. From the most moderate to the most jingoist, all dailies clamored for firm action against Britain, scoffed at the possibility of retaliation and blamed all of Nippon's woes on perfidious Albion. Thus, the influential *Nichi-Nichi* declared:

So long as the British Government continues the policy of checking Japanese action in North China in co-operation with the Chiang régime, there is a possibility of incidents more serious than the present Tientsin affair. . . . An important reason for the British support of General Chiang is the belief that London is safe from Japanese aerial attacks. . . . London is certainly out of the range of Japanese warplanes, but Britain has territories and interests in the Orient which are bound up with the fate of the British Empire. . . .

And the prominent *Yomiuri*, having studied every aspect of the question, came to the conclusion that Japan would emerge winner in a war with Britain.

Such a war [the daily said] is not impossible if the anti-Japanese agitation in Britain becomes worse and Britain decides to employ sanctions and a naval demonstration against Japan. . . . Singapore would fall before a Japanese aerial and naval attack, while submarines would also be busily engaged. The loss of Singapore would serve as a signal for the collapse of the entire British defense system in the Far East.

The anti-British fever also communicated itself—mainly through the medium of the ultra-reactionary groups closely allied with the Army—to the general public. Throughout the land patriotic leaders, professional and amateur, called mass meetings of protest against Britain's insincerity. Carefully marshaled by police, 30,000 paraders demonstrated in front of the British Embassy in Tokyo. Their posters called on the nation to "Repulse Britain With Determination" and "Down Britain, Cancer of New East Asia." While passing by the German Embassy, the marchers—prompted by leaders—cheered for the Axis. When the procession was dispersed, a lone funeral wreath lay on a grass plot across the street. The ribbon read: "Britain Is Dead."

In a unique demonstration of political consciousness, two hundred youths climbed Mount Fuji, offered a tablet to the shrine, heard anti-British speeches, and, lustily if not well, sang the anthems of Japan, Germany, Italy, Spain, Hungary and the puppet régimes in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and China proper. As in Italy a year later, buildings were plastered with anti-British posters and sign-makers were doing a rushing business. School registration for English-language courses dropped precipitously. Anti-British chain letters took the country by storm. The two most popular forms were: "Attack Britain. The true enemy of Japan is brutal England. Put Britons out of East Asia," and "Britain is a colony thief. Lay bare the big thief Britain, who pretends to be a gentleman." Books on British Imperialism—especially *The History of British Invasion in China*—sold like popcorn.

Patriotic societies were busy. The people were both a lit-

tle frightened and a little happy to be twisting the British Lion's tail. Newspaper circulation soared. Army heads planned better and bigger demonstrations to impress the civilian Cabinet with the "public will" for strong-arm action against Britain. And in the turmoil, the Japanese people forgot to ask the Army those embarrassing questions about the stalemate in China.

STRIP TEASE

The dawn of June 14, 1939, saw Japanese soldiers throwing up barricades at the entrances to the British and French Concessions in Tientsin. At five o'clock in the morning martial law was clamped on the Hai River, on which Tientsin stands. From that moment all entry into the two foreign areas was forbidden except after a thorough examination. The blockade was on.

Chinese and foreigners seeking entry formed lines half a mile long. The Chinese were asked reasons for visiting the two Concessions, thoroughly and roughly searched, and usually turned away. Germans, Italians and Americans in possession of consular passes were let through without inconvenience other than a long wait in line. Britons were subjected to a thorough examination and search. That morning the first Briton—a prominent businessman—was ordered to take off his trousers and shoes, to the delight of cheering Chinese onlookers. The Japanese sentry solemnly felt the seams of the garment, put his hand into the shoes (in search of secret Communistic documents, if a subsequent Japanese statement was to be believed), and allowed the Briton to proceed.

Foreign women and children continued their exodus from Tientsin to the neighboring health resorts. Chinese produce vendors were turned away at the barricades, and both food and milk became scarce. Other cargo entering the Concessions was subjected to an examination whose slowness discouraged further attempts of the kind.

On the second day, several Britons were ordered to strip to the skin in the street. One Briton was beaten by an armed Japanese officer. There were protests but no apologies. An American businessman was searched, despite his protestations that he was an American. The Japanese promptly explained it was a "mistake," tendered an apology. A British friend of mine, lacking a pass, walked through the Japanese lines proudly waving a large, multi-colored Italian restaurant menu and shouting, "Italy! Italy!"

British ships called off stops at Tientsin. A threatened Japanese parade through the Concession was cancelled at the last moment, possibly because of American pressure. Anti-British leaflets were distributed in the city. A large advertising balloon hovered over the Japanese Concession, its streamer reading: "Britain Must Recognize the New Order in East Asia."

On the third day the British Consul-General protested against the severity of the search of Britons and the ban on the entry of foodstuffs into the Concession. The Japanese rejected the protest because "Japan cannot accept British interference in her independent measures for the maintenance of peace and order in Tientsin." Two Chinese farmers bringing vegetables into the Concession were shot by Japanese sentries "as a lesson to others." There was a shortage of greens at the market. Agitators harangued Chinese mobs into rushing the Concession's defenses.

On the fourth day of the blockade a Briton was clubbed into unconsciousness by a puppet policeman. Food supplies in the Concessions were running short. The searches continued. The commander of the Japanese garrison in Tientsin declined an interview to British officials on the ground that he "saw no use in the proposed interview now that things have come to such a pass." The United States Government, for the second time, informed Tokyo of its concern for the safety of its nationals and investments in the area.

With the mercury hovering above 100° there was a shortage

of ice. German firms were advised by the Japanese to move outside the British Concession. A leading Briton told Reuters News Agency: "The conviction is gaining ground that Tientsin will prove to be a test case, primarily in relation to ultimate Japanese economic and political domination of North China." The British-owned *Peking & Tientsin Times* opened its editorial with: "The local situation is no longer a local situation."

On the ninth day numerous Britons were stripped to the skin in the street. Two Britons had their crotches closely examined for fifteen minutes. A British girl was ordered to strip, but darted back to the Concession. A prominent Briton was ordered to disrobe and open his mouth. In his search for secret documents, a Japanese officer used the Briton's passport as a lever to open the mouth wider. Protests were filed during the day by British, American and Soviet Consuls-General.

Tientsin's "strip tease" went merrily on, while Britain burned with indignation over the unprecedented indignities. All efforts of the British consular officials to make contact with a responsible Japanese commander remained fruitless. General Sugiyama, happily watching the spread of the affair, felt his power in Japanese imperial counsels grow by the hour.

This gave London its desperately sought cue. Whitehall, sensing Tokyo's apprehension over Sugiyama's rise, exploited it to the full. Secret conversations led to the Japanese War Ministry's decision to open negotiations for the settlement of the Tientsin issue in Tokyo. Sugiyama's fond hopes of holding the conference in Tientsin, where he would dominate it—and possibly browbeat Britain into major concessions—were dashed to the ground. Unable to block the War Ministry's plans, Sugiyama announced he would send a delegation to Tokyo to "advise" the Japanese representatives. Simultaneously, harassed Britons in Tientsin were informed that the blockade would be further tightened with the opening of the Tokyo conference.

Thus Britain, shorn of her weapons by appeasement, displayed her impotence before the eyes of the world.

BRITAIN DISCARDS RETALIATION

The indignities suffered by British nationals in Tientsin had no precedent in contemporary history. British men and women were stripped, searched, beaten, starved and jailed. British rights were dragged in the dust. Great Britain's dignity and prestige were made the playthings of scornful soldiery. And the embittered, unhappy Government could offer no better protection to its Far Eastern interests than Chamberlain's cautious protests. On the sixth day of the Tientsin blockade he told Commons that, "while insisting that this treatment of British nationals must cease, I do not want to say anything which would prejudice the prospects of a satisfactory issue with the Japanese Government. . . ."

Viscount Halifax (who eighteen months later was to step out of the Foreign Office and take the crucially important ambassadorship to Washington) was no less vigorous in his advocacy of appeasement in the Pacific. While headlines pictured new indignities in Tientsin, Halifax backed Chamberlain with the pious: "I do not believe that the Tokyo Government wishes deliberately to challenge the whole position and policy of Britain in the Orient. . . . If [the Japanese] can be brought to believe that, and give proof of their repeated declarations that they do not intend to destroy British interests in the Far East, I should hope that the Tientsin matter might be capable of settlement. . . ."

Believing that the Tientsin incident was staged in close understanding with Germany and Italy, the entire British press urged strong action. While recognizing the difficulties of military reprisals, the newspapers and anti-appeasement leaders advocated two specific measures to curb Japan: economic retaliation and an alliance with Russia.

Both measures would have effectively checked Nippon's offensive against foreign interests. Japan's trade with the British Empire in 1938 was valued at Y1,135,000,000, the imports and exports being nearly balanced. Britain in that year

took thirty-eight per cent of Japan's exports abroad, outside of the Yen-bloc (Manchuria and China). British exports to Nippon, on the other hand, were valued at £34,000,000, or less than one eleventh of the United Kingdom's food imports alone.

There were other means of hurting Japan. The City of London, for instance, would have had little difficulty in putting the Japanese financial machinery out of gear. Japanese shipping could be denied entry into British ports, with ruinous effect. Retaliation by Tokyo could not have been much more painful than the already existing restrictions on British shipping. An understanding, too, with Russia, would have radically altered the picture in Britain's favor, not only in the Orient but in Europe as well. Had Chamberlain really desired to halt Japan's aggrandizement, he could have done nothing better than conclude an alliance with the Soviets in 1937. And it is more than probable that in May, or even in June, 1939, the Kremlin still was willing to make friends with London.

But the Tory Government was allergic to drastic action. It was not prepared to discard its ideas of 1927 to meet the conditions of 1939. Communist Russia was still the British Empire's greatest foe; and nothing should be done to upset the Pacific balance of power, in which a strong Japan was a mainstay.

It is interesting to speculate on Britain's course had Winston Churchill been at her helm. Positive economic and diplomatic action would unquestionably have stirred other powers, notably the United States, to a more vigorous defense of their interests in the Pacific. Between September, 1931, and July, 1939, there had never been a moment at which vigorous leadership in London could not have checkmated Japan. Every opportunity lost by the apostles of appeasement meant growing boldness on the part of Tokyo, Berlin and Rome, and a decreased chance of success by London, Paris and Washington.

The threat of economic retaliation in June, 1939, gave Japan two very unhappy weeks. It is true that the Army and the press threatened to tear the British Empire asunder, but behind this bluster there was an unconcealable anxiety. Faced by a serious economic crisis, Japan could neither afford to lose her trade with the British Empire nor saddle herself with a financial war which her weakened structure could not survive.

Appeasement, however, won the day. Even though continued concessions were fatal, the Tory Government arranged a conference at Tokyo at which concessions were unavoidable. Japan gave a deep sigh of relief and prepared to exact her tithe from conciliatory John Bull.

JAPAN SCORES A VICTORY

Few recent conferences have been as dramatic or as rich in their undercurrents as the Anglo-Japanese pourparlers in Tokyo in July, 1939. What went on over the conference tables formed only a small part of the picture. The fate of the negotiations was also being molded at the Tientsin barricades, at mob parades and riots in Japanese-occupied China, in the chancelleries of Berlin and Rome, at the headquarters of ultra-reactionary groups in Japan, at the War Ministry in Tokyo and in the offices of Japanese super-trusts.

To Downing Street the conference was a means of damming indignation in the British press and Parliament, of taking the dispute out of the hands of bellicose and irresponsible Japanese military leaders in Tientsin. The negotiations also provided a breathing spell, badly needed because of the thickening war clouds in Europe.

The conference was even more important to the Japanese Army. In June and July, 1939, the War Office was making a supreme effort to convert the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo anti-Comintern pact into an air-tight military alliance. The wave of anti-British propaganda created an anti-democratic sentiment of such strength that the Navy and the moderates could

no longer resist the Army's pressure. The importance of the propaganda drive could not be overrated. It produced a state of mind favoring the military demands for rigid regimentation of national life and for new sacrifices. It exerted an irresistible pressure upon Foreign Minister Arita and other Japanese delegates. It precluded moves by the moderates within the Tokyo Government and the Imperial Court. Finally, it could not but leave a deep imprint upon the British delegation.

Although the War Office succeeded in keeping General Sugiyama out of the picture, he continued to cast a dark shadow upon the conference. In a series of press statements Sugiyama indicated his refusal to abide by any decisions of the conference save those demanded by himself. By alternately tightening and relaxing the blockade in Tientsin, he made it clear that although the negotiations had been shifted to Tokyo he was still the master of the situation. It was thus that Major-General Akira Muto, Sugiyama's personal representative in Tokyo, although not a delegate, became the most important figure at the conference. Neither the War Office nor Mr. Arita made a single move without consulting this belligerent officer.

The Japanese Government and press made no effort to hide Sugiyama's whiphand. The conference was delayed for a week to enable General Muto to complete the day's trip from Tientsin. When he finally landed in Japan, he unburdened himself of an anti-British diatribe and a warning to the Tokyo command that "the authorities on the spot" (read Sugiyama) had "already fixed the fundamental policy for settling the issues with firm determination."

Britain's strategy at the conference was to avoid the discussion of general issues and to delay the pourparlers by all possible means. If, however, the pressure became too great, London was prepared to make all possible concessions. Japan's strategy, on the other hand, was to force Britain into a recognition of Japanese hegemony over China, taking advan-

tage of the crisis in Europe, the blockade of Tientsin, and the anti-British campaign in China and Japan. Tokyo was determined to permit no delays in the negotiations.

With Japan holding all the trump cards, the conference followed the Japanese schedule. The first meeting was held on July 15, 1939. Mr. Arita² presented Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador, with an outline of the sweeping Japanese terms. Craigie asked for a four-day grace to cable the text of the demands home. On July 19 he submitted to the Japanese Minister three counter-proposals. These were rejected by Mr. Arita after a few hurried trips to the adjoining room, where General Muto held court. On July 22 Sir Robert accepted the Japanese terms "in a conciliatory spirit," to quote a Tokyo communiqué. The following day the agreement was made public.

Known as the Craigie-Arita agreement, the momentous document read:

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully recognize the actual situation in China where hostilities on a large scale are in progress and note that as long as that state of affairs continues to exist, the Japanese force in China have special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order in regions under their control and that they have to suppress or remove any

2. Mr. Arita, the Japanese press reported, prepared for the day's trials with several cups of black coffee and a look at the newspapers. Later he and Mrs. Arita walked in their garden and listened to a recital of patriotic songs played on a phonograph by a neighbor anxious to encourage the Foreign Minister. When Mr. Arita left for the conference, his wife gave him a large bottle of "barley" tea for his "weak stomach." "It has never been made known," said a Japanese paper, "how much of this bottle was drawn off while the Minister talked with the British Ambassador. But it is learned that some time after noon, Mr. Arita rose and brought another bottle of more potent drink. It was the brand of whisky that Sir Robert favored. . . . It is feared, in quarters concerned, that if Mr. Arita's hospitality proves too generous and the parleys run for too long, the precious bottle will never be replaced, unless restrictions on imports from Scotland are lifted."

such acts or causes as will obstruct them or benefit their enemy.

His Majesty's Government have no intention of countenancing any act prejudicial to the attainment of the above mentioned objects by the Japanese forces, and they will take this opportunity to confirm their policy in this respect by making it plain to the British authorities in China that they should refrain from such acts and measures.

The agreement stunned the capitals of the world. Rome and Berlin described it as another step in the disintegration of the British Empire. Moscow said it was a betrayal of China. Washington admitted that Britain had had no choice; but three days later President Roosevelt denounced the American-Japanese trade agreement. In Chungking the Chinese Government said unhappily that it "could not conceal disappointment," while the Chungking *Joint Daily News*³ declared:

If our home has been robbed by bandits, and members of our family killed and injured, and then our neighbor informs the bandits that "he notes their special requirements, and undertakes to prevent members of his household from interfering with the activities of the bandits," what will we think of our neighbor?

Even if our neighbor has no legal obligation to assist us, and if he encourages the bandits, but at the same time declares that he has not changed his policy of friendship towards his neighbor, what will be our reaction?

This was a calculated response to Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons that the accord did not mean that Britain was taking Japan's side against China, or that she recognized Japanese sovereignty over the occupied territory in China.

The same day Viscount Halifax, with fine distinction between words, assured China that the Tokyo agreement merely "recognized" but did not "condone" the presence of the Japa-

3. This remarkable newspaper combined the facilities of four other dailies bombed out of existence in a Japanese air raid on Chungking.

nese troops in China, and that there had been no change in Britain's policy in the Far East. One could not help recalling General Muto's quip that "Japan would never even think of demanding a change in Britain's policy; all she asks are amendments."

THE APPEASERS EXPLAIN

The Craigie-Arita agreement was a logical offspring of the Munich accord of ten months earlier. It was equally disastrous. With one flip of the pen, with practically no pretense at firmness, the Tory Government surrendered its treaty rights and interests throughout the Japanese-invaded territory. While the conservative papers in London and Paris consoled themselves with the thought that the agreement represented a defeat for the trouble-bent totalitarian axis, the British organizations in China issued sharp protests against the accord.

The advocates of appeasement in London, however, were not to be swayed by protests. Like Czechoslovakia, China was being sacrificed to the myth that concessions could halt aggression. The Japanese Army was given free rein in East Asia, while Britain withdrew the northern boundary of her economic and political influence in the Pacific to Singapore. A wide breach was also opened in the foreign front in Asia. The "appeasers'" point of view was lucidly explained in an editorial in *The Sunday Times* on the eve of the signing of the Craigie-Arita agreement:

The first of our principles must be that neutrality has its duties as well as its rights. That we should assist Japan in her campaign in China would be a violation of our neutral duty but equally it would be a violation to let our sympathies with China color our interpretation of our rights as against Japan. However strongly we may feel about the injustice of Japan's war, the strictest neutrality is still incumbent on us unless we are prepared—as we are not—to take the Chinese side. . . .

It is fair after all to remember that Japan has interests in China of a kind that no other country has. If any nation seemed to be marked out as the natural protector of China, her guardian and helper in her troubles, it was surely Japan. Moreover, it is not generally realized how small a country Japan is and how great is the pressure of her population. . . .

The article made no effort to explain how protection of British rights and interests against China's "guardian and helper" would constitute a violation of British neutrality.

Statements of this sort, however, encouraged the Japanese Army to new endeavors. General Sugiyama continued the anti-British campaign in North China without a letdown. Lord Halifax's protests immediately brought charges from the Army command in Tokyo of British "insincerity." And on August 14, 1939, leaving for North China, General Muto⁴ declared that:

. . . Conditions in Tientsin will teach Britain the right course she should adopt in China. . . .

We intended to show Britain the right direction she should follow in her Far Eastern policy by using the Tokyo conversations as a class room. . . .

Britain seems to have failed to understand our kindness. Instead, she has given us the impression that she wishes to solve the issue by a test of blood and iron. If Britain wishes that, it certainly is one way to solve the issue . . .

With General Muto's departure, the pourparlers languished. It seemed as if the conference had lost its soul. Mr. Arita seemed uncertain. The press appeared torn between delight over the accord and a desire to emulate General Muto's displeasure. The ultra-patriotic groups demanded further concessions from Britain. In August, 1939, came the Hitler-Stalin bombshell, and with it a drastic shake-up in the Gov-

4. For his meritorious service, Major-General Muto had been placed, in 1940, in charge of the War Ministry's important Military Affairs Department. He had thus become one of the Army's policy-makers.

ernment and Army command. Mr. Arita vacated the Foreign Office. General Sugiyama was recalled to Tokyo and placed on the retired list.⁵ The pourparlers were brought to an end.

Britain's concessions to the Japanese Army remained, however, as did the heavy dents in her prestige.

5. He emerged into the limelight again in 1940, when another change in the balance of power within the Army made him Chief of the General Staff. In this post, he played a paramount rôle in the Army's aggressive actions in Indo-China.

Chapter Three

Paradise Lost

AS LONG AS Britannia ruled the waves, Hongkong was wedded to prosperity. Straddling sea lanes linking Europe and the Orient, this imperial outpost collected a rich tribute from the Far Eastern trade. From Hongkong British banks and huge merchant houses branched out inland, into the crowded provinces of South China. British investors poured funds into railways, commerce and industry. British salesmen combed the market and British engineers built power plants, cement factories and mills.

With a friendly China in the rear, Hongkong was Britain's proud challenge to her foes. Steel-hulled men-of-war rolled gently in the harbor, ready to dart to any part of East Asia where British interests demanded protection. The Colony's towering Peak was studded with large guns, threatening the attackers. Japan's air force was still in its diapers and nothing seemed to menace Hongkong's equanimity.

It was difficult to believe that but a century ago Hongkong was a barren rock with an unsavory reputation as a pirate stronghold. The gate to South China then was Portuguese Macao; and it was from there that the British had conducted their profitable trade in opium.

Two factors had drawn Britain to Hongkong. The first was the island's favorable position on the waterway to Canton. The other was the recalcitrance of the Chinese officials, to

whom the "foreign devils" were a nuisance and an evil. In 1839 Commissioner Lin Tse-hsi, by all accounts an enlightened man, demanded of British tradesmen in Canton the surrender of their stocks of opium. When they refused, he blockaded the settlement, bringing it to starvation. Later, in November of the same year, British sailors murdered a Chinese. When Lin's braves attempted to arrest the sailors, British men-of-war opened fire on the Chinese fleet. The first 'Opium War' was on.

The British promptly landed men at Hongkong and built barracks and warehouses. Meanwhile Britain's warships played havoc with the Chinese junks, and her firearms instilled terror in the hearts of Chinese soldiery. East Asia was feeling her first full impact of Western military might. The mighty Middle Kingdom found itself paralyzed by the efficiency of British effort, by the ferocity of the attack. Enconced in the Forbidden Palace in Peking, the Emperor vainly sought a way to halt the "barbarians." His generals played politics and advanced imaginative, if futile, plans of campaign. One contemporary historian recorded a proposal to send a thousand good divers to the Yangtse bottom, with orders to attack the British men-of-war with sharp spears as they passed overhead.

The outcome of the war was beyond doubt. In 1842, in Nanking, British envoys dictated to Chinese the terms of a treaty under which Hongkong became Britain's, five major ports were opened to foreign traders, and Britons were granted extraterritorial rights.¹

1. Throughout the nineteenth century, the British enjoyed superiority over the Chinese on the field of battle. But the Chinese had their moments of triumph. One of these followed the massacre of French nuns in Tientsin in the late 1860s and the subsequent capture of the city by a joint Anglo-French force. The Allied commanders informed the defeated Viceroy that their troops would march round the city with drums beating and flags flying, in token of victory. The Viceroy was crest-fallen. A parade of this kind meant a loss of "face," a political slap of first magnitude. Pleas to the foreign commanders brought no results.

The empire-builders who took Hongkong were dissatisfied with their victory. For nearly two decades the Chinese authorities in Canton continued to block British advance into the interior. Moreover, with hostile Chinese in control of the Kowloon Peninsula flanking the island, Hongkong did not feel itself secure.

Once again the lid was blown off. In 1857 Chinese officials boarded a British ship in an attempt to arrest a Chinese seaman accused of murder. Britain went to war, was soon joined by France, and China again tasted the bitterness of defeat. A "Provisional" puppet government—the first in China's modern history—was set up in Canton, and the Viceroy, to quote a British historian, was "induced to function under it." Britons promptly persuaded the Governor of Canton to grant to Hongkong a perpetual lease of a four-square-mile area at Kowloon. Meanwhile, in Peking, the British and French forces sacked and destroyed the Summer Palace. The Emperor speedily ratified the Kowloon agreement.

Now secure, Hongkong grew and prospered. Soon Chinese began to flock to the new paradise to share of its prosperity and comforts. Graft blossomed brightly and corruption found its way into high places. But neither graft nor civil wars in South China, neither pirates nor typhoons, could check the Colony's progress. Hongkong became "a little bit of England in China," whence British capital and influence infiltrated into the world's largest market.

The foreigners wanted to demonstrate their power to the populace by degrading their ruler, and they did not intend to change their plans.

With a show of unhappiness, the Viceroy finally submitted. The parade was a success. Thousands of Chinese crowded the route of the march, with seeming admiration watching the smartly attired whites. The Allied Commanders were pleased: the Viceroy had been taught a harsh lesson.

Days later, the Allied command was flabbergasted to learn that on the eve of the parade, Viceroy's men had posted notices throughout the city announcing that the "foreign devils" would parade themselves for the amusement of the populace and as a mark of respect for the Viceroy.

The Viceroy's face had been saved.

In the famous grab for concessions in 1898, in which Germany obtained Kiaochow, Russia Port Arthur, and France Kwangchowwan, Britain received a lease on four hundred square miles on the mainland, facing Hongkong. With its warships and powerful fortifications, the colony could now feel itself completely secure from attack.

BORODIN VS. HONGKONG

Unfortunately, the Fathers of Hongkong could not see far enough ahead. They thought in terms of guns and sea power. They assumed that the hinterland, tied to the Colony with firm links of economic dependence, would remain friendly. They failed dismally to foresee the destructive power of ideas and aircraft.

In 1923 a stout man with a moustache, one Michael Borodin, arrived in Canton to advise the Kuomintang Government, led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He found the government impotent and disorganized, Dr. Sun disheartened. Within twelve months Borodin built up an army, trained thousands of propagandists, and created a strong revolutionary base under the Kuomintang.

On May 30, 1925, a unit of the Shanghai Municipal Police, commanded by a Briton, fired on a group of demonstrators. Immediately a wave of anti-British strikes and parades swept the country. In Canton the paraders were fired on by French and British troops on the island of Shameen. Thirty-seven were killed, several hundred injured.

This incident was all that Borodin needed to launch a deadly campaign against Britain's interests in Asia. The first blow was struck at Hongkong. One hundred thousand Chinese workers left the Colony for Canton. Without labor, Hongkong's shipping was brought to a standstill. The factories shut their gates, the essential services were crippled. British vessels, en route to Canton, were refused entry into the Pearl River. Other vessels touching Hongkong were likewise

barred. All trade between Hongkong and South China was stopped. British goods were solemnly burned in huge bonfires. Half of the Hongkong strikers were sent into the countryside to conduct revolutionary and anti-British propaganda.

The strike lasted sixteen months, until October 10, 1926. Hongkong's losses were estimated in billions of dollars. From this blow it never fully revived.

THE BOOM AND THE CRISIS

Hongkong partially recovered its breath around 1935, however, when Great Britain launched her intensive financial drive in China. The economic development of South China, financed by British credits, caused a minor boom in the Colony. Once again Hongkong became the crossroads of the Pacific, and 100,000 vessels with a total tonnage of 43,000,000 entered its spacious harbor annually. Between a third and a fourth of China's entire export trade passed through the Colony.

The minor boom became a major boom on the invasion of China. With Japanese men-of-war enforcing an airtight blockade of the North and Central China coast, Hongkong became the main channel of supply for the embattled Chinese Government. Scores of freighters, mostly British, German and Norwegian, emptied their holds of millions of dollars' worth of war materials on the crowded wharves of Hongkong. Airplanes, tanks, armored cars, lorries, guns and munitions cluttered the Colony's warehouses, awaiting transportation to Canton by river craft, truck or train.

Most of the war supplies poured into the interior over the British-financed new railroad linking Hongkong (Kowloon) with Hankow through Canton. Therefore, when the Japanese Navy attempted to halt the munitions traffic, its first target was the railway. Despite daily raids, however, the line continued to function until the fall of Canton in October, 1938.

In the first six months of 1938 Hongkong's foreign trade

totalled HK. \$612,100,000, as compared with \$505,300,000 and \$375,800,000 for the corresponding six-month periods of 1937 and 1936.

With the growing importance of Hongkong, Chinese officials and bankers moved their offices from Shanghai to the Colony. There they molded the nation's economy, managed its publicity, placed war orders with a myriad of "sewing machine" salesmen. The Chinese press in Hongkong engaged in a violent anti-Japanese campaign, Chinese propaganda organs conducted their work without hindrance, and Chinese mobs threatened Japanese residents.

This situation contributed little towards Anglo-Japanese amity. Within two months of the outbreak of the war, Japanese newspapers began to demand the "isolation" and seizure of Hongkong. Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu, the ultra-jingoist Home Minister, in his sensational prediction of an Anglo-Japanese war, said pointedly:

Hongkong is a very small place and cannot withstand any determined siege by submarines and aircraft. It would be strong were China a reliable ally, but China happens to be very far from that.

But the Japanese Navy ignored the press. It did not occupy Hongkong. In a less dangerous stratagem, it began to seize and fortify islands along the coast of South China. Chinese junks in the immediate vicinity of the Colony were sunk by the score. This measure was described by a Foreign Office spokesman in Tokyo as "co-operation with Britain in the suppression of Chinese piracy." British merchantmen were stopped on their way to Hongkong and their papers and cargo examined. Even the planes of the Imperial Airways, carrying passengers and mail between Penang and Hongkong, did not escape. They were chased and machine-gunned by Japanese naval aircraft.

Japanese planes roaring along the Colony's borders on their destructive mission inland failed to help the situation. Bomb explosions could be clearly heard in Hongkong. A British

border pill-box was attacked by a Japanese bomber and casualties inflicted on British troops. As aerial terror spread, thousands of Chinese refugees fled to the Colony, creating new problems of health, food and security.

With war on its doorsteps, Hongkong suddenly discovered itself defenseless. Thirteen years earlier it had been powerless to check the inflow of Communist ideas. Now its armory contained no weapons to halt aerial attacks. The Colony's tremendous water reservoirs invited enemy bombs. The harbor and the city lacked anti-aircraft guns. Officially, the Colony had an air force of only two planes. Hongkong's garrison consisted of only four battalions of regular troops and a small volunteer unit. It was obvious that when the Japanese launched their long-awaited attack on South China, these defenses would be woefully inadequate.

Japan's moves along the coast were also disturbing. The tiny island of Pratas, 16½ miles southeast of Hongkong, was converted into a naval air station in the late fall of 1937. An air base was established at Chekkai, seventy miles away. In Amoy, north of Hongkong, the Japanese were building a submarine and air base. Combined with the important base at Mako, Formosa, these newly acquired outposts formed an impenetrable cordon around the Colony. Britain felt she could delay action no longer. In the Admiralty's plans for 1938 Hongkong was still listed as a major foothold—the northern apex of a strategic triangle, whose base was formed by the Singapore-Penang line. The triangle was the spearhead of British influence in the Orient; and its collapse would have had disastrous effects on Britain's fortunes.

Authorities in London and Hongkong now clearly realized that the Colony could not be made impregnable. It was hoped, however, that powerful defenses would make the attacker—presumably Japan—think twice before striking. The engineers who built the Singapore base were rushed to Hongkong and the work was begun.

Approximately £8,000,000 (at that time about U.S. \$36,000,000) was appropriated for the strengthening of Hong-

kong's defenses. Thousands of workers were pressed into the task of constructing new fortifications, building subterranean water cisterns, laying out a new airfield in Kowloon, stringing out new roads to the little pill-boxes lining the border, and installing bigger and better guns.

Other preparations for the dark hour included the building of well-hidden arsenals, radio stations, and barracks for additional troops and the storing up of a vast reserve of foodstuffs. New aircraft were flown from Malaya. Gas masks were issued to the populace.

Hongkong's worst fears came true in October, 1938, when a small Japanese expeditionary force captured Canton, after a thirteen-day lightning thrust.

HONGKONG ISOLATED

With the Japanese tide lapping its borders, Hongkong's flourishing trade with South China was brought to an abrupt halt. In the first six months of 1939 the Colony's trade with China was H.K. \$100,000,000 below the figure for the corresponding period of 1938. The trucks, tanks and airplanes ordered by China either rusted on Hongkong's wharves or were trans-shipped to Hanoi. Chinese officials and bankers also flocked south. In their place, half a million frightened refugees sought haven under the British flag.

Hongkong was at Japan's mercy. Fenced off on the sea side by a string of new Japanese bases, running as far south as Hainan and Spratley Islands, the Colony could no longer expect succor from Singapore in an hour of crisis. Nor could it count on a flow of foodstuffs from the Japanese-controlled mainland. Without shedding a drop of blood, Japan could starve Hongkong into inglorious submission.

Under the terms of the Craigie-Arita agreement of July, 1939, Britain virtually withdrew her defense line in the Pacific to Singapore. Hongkong was thus doomed—and knew it. Only five days after the signing of the accord, the Colony passed a military conscription bill, requiring military service

of all British subjects. In a special statement Sir Geoffrey Northcote, the then Governor of Hongkong, said he believed "the Anglo-Japanese agreement left British policy in the Far East virtually unchanged . . ." but "it is necessary that the services be kept going if the Colony's defense and bare necessities of civil life are to be maintained during war time."

As if to underscore the officer's declaration, the Colony was plunged into complete darkness that night, in the first elaborate air-raid precaution drill. The Japanese press reported the passage of the law and the drill, and dryly commented—to quote but one paper—that "with Canton in our hands, Hongkong and Britain's paramount position in South China are doomed."

A STORM SIGNAL

As war broke out in Europe, Hongkong became the base of British warships scouring the western Pacific for German merchantmen and raiders. Dark clouds, however, remained over the Colony. Its trade was at a standstill. The Colony's finances groaned under the burden of war expenditures. Part of the troops had been withdrawn to Singapore, thus further weakening Hongkong's defenses.

With the steady extension of Japanese influence west and south, Asia's "Little Gibraltar" was completely isolated. This fact was of paramount importance in the rearrangement of international forces following the outbreak of World War II. To Siam, to the Philippines, to the rich Dutch East Indies, to Australia and New Zealand, the decline of the great imperial outpost was a storm signal. And the storm came in the summer of 1940. In the face of the Japanese threat, the British Government evacuated all British women and children to safer areas, mobilized the men, speeded up the erection of defense works. The garrison was reinforced and the entrance to the harbor mined.

But London knew as well as Tokyo that Hongkong could not withstand a siege. The paradise had been lost.

Chapter Four

Retreat to Glory

NEVER IN HISTORY had Britain been weaker in the Pacific than on that tragic day in September, 1939, when Chamberlain announced the beginning of World War II. By this time Britain had neither the will nor the physical strength to protect her interests in the Far East. Having accepted Hitler's challenge, she had to dismiss all else from immediate consideration. Moreover, eight years of appeasement had seriously undermined British roots in Asiatic soil. Even at this, the eleventh hour, few Tory bigwigs—with the notable exception of Churchill—doubted that Japan could be bribed into a benevolent neutrality or even an outright alliance with Britain. The Men of Appeasement—Chamberlain, Halifax and Hoare—still formulated foreign policy, and Japan still enjoyed a warm spot in their hearts.

Meanwhile, within Japan herself there developed a struggle between the advocates of war and of peace. The former argued that the war in Europe had made it possible for them to force the democracies—and especially Britain—to discontinue their assistance to China. The "peace" group, backed by the great exporting houses, maintained that Japan could regain her old prosperity by taking over the world markets abandoned by the European combatants. The contest was bitter, but for the first four months of the war the "pacifists" managed to hold their own. The Japanese Army, stunned by

the Hitler-Stalin accord, momentarily preferred to remain out of the limelight.

The Government of Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai pursued a cautious middle-of-the-road course, fearful of a slip that would endanger its position. The slip was thoughtfully made by Britain herself. In January, 1940, a British cruiser halted the crack Japanese trans-Pacific liner *Asama Maru* within fifty miles of Japan and removed twenty-one German seamen homeward bound from the United States.

The alacrity displayed by the Japanese jingoist elements in the next twenty-four hours produced a near-panic in Tokyo, intense alarm in London. The *Asama Maru* case involved more than the mere seizure of potential German soldiers. It was inextricably tied up with the whole question of sea blockade enforced by Britain, as well as with Japan's position as the dominant power in the western Pacific.

Retreat in this controversy could not be made without sacrificing the basic principles for which the two nations stood. And for the Japanese Government there could be no retreat, for close behind it was the sinister coalition of political underworld, ultra-nationalists and the Army—cajoling, threatening, demanding a course of firmness. Almost instantaneously this powerful bloc pulled out of its closets the weapons it had used with success in the Tientsin episode the previous summer. A venomous anti-British campaign was started in the jingoist press. There were daily demonstrations, rallies of protest, inciting posters. Under the Army's guidance, the drive spread to the "occupied" territory in China.

A wit in Tokyo said: "Japan has lost her reason, Britain her imagination." The quip was not quite true. Japan's madness had cold calculation behind it. Britain's seizure of men "within the shadow of the sacred Fujiyama"—to employ the favorite Japanese phrase of those tense days—was more than unimaginative; it was a gargantuan blunder.

The incident—as expected—was settled a month later by the surrender of all the arrested Germans to Japan. But this

damage had been done meanwhile: Britain had tacitly recognized that the Japan and the China Seas were no longer open seas; the Army clambered back into the Japanese political saddle; the anti-Axis moderates had been driven underground; and the Navy had joined the groups baiting Britain.

The doctrine enunciated in this month of argument sought further to strengthen Japan's claim to supremacy in the western Pacific and bar it to the British fleet. The Navy went so far in pressing these claims that it undertook to "protect" Soviet ships—bearing East Indian rubber and oil to Germany via Vladivostok—from British seizure in the "Japanese waters." Moscow, of course, ignored the generous offer, but that did not matter. The proffer was made for the sole reason of staking Japan's claim in East Asia.

Having meekly accepted the Japanese doctrine, the Conservative Government next proceeded to make overtures for closer amity. The pro-Nazi camp in Japan, aided by the finely geared German propaganda machine, was fanning the flames of anti-democratic feeling in the country. The Army, the Government, the press and even the corner soap box were under its sway. There was a suspicion that the tumult was but a prelude to Japan's entry into the war on the side of the Axis.

London decided that strong medicine was in order. For the doctor it chose the ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, who first became known as an expert on naval affairs and a proponent of Anglo-Japanese collaboration. The sugar-coated pill was administered at the meeting of the Japanese-British Society in Tokyo, in the presence of the Emperor's brother. Said Craigie:

Our two countries are ultimately striving for the same objectives—namely, lasting peace and the preservation of our institutions from extraneous and subversive influences. . . . It is surely not beyond the power of constructive statesmanship to bring the aims of their national policies into full harmony. . . .

The speech stirred great commotion abroad, none in Japan. In the House of Commons the Government had to give solemn assurances that the statement connoted no change in Britain's policy in the Pacific. China protested. In Washington, officials of the State Department said they were "greatly surprised."

Once again ominous calm settled upon the Anglo-Japanese front. Tokyo was too busy formulating a new Pacific policy and preparing for action in the Netherlands Indies to devote much thought to anything else. It was also clear that the relations with Britain depended much less upon Japan's readiness to forgive and forget than upon the opportunities presented by the events in Europe.

THE BURMA ROAD

The invasion of Holland brought with it Japanese pressure on the East Indies. The downfall of France led to demands on Indo-China. In these crises Britain judiciously stayed on the sidelines, permitting Washington to deal with Japan. But if London thought Tokyo would forget Britain, it erred. Together with the rest of the world, Japan believed that the Nazi victory in France would immediately be followed by an attack on England. In the face of such peril, London was not expected to be in a mood for fresh arguments in the Pacific. As soon as France, surrendering to Japanese demands, closed the Indo-China route to China, Tokyo turned its attention to Britain.

By this time (July, 1940) China too was in desperate straits. Financially exhausted, short on supplies, harassed by Japanese raiders, "Free" China was apparently on the verge of surrender. The closure of the Indo-China route left the country with only two life arteries, one running west into Russia and another extending south into Burma. If the latter could be severed, China, it seemed, must collapse.

The Burma Road links Rangoon, in India, with Chung-

king, in the Yangtse Gorges, 2,100 miles to the north. Over this route Marco Polo once travelled from the Khan's Court to India. Over its paths, crawling over tall, rugged mountains and plunging into deep valleys, mule caravans of Burmese and Chinese merchants have travelled since to trade with the wild border tribes. Two end links of the route were ready before the Sino-Japanese war. Rangoon was linked with Lashio, on the Chinese border, by a railway. Chungking and Kunming were bound by a highway completed in 1935.

Following the Japanese occupation of Nanking in 1937 and the inauguration of coastal blockade, General Chiang Kai-shek ordered the construction of the middle link, from Kunming to Lashio. One hundred thousand coolies, armed with primitive tools, were put to work under the direction of young American-trained engineers. Hundreds died in accidents. Thousands of others perished of malaria and other sicknesses. But in eight months the first American-built truck rolled over the road's bumpy surface. It was a great engineering achievement, as well as a tribute to China's new nationalism.

The road was poorly surfaced, and for the three rainy months—July through September—it was impassable. But in the remaining nine months an endless fleet of trucks carried 5,000 tons of war supplies alone into China every thirty days. And on their return trip to Lashio, the cars, many of them equipped with tanks for tung oil, bore China's exports abroad. This flow of supplies Japan now proposed to halt.

In June, 1940—exactly seventy-two hours after French envoys signed the armistice agreement with Germany—Sir Robert Craigie was summoned to the Foreign Office in Tokyo and presented with a list of demands. These included the closure of the Burma and the unimportant Hongkong routes to China, the cessation of financial aid to the Chinese Government, Britain's assistance in securing Sino-Japanese peace and further concessions in Tientsin. It was made plain to Craigie—as plain as the Japanese diplomatic language can be on

occasions—that the rejection of the demands would compel Japan to use force and, possibly, to join the Rome-Berlin Axis.

In this desperate hour London turned to Washington. But there it found little comfort. It was obvious that the Japanese were in earnest, and the American Government was not yet prepared for a showdown with Japan. Winston Churchill was asked to do the best he could. This he did. It was appeasement once again, but the Japanese demands were whittled down as much as Japan's temper permitted. Britain agreed to close the Burma Road to the passage of arms, ammunition, trucks, gasoline and railroad supplies for three months—the months of rain. Britain also agreed to make concessions in Tientsin, and to try to bring about peace in China.

The British reasoning was well defined by Churchill in a surprisingly frank parliamentary speech. Britain, he said, was engaged in a life-and-death struggle in Europe and could not take on new foes elsewhere. The Burma Road being nearly impassable in the months of July to October, it could be closed for this period without great loss to China. During these months, the Battle of Britain would probably be decided, one way or another. And if England lost, the situation in the Far East would not matter anyway.

The agreement, effective for three months, was signed on July 13, 1940. Three days later Admiral Yonai proceeded to the Imperial Palace and submitted his resignation. The Emperor immediately named Prince Konoye to succeed him. The new Cabinet came to power on an openly pro-Axis platform. It was not satisfied with the meager British concessions in Burma. London was given to understand that nothing it would voluntarily give Japan could placate her. Japan was out after much greater stakes.

Now the carrousel of hate was spun again, to prepare public opinion for new crises. One was provoked in Shanghai by a drive against foreign newspapers. Another, a more serious one, was caused by the arrest of a dozen leading Britons in

Japan on trumped-up charges of espionage. Among the men was the jolly, able Melville James Cox, chief of the Reuters bureau in Tokyo. Two days after his arrest the Japanese police announced that he had committed suicide by jumping out of a second-story window in the gendarmerie headquarters, "for fear of conviction." Months later his wife, in the safety of Canada, revealed that the American doctor who inspected the body found a score of tiny dots on Cox's leg—tell-tale signs of hypodermic injections.

After a brief hesitation, the British Government ordered the retaliatory arrest of Japanese business leaders in London, Rangoon and Singapore. The trick worked. All but one of the detained Britons were released. But Japanese pressure remained unrelaxed, and a fortnight after Cox's death all the British troops were withdrawn from Shanghai and North China, and the Yangtse flotilla was cut from thirteen to three gunboats. Britain had abandoned her vast interests in China to their fate. The lowest point on the tortuous road of appeasement had been reached.

BRITAIN REGAINS HEART

When the small British garrison marched out of Peiping's famous Legation Quarter on August 13, 1940, the city was left without a British soldier for the first time in the twentieth century.

Bitter was the heart of Britain—bitter and vengeful. Many an editorial in England let a threat of eventual retaliation slip in between the lines. But together with this dismay there was also delight at the growing warmth of relations with the United States. Daily headlines told of American planes and arms streaming across the Atlantic, of the United States' anti-Axis moves in South America, of embargoes on the exports of vital materials to Germany, Italy and Japan, of public sympathy for the British cause in the United States, of the new American rearmament program.

The conviction was growing that sooner or later the United States would join Britain in the war on the Axis. This belief found ready support in the increasing identity between British and American foreign policies. In many parts of the world, and especially in the Pacific, London seemed willing to pursue a policy determined in Washington. The identification of Britain's imperial interests with those of the United States was in effect the price the British Government paid for American support. In a hostile world, the United States alone stood ready to help Britain; and Britain reciprocated.

The two outstanding expressions of this newly found community of purpose were the United States-Canadian defense agreement and the exchange of American destroyers for British bases in the western Atlantic. Both had a tremendous impact upon the Pacific, for they were obviously the forerunners of joint Anglo-American action in the Far East. In the wake of the Canadian agreement came reports of negotiations for a similar United States-Australian accord. In reply to an American official hint that the United States needed additional bases in the Pacific, the British Government announced that Washington could "have its pick." This blanket invitation, it was made plain, extended to the great Singapore base, well fortified to withstand enemy attacks but still waiting for the fleet it was built to accommodate.

In the changing picture, a factor almost as important as Anglo-American collaboration was the appearance of Australia as a major military power.

Two decades earlier, in the aftermath to another great war, Australia had forced London to renounce its alliance with Japan, which she feared and distrusted. In the subsequent years, however, Australia found in Japan one of her best buyers of wool. Thus the policy of Canberra swung from acute hostility to the extreme of appeasement. There were occasional squabbles, attended by a great deal of bitterness, between Japan and Australia; but Canberra found these disputes

costly and lost no time in patching up its relations with Tokyo.

As recently as the summer of 1940, Canberra had exerted all pressure within its power to compel London to seek a compromise with Japan on the Burma Road issue. Her finances strained by a vast armament program, Australia could not afford to lose yet another customer. Moreover, it was clear that in any armed dispute between Britain and Japan the brunt of the fighting would fall upon Australian shoulders—and this Canberra was anxious to avoid.

Events, however, crowded upon each other in those critical months. Whereas in June, 1940, Australia believed herself to be facing Japan alone, in August it had already become obvious that the United States had embarked on a policy of vigorous opposition to Japan. Increasingly, Australia was turning to American industry for tools and manufactured goods. In the United States the young Australian air force acquired its training planes and engines that Britain could no longer supply. Circumstances were presenting Australia with the choice: Japan or the United States. Of the decision there could be no doubt. And thus, just as she urged appeasement in June, 1940, Australia began to urge firmness in September. Sir John Latham, the newly appointed Australian Minister to Tokyo, delayed his departure for many months. In Canberra, as in even more pro-American Wellington, New Zealand, officials spoke of their eagerness to co-operate with the United States, and of their determination to resist Japan should she attack Malaya or the Dutch East Indies.

Alarmed, Japan made last-minute efforts to swing Australia back into line. Less than a week after his installation Premier Konoye, in a special message, invited the Australian people to co-operate with Japan in promoting international goodwill. Said the message:

With the world divided in two opposite camps, international cultural understanding is the way to lasting peace and

coming prosperity; . . . Australia and Japan, two vital dynamic countries in the Pacific, can do much to foster these causes. . . .

The Tokyo Foreign Office intimated to Canberra that hostility would meet with retaliation. A few of the more belligerent Japanese publications threatened to "chastise" the brash Commonwealth. But all these gestures were ignored. The final factor determining the Australian attitude was Japan's adherence to the Rome-Berlin Axis late in September, 1940. Canberra accepted Tokyo's action as an admission of hostility. It reacted accordingly.

Thus, when the British Cabinet met early in October, 1940, to consider the re-opening of the Burma Road, there was little argument. Australia, New Zealand and Canada urged firm action. Washington made it plain that it expected Britain to re-open the route. With Chamberlain finally out of the Cabinet, there was little talk of appeasing Japan. There was also an acceptance of the principle that China's war with Japan was a part of the world struggle between totalitarian and democratic powers. The acceptance came three years too late, and it came mainly as the result of American pressure—but it was a promising sign.

Japan noted the change of temper in London. Britain was accordingly warned that any anti-Japanese gesture would promptly be followed by raids on Burma from the newly acquired bases in Indo-China. Japanese nationals in Hongkong and England were ordered to return home. Japanese troops were massed on the Hongkong border. But Britain's die was cast. On October 13, 1940, two hundred Chinese trucks, loaded to the top with arms and airplane parts and preceded by a few "trial" lorries with Japanese textiles, left Lashio for Kunming. Most of them reached Kunming before Japanese bombers swooped down upon numerous bridges on the Burma Road and blew them up, thus disrupting the traffic. But there was little doubt that the Chinese

would be able to maintain a steady, if thin, trickle of supplies into China.

By this time the United States was already pursuing a course of unconcealed hostility to Japan. To starch the courage of China and Britain, Washington agreed to buy \$10,000,000 worth of Chinese tungsten—to be transported to Rangoon via the Burma Road. A few weeks later came the announcement of a \$100,000,000 loan to Chungking. Though pressed financially, Britain promptly followed with a \$40,000,000 credit of her own.

The decision to re-open the Burma Road and to make the loan were the turning points in British policy in the Pacific. For nine years Britain had been in constant, humiliating, costly retreat before Japan. During these trying years, Britain carried her cross from the Amur River to Singapore. But there she planted it and made ready for the final stand.

There were still admittedly a few fissures in the new British policy. One of these was the appointment of Lord Halifax as Ambassador to the United States. There was little doubt that this pious and distinguished statesman—a Tory of the 1900 vintage set loose in the Europe of dictatorships and social upheavals—no longer favored appeasing the Nazis. It was, however, less certain that he had parted with his belief either in the efficacy of conciliation with Japan or of a strong-arm policy towards Russia. A man harboring such notions could be dangerous in Washington—where the democracies hatched their policy for the Pacific. And his capacity for harm could only be enhanced by the fact that Washington's design for Asia was diametrically different.

But neither Lord Halifax's appointment nor the continued sale of British strategical materials to Japan could alter the fact that Britain had changed her course in the Pacific. The lullaby of appeasement had given place to a bugle call for resistance. Britain could retreat no more, for beyond Singapore lay the great empire which she would not give up without a desperate fight. With the bulk of this empire caught

between the Italo-German pincer in the West and the Japanese pincer in the East, Britain had no choice but to resist on both flanks.

Britain was not courting a war with Japan. As long as it could, London would try to avert hostilities in the Pacific. New concessions there were bound to be. Britain still had a billion-dollar investment in China which was at Japan's mercy and which could be saved only by new sacrifices. But Japan's men-of-war were already steaming in sight of Malaya, her aircraft roared along the Indian border, and Nazi sea raiders were being equipped and fueled at Japanese bases. Thus, in 1941, Britain dug herself in on her last line of defense—anxious for peace, but ready to fight for what was hers. The path of retreat had brought her, perhaps, to glory.

II

MOSCOW TURNS EAST

Chapter Five

Detour to Revolution

SOVIET RUSSIA is the mystery combatant of the Pacific arena. Her goals and policies do not fit into the orthodox pattern of Imperialism. The urges which motivate other powers do not move her. Where her rivals speak of territorial conquests, of trade and of returns on investments, she largely ignores all. Where the others thrive on prosperity, she seeks out misery and distress. To her rivals' three-dimensional strategy of the gun, the dollar and diplomatic moves, she adds a fourth dimension—that of idea.

Britain and the United States help China with war supplies and loans. Russia gives these, and adds to them the much more important stimulants to high morale—program and organization. While Japan marches into Indo-China with guns blazing, Russia sends her agents to foment rebellion among the colony's hungry and discontented natives. The key to an understanding of Russia's goals in the Pacific, of her behavior and political philosophy, lies in what Communist textbooks describe as "World October."¹

"World October"—universal revolution—is the justification of Russia's military ventures and the basis of her foreign policy. It is Moscow's hope, *raison d'être* and objective.

The path of revolution, however, is neither straight nor easy. For a quarter of a century Capitalist powers have defied

1. On October 24, 1917, the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, overthrew Kerensky's Provisional Government.

the Kremlin's predictions of their imminent collapse. Instead, Moscow has found herself face to face with the very real possibility of an international anti-Soviet offensive. Promptly then the plans for "World October" were shelved in favor of the more pressing plans for self-defense. The change entailed major compromises and detours, but these were made in the firm belief that the defense of the Soviet Union was the best service to the cause of universal revolution.

The man responsible for making Russia's security the cornerstone of new revolutionary strategy was Joseph Stalin. In direct contrast to Leon Trotsky—who believed that revolution is a dynamic process recognizing no retreats and no allies outside the proletarian camp—Stalin was a wily opportunist who maintained that "World October" could be reached by detours. If Russia's security demanded co-operation with General Chiang Kai-shek, who only yesterday butchered Communists by the thousands; a pact with Hitler, whose avowed credo provided for the subjugation of Russia; or the invasion of Finland, at the cost of alienating countless sympathizers abroad—well and good, it must be done.

The Kremlin devoutly believes in the inexorable processes of history. As surely as the machine has replaced the hand loom, so must Socialism replace Capitalism. In World War II the Bolsheviks see another vindication of their belief in the self-destructive qualities of Capitalism. The war, they say, is a clash between two opposing Imperialist camps, fighting for the redivision of spoils. Whoever wins on the field of battle, the war cannot but result in the disintegration of the Capitalist system, growing social unrest in the West, a rising anti-Imperialist movement in the Pacific area and—"World October."

RETREAT FROM CHINA

These, then, are the principles which dominate the Soviet course abroad: security for Russia, revolution for the world—the Pacific included.

In its infancy, the Bolshevik Government made several attempts to revolutionize war-shaken Europe. In Poland this took the form of an armed raid, defeated by the military genius of General Maxime Weygand. In Germany and Hungary, Communist uprisings were put down with terrifying severity.

Frustrated in the Western strongholds of Capitalism, the Soviet leaders then turned to its happy hunting grounds in the East. Decades of international intrigue and wars had made Asia readily susceptible to revolutionary propaganda. Asia was also an integral part of Capitalist economy. Moscow thus had a double incentive for launching a continent-wide anti-Imperialist offensive.

The attack was started in 1923. For four years Moscow enjoyed victories of ever-growing importance. Asia's countless millions were being organized under Red banners. Large armies, trained and officered by Communists, waged successful war on foreign and native Capitalism. Confronted by a foe whose best weapons were ideas, the great Imperialist Powers were rapidly losing ground.

Singled out for destruction, Britain was the heaviest loser. In India, Communist and nationalist agitators were forging the restless, impoverished masses into a powerful anti-British ram. Throughout China a Communist-inspired boycott crippled British trade. In Hankow and Kiukiang howling mobs took over the British Concessions. But revolution hurt China's own landed gentry as much as it did the traders and bankers of France and Britain. Thus, in 1927, the anti-Communist elements of all nations joined hands to wreck Russia's ambitious plans. Retreat from Asia was painful—and complete.

In the succeeding seven years, Stalin thinned out the ranks of his opponents, put Russian industrialization in high gear, ordered his generals to build a powerful war machine. He was proving to the opposition—and to himself—that "Socialism can be built in one country."

Capitalism had meanwhile seemingly recovered from

World War I. Trade and industry prospered. The League of Nations was at its prime and plans for a Pan-European Union were solemnly aired in leading newspapers. Aristide Briand, France's diplomatic siren, lured Europe into the arms of peace. Obviously this was not the moment to launch new Communist ventures, either in Europe or in the Far East.

Moscow began to play the game of patience. Maxim Litvinov, probably the ablest diplomat ever to come out of Russia, went to Geneva to champion collective security. It was curious that the most beautiful concept of post-bellum Europe was nursed by its ugliest statesmen. Litvinov took the clichés bandied about by Capitalist spokesmen and infused them with meaning remote from that desired by London, Paris and Rome. But his very presence in the League helped to uphold the status quo, with its Capitalism, its balance of power, its continued oppression of colonial peoples.

Moscow remained strictly aloof from Asia. Even the Chinese Communist armies battling General Chiang Kai-shek fought without help. Respectability was the Kremlin's new motto, and it was not going to prejudice it by assistance to beleaguered Chinese Reds.

SIBERIA BECOMES A FORTRESS

But if the hard-pressed Chinese Communists could not lure Russia back to the Asiatic stage, Japan could. Up to 1931, Moscow gave little thought to its Far Eastern frontier. Outer Mongolia protected the exposed Siberian flank on the south. From fortified Vladivostok northward the sea was Russia's guardian. The tremendous gap between Vladivostok and Outer Mongolia was filled by the Manchurian buffer, which softened the impact of Russian Communism and Japanese Imperialism upon each other.

When the Kwantung Army struck in Manchuria in 1931 it removed the buffer, thus bringing Japan and Russia into physical contact. From that moment on, friction began to imperil the relations between the two nations. Japan's apol-

ogists justified the conquest of Manchuria by a desire to fence Japan off from Communist ideas and arms. Whether the Kwantung Army was motivated by the demands of defense or offense is open to question. Arms offer poor protection against ideas, and the Kwantung Army's "brain trusters" could not have been unaware of this.

But the Manchurian incident did have this effect: with the Japanese guns on her frontier, Russia was compelled to re-enter the game of power politics in the Far East. Hard-headed Soviet leaders saw little hope for the efforts to form an Occidental united front against Japan. Britain's impotence in the Pacific and the United States' isolationist sentiment were barriers much too high to be hurdled by the advocates of a crusade against Japan.

To be certain, Russia had to act alone, and the General Staff in Moscow conceived of a broad and daring plan. The Trans-Siberian Railway offered a single link between the underpopulated, poorly defended Far East and the bases in European Russia. In case of war the rail line presented an admirable target for enemy attacks. Now, at forced pace, Siberia was to be developed to a point where in a crisis it would need no help from European Russia.

Decided, done. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian peasants were shipped East in the famous "Forty Men, Eight Horses" freight cars. A burning appeal was issued to the members of Communist youth groups (Komsomol) to "Go East," to hew civilization out of wilderness. Later another appeal was made to young women to "Go East, Young Woman, To Marry." In Birobijan, on the forested left bank of the Amur River, a large area was allotted for Jewish settlement.

These hardy pioneers performed miracles. By 1934 bustling towns and industrial plants had risen in the heart of the Siberian *taiga*. New mines were put in operation, new railways and highways laid out, new ships added to the Far Eastern merchant marine. A regular sea route was established to link Murmansk with Vladivostok by way of the

Arctic Ocean. But, even more important than all these, Siberia, between Lake Baikal and the Pacific Ocean, became the base of a powerful war machine, independent of Moscow. It was done just in time.

The Kwantung Army was becoming increasingly aggressive. White Russian units, organized by the notorious Kenji Doihara, were beginning to filter through the border defenses into Soviet territory. The demand for a holy war on Russia was growing in Japan.

While the Far Eastern Army was being whipped into fighting shape, Moscow pursued a conciliatory policy, heavily tinged with firmness. The focus of Soviet-Japanese friction was the Chinese Eastern Railway, running half across Manchuria. Built with Russian money in the halcyon years just preceding the Russo-Japanese War, this railroad had long attracted Japan. Rather than continue the ceaseless disputes over the management and operation of the line, Russia sold it to the puppet Manchurian state in 1935 for a fraction of its worth. The deal was accompanied by the wholesale withdrawal of Soviet subjects from Manchuria.

Yet even this retreat failed to restore amity between Japan and Russia. Border affrays became almost a daily occurrence. Between January, 1935, and June, 1937, their number exceeded four hundred and twenty. As the strength of the Far Eastern Army grew, the minor clashes developed into miniature wars, in which aircraft, tanks and gunboats took part.

There is no more entrancing reading in present-day diplomatic literature than the Soviet notes of protest to Tokyo over the border incidents. Only the notes of Mr. Cordell Hull equal them in directness. For cruel outspokenness they have no match.

THE KREMLIN AIDS CHINA

The League's ignoble failure to muzzle the Japanese Army cleared the way to aggression in Asia. By 1932 no informed

observer doubted the victory in Manchuria would be followed immediately by incursions south of the Great Wall. Realists in the Kremlin perhaps saw the shadow of new aggression before anyone else. Each Japanese move extended the envelopment of Russian frontiers. Within four years of the Manchurian incident the border between the two spheres of interest stretched from the Pacific Ocean deep into Inner Mongolia.

Russia's first counter-move, apart from her military preparations in Siberia, was the shift of the Chinese Communist armies from Central to North China. Many observers believe the Red migration was necessitated by General Chiang Kai-shek's tightening stranglehold on Communist territory in Kiangsi. I am not one of them.

By withstanding five great offensives in isolated Kiangsi, the Communists had clearly shown their independence of the Soviet sources of supplies. Once out of General Chiang's steel ring, they could easily have established a new base in the rich—and discontented—southwest.

What happened instead was this: the Chinese Communist armies drove south, defeating all opposition, and then—in a maneuver as surprising as it was daring—veered northward towards the hungry, barren northwest. When they reached Shensi province the Reds, virtually junking their Communist program, called for a holy war on Japan.

The Chinese Red armies in the northwest had, in effect, made ready to stab the Japanese forces, preparing for an attack on Soviet flanks, in the back. That Tokyo did not underestimate the importance of this factor was clearly demonstrated by the hysteria which attended the successful experimental Communist drive into Shansi in 1935-'36.

The next Russian move was renewed support of General Chiang Kai-shek. Moscow had by this time sacrificed proletarian purity on the altar of the "Popular Front." The Comintern was pushed into the shadows, while Communist partisans the world over began to co-operate with bourgeois groups

in combating reaction. In China, Moscow's policy of "appeasement" resulted in the abandonment by the Communist Party of its radical land policy and collaboration with other anti-Japanese bodies, whatever their political hue.

The Soviet policy became especially clear in the dramatic days of December, 1936, when Moscow pulled every wire to prevent the assassination—and, later, to secure the release—of General Chiang Kai-shek by his captors in Sian. The pledges made by General Chiang to the patriotic kidnapers led to a reversal of the Chinese Government's policy in 1937. Nanking traded war on Communism for resistance to Japan. This almost automatically tightened the bonds between Nanking and Moscow. Negotiations, secret and otherwise, were carried on between the two capitals almost without interruption.

Late in 1937 a Soviet official told me that a month or two before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war Moscow had offered Nanking a mutual-assistance pact. General Chiang Kai-shek rejected the offer in the belief that such an accord would bring about Japanese intervention. Similar information had been obtained by other correspondents in Shanghai.

As a matter of fact, exactly a week after the opening of large-scale hostilities in Shanghai, Dimitri Bogomoloff, the jovial, sybaritic Soviet Ambassador, signed a treaty of non-aggression in Nanking. The pact, however, lacked teeth, merely providing that both nations would refrain from aggression against each other, individually or in concert with other powers. After this slap at Japan, Moscow recalled Bogomoloff and "purged" him, reportedly as a Japanese and German spy. Tokyo contented itself with an acid: "China's dancing to the Comintern's tunes will neither do her any good, nor will it help the maintenance of peace in the Far East."

It is interesting to speculate on the course of Asiatic history had General Chiang accepted the Soviet proffer. It is more than probable that Japan would not have tackled China and

Russia simultaneously. It is equally probable that had she done so, the United States would have given assistance to Japan's foes. The years 1936 to 1938 were marked by warm cordiality between Moscow and Washington; and nothing could have enhanced such sentiment more than Russian aid to attacked China.

Many well-informed observers in the Orient firmly believe that a powerful Japanese fleet was held in readiness in Tsu-ruga in 1936 for an attack on Vladivostok, and that only American pressure halted the attack.

JAPAN MAKES A TEST

Moscow cannot permit Japan's entrenchment in China for two important reasons. First, it still fondly regards China as Asia's first possible convert to the Communist cause. Second, victory in China would make Japan a foe too dangerous to have on the other side of a long and uncertain frontier, and too formidable to tackle.

In Moscow's eyes the world is a battleground of conflicting economic forces. In China, as in Spain before her, an Imperialist nation was seeking to enslave a free—and potentially revolutionary—people. Therefore it was the duty of the Soviet Government to intervene in behalf of the attacked country.

On the other hand, the Kremlin had at no time been ready to plunge into war with a major power while defending a weak one. The Soviet leaders strongly believe that this would immediately serve as a signal for a world-wide anti-Russian crusade. Soviet history since 1933 is a succession of maneuvers to escape involvement in an international war. For this reason Moscow has given China what one is tempted to describe as "cautious assistance"—enough to keep China fighting, not enough to goad Japan into declaring war on Russia.

In planning its invasion of North China in the summer of

1937, Tokyo obviously regarded Russia as China's only potential ally. To learn the exact limits to which Moscow was willing to assist China, the Kwantung Army late in June provoked a clash on the Amur River.

The incident in itself was unimportant: trespassing of a channel on the Soviet side of the border Amur River by Manchurian gunboats. When, three days later, a few Soviet border guards were landed on two small islands in mid-stream, the Kwantung Army rushed reinforcements to the spot, dislodged the Soviet soldiers, sank a Russian gunboat and disabled two others, and occupied the islets.

This activity was accompanied by great commotion in Tokyo. The notorious Japan Production Party—an offspring of the equally notorious Black Dragon Society—demanded the immediate severance of diplomatic relations with Russia. The press asked for the "chastisement of the Russian bear." The War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff reported to the Emperor. Cabinet officials remained closeted in night-long conferences. Tokyo was going through all the gestures of a capital preparing for war.

The demonstration had its effect. Alarmed Washington, on July 1, 1937, instructed Ambassador Joseph E. Davies to urge the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow to localize the incident. On July 2—in what the London press described as "a studied effort not to aggravate the situation"—Maxim Litvinov informed the Japanese Ambassador that Tokyo's demands would be met. Moscow retreated. The Japanese Government and Army had learned that Russia would not join China in a war on Japan.

Five days later, on July 7, 1937, the Japanese troops struck at the Marco Polo Bridge, twenty miles west of Peiping. On July 11 the Cabinet in Tokyo reached a "fundamental decision" to fight in North China, and thousands of Japanese soldiers poured across the Great Wall.

The intervening years have shown the correctness of Tokyo's judgment. Even in the summer of 1939, when desper-

ate China found herself abandoned by her democratic well-wishers, Moscow refused to be drawn into the Sino-Japanese war.

SOVIET PLANES IN CHINESE SKIES

Russia's first aid to China came in December, 1937, or five months after the outbreak of the war. The assistance took the shape of a small air force of about thirty SB light bombers and I-15 fighters, manned by fifty fliers and mechanics. At this time China—in addition to her own badly tattered air force—had the services of the so-called "International Legion," headed by Vincent Schmidt, an American ace flier and soldier of fortune.

The three forces operated as independent units. The undertrained Chinese had difficulty in coping with the overwhelming number and equipment of the foe, and were soon virtually rubbed out. The expensive—and recalcitrant—"International Legion" was disbanded. The Russians, taciturn and secretive, took their orders from their own commanders, flew—and flew well—when and where they chose, and disregarded the plans of the Chinese Command.

General Chiang Kai-shek was displeased but could do nothing. The Russians refused to allow other pilots, Chinese or foreign, to fly, or even examine, their planes. They kept to themselves and did not mix socially with other fliers. There is good reason to believe that several new Soviet models had been tried out in combat under the Chinese skies, as earlier they had been tested in Spain.

On the whole, the Soviet aircraft were good and active, but far too few. China never had more than two hundred of them. Apart from the spring of 1938 and the summer of 1940, when Russian planes bombed Japanese troop concentrations in the Yellow and Yangtse River Valleys, they have been used almost exclusively for the defense of the capital and for reconnaissance.

Besides supplying aircraft, Russia also gave every possible assistance in the building of the long motor route from Soviet Turkestan to the Chinese Northwest. Down this tortuous road, running over high mountains and across a limitless *loess* plateau, hundreds of Soviet trucks manned by Russians brought to China munitions, automobile parts and medical supplies. On reaching Lanchow the badly battered trucks were discarded, and the drivers were sent back to Russia to bring other truck caravans in.

Much of the Chinese Army equipment—especially the light field-guns—that fell into Japanese hands during the Hankow campaign was of Soviet manufacture. There was also a scattering of rifles, machine-guns and armored cars. Soviet supplies of munitions to China, however, were always short of the armaments sold by other nations, notably Czechoslovakia, Germany and England.

Following the capture of Hankow by the Japanese, the main Soviet bases were established in Chungking, Sian and Lanchow. The last of these became the main distributing center for Russian war supplies and the largest air base. Repeated Japanese raids which converted its business center into heaps of rubble failed to disrupt the beehive activity in Lanchow.

The Second World War dried up the flow of British and German munitions to China, increased Chungking's dependence upon Soviet aid. In March, 1939, the Chinese Government appealed to Moscow for increased assistance. It was made clear to the Kremlin that without such help Chinese resistance would inevitably and quickly collapse. It was also undoubtedly pointed out that Japanese victory would be as disastrous for Russia as for China.

The negotiations were conducted through Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist Party's ablest politician and Vice-Minister of Military Affairs. Chou flew to Moscow, described the critical situation to the Soviet leaders and returned with the Russian counter-proposals. The terms, naturally, remained

a closely guarded secret. But the first result of the pour-parlers was an "armistice" between the Communist and Kuomintang troops. Communist leaders—among them Mrs. Chou En-lai—were invited to Chungking from their headquarters in Yen-an and given assurances that Government units would no longer impinge upon the so-called "Red territory."

Tokyo's propaganda mill made much of the Communist-Kuomintang friction. Every armed clash was magnified into a final irrevocable split in the United Front. Every trip of a Chinese Communist to Moscow brought in its wake reports of Soviet ultimatums and demands. Japanese speculations on the nature of Soviet terms ranged from China's adoption of a Communist program to the cession of the northwestern provinces to Russia.

I greatly doubt if the Kremlin's demands—at the time—had gone that far. Whatever else can be held against the Soviet leaders, they cannot be denied political sagacity. In the summer of 1940 they felt that important concessions to Russia by General Chiang Kai-shek would immediately split the anti-Japanese front in China and throw the conservatives into Japanese arms. With a war raging at Russia's doorsteps in Europe and Asia Minor, Moscow was *at that time* much more interested in keeping Japan preoccupied in China than in bringing the light of Communism to the war-ravaged land.

That summer the concessions asked—and probably obtained—by Moscow must have aimed more at ensuring the continuation of Chinese resistance than at gaining a foothold in China. The most that might have been sought by Russia then was increased Communist influence in the northwest. But this much is certain: Russia's potential weight in China was never as great as at the end of the first year of World War II. In the dark days of fall, 1940, it was Russian political pressure and military assistance that prevented China's acceptance of the Japanese peace terms. The last of such "peace offensives"—just a few days before the "recognition"

of Wang Ching-wei's régime by Japan in October, 1940—was brought to naught largely by a direct Soviet warning to Chungking. And it was significant that the announcement of the \$100,000,000 American loan to China in November was followed a fortnight later by reports of a similar loan by Moscow—expressly for the purchase of arms.

JAPAN VS. RUSSIA

Japan and Russia have been at war since 1931. That this war was undeclared and punctuated by armistices did not detract from its ferocity. The battles were fought over entire East Asia; from the Okhotsk Sea, where Soviet cutters chased armed Japanese fishermen, to Central China, where Russian airmen tangled with their Japanese foes.

It would be almost impossible to estimate the number of the disputes. In Manchuria alone they neared a thousand. There were similar encounters in Kamchatka, in Saghalien, in the Vladivostok waters, on the Korean border and in China proper. The majority of the incidents involved nothing worse than a few shots exchanged by border patrols. At times, however, there were large-scale hostilities involving between 50,000 and 100,000 troops, hundreds of airplanes and tanks—and thousands of casualties.

The root of the trouble lay in Japan's desire for lebensraum. When the Japanese fishermen went out to sea to procure an important part of Japan's daily diet, they had to sail in Soviet waters.² Japanese coal and oil concessionaires in North Saghalien found themselves shackled by Soviet wage-

2. In 1938—a typical year—20,000 Japanese fishermen brought home 80,000,000 Russian salmon, valued at ¥42,000,000. Of this, ¥17,000,000 was consumed at home, the rest exported to procure the badly needed foreign exchange. The fishing is conducted along rented coastal strips of Kamchatka, under the terms of a convention. This treaty has been the subject of bitter wrangling since 1934, partly because of Moscow's desire to regain control of her own resources, partly as a reflection of other differences between the two nations.

and-hour laws. Japan's once prosperous trade with the Maritime Province had been cut down to the bone and her nationals in Siberia had been forced out. In Manchuria, which Japan has considered her own since 1905, Soviet Russia disputed the Japanese hold.

The Japanese Navy resented its dependence on Soviet oil³ and both the Army and the Navy fretted at the proximity of Russian aircraft and submarines. To people who have been steadily whipping themselves up into ecstatic pride, the ever-present Soviet peril was a bitter hurt and a challenge. The seizure of Manchuria in 1931 multiplied the causes of friction.

Foreseeing the impending crisis, Russia, as early as December, 1931, proposed to Tokyo the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Tokyo declined. A similar détente eleven months later was also turned down.

By 1933 Moscow's hand had been strengthened with two trump cards: completion of military preparations in the Far East and *de jure* recognition by the United States. Alarmed Tokyo proposed the demilitarization of the Russo-Manchurian border. Moscow, which had just spent half a billion dollars on defenses, rejected the proposal. A year later, in December, 1934, Koki Hirota, Foreign Minister and one of the leading advocates of a war on Russia, suggested the settlement of all outstanding differences and the appointment of a frontier commission before considering a non-aggression pact.

These proposals were discussed at a conference held in 1935. The talks came to naught. Tokyo rejected Moscow's suggestion to invite a neutral (presumably American) chairman of the commission. Moscow, in turn, vetoed the Japanese plan to re-demarcate the entire Russo-Manchurian border. In April, 1936, after a series of particularly bitter armed

3. In a good year, Japan imports 300,000 tons of oil from Soviet Saghalien, reserves it for naval use. The oil fields are operated by a semi-official concern, headed by a retired admiral. The six-year disputes over both the fisheries and the oil concessions were brought nearer to conclusion following Hitler's march into Rumania in the fall of 1940.

clashes, two commissions were formed to delimit a portion of the frontier and to adjudicate disputes. Both, however, died an early and natural death.

The signing of the anti-Comintern pact in November, 1936, failed to endear Japan to Moscow. Despite Tokyo's solemn declaration that Russia was welcome to join the anti-Communist crusade, the Soviet Government promptly suspended negotiations for a new fisheries agreement. Because of the anti-Comintern pact and a succession of anti-Soviet gestures in Tokyo, the first half of 1937 witnessed almost ceaseless disputes. The friction culminated with the hostilities on the Amur River.

While Soviet aid to China removed the center of gravity from Manchuria, the border clashes did not cease. In 1938 Japan and Russia fought the "little world war" on the slopes of the Changkufeng hills. One hundred thousand troops took part in this conflict, the Japanese force—"betrayed" by Tokyo—getting the worst of the fight. A year later came the tremendous engagement in Outer Mongolia, in which Japan used 60,000 troops and five hundred airplanes.

As the two forces lashed at each other in the Mongolian plains, Hitler concluded his accord with Stalin and hurled the German armies against Poland. The effect on the East Asiatic scene was electric. With two wars on her hands, Japan suddenly saw herself completely without friends. Tokyo, moreover, feared that the pact was a prelude to a Soviet offensive in the Far East. Moscow, on its own part, was preparing to send its armies into Poland and Finland, and was anxious to terminate the hostilities in Asia.

On September 19—on the sixteenth day of World War II—an armistice halted the Russo-Japanese battle in Mongolia. When I reached Japan three days later, no one I met tried to conceal joy at the conclusion of what was beginning to look like a very ugly conflict. Editorials in Soviet newspapers indicated a similar satisfaction. From an armistice to a rapprochement, however, was a long step. While the exchange

of verbal unpleasanties was halted, little progress was made in settling any major problems. The delegates who tried to define the border between Manchuria and Outer Mongolia went home without agreement.

The next impetus to an understanding was supplied by the Nazi victories in France. In June, 1940, as the German tanks neared Paris and Mussolini joined in the war, Moscow and Tokyo came to a quick decision. As the result of "mutual concessions and compromises"—to quote an official Japanese statement—it was decided to demarcate a part of the Mongolian border with all possible speed. A week later Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov proposed the settlement of all other outstanding issues.

The motivation of both powers was clear. Russia feared involvement in new Asiatic squabbles while Hitler was on a rampage in Europe. Japan felt that the poorly defended possessions of Britain, France and Holland in the southwestern Pacific offered a much better prize than the well-protected Outer Mongolia and Siberia. As subsequent events showed, Moscow was clearing its decks for the occupation of the three Baltic countries, Tokyo for the invasion of Indo-China.

But there the rapprochement ended. The two powers began to jockey for advantage. Japan was eager to make peace with Russia—for the time being—but felt that she could obtain it on her own terms by tightening her bonds with the Axis. The Kremlin, on the other hand, based its policy on three premises: first, that Japan was nearing an economic collapse; second, that Tokyo would pay a high price for freedom to strike in the South Seas; and third, that no agreements with Japan could be lasting.

Moscow was particularly displeased by the tripartite military alliance of September 27, 1940. While all three Axis powers solemnly assured Russia that the accord was not directed against her, Moscow knew that the pact could be converted into an anti-Soviet instrument at a moment's notice.

For all these reasons Moscow's "peace terms" to Tokyo in November, 1940, were extremely harsh. Refusing to disclose their nature, many a Japanese official has bitterly charged that the Soviet demands appeared to be deliberately prohibitive. The high hopes entertained in Japan that the new Ambassador to Moscow, Lieutenant General Tatekawa, would settle all the outstanding problems, were shattered by the Kremlin's studied indifference. On New Year's Day, 1941, the only negotiations in progress dealt with the question of fisheries, the perennial trouble-maker. It seemed as if the stalemate in Europe had swung the Soviet pendulum back to the Pacific. Moscow no longer appeared to be certain—as it was in the first summer of the war—that the perils in the West justified a peace at any cost in the Far East. Once again the Orient began to loom large in Soviet headlines. Japan and the United States were rapidly nearing a showdown and both energetically wooed Russia.

Under the circumstances, Moscow felt there was no need for haste in settling the differences with Tokyo. On the contrary, in moves strikingly parallel to those of the U. S. State Department, the Kremlin gave Japan a deliberate and painful rebuff in China as 1940 drew to a close. After a year's "time out," Russia was back in the game of power politics in the Pacific. The Soviet actions, it is true, were no whit different from those of her Imperialist rivals. But "World October" was still the goal; Moscow was merely following a detour.

Chapter Six

How Strong Is the Bear?

UNTIL THE UNITED STATES launches her two-ocean navy, the Soviet war machine remains the strongest brake on Japan's ambitions in the Pacific. In public, the Japanese generals will as often as not pooh-pooh the Russian threat. But at the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo, where policies are decided, the Soviet submarines and bombers overshadow every discussion.

For this there are sound reasons. Kobe's busy dockyards, Nagoya's munitions works and Tokyo's Imperial Palace and Government offices lie within a six-hundred-mile radius of Vladivostok. For Russia's modern bombers a raid on Japan represents a journey of three to six hours. On a flight as short as this, the bombers can carry a heavy load of explosives and take along fighters to beat off the Japanese interceptors. Russian submarines can simultaneously sow mines at the entrances to the Inland Sea and the Tsushima Strait, effectively bottling in the bulk of Japan's merchant marine and disrupting her vital communications with the mainland.

Should the Russo-Japanese war break out, it will develop into a race for the first, the all-destructive blow to the foe's airfields and submarine bases. And Russia then would hold the edge. Her industrial and military centers are well spaced, whereas Japan's are bunched together. Her boundaries are less vulnerable to attack. And finally, her war machine is superior to that of Japan.

Between 1938 and 1940, Russia fought three major conflicts. Two of these were in the Far East—on the approaches to the Changkufeng Hill (Korea) in 1938 and at Nomonhan (Outer Mongolia) a year later. Both of these battles, coupled with the war in Finland, have produced a wealth of data on the Soviet armed forces.

Thus, to the all-important question, "How strong is the Russian army"? one can now offer this answer: The heavy tanks, field artillery, non-commissioned officers and artillerymen are excellent; the air force, the mechanized equipment and the bulk of the infantry are fair; the military transport and the staff are poor. The showing made by staff officers in the Finnish campaign was so patently unsatisfactory that in the summer of 1940 Moscow ordered a widespread reshuffle. As a result of the changes Marshal Voroshilov was "kicked upstairs," and the two men responsible for organizing the final victorious assault on the Mannerheim Line were advanced. One of them, significantly, was General Stern, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Army in the Far East.

In Asia, General Stern faces no Mannerheim Line or narrow snow-bound bottlenecks such as he encountered in Finland. Instead he has to deal with vast spaces which dictate a strategy of fast, sweeping movement, of great daring and split-second co-ordination over the world's longest battlefield, extending from Kamchatka to Tibet. Soviet performance in the Battle of Nomonhan in 1939 indicated that the Red command is capable of spurts of brilliance. It still remains to be seen whether the reshuffle of 1940 has endowed it with a capacity for sustained efficiency in a full-dress total war.

Along an important stretch of the Far Eastern front the Soviet Army has the advantage of operating from behind a powerful defense line. Built between 1932 and 1937, this string of 5,000 well-camouflaged concrete pill-boxes armed with cannon and machine-guns hugs the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, where they skirt Manchuria. Behind this screen of

fortifications lie the vulnerable Trans-Baikal Railway and the new defense centers in northeastern Siberia. At bases sprinkled behind the line, Soviet forces could be concentrated for thrusts into the Japanese puppet state.

The Soviet command expects the defense wall to stop—or at least to delay—the Japanese attack. Meanwhile it intends to launch its own offensive. General Stern and some of his abler aides are known as proponents of offensive strategy. The incredible success of German arms in Europe could not but confirm them in their views. No military man in Russia, and least of all the commanders, forgets that it was the Red Army which pioneered in the methods so successfully utilized by the Nazis. Parachute troops, massed tank attacks and large-scale air raids were all developed by Soviet military masterminds. With the terrain as suitable for blitzkrieg as Outer Mongolia and parts of Manchuria, Soviet strategy in the war on Japan is almost pre-ordained.

BRAWN PLUS PROPAGANDA

The backbone of the Soviet Army—of any army—is its men. The Soviet backbone is strong. The soldier of Tzarist Russia was famous for his endurance, doggedness and perseverance in the face of overwhelming odds. He knew crushing defeats, but these had their roots in incompetent and corrupt command. On the other hand, he tasted victory and kept Europe in fear. To these qualities of patience, courage, and physical strength, the Bolsheviks added fanaticism and high morale. The soldier had been one of their earliest and most devout recruits, for they gave him peace and bread. Once in power, the Communists spared no effort to retain this loyalty.

The bulk of the Red Army comes from the country. Caninely, the Communist Party transformed the Army not only into the nation's defensive organ, but also into a tremendous propaganda mill in which the young peasants' uncertain loyal-

ties were converted into faith in Communism. After their two years in barracks, the Russian soldiers became staunch backers of the Soviet Government in their villages.

Bolshevism gave Russia something that she largely lacked in Tzarist days: a "mission." In common with the peoples of totalitarian nations, the Russians today are crusaders for an idea. Faith in the eventual victory of this idea—as much as Bolshevik promises of better days to come—has helped the Russians to keep their belts tightened for nearly a quarter of a century. It has also imbued them with a militant fervor to confer their brand of ideology upon the rest of the world. The Red Army is one of the agents whose task it is to translate fervor into action. Foreign military experts do not take this spirit lightly. It forms an important element in the Red Army's strength, for it ensures high morale, capacity for sacrifice and great staying power.

Any war between Japan and Russia will pit against each other militant carriers of diametrically opposed ideas. In its own way, Japan's lust for power cements public morale as firmly as Russia's craving to introduce the blessings of Socialism to mankind.

Russia's losses in the Finnish war were placed by Moscow at nearly 200,000 officers and men, of whom about a fourth were killed. Coupled with intense cold, death on a rampage must have severely tested the soldiers' morale. Yet day after day these men re-formed ranks and charged the Finns again and again, until they broke through the wall of steel and fire.

A few months earlier the men of the Far Eastern Army had displayed a similar disdain for death on the Nomonhan battlefield. There one unit, encircled by the Japanese, defied the attackers for a fortnight until a Russian counter-attack saved it; and during these harrowing days the besieged force was under continuous shell fire and aerial bombardment. Its ammunition, food and medical supplies were dropped daily by Soviet airplanes.

The successful counter-attack culminated a series of costly attempts to cross a narrow river in the face of withering Japanese fire. Months after the "vest pocket war" Japanese newspapermen grudgingly paid tribute to the courage of both the besieged men and their rescuers, and to the excellence of Soviet artillery. When the final Russian drive came in September, 1939, the momentum carried the advancing troops twenty-five miles into the Japanese lines.

The Russian Army's reserves are so immense that its command can disregard losses which would cripple any other first-rate force. To attain victory the command would readily pay a high price in lives. Russia's treasury of manpower is almost inexhaustible. When the curtain was rung on the Finnish tragedy in January, 1940, the Red Army numbered close to 4,000,000 men under arms. Twelve million others were held in reserve. Of the Army's 250 divisions, a fifth were cavalry units. These were stationed mainly in the Far East and the Ukraine, where the rolling plains afford few roads.

The Russian air force was said to include 9,000 planes, a third of them first-line. Aircraft in Siberia and Outer Mongolia numbered 1,000. Many airfields in the Far East have long been equipped with subterranean hangars. Of Russia's 6,000 tanks, 1,000 were reported in Siberia. The Soviet tank manufacturing capacity is immense, since all the large tractor works are geared for the production of tanks.

The Soviet fleet in the Far East was dwarfed by the Japanese Navy. Russia's seventy or eighty pocket submarines, however, were capable of crippling Japan's communications with continental bases.

In 1941 no military statistics were allowed to escape Russia. The only indications of feverish military activity were the calling of new army classes and Stalin's declaration that the country had been put on the basis of "war mobilization." This could mean only a further strengthening of the Soviet war machine at all danger points, the Far East included.

THE RED COMMAND

The credit for transforming underpopulated, undeveloped Siberia into a tremendous fortress goes to a man probably no longer alive. Vassilii Bluecher's name last appeared in a laconic Moscow communiqué, announcing his replacement as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet armies in the Far East by General Stern. A persistent rumor later said Bluecher had been tried by the Supreme Military Tribunal in Moscow on charges of espionage for Japan, convicted and disposed of in the customary manner. There has been no confirmation. But long before his disappearance, Bluecher had become a legendary figure from one end of Asia to another. Whether in South China, where he was known as Gah Lin, or in Trans-Baikal, where peasants called him by his first name, Bluecher was loved, feared and respected.

No one knew whence Bluecher came. Official Soviet biographers provided him with a peasant background, of very doubtful genuineness. White Russians said he was an adventurer propelled to fame by the storm of revolution. An enthusiastic German journalist linked him by descent to Marshal Bluecher of Waterloo fame. But whatever his origin, he promptly demonstrated his military genius. In 1920, when Moscow ordered him to the Far East, twenty-two-year-old Bluecher was already Russia's ranking hero. His special assignment was to check Japan's efforts to establish a puppet régime in eastern Siberia.

The Red commander had to be not only a skilled fighter but also a masterful diplomat, as patient and canny as the Japanese. Moscow did not err in selecting Bluecher. Within two years he had defeated the two major Japanese puppets—the burly Cossack Ataman Semenoff and the maniacal Hungarian-Russian Buddhist Baron Ungern. His next step was the establishment of a Soviet Mongolian Republic, which a decade later became part of his command in the Far East.

In 1923 the curtain was suddenly drawn on Bluecher. Rus-

sia was cleared of White and foreign armies and in Petrograd the Communist International was mapping out plans for "World October." The blow to world Imperialism was to be struck in China. The man entrusted by the Comintern with the task of making China red was Michael Borodin-Berg-Gruesenberg, who began his career teaching English and revolutionary methods to Chicago immigrants. His military adviser was a General Galen. A year passed before Galen was identified as Bluecher.

Galen's first act was to organize the Whampoa Military Academy, China's "West Point," where the more intelligent students were taught the rudiments of military science and Communism. In 1926, after training 6,000 officers, equipping an army of 70,000 and infesting China with thousands of skilled agitators, Galen gave the signal for the so-called "Northern Punitive Expedition."

In a month, the revolutionary troops of Generals Galen and Chiang Kai-shek captured Changsha; and a while later, in the stifling, misty heat of the Yangtse, they broke through the walls of Wuchang. But here Borodin and Galen made a fatal slip. They stayed in Wuchang, letting General Chiang continue the drive on Shanghai. With his armies at the gates of Shanghai, Chiang made peace with the city's bankers and broke with the Reds. Borodin and Galen fled from China across the Mongolian steppes in motorcars. Galen's place as General Chiang's chief adviser was taken by Colonel Max Bauer, of the German General Staff, who was later poisoned by his boss's enemies.

Galen, once again known as Bluecher, was promptly sent back to the Far East. There, in 1929, he administered a severe beating to the poorly led, poorly trained Chinese troops of the Manchurian warlord Chang Hsueh-liang. For the victory, Moscow gave Bluecher a conquering hero's reception and pinned more medals on his barrel chest.

In the succeeding years Bluecher built frontier fortifications, developed Siberia's heavy industries and fought bitter border battles with Japan. In 1937 he was appointed one of

the nine judges on the Military Tribunal trying Marshal Tukhachevsky and eight other generals on charges of espionage for Germany. Dutifully, Bluecher voted for the death verdict for the nine men, most of whom had been his intimate friends; and he returned unhappily to the Far East. A year later he disappeared.

With Bluecher's removal, the Far Eastern Army was divided in two. The all-important Maritime Command was given to the thirty-eight-year-old Gregory M. Stern, the son of a Crimean doctor. In his own way, Stern was a figure almost as spectacular as Bluecher. Only brief snatches of his career have been made known; and these never went back beyond 1937. In that year he apparently played an important rôle in directing Loyalist resistance in Spain. In April, 1938, he was recalled to Russia and made Bluecher's chief of staff. The appointment was a prelude to Bluecher's dismissal. With Bluecher purged, Stern, put in command of the First Primorsk Army, directed the Soviet forces in the month-long war at Changkufeng in the summer of 1938. For this he was decorated with the Order of the Red Banner.

When war clouds began to gather over Outer Mongolia, Stern was rushed to the new front. There he led the Soviet forces in the sanguinary four-month struggle with the Japanese Kwantung Army. The distinction he gained in this war placed him in the front ranks of Soviet generals. Thus, when the first thrust into Finland was badly bungled in December, 1939, Stern was ordered to the Finnish front. As second in command to General Ivan Timoshenko, he reorganized the Soviet forces for the final onslaught on the Mannerheim Line.

After the victory was won, Timoshenko became War Commissar and Stern went back to the Far East. He was still there at the beginning of 1941, strengthening defenses in Siberia and Outer Mongolia, training his forces and dreaming of war on Imperialist Japan. A lull reigned on the Soviet-Manchurian border, but Stern knew it could be only an armistice, not peace; and he prepared for new battles.

III

SAMURAI CARVE AN EMPIRE

Chapter Seven

Japan Defies the World

BEFORE TINY HOME shrines, 300,000 tearful Japanese mothers early each morning burn incense to the spirits of their sons who are no more. The brief ceremony is an integral part of the Japanese picture today. The dead boys are the price Japan's mothers have paid for a decade of aggression which brought misery and devastation to her neighbors, claimed five million casualties, re-carved the map of Asia and pushed the Pacific to the brink of a great war. The uniformed boys whose portraits hang at the shrines carried the sword which Japan unsheathed in 1931 and has not sheathed again. They conquered Manchuria and Mongolia. They fought China, Russia and France, and baited Britain. And today their brothers are being drilled for coming conflict with the United States.

The picture of Japan at aggression is fascinating, for blended in it are elements of courage, daring and great ruthlessness, of sacrifice and suffering, of twentieth-century imperialism and eighteenth-century feudalism, of a peculiarly Oriental philosophy and up-to-the-minute Fascism. It is also one of ominous importance to the United States, against whom Japan arms today.

This and the following five chapters deal with the principles and the record of Japan's aggression, her politicians, generals and admirals, the strength of her war machine and,

finally, the means by which the military rule the land. They tell the story of how Japan defies the world.

AGGRESSION: BASIC PRINCIPLES

Japan's foreign policy is drafted with an eye on the Occidental chancelleries—and battlefields. When there is peace abroad, Japan reins her ambitions. Moderates replace jingoists in the Cabinet, and Japanese spokesmen mouth sweet phrases of good will to all men. But the first dark cloud on the western horizon brings a hopeful reshuffle in the Cabinet and a distinct change in the tenor of governmental and press utterances.

Under skilful direction from pressure groups, the normally undemonstrative Japanese fly into a nationalist dither and clamor for Positive Action. Never unresponsive, the Government promptly reformulates its policies in tune with "popular will." But whatever form the new policy takes, its basic principles remain unaltered. These are as nearly immutable as they can be in a world of ceaseless flux. In their effect upon Japan's course they are comparable to America's Monroe Doctrine or Britain's doctrine of control of the seas.

The first of these fundamental principles is domination of China. Today the horizon of Japanese aggression stretches to the South Seas. But no land that she might covet there would rival China in importance. Japan *might* fight the democracies for Indo-China or the Netherlands East Indies; ¹ for the control of China she would fight without a moment's hesitation. To the Japanese man-in-the-street, China is as inalienably Japan's as is his own little garden. For both he would

1. The Federation of Japanese University Professors conducted, in July, 1940, a poll of parents and guardians of students in Tokyo. The three questions and the answers were: 1. Should Japan fight the United States if the latter obstructs the Japanese program in the Netherlands East Indies? Yes—6,428; No—1,334. 2. Do you prefer Germany or Britain as the victor? Germany—9,697; Britain—344. 3. Should Japan be involved in the European war? No—7,255; Yes—1,508.—*The New York Post*, July 6, 1940.

don his uniform and battle the greedy "Occidental oppressors."

The second basic factor is Japan's fear of Russia, whether under the tzars or the Soviets. Tokyo's insurance against Russia is invariably an understanding with a European nation or bloc upon which it can call in the hour of woe. In the first two decades of this century an alliance with Britain was Japan's assurance of support. Since 1936—with a brief lapse in 1939—an accord with the Rome-Berlin Axis has filled the bill.

The third factor is Japan's boundless confidence in her own strength and mission, and a conviction that disharmony is inherent in the ranks of her Occidental rivals. In the strength of these beliefs Japan will neither retreat before bluff nor play second fiddle within the Axis. Japan cannot forget that she seized Manchuria in 1931 in the face of opposition from the entire world, Germany and Italy included. She feels that today, with the globe aflame, aggression would entail even lesser risks.

Against the background of these three basic factors, Japan has drawn her pattern of conquest. Masked as a "mission to establish lasting peace in East Asia" or as a "crusade against Communism," it has become the Alpha and Omega of the Japanese foreign policy. Japan's leaders, inebriated with their own slogans and propaganda, with their confidence in the nation's armed might, with their contempt for the weakened democracies, reach out for more and more new territory. Appeasement cannot check this attrition of ambition. On the contrary, it invites new conquests. The only answer Japan will take is war. And for the United States there appears to be no escape from involvement in the holocaust.

TECHNIQUE OF AGGRESSION: I

Geography conspired with psychology and politics to make China Japan's favorite victim—and the major bone of American-Japanese contention. When Japan came of age in 1890,

she saw China sprawled all over the mainland—rich, weak and harassed by the Western powers. To the empire-builders in Tokyo, China thus became a temptation to aggression. With new foreign bases strung along the coast, China also appeared to be a threat to Japan's security.

The blow was struck in 1894. Japan's little modern navy, her new weapons and her well-trained army had things their own way. A week before the war was declared, Captain Heihachiro Togo attacked and heavily damaged three Chinese men-of-war and sank a British freighter carrying 1,000 Chinese soldiers. As the vessel went down, Togo's ship lowered life-boats, picked up the British captain, machine-gunned the Chinese struggling in the water. While London fumed over this "act of piracy" and demanded Togo's "condign punishment," Japan acclaimed him as a hero. Today he is known as Japan's "Lord Nelson."

The rest of the war was very brief. Nippon's booty included Formosa, the Liaotung Peninsula, the Pescadores, a heavy indemnity and a declaration of Korea's "independence" of China.

Alarmed by the Japanese gains, Russia, Germany and France joined hands. Tokyo was forced to disgorge the strategically important Liaotung Peninsula. As soon as China regained control of the territory, Russia obtained a twenty-five-year lease on it. Japan never forgave this "treachery."

In 1904, as Russian influence crept into Korea—where the Grand Duke had secured rich forest concessions—Japan struck at her powerful neighbor. Undermined by corruption, inefficiency and revolution, and fighting 10,000 miles from its bases, the Russian Army was no match for the Japanese war machine. The victory gave Japan a secure foothold in Korea and South Manchuria, put in her hands important continental bases at Port Arthur and Dairen, established her firmly as a great Pacific power.

When, five years later, Japan annexed Korea, she received the blessings of Britain and nothing worse than frowns from

other powers. Japan's appetite for conquest was whetted, but the wounds of war with Russia were still fresh. Patience was in order.

Japan's chance came with World War I. With the tide turning against them, the Allied Powers momentarily lost interest in the Far East. To Britain's dismay Japan entered the conflict, captured Germany's Tsingtao, began to eye other German possessions in the Pacific. And taking opportunity where it found it, the alert Foreign Office in Tokyo in the spring of 1915 presented General Yuan Shih-kai, President of the young Chinese Republic, with an ultimatum.

Japan's note, containing the now famous "Twenty-One Demands," asked China to:—Recognize Japan's domination in South Manchuria, eastern Inner Mongolia and the rich province of Shantung; grant Japan economic and railway concessions, and grant none to other nations; employ Japanese political, military and economic advisers and hire no others; administer police in key cities "jointly"; purchase Japanese munitions and railway equipment; "consult" Tokyo on the development of the coastal Fukien Province; and finally, convert the British-controlled Hanyehping Company, the great iron and steel works near Hankow, into a "joint" Sino-Japanese concern.

Venial as the Chinese officials in Peking were, even they could not openly accept this demand for China's conversion into a Japanese colony. The wrangling went on for four months. On May 7, 1915, exasperated Japan presented Yuan with a forty-eight-hour ultimatum. Given no support by the Western powers, Yuan capitulated, signed the Japanese demands.

Bluff had made its successful debut on the Pacific scene. Without shedding a drop of blood Japan had obtained a protectorate over portions of Manchuria and Mongolia, and over two prosperous coastal provinces. She had also gained control over China's foreign and military policies.

Still the powers dared not call a halt to Japan. When, late

in 1915, London asked Peking to enter the war, Tokyo vetoed the move. Japan did not intend to allow China to organize a strong army, which could later be used to defend national sovereignty. Only in 1917, when China had been weakened by internal strife and Japan had extracted from the allies secret pledges of support for her claims at the peace conference, did Tokyo assent to China's entry into the war.

Once the United States joined the Allies, she too appeared disinclined to offend Japan. Thus in November, 1917, Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, exchanged with Viscount Ishii notes recognizing Japan's "special interests" in China, in view of the two countries' "territorial propinquity." Lansing later, a little shamefacedly, explained his recognition of Japan's special economic interests as "an axiom and nothing more." But his motives, and the motives of all other Allied powers, were clear. Germany had just launched her terrifying submarine campaign and the outcome of the war was far from certain. Japan could not expediently be alienated.

Germany's defeat brought reassurance to Britain and the United States. With the peace treaty signed, the two nations turned the weapon of bluff against Japan herself. Although triumphant in World War I, Japan could not hold on to all her gains. Intimidated by the show of Anglo-American solidarity, she took part in the Washington Conference and agreed to barter her continental booty for naval security.

At Washington Japanese delegates signed away the far-reaching concessions their colleagues had wrested from frightened President Yuan seven years earlier. All that Japan salvaged were the former German islands north of the equator, a 3-5-5 naval ratio and a lusty appetite for another Chinese repast.

TECHNIQUE OF AGGRESSION: II

Ever since Japan defeated Russia on the Manchurian battlefields in 1904-'05, she has harbored a proprietary interest in

the region. In the twenty-five years following that war, Japan poured millions of yen into the industrial development of Manchuria, built railways, developed harbors and kept a Chinese warlord—the reformed bandit Chang Tso-lin. When the latter became too independent he was “liquidated.” His place was taken by his opium-smoking son, “Young Marshal” Chang Hsueh-liang. Soon he in turn showed signs of independence, and began to respond to the friendly advances of the Nationalist Government.

The faithlessness of the Changs was not, of course, the sole reason for the seizure of Manchuria. There were many other causes. The Japanese super-trusts which invested money in the gigantic South Manchuria Railway Company wished to halt the construction of competing Chinese lines. The Army wanted to establish a base for an attack on Russia. Army heads also wanted to create a safety valve for the emotions of the ultra-patriotic officers, who were slaughtering Japanese statesmen with much skill and little mercy. It was further desired to forestall the expected liberal victory in the autumn elections.

The plot was hatched by the Kwantung Army, garrisoning Manchuria, with the aid of firebrands in Tokyo and Korea. Troops at key points were given “Stand By” orders. “Incidents”—a word made sinister by Japanese usage—began to occur with alarming regularity. In July, 1931, there were gruesome riots in Manchuria and Korea. In August Tokyo announced the murder in Manchuria two months earlier of a Captain Nakamura, a spy.

The Nakamura case was seized upon by the extremists to whip up public sentiment favoring “positive action.” Patriotic fever in Japan ran so high that on September 6, 1931, the worried “Young Marshal” secretly ordered his troops not to resort to force, whatever the provocation. The order was useless.

On the night of September 18, a small bomb exploded on, or near, railway tracks near Mukden. The blast was bungled,

and a train passing over the spot soon afterwards arrived in Mukden on time and with its passengers recalling no jolts. Normally, an explosion of this type would not have merited more than a three-line item in a newspaper. This, however, was a very special explosion, arranged for a specific purpose.

Within a few hours Kwantung Army units were on the march in entire southern Manchuria. An American expert with the League of Nations' Lytton Commission, which investigated the Manchurian incident, told me that the Japanese troops had left Dairen for Mukden even before the bomb went off. He described it as an instance of "imperial premonition."

The Chinese resistance was half-hearted and unorganized. Within four days most of the major Manchurian cities were occupied, and within four months Chinese troops had fled south of the Great Wall. While the League of Nations blustered and threatened, the Japanese pushed on. The Chinese Governor of Jehol fled, taking with him his harem and a fleet of opium-laden trucks.

Claiming that the concentration of defeated Chinese troops in North China threatened the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria, the Japanese Army crossed the Great Wall and drove towards Tientsin. In the dusty little town of Tangku, on May 31, 1933, the Chinese and the Japanese signed a truce agreement. This infamous accord demilitarized a large strip between Peiping and the Great Wall and gave the Japanese the right to send planes over the area to check up on the Chinese.

The Japanese promptly converted this provision into a wedge to pry the North China doors open to Japanese infiltration and to shut the "Open Door" to foreigners. The demilitarized zone became a haven for opium smugglers and contrabandists. In 1935 it gave refuge to the puppet East Hopei Autonomous Anti-Communist Government, used by the Japanese to undermine Chinese authority in North China.

The Japanese strategy was simple. The Tangku Agreement was the first of a series of "accords" forced upon the Chi-

nese local authorities. Deliberately vague, they gave the Japanese great latitude in interpretation. Each interpretation extended the scope of the agreement, tightening the Japanese stranglehold on North China.

The Japanese rode to success on two words: "sincerity" and "incident." As soon as its first soldier crossed the Great Wall, the Japanese command began to demand of the Chinese officialdom a demonstration of "sincerity." In the Japanese military vocabulary this word was made synonymous with a "desire to co-operate" with the Japanese Army in subjugating North China.*

"Insincerity" automatically produced "incidents." An "incident" had a wide scope. It could be the murder of a Japanese newspaperman, a Korean contrabandist or a Chinese puppet official. It could be the detention of a Japanese drug peddler, prostitute or spy, or the seizure of a Japanese smuggling ship. It could be a Chinese editorial doubting the divine descent of the Emperor, or the failure of Chinese policemen to take their shoes off in searching a Japanese opium den.

The strangest "incident" in my memory dealt with a pear core. A piece of core sailed out the window of a Chinese dance hall and hit a passing Japanese marine on the helmet. The building was immediately surrounded, the owner arrested, the dancers cross-examined. None confessed. Many hours later the dancers were released. The owner was taken to the Japanese headquarters. A protracted grilling produced no signs of "insincerity." Still, a culprit was needed to soothe the hurt Japanese dignity.

The Chinese authorities received a demand for official apologies. To display their "sincerity," they agreed. The terrorized dance-hall owner was ordered to appear at the headquarters daily until the real culprit was found, tender his own private apologies and salute the Japanese flag. I do not know how long his ordeal lasted. If the Japanese themselves did not release him from the obligation—because of the universal

* See pages 32, 50.

guffaw—the man probably fled to his native village. When the Sino-Japanese war broke out the dance hall was levelled to the ground.

The Chinese officials never had the audacity to treat "incidents" lightheartedly. The Kwantung Army hovered on the other side of the Great Wall and seemed to miss no opportunity for a thrust southward. Faced by such capacity for persuasion, Chinese warlords met the Japanese demands with alacrity. A few who to the bitter end remained "insincere," met with "incidents" and were forced to retire to other climes. Thus aggression continued on its merry way, paying heavy returns in political power and increased trade, and encountering no resistance from Japan's western rivals.

TECHNIQUE OF AGGRESSION: III

In July, 1937, the Japanese command decided to convert North China into another Manchukuo. The Chinese warlords seemed eager to oblige, but their troops, propagandized by student and Communist agitators, rebelled. With a more intelligent handling by the Japanese Army, the trouble could have been averted and North China annexed promptly and more or less peacefully.

There was arrogance in Japanese hearts, however, and a conviction that a little bloodshed and a stern mien would ensure future tranquility. But once bloodshed started, there was no way to check it. With each Chinese concession the Japanese demands mounted. With Japanese ultimatums on their heels, the Chinese units evacuated one town after another. Each withdrawal led only to fresh demands.

The story of the four weeks immediately following the Marco Polo Bridge incident*—which heralded the opening of the war—does not make pleasant reading. Imperialism is never pretty. Here, at the gates of Peiping, it was at its ugliest. Arrogance, deception and the sword marched hand in

* See page 84.



JAPAN SPREADS OUT

To the south lie bases, markets, natural riches—and the hospitable seas of which she is undisputed mistress.

hand for the glory of Japan. Inflamed by the students—who themselves were being hounded by the Chinese police—a few Chinese army units attempted to make a stand. They did not have a chance. The Japanese war machine functioned with the relentlessness of a meat grinder. Chinese troops were slaughtered, often without seeing their enemy.

All through this period Tokyo insisted that the clashes were a "local incident." The Chinese Government was "advised"—often in a peremptory tone of voice—to make no move. Many leaders in Nanking were inclined to comply. But the groups favoring resistance could not be held in curb. General Chiang Kai-shek decided to put an end to the ceaseless nibbling of Chinese territory. Troops were ordered north. In Shanghai preparations were launched to tackle the Japanese.

The war was on. Tokyo predicted victory in three months. Nanking said it would be a war of attrition, in which Japan would collapse of exhaustion within three years. The Chinese were better prophets. In 1941 the war still was on, with the Japanese desperately seeking a solution that would free their hands for the next stage in armed aggression—conquest in the South Seas.

AGGRESSION: POLICY

The Japanese diplomats have traditionally trudged far behind the soldiers. And their policies, no less traditionally, have been rationalizations of conquests. Thus it has become possible to predict Japan's foreign policy by studying the Army's actions and utterances of a year or two earlier.

The course of Tokyo's policy in the past decade has been marked by four mileposts—official expositions of the aims and philosophy of aggression. Their most striking feature was the growth of Japan's objectives from dominance in China alone to supremacy in entire East Asia.

The first milepost was the "Hands off China" statement of suave, brilliant Foreign Office spokesman Eiji Amau on April

18, 1934. The declaration, which had all the effects of a bomb-shell, was Japan's first formal warning to her rivals that she intended to branch out south from Manchuria. Stressing Japan's "special position" in China, this declaration asserted that China *alone* shared with Japan the responsibility of maintaining peace in East Asia; and Amau hammered on Tokyo's determination to carry out its mission:

We oppose any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan. . . . Any joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers, even in the name of technical or financial assistance . . . are bound to acquire political significance. . . . Japan . . . must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle. . . .

Supplying China with war airplanes, building airdromes in China, and detailing military instructors or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to alienate friendly relations between Japan, China and other countries, and to disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects. . . .

Place this statement in its proper setting. Having recovered from the blows of 1931-'32, China was beginning the work of rehabilitation. She was also quietly and efficiently laying the foundation for a modern war machine. Japan was not prepared to watch China's growing strength with equanimity.

The West, on the other hand, hailed China's rebirth. To Berlin, as to Washington, London and Rome, the process signified increased trade and new opportunities for safe investment. There was an international race for the privilege of rearming and training China. Again this was much less a question of anti-Japanese design than of dollars and cents. The power which supplied General Chiang with advisers could be assured of orders for aircraft, arms, machines, ships and locomotives. Britain focused her interest on banking and communications. Germany secured a virtual monopoly on military training. Italy and the United States shared the

not unremunerative privilege of building up a new air force.

A few weeks before Amau's statement there were reports of a loan to China by an international banking consortium. Japan at first demanded a share of participation, "as the power principally interested in the Far East." Later she changed her mind and announced she would permit no "political" loans. With the Army drumming a steady tattoo on the "crisis" facing Japan, Tokyo was not prepared to countenance foreign "intrigue" in next-door China. Amau's warning was the voice of the Army.

Japan's rivals met the Amau statement with protests. The reaction was so unmistakable that Tokyo was taken aback. The declaration was explained away as a "trial balloon"—and filed for future use.

Twenty-one months passed before Tokyo erected another milepost. The builder this time was Foreign Minister Koki Hirota, also a brilliant apologist for Japanese aggression and a faithful member of the ultra-nationalist "Black Dragon" Society. The twenty-one months were laden with events. "Incidents" followed each other with clocklike precision. Each incident enabled the Japanese commanders to shuffle about the Chinese forces in North China, to reshape its administration, to seize control of North China's economic resources, and to stifle all spirit of opposition, whether in the form of political movements or textbooks.

In delivering each blow the Japanese officer responsible invariably depicted it as an integral part of Japan's continental policy. In Tokyo, however, Amau blandly denied knowledge of any policy-making activities on the mainland. The accords forced by the Army commanders upon the browbeaten Chinese, he asserted, were merely local military agreements. The demands grew in scope and number until they affected the fate of a hundred million Chinese. Still, to official Tokyo this was a "local development, of which we have no knowledge."

November, 1935, was a stormy month in China. On the

first day of the month an assassin, masquerading as a photographer, seriously wounded Premier Wang Ching-wei. In view of his unconcealed sympathies towards Japan, Tokyo immediately interpreted the attack as an act of "anti-Japanese terrorism." Two days later China announced important currency reforms. Since Sir Frederick Leith-Ross had a hand in their preparation, Tokyo branded them as a Sino-British conspiracy directed against Japan.

In North China, under the expert guidance of Japanese military agents, an "autonomy movement" threatened to deprive China of five provinces. Under this pressure the Chinese Government buckled down. The Cabinet was reshuffled. Of its nine members six were renowned for pro-Japanese sympathies. By a succession of pin pricks—"local incidents"—the Japanese Army had thus forced a reorganization of the Chinese administration and a swing towards Japan.

The Army's policy was bearing fruit. Willy-nilly, the Foreign Office in Tokyo had to sit up and take notice. Mr. Hirota called on War Office chiefs. Out of these consultations emerged the famous "Three Points," which still form the foundation of the Japanese policy in China.

Hirota's milepost was presented to the world on January 21, 1936. Modestly described by their author as "the most obvious and elemental concepts which must underlie the great undertaking of ensuring the stability of East Asia," the Three Points demanded the following:

1. Cessation by China of all unfriendly acts, and active collaboration with Japan.
2. Recognition of Manchukuo and China's co-operation with Japan and the puppet state in the economic development of North China.
3. Suppression of all Communist activities in "our part of the globe."

The details of the new policy were conveyed to Japanese officials in China by special envoys. These emissaries imme-

diately convoked conferences in Dairen, Tientsin and Shanghai. Every effort was made to produce an air of ominous mystery. The reconstituted Chinese Cabinet, properly impressed, indicated its readiness to discuss the whole gamut of the Sino-Japanese relations on the basis of the Three Points.

There seemed to be no way out for China. Late in January, 1936, I air-mailed from Nanking a dispatch to *The Washington Post*, reporting that "neither economically nor politically is China now in a position to challenge Japan's policies. . . . The only factor which may in any way change the cycle of events [is] a serious domestic upheaval in Japan herself. . . ." The dispatch was near-prophetic. It was published on February 27, 1936, on the editorial page. The front page carried banner headlines on the mutiny, twenty-four hours earlier, of 1,400 soldiers in Tokyo and the assassination of Government and Army leaders. The revolt put a wrench in the Japanese military wheels, temporarily slowed up aggression in China.

AGGRESSION POLICY: (II)

By hook or crook, China continued to stall off the Japanese demands for the next year and a half. The Japanese Army carried on its "Manchukuoization" of North China. This process, however, was carried on without the desired blessings from the Chinese Government. To the Japanese military mind, the only way to ensure complete control seemed to lie in an impressive armed demonstration before the gates of Peiping. Thus in July, 1937, came the Marco Polo Bridge clash—and war.

But victory proved to be a will-o'-the-wisp. China's great cities fell but China did not surrender. Meanwhile, the failure of Japan's rivals to take firm action in defense of their interests encouraged further ventures in this direction.

In November, 1938, therefore, came the third milepost in Japan's policy—Prince Fumimaro Konoye's "New Order"

declaration. The statement boldly defined Tokyo's objective as complete domination of East Asia, to the exclusion of all her rivals. It was another Amau doctrine, applied to a wider field. Said Konoye:

It is undisputed history that China heretofore has been a victim of [imperialist] rivalry. . . . Japan realizes the need of fundamentally rectifying such a state of affairs and she is eager to see a new order established in East Asia. . . .

Japan is in no way opposed to collaboration with foreign Powers, nor does she desire to impair their legitimate rights and interests. If the Powers, understanding her true motives, will formulate *policies adapted to the new conditions*, Japan will be glad to co-operate with them. . . .

Germany and Italy, our allies against Communism, have manifested their sympathies with Japan's aims in East Asia. . . . It is necessary for Japan not only to strengthen still further her ties with these countries but also to *collaborate with them on the basis of a common world outlook in the reconstruction of world order*. . . .

It is high time that all of us should face squarely our responsibilities—namely, the mission to *construct a new order on a moral basis—a free union of all the nations of East Asia, in mutual reliance*, but in independence. . . .²

Out of Japan's war on China a more ambitious program for the control of the entire western Pacific was thus emerging. And its basic principles were a closer union with the Axis powers and a Japanese-dominated "union" of the Asiatic peoples.

A few days later Prince Konoye amplified his statement with a set of terms on which Japan was ready to make peace with General Chiang Kai-shek. Known as the "December 22nd Statement," the declaration became the basis of a "peace treaty" signed two years later by Japan's puppet régime in Nanking. Konoye called on China to:—Recognize Manchukuo; join the anti-Comintern pact; permit the stationing of Japanese troops in certain areas in China "to fight Com-

2. The italics, in all cases, are mine.

munism"; designate Inner Mongolia as a "special anti-Communist area"; and give the Japanese every facility to develop China's natural resources.

Less than a fortnight later Konoye retired from the political scene. When he returned to it in 1940 the war in China still raged on. Elsewhere, however, the picture had been radically altered. Hitler ruled over Europe, England was being devastated by air raiders, and Washington was launching a desperate program of rearmament which was not to be completed before 1944. The Golden Opportunity for which Japan had hopefully waited for so long had finally arrived.

New opportunities obviously invited new aggression. New conquests called for a new policy. Thus in June, 1940—soon after the fall of Paris—the Foreign Office in Tokyo erected its fourth great milestone. This took the form of Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita's "Greater Asia" statement. Said Mr. Arita:

All mankind longs for peace, but peace cannot endure unless nations have their proper places. Since this is difficult in the present stage of human progress, the next best thing is *for peoples who are related geographically, racially, culturally and economically to form spheres of their own.*

The countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are . . . very closely related. They are *destined to co-operate and minister to each other's needs* for their common well-being and prosperity. . . .

This system presupposes the *existence of a stabilizing force in each region with which as the center the peoples within that region will secure their co-existence and co-prosperity as well as the stability of their sphere.* . . .³

Anticipating by a year Germany's official division of the world into four major spheres of influence, Arita had proclaimed Japan's hegemony over entire East Asia, from Manchuria to the South Seas.

Control of China was still the major objective. Japan's

3. The italics, in all cases, are mine.

aims there remained unaltered in a quarter of a century—as witness the striking similarity between the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 and Prince Konoye's "peace terms" of 1938. But Japan was no longer content with China alone. She sought new fields of conquest—at the expense of the democracies.

AGGRESSION: FRIENDS AND FOES

Japan expects the great fight for the Pacific to begin before the end of 1942.

Under the terms of the triple Axis military alliance of September, 1940, she designated the United States as her major foe. President Roosevelt, in turn, named Japan as one of the United States' three enemies in his "Arsenal for the Democracies" speech in January, 1941.

Following the signing of the Axis accord, seldom a day passed without a political or economic skirmish between Tokyo and the United States. Japan further tightened restrictions in China, set up a puppet government in Nanking, invaded Indo-China, presented demands to Batavia and fired a verbal barrage at the democracies. The latter retaliated with large-scale financial aid to China, a tentative agreement for naval collaboration in the South Seas, diplomatic and military assistance to the Netherlands Indies, embargo on the exports of strategic raw materials to Japan, re-opening of the Burma Road and the strengthening of their bases in the southwestern Pacific.

It has always been known that the outbreak of fighting in Europe would automatically sharpen the Japanese-American friction. Japan began to prepare for the Pacific showdown long before World War II. Her vast rearmament program antedated the American decision to build a two-ocean navy by at least two years.

The main cause of Japan's friction with Britain could be expressed in one sentence: Japan wanted to be the sole heir

to the British Empire in Asia. The American-Japanese differences were far more varied, and each of them was a potential *casus belli*. Japan felt that her crusade in China was being seriously hindered by the United States. By 1941 American aid to the Chinese Government had assumed proportions which, for the first time, made Tokyo consider the possibility of eventual defeat.

Of retreat from China there could be no thought. Such an inglorious withdrawal would have had even graver repercussions at home than abroad. Peace with the Chinese Government—peace on almost any terms saving Japan's face—seemed unattainable. Thus, the only solution for the Chinese puzzle appeared to lie in war on the United States, which bolstered China's resistance.

War also seemed to offer the most effective means of overcoming American opposition to conquest in the South Seas. The barriers erected by Washington in the Japanese path were steadily rising in 1941. Japan found them blocking her way in the Dutch East Indies and Burma, in Australia, Malaya and the Philippines. It seemed unreasonable to Tokyo that Washington should object to the establishment in Asia of the same "Monroe Doctrine" that it had imposed upon the Americas. And the Japanese vehemently denied the American charge that their concept of hemispheric co-operation for the Asiatic peoples was a doctrine of enslavement. Japan, they claimed, had merely advanced so far beyond the economic and political level of other Asiatic nations that her tutelary rôle was inevitable.

On the other hand the Japanese, from Government leaders to the humblest Man-in-the-Street, felt that the United States had no business meddling with Asiatic affairs. Foreign Minister Matsuoka clothed this idea in official verbiage in warning the United States that "our [respective] political efforts had better be restricted only to those spheres in which we are vitally interested and not extended to other peoples' domains."

It was on this occasion that Matsuoka, hinting that Japan would fight the United States the moment the latter entered World War II, cried: "I beseech my American friends to think twice, thrice, nay, a thousand times, before they take the leap that may prove fatal to all humanity."

The final major point of Japanese-American friction was strategic. The 5-5-3 naval ratio had been junked by Tokyo even before the invasion of China in 1937. Japan felt that any restrictions on her naval might were unfair to her status as a great power. Between 1937 and 1941 she therefore made every effort to reach parity. This was achieved both through secret shipbuilding and the acquisition of bases in Indo-China and China. By 1911 Japan enjoyed supremacy in the western Pacific.

But Japan felt that her position was being seriously threatened by the building of the two-ocean navy and the steady penetration of the southwestern Pacific by an American fortified wedge. The American outposts strung across the Pacific from Hawaii to the Philippines were rapidly being strengthened. Singapore and Sydney were regarded in Tokyo as great United States bases. There was also little doubt that in case of trouble the Dutch East Indies would throw their facilities open to the American Navy. Were this process allowed to continue, the attainment of Japan's objectives in the southwestern Pacific would have become impossible long before 1946.

Tokyo was convinced, on the other hand, that America would soon be drawn into the European war. This seemed to offer an unprecedented opportunity to Japan to strike both at the United States and the poorly defended countries in the South Seas. With Britain completely out of the Asiatic picture and with the United States—not yet at the peak of her strength—preoccupied in Europe, victory was a certainty to the optimists in Tokyo.

As 1941 drew on, Japan's relations with Russia were condi-

tioned by these preparations for war on the United States and Britain. If there could be "natural" enemies, Russia was Japan's "natural" foe. Tokyo felt that the Soviets were poaching upon its sphere of influence. With justice, Japan charged Moscow with obstructing the conquest of Manchuria and China proper. But as long as opportunity beckoned in the South Seas, Japan could not permit herself the luxury of fighting Russia. Thus, the outbreak of World War II had found Tokyo seeking better relations with her powerful neighbor. Border clashes in Manchuria were ended, as if by a magic wand. The Japanese press was muzzled; so were the ultra-nationalists. And, as a climactic move, the nation's most virulent jingoist, General Tatekawa, was appointed Ambassador to Russia.*

Moscow, in a matching display of political cynicism, received the new envoy, who only yesterday was the favorite target of Russian ridicule, with open arms. The Kremlin, too, was anxious to avoid trouble in the Pacific while Hitler was on the loose in Europe. The wily Soviet diplomats soon discovered, however, that they could achieve their ends merely by keeping Japan in suspense.

Thus there developed early in 1941 an air of acute uncertainty about Russo-Japanese relations. Tokyo sourly admitted that it was making no progress at all in its negotiations with Moscow, but still took every care to prevent a relapse to former friction. The Japanese Navy hesitated to strike in the South Seas while Russia remained an enigma. The Army still kept 300,000 men in Manchuria to watch Russia. And all fervently hoped that Russia—both in fear of Germany and in pursuance of her policy of non-involvement in war—would remain neutral if Japan joined the battle against the democracies.

When Foreign Minister Matsuoka set out on his dramatic trip to Europe in March, 1941, one of his major objectives

* See page 92.

was to obtain from the Kremlin a clear statement of policy. Japan wanted to be sure the Soviet war machine would not strike at her when her armed forces went into action in the South Seas. And Japan was ready to swallow momentarily her acute distaste for Communism—and conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia.

In the circumstances closer bonds between Japan and the Rome-Berlin Axis were inevitable. Hitler needed Japan to harry the United States. But Japan needed him even more to keep the Soviets from pouncing on her if she became engaged elsewhere. Tokyo's original accord with Berlin was intended by its Army sponsors to facilitate Japanese aggression in China. Japan's increasing friction with the democracies tightened her bonds with the Axis. It was a process that could be foreseen by all save the apostles of appeasement. Japan wanted control of Asia. The democracies had nothing to offer her that could induce her to give up this ambition. The Axis, on the other hand, had no vital interests in the Pacific and was anxious to encourage Japan's expansion. And its offer was very substantial: support against the democracies.

Japan never doubted that the Axis would emerge victorious from World War II. Even Britain's successful resistance, the Italian reverses in Greece and Africa, and American aid to the democracies failed to dent this conviction. And it seemed common sense to Tokyo to side with the winner. Apart from this consideration, psychology also played its part. Democracy, Western civilization, idealism were—according to the Japanese spokesmen themselves—concepts wholly alien to the Japanese mind. Germany's magnificent military machine, her genius for organization and conquest, her unquenchable lust for power, on the other hand, were clearly comprehensible. Both in his feudal history and in his present environment, the average Japanese found innumerable similarities between his own country and the Reich.

Thus, for spiritual as well as for military and economic

reasons, Japan found her union with Germany of great value, and, with German backing, she continued her march of aggression. Ten years earlier she had defied the world in Manchuria. When no one rose to oppose her, Japan began to redraw the map of the Pacific. It is still being redrawn and Japan is still defiant—though she knows that her great rivals may no longer retreat now before her challenge.

Chapter Eight

Façade for Aggression

MANY ARE THE apologists for Japan's aggression and varied are their pleas. Some defiantly call for war on the democracies to "Emancipate Asia from the Occidental yoke." Others decry international misunderstanding of Japan's aims. Still others clamor for recognition of an Asiatic "Monroe Doctrine," which would enable Japan to expand peacefully and prosper.

None of these spokesmen, whatever his appeals, matches the luster or claims the world-wide audience of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Japan's Premier in the spring of 1941. Tall, handsome (despite his receding chin), soft-spoken and astute, Konoye enjoys immense popularity at home. The masses are awed by his family tree. The conservative, peace-loving elements see in him a champion of the established order and their sole hope of averting a disastrous war with the United States or Russia. The military feel that he is a jingoist at heart and can be swayed completely to their way of thinking.

Abroad, Konoye is regarded—a little uncertainly—as a moderate and an opponent of aggression. Washington and London have repeatedly withheld firm action against Japan in the belief that this would strengthen Konoye's hand against the extremists.

Most of these portraits of Konoye are untrue to life. He was first made Premier in 1937 to act as a buffer—a master conciliator—between Big Business and the Army. In the

succeeding four years he has gradually moved his political belongings from the moderate camp to that of the chauvinists. Today he fancies himself as Japan's own version of a "fuehrer." Actually he is a blind in the Army's political maneuvers—a gilded screen for aggression.

Konoye's first political hue, like that of so many other great Japanese leaders, was pink. Partly this was in emulation of Prince Saionji, one of the makers of modern Japan, who began his career as a socialist. Partly it was the reflection of Konoye's family life. Many years later Konoye thus described his youth:

I was melancholy and perplexed about my future. I read Tolstoy and felt oppressed by the injustice of the world. . . . As a result of his political activities, my father had fallen deeply in debt. While he was active our home was filled with his supporters and my boyish vanity was flattered. After he passed away, they ceased to come. Creditors pressed us for payment. For the first time, I knew what chilly winds blew in this world of ours and I became discontented and spiteful. . . .

Konoye's father was President of the House of Peers and an intimate of the Elder Statesmen who molded Japan's future. For the son of one of the country's leading figures, for a member of the great house of Fujiwara which had supplied so many Empresses, for a man removed only two rungs on the social ladder from the gods who created Japan, it must have been unbearable to be hounded for debt.

Young Konoye thus became a radical. He even transferred to another university so that he could attend lectures by a famous Marxist—since jailed for the sin. Somewhere in the back of his mind, however, Konoye kept a few reservations. While other "pinks" read Marx, Konoye played first base on the university nine and joined the track team. He also managed to acquire a firm belief in State Socialism. Twenty years later he found it easy to swallow Mussolini's doctrine of the Corporate State.

Konoye was graduated with distinction in law, political science and philosophy, and with a feeling of the futility of it all. To Saionji he propounded a fantastic plan of renouncing his title and going to the United States to study and do manual work. In Japan, however, princely talent is not allowed to waste. Saionji dissuaded Konoye, and took the youth as his secretary to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. From France, Konoye returned maturer, more conservative. Under Saionji's watchful eye he took his seat in the House of Peers. In 1931, at the age of forty, he became Vice-President of the House. Two years later he became its head.

When Konoye visited the United States in 1934 he was already regarded as Japan's outstanding statesman, head and shoulders above the usual run of civilian and military politicians from whose ranks rise the country's premiers. His flair for political compromise, his princely descent, even his physical stature—he is just shy of six feet—invited general respect. That year Konoye was yet too young to become a member of the Court group advising the Emperor and pulling political wires. But he was already old enough to be one of Saionji's "bright young men," active behind the scenes.

Konoye's political philosophy still had wide gaps. From his student days he saved morsels of Marxism; from association with practical politics and Big Business he gained a healthy regard for capitalism and its rewards; and the Fighting Services and their controlled press brought to him an increasing awareness of totalitarian ideas.

Another factor in Konoye's political education was the pretentiously named East Asian Common Language Cultural Society, dedicated to the advancement of Japan's imperial ends through cultural propaganda. Appointed president of the society, Konoye began to frequent its headquarters in Tokyo. There the melancholy prince met bold, articulate and jingoist young men—professors, politicians, Army officers, journalists. With these he struck up a strange friendship. He welcomed their company and listened avidly, but

spoke little. The society gave Konoye an understanding of imperialism, respect for the Army, a host of military cronies.

"The Army," he once said, "is drawn from the whole manhood of the nation and is very close to the people. It would be quite impossible, according to the Japanese idea, that so large a part of the national family should not have influence in our affairs. . . ."

"How could the Army be indifferent to farmers' difficulties when it is largely composed of farmers' sons? . . . Our friends abroad need not fear a military dictatorship simply because the Army is deeply concerned with the state of the nation. The Army respects the Constitution. . . ."

But if, in a piece such as this, Konoye sounded like a spokesman of the military, he was not yet actually their mouthpiece. His contacts with the super-trusts and the Court moderates still remained intimate. Together with them he nursed a distrust of a military dictatorship, a belief that imperialism needed its reins as well as its spurs.

In June, 1937, Konoye became Premier. Although he was still reluctant to enter the political free-for-all, the pressure of various groups could no longer be resisted.

By this time the military mutiny of 1936 was a year-old headline, but the storm it had aroused continued to rage. The captains who led the revolt had been shot. The generals who inspired it were still pulling the wires behind the scenes, to the distress of the moderates. The Army was preparing for the invasion of North China. Its "brain trust" was simultaneously drafting blueprints for economic and political regimentation. For all these plans the military needed a screen, a Premier inspiring confidence abroad and devotion at home. The Army felt Konoye filled the bill. With equal assurance Big Business felt he alone could check the Army. As it happened, each was a little wrong. Prince Konoye sanctioned the Chinese adventure, approved the immense rearmament program, forced the totalitarian National Mobilization Bill through the reluctant Diet. But in bowing to the

Army's will, he managed in each case to salvage a little of the old economic laissez-faire, a vestige at least of parliamentary government.

The crisis came in the spring of 1938. The Army demanded regimentation of business at a forced pace and the conclusion of a tight military alliance with Rome and Berlin. Konoye chose to range himself with the moderates. Both in the Diet and in the Cabinet he rose repeatedly to urge caution and to attack Fascism. By fall, however, the Army's voice became too insistent to resist. Konoye rejected the military demands. On January 3, 1939, he handed the premiership over to Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, whose chief virtues were archery and punctuality, and whose vices were his close affiliations with the Army and political terrorists.

Though forced out of the Cabinet, Konoye remained in the limelight. Appointed president of the all-important Privy Council, he became a member of the Court triumvirate which was gradually succeeding the eighty-seven-year-old Elder Statesman Saionji as "Maker of Premiers." In this high post Konoye continued his fight on military alliance with the Axis and on efforts to foment new disputes with the United States and Britain.

He might have remained long in this rôle had not Hitler succeeded in Europe. The initial German victories had a tremendous impact on Japan. They roused anew the Army's craving for conquest, gave a boost to domestic jingoism, revitalized the demand for a regimentation of national life. Its back to the wall, Big Business once again turned to Konoye. He alone seemed capable of playing a St. George to the dragon of Japanese militarism. And this time Konoye was willing to return to the premiership—on certain conditions.

The most important of these was the Army's pledge of non-interference with the Government's policies once they had been decided, and the establishment of a national totalitarian party with Konoye at the head. Gradually and so

skillfully that few realized what he was doing, Konoye was edging himself into the rôle of his nation's savior in a grave emergency—a "fuehrer." And if the leaders of the Army and Big Business sensed the maneuver, they gave no second thought to it. Each still regarded Konoye as its own, heart and soul. Accordingly, both the moderates and the military launched a campaign of "building up" Konoye. The publicity drive continued in full gear for several months until, in midsummer, 1940, in an atmosphere of intense national excitement, Konoye again became Premier.

Konoye's first move was the selection of an intensely jingoist Cabinet, built around a fire-breathing foreign minister and a fascist economic planner. His next move was the creation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, which was to be to Konoye what the National Socialist Party is to Hitler.

To their dismay, the moderates saw Konoye fall in step with the Army. A series of belligerent statements created a chasm between Japan and the United States. The gap was widened in September, 1940, with the conclusion of the long-delayed alliance with the Rome-Berlin Axis. At home, meanwhile, Big Business saw itself being rapidly forced into the military harness.

In 1941 Konoye was still encountering great difficulty in achieving his ambitions. The Army forced him to take Baron Hiranuma into the Cabinet as a "vice-premier." The American embargoes, with the resultant economic crisis, were wrecking Japan's heavy industry. Big Business had wormed its way into the Imperial Assistance Association and was still hindering Konoye's plans for a totalitarian régime. But Konoye remained hopeful. Early in 1941 he told the Diet that he alone was responsible for the outbreak of the war with China and that—because of this responsibility—he was determined to remain in office "so long as I continue to enjoy the confidence of His Majesty."

The Army looked on approvingly. It was comforting to have someone else assume the responsibility for the costly in-

vasion of China. And the generals knew that Konoye would retain his office only as long as he served his purpose as façade for aggression. Once his usefulness was ended, he would again be forced out of office.

THE FIRE EATER: MATSUOKA

Konoye's closest rival for headlines is Yosuke Matsuoka, Foreign Minister in 1941. It would be difficult to find two men more dissimilar. Matsuoka has behind him four decades of active empire building. During these years he has displayed extreme chauvinism, great daring, and cold, impersonal ruthlessness. A man of boundless ambition, he thinks in terms of empires and continents. A great Japan is to him the end that justifies all means—and there are few means he has not employed.

Outwardly, Matsuoka resembles a peaceful, self-contented Nagoya chinaware shop-owner. He is short and stocky, with a tendency towards bulging in the midriff. He has a bristling moustache, closely cropped hair, and sparkling eyes. But appearances are deceptive. Of all Japan's spokesmen he alone possesses the fire of unswerving conviction. And—alone among them—he possesses that compound of mysticism, keen mind and oratorical brilliance requisite to the spokesman of a great imperialist power.

Matsuoka was born in 1880 in Fukuoka, the seat of the Choshu clan which rules the Japanese Army. It is scarcely coincidental that he has always worked hand in glove with the Army, and was chosen to head the Foreign Office when the military made ready for their greatest adventure.

At the age of twelve Matsuoka was sent to the United States to be educated. He went to a grammar school at Oakland, California, a high school in Portland, Oregon, the Law School at the University of Oregon. From the last he was graduated with honors. Short of money, he hoed fields for Japanese truck gardeners, waited on tables, worked in a

Seattle hotel. The work made him hard as nails, enterprising, determined to get ahead.

The American educational system can claim credit for rearing the Occident's bitterest—and ablest—foe. In later years he dipped into his American experience, education and lexicon to justify the Japanese violation of American rights in the Far East.

Matsuoka returned to Japan in 1903 and at once joined the Foreign Service. His first assignment was as consul in Shanghai, and he revelled in his new duties and responsibilities. The empire builder was learning the political ropes. His promotion, however, was slow. He did his job well, but promotion—at the time—was the reward of age, not brilliance. He served as Consul-General in North China and Manchuria, and during the World War was recalled to Tokyo to head the Foreign Ministry's Information Bureau. The man holding this post acts as Japan's spokesman. His is the voice heard by the Westerners by way of the morning newspaper. Matsuoka was a good spokesman. So good, in fact, that in quick succession the Foreign Minister and the Premier asked him to serve as their secretary.

Like Konoye, Matsuoka was sent to the Versailles Conference in 1919. He returned with his latent contempt for the Occident fortified, and with a conviction that sooner or later Japan would assert herself over her rivals. His next job gave him his cue. He became a director of the octopus South Manchuria Railway Company, which he himself later described as the "East India Company" of Japan. The "mission" of the concern, he once said, was to convert Manchuria into Japanese armor against Russian attack. With the company he remained for a decade, doing the spadework for the conquest of Manchuria. He acquired a thorough knowledge of the Chinese people, experience in handling billion-yen projects, intimate contacts with military leaders.

In 1931, finally, the Kwantung Army seized Manchuria. While the democracies waved their arms in Geneva and the

war spread to Shanghai, Toyko found Matsuoka a valuable man. He not only possessed a supple intellect and a first-hand knowledge of Manchuria, but also the ability to convey his ideas to the foreigners in their own clichés. Accordingly, Matsuoka was ordered to Shanghai as an envoy extraordinary in charge of press relations. From his glib tongue came the most persuasive defense of Japanese aggression; out of his easy, "man-to-man" contacts with foreign correspondents many a Japanese argument found its way into the press abroad.

Tokyo had good reasons to admire Matsuoka's work. And when the Japanese diplomats in Geneva were found incapable of holding their ground against the fluent, able Chinese spokesmen, Matsuoka was rushed to Europe to present the Japanese case before the League—and the world. He had no better luck in swaying the international public mind than his predecessors. But he, at least, contributed to the historical session the glitter and drama which it otherwise lacked. Some foreign correspondents later described him as illogical. One, Clarence Streit, branded him a "pathological case." But none could deny either Matsuoka's great ability or his extraordinary gift of oratory. In March, 1933, Matsuoka defiantly led his delegation out of the League. Although the world did not realize it, he had written the League's death warrant.

At home Matsuoka received the welcome of a conquering hero; twenty thousand cheering patriots met him at the docks, and Imperial messengers solemnly presented him with gifts of *sake* and fish. It was a reception to turn anyone's head. Matsuoka went to his Tokyo residence, famous for its priceless collection of Oriental art, to await the Imperial command to form a new Cabinet. The command did not come. It was assassination time in Japan, and there seemed little to choose between the philosophy of the patriotic killers and Matsuoka's own.

Matsuoka felt grievously offended: the country had failed

to appreciate his services. He decided to awaken the nation to its ills, cures and responsibilities. Matsuoka's motto was "One Emperor, One Nation, One Party." A motto upholding a single fascist party did not enhance his popularity in the Diet. Resigning his seat, he started stumping the country in the interest of ultra-nationalist, anti-capitalist "reforms," and made a couple of propaganda movies. In one of these he shared the klieglights with two other noted jingoists, General Araki and Admiral Suetsugu.

His reward came from the Army. The Kwantung Army's plans for the militarization of Manchuria demanded vigorous support from the South Manchuria Railway Company. Its president could not supply it. He was jettisoned and Matsuoka was offered the post. Under Matsuoka's guidance, the company doubled its capitalization to nearly \$200,000,000, spread its tentacles into every corner, every field of endeavor in Manchuria. It poured funds into the expansion of coal and iron mines, into steel mills, into the liquefaction of coal, into the cultivation of the soya bean, the construction of cities, highways and rail lines, into a thousand and one other projects.

Like many another Japanese empire builder, Matsuoka knew that sooner or later North China would be drawn into Nippon's political and economic orbit. As early as 1935 the technical staff of the South Manchuria Railway Company at various points south of the Great Wall was multiplied fifty-fold over the preceding year. Matsuoka's men were studying the lay of the land which was soon to become Japan's own.

Matsuoka himself began to lose interest in Manchuria. The rich areas stretching to the south beckoned temptingly. He began to urge the Government to allow the South Manchuria Railway to monopolize the economic development of North China. The Government, torn between fear of the Army and a desire to serve Big Business (which did not want Matsuoka to poach upon its Chinese preserves), temporized.

Matsuoka hailed the invasion of China in 1937. It was an-

other step forward in Japan's destiny. It also seemed a boon to his personal fortunes. Promptly he proposed to the Government to merge all the railways in Manchuria and North China, with himself as the economic "fuehrer" of the newly conquered territory.

But while Tokyo was studying the plan, Manchuria was going through a mild revolution. It had finally dawned on the Kwantung Army that its ambitious five-year industrial plan was being "sabotaged" by the super-trusts. The conquest of North China, by opening new avenues of investment, threatened to dry further the funds trickling into Manchuria. Something had to be done at once, and the Kwantung Army decided to sacrifice Matsuoka. It was already frowning upon his activities in North China. There seemed to be enough work to do in Manchuria, without crossing the Great Wall.

This is what the Army did: it sheared most of the heavy industries off the South Manchuria Railway Company. Matsuoka was offered the direction of the purely railroad enterprises. The industries—steel, iron, coal, automobiles, aluminum and aircraft—were bunched together in a \$120,000,000 monopoly concern. While the super-trusts were allowed to buy shares in the new firm, the presidency was given to a rising figure in the Japanese financial world, Yoshisuke Aikawa, who had begun his career as a miner in Japan and a steel-roller in the United States. By pyramiding investments upon a broad base of munitions, he had become the most prominent of the new crop of "robber barons." His \$50,000,000 Japan Industry Company now became the nucleus of the new Manchuria Heavy Industries Company.

Matsuoka was distressed. He hoped, however, to regain his exalted position in North China. Months passed. The squabble for the North China spoils developed into an open battle involving Matsuoka, one of his faithless ex-subordinates, and the super-trusts. Lacking the proper political connections, Matsuoka lost out. Downcast, he went back to Manchuria to manage his mutilated enterprise. But his

position had become unbearable. He resigned in March, 1939, and returned to Tokyo to await a political crisis that would bring the ultra-nationalists to the fore.

The Golden Opportunity came only sixteen months later. When Prince Konoye sailed into power on the wings of Hitlerian victories in July, 1940, he brought with him a group of fascists from Manchuria. Among them was Matsuoka. Within a week Matsuoka unburdened himself of this warning to Britain and the United States:

Our immediate aim is to establish a Greater East Asia chain of common prosperity, with the Japan-Manchukuo-China group as one of its links. . . . In concert with those friendly powers which are prepared to co-operate with us, we should strive with courage and determination for the fulfilment of the ideal and heaven-ordained mission of our country. . . . The Government will not make vain efforts to grasp the hands of countries which cannot be made friends. The Government is through with toadying. . . .

Almost simultaneously envoys were rushed to Europe to conclude a military alliance with Germany and Italy—an alliance expressly directed against the United States.

In 1941, when relations between Japan and the United States came to a near-breaking point, Matsuoka declared that there can be no peace with the United States until the latter "comprehends Japan's ideals in East Asia." And, to make matters plain, he defined these ideals as the establishment of Japan's hegemony over the entire western Pacific.

Late in March, 1941, Matsuoka spent four days in Berlin, conferring with Hitler and Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on concerted action against the democracies. He had thus become a major cog in the world totalitarian machine.

SMALL FRY OF AGGRESSION

Matsuoka's closest adviser in the diplomatic defense of aggression is an embittered, alcoholic man named Toshio

Shiratori, who has long been the favorite victim of ill fortune.

Consistently jingoist, Shiratori has always been too far ahead of Japan's policy to gain recognition from Cabinet-makers. He was the first of the fire-eating spokesmen who adorned the Foreign Office after the invasion of Manchuria; he introduced insult and invective into Japan's diplomatic language. Yet these achievements brought him nothing but notoriety. To the man-in-the-street he was known mainly as the man who once, under the influence of *sake*, bashed a Japanese ambassador on the head with a stool. His enemies were many, and his promotion slow.

It was only in 1938 that Shiratori received his chance. Appointed Ambassador to Rome, he promptly joined hands with the Ambassador to Berlin, Lieutenant General Hiroshi Oshima, in efforts to forge a Rome-Berlin-Tokyo military axis. Backed by the Army, these two men pursued their maneuvers often in direct violation of Foreign Office orders; nor did any Foreign Minister possess the courage to fire the rebellious envoys.

Shiratori's career was spiked by Hitler. The Russo-German accord, halting the pro-Axis agitation in Japan, deprived both Shiratori and Oshima of their posts. On his return to Japan, Shiratori went through a brief period of sullen silence. Then he blossomed out anew as a champion of an alliance with the Axis. A month after Matsuoka came to power, he appointed Shiratori a special adviser and made him a member of the ruling triumvirate in the Foreign Office.

His colleagues and the press still remained unkind to him. His subordinates described him as a "tough customer," "a ten-ton tank," "an overgrown boy." A popular magazine, comparing him to Saito, the late Ambassador to Washington, said that in performing the same act "Saito gave the impression of civilized polish, Shiratori one of barbarism." Yet Shiratori is now a powerful figure behind the scenes, and, if the Army decides to retire Matsuoka, Shiratori will head the line of candidates for the post.

General Oshima, probably the most genuinely convinced fascist in the Foreign Office, returned to Berlin in 1941—at the insistence of Wilhelmstrasse.

Unlike either Oshima or Shiratori is Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, Ambassador to Washington. He is cautious and moderate in his utterances. He keeps no company with the ultra-jingoists and, alone among Japan's diplomats, can show a consistent record of conciliatory gestures towards the democracies. Yet Nomura has played as active a rôle in Japanese aggression as any other man. As Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Fleet in China Waters in 1932 he directed the destruction of the Chinese City in Shanghai. There, during a parade, he was bombed by a Korean terrorist and lost an eye—promptly replaced by a glass eye presented by the Empress.

In 1938 the Navy pulled him out of obscurity to serve as Foreign Minister. His record was distinguished only by a fruitless attempt to win the American heart with an unfulfilled promise to reopen the Yangtse River to foreign shipping. When he failed, the Navy recalled him and sent him on a tour of the South Seas. Though his mission officially was "to inquire after the health of the Japanese residents," unofficially he was inspecting Japanese footholds in the areas coveted by Japan—including the Philippines.

Nomura was picked for the Washington post because of his hail-fellow-well-met manner, his knowledge of the United States (where he once served as a naval attaché), and his reputation as a moderate. And it was his seeming moderation that made him a dangerous diplomat to deal with. For his particular assignment in 1941 was to lull American anxiety with the sedative of moderation—to blind the American public and, if possible, the United States Government to Japan's aggression in the Pacific. And, strange to say, his main obstacles in the task were the Japanese Army and his own immoderate, belligerent chief, Matsuoka.

Chapter Nine

Soldiers Rule Japan

THE KEY TO the future of the Pacific, and of Japan herself, lies in the hands of her Army. It was the Army which in 1931 launched Japan on the course of continental Asiatic aggression. It was the Army which in the subsequent decade reshaped the nation's economic and political structure. It is the Army, finally, which today drafts Japan's foreign policy. All that goes on within the Army—its plans, hopes, needs and hates—therefore has become the concern of every man-in-the-street, from Boston to Bangkok.

What does the Army want? Soon after the outbreak of the Second World War, I asked this question of a Japanese Army captain, a man as frank as he was articulate, sane and able to divorce wishful jingoist thinking from realities. This was his answer:

"Our goal is continental supremacy. Yesterday we were content with Manchuria. Today we must have China. Tomorrow, Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies—perhaps India—will be ours. It is not a question of imperialist greed or of lust for power. It is merely the inevitable development of a virile, aggressive nation.

"Yesterday the white race supplied the missing leadership in Asia. Today Japan—herself an Asiatic country—is able to do it. There is no longer any place for outsiders in Asia's New Order.

"Our first task is to establish peace in China. We firmly believe that foreign assistance to General Chiang Kai-shek alone is responsible for China's continued resistance. Thanks to the crisis in Europe we have been able to bring France and Britain to their senses. If the European war goes on, Russia and the United States would likewise be compelled by the force of events to cease their opposition to our progress.

"Once China ends her resistance, she will become a member of a tripartite Japan-China-Manchuria economic and political bloc, which—under our guidance—will dominate the entire Pacific. From China we intend to drive into Indo-China, thence into Siam, Burma and the Dutch East Indies. Once that's done, we can face the prospect of wars with Russia and the United States with equanimity.

"How do we expect to accomplish this program?

"The first step, necessarily, must be complete regimentation of Japan herself. We are admittedly in a very difficult position today. The opportunities before us, however, may never be repeated. Whatever the sacrifices, therefore, we must act before it's too late. Fortunately, the National Mobilization Law has placed in our hands the means for focusing all our energies on defense. The money which we would ordinarily spend on *sake*, cigarettes, and shoes must now be spent on guns and more guns. A tightened belt today means a full stomach tomorrow.

"The next step must be the establishment of closer links with the Axis. Hitler's pact with Stalin was unfortunate. We can now see, however, that expediency dictated the move. Instead of diminishing it, the war has only increased the community of our interests. We firmly believe that the Axis will win. Japan must be in a position to join it in the establishment of a new world order.

"A corollary of amity with the Axis is our divorcement from the democracies. There is not the slightest doubt that they are bitterly opposed to our progress and that at the first

opportunity they would pounce upon us. Why should we be more squeamish?"

By profession this captain was a spy, not a prophet. Yet, like every other Japanese in uniform, he had known for years what his country wanted; and he knew how to go about getting it. Within a year, part of his prophecy came true.

THE ARMY MARCHES TO POWER

Inexorable as fate, Army ukase today regulates the life of the average Japanese from his Monday breakfast to his Saturday visit to the brothel. Whether it is Japan's policy towards Indo-China, the number of pages in a newspaper or the cotton content of a kitchen towel, the final decision rests with the Army.

How did the Army usurp this absolute power? By what means, lawful or illegal, does it maintain its grip on the nation? Where does it find its support? The answers to these riddles are many and complex. They branch out into economics and psychology, into European crises and Japan's feudal past, into machine politics, terrorism and the devious processes of propaganda.

Those who seek to evaluate Japan's forces and trends must remember that she is young. It took Europe four centuries to progress from feudalism to advanced capitalism. Japan bridged the gap in sixty years. This accelerated conversion left an indelible stamp on Japan's government and public mind, and produced a strange marriage of the Oriental old and the Occidental new. Japan's modern cities, her busy harbors, her railways, ships and power plants belie the fact that only eighty years ago the country was ruled by numerous feudal lords. A nobleman, however unimportant, was superior to any commoner and could slay him at will. The sword never left the Samurai's side. It was a mark of his noble status, a means of suasion, often a breadwinner. It was also the

cornerstone of economy, political philosophy, and personal behavior.

When Chinese culture seeped into Japan the Samurai took its letter, not its spirit. The soldier remained superior to the scholar. He who thought otherwise was quickly, and painfully, disillusioned. The gentility taught by China never emerged from the shadow cast by Bushido. Bushido was the ethical code of the armed man, venerated not only by the Samurai but—through mental infection—by the common people. It taught, in the words of a Japanese writer, that "the sword of the Samurai was his honor, which was dearer to him than his life." It also placed loyalty to the feudal lord, to family and friends above all virtues.

Under the impact of Western civilization the feudal society crumbled. Commodore Perry entered Yedo Bay in 1854. Only twenty-three years later the last vestige of feudalism was crushed in an abortive Samurai revolt. But though his feudal structure was gone, the Samurai remained. The few clans which, with foresight, climbed on the new bandwagon, secured control of the State. The Choshu and Satsuma clans contributed their best minds to the Government. Still later Choshu took control of the Army, Satsuma of the Navy. Even universal conscription failed to shake this stranglehold. The Choshu men remained at the top; and they took care to see that their clansmen got the breaks.

Thus, the respect once accorded by the commoner to the Samurai was now accorded to the officer. The title was changed, the form of society was different, but the sworded man's social and political status remained virtually unaltered. Even Bushido retained its hold on public mind. The favorite tale of the Japanese school child today is the particularly gory story of the Forty-Seven Ronin—the Samurai retainers of a feudal lord—who massacred an entire clan to avenge the death of their master, and then committed a collective hara kiri. Innumerable pilgrims visit the graves of the Ronin. In

Japanese folklore their action stands forth as an example of loyalty and fortitude.

Time and economic forces, however, are implacable foes of tradition. The shrewd leaders of Japan's sworded men knew it. They took steps to perpetuate their class by weaving it into the nation's social fabric, by insuring it against the destructive qualities of time and tide. In parliamentary government they sensed a definite threat to their power. Therefore they established safeguards, the first of which was to keep the Army permanently out of civilian hands by vesting supreme command in the Emperor. The Japanese man-in-the-street describes this prerogative as "*aku no gunmu*," literally translated as "the military affairs of the curtain and screen," referring to the command exercised from the Imperial camp.¹ In a parallel process, the Emperor was deified by tracing his ancestry to the gods who created Japan. As the Army leaders were Imperial appointees, they, in effect, mirrored his divine authority.

The prerogative of supreme command was buttressed by the Army with two other canny political devices. First, the War and Navy Ministers were given the right of direct access to the Emperor, over the head of the Premier. Second, appointment to the War portfolio was confined to lieutenant generals and generals. At odds with the Diet or the Cabinet, the Army could now communicate its stand directly to the Throne. And if this failed to overawe the civilians, the Army could withdraw the War Minister, thus wrecking the Cabinet. A bold Diet could inconvenience the Army by refusing to vote it funds. More it could not do. In the face of such challenge, the Army could force the Cabinet out, block the formation of any new Government unacceptable to it, and automatically receive an appropriation equal to the preceding year's budget.

1. Kenneth W. Colgrove's *Militarism in Japan* (World Peace Foundation, 1956) is recommended to those seeking additional information on the Army's position in Japanese life.

The rebellious parliamentarians, on the other hand, would run the risk of a military coup or of assassination by indignant Army-loving patriots. But there has been little likelihood of a wholesale parliamentary revolt, for the simple reason that the wire-pullers behind the political parties have not seen fit to part ways with the military.

When the Samurai discarded their kimono for the uniform and adopted universal conscription, they threw into the ashcan their feudal disdain for the tradesman and the artisan. A modern military machine, they realized, needed its moneyed men and skilled workers, as well as fighters. The result was a coalition between the Army and Big Business. The super-trusts found Japan's conversion into a first-rate military power very profitable. As long as the balance between peace and war industries was being maintained, as long as Big Business continued to be favored by the Government, they were not inclined to quarrel with the Fighting Services. The differences became even less marked when some super-trusts decided a little aggression would do business no harm. As the Army swung closer to capitalism, Big Businessmen turned to jingoism. The phenomenon, of course, was not novel. Japan was becoming an imperialist nation.

Every once in a while the super-trusts felt that the pace of rearmament was too rapid, or that it threatened costly international disputes, or that the Army was usurping more than its share of power. In such cases Big Business aired its displeasure through the politicians and newspapers it controlled. But these were merely family squabbles, too unimportant to affect the Army-Trust liaison.

In Manchuria, however, the Army sowed seeds of discord which came to plague its relations with Big Business. As soon as the conquest of Manchuria was completed the younger officers began to clamor for the regimentation of its economy. Coming mainly from the rural areas, held in an iron grip by the super-trusts, the officers viewed the entire Japanese economic and political set-up with distaste. Unlike the moder-

ate generals then in control of the Army, the captains and lieutenants felt the need for a drastic shake-up. Removed from the Tokyo apron-strings, about 1932 these officers began to talk in this manner:

"Here is a rich, virgin country for whose conquest we shed our blood. If we don't look out, tomorrow Manchuria is going to be overrun by the super-trusts, which will make our blood pay fat dividends. Manchuria is not ordinary imperialist loot. We need it to protect our fatherland from Bolshevism. We need its raw materials for our heavy industries. Finally, we need it as a base for the coming holy war on Russia. Can we prejudice all these important objectives by letting Big Business run hog-wild? Can we put profits above national destiny?"

The answer, naturally, was negative. But the feeling would have remained unconverted into action were the younger officers without influence. As it happened, the Kwantung Army's leaders saw eye to eye with their subordinates.²

Thus it was that a year before Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, Japanese officers put the essential tenets of National Socialism into practice in Manchuria. The super-trusts were allowed to function. That was inevitable, for they alone could subsidize the Kwantung Army's ambitious industrial projects. But in allowing them to come in, the Army made plain that it would restrict the rate of dividends, control the channels of investment, and require the super-trusts to supply all the desired funds. The Army knew what it wanted, and it expected the super-trusts to co-operate. Very reluctantly, the trusts did. But the Manchurian example was infectious. When the war in China strained the Japanese economy—and morale—regimentation of men and material became the motto of the War Office.

2. The Kwantung Army is named after the Kwantung Peninsula, which juts out into the Chihli Bay. Originally based on the peninsula, the Army spread out in the past decade to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

Those horrid younger officers, who had given the military "control group" in Tokyo so many unhappy hours, seemingly were right, after all. Their leaders—at first cautiously, later openly—were brought to Tokyo to put the Manchurian version of National Socialism into practice. The National Mobilization Bill, pushed down the throat of the opposing Diet by the Army in 1938, was the high point of the drive. It placed in Army hands a "big stick" with which they could bludgeon Labor and Capital alike into an acceptance of regimentation. The passage of the law served as a signal for growing coolness between the Army and Big Business. The two still co-operated, for each was indispensable to the other. But the super-trusts champed at the military bit. They wanted to remain an equal partner, not an Army tool, in Japan's expansion.

Big Business began to explore channels of opposition. To its dismay, it found all of them blocked. Cabinets were wrecked as soon as they displayed hesitance in following Army wishes. Parliamentarians daring to attack the military were disowned by their own frightened parties. Under the Army whip, the Foreign Minister pursued policies antagonizing the powers. By the adroit use of the National Mobilization Law, the Army diverted funds from the famished export industries to the production of munitions.

In the summer of 1940, therefore, Big Business grasped at the last straw. It turned to Prince Konoye to maintain an uneasy balance between Capital and the Army. It was a losing battle. The Army had achieved mastery of political weapons. It dominated public opinion, economic structure, social habits. Lastly, it possessed the means for making—and breaking—coups. The soldiers ruled Japan.

THE UBIQUITOUS IH

The soldiers ruled Japan, but the fiction of civilian government was still being preserved. It was only when Hitler's

bombers began to devastate London that the Japanese Army threw off all pretense and took over the Government, both in fact and name. There was a close connection between the bombs over London and the bloodless coup in Tokyo. Britain's distress drove the Japanese moderates, who have always been Anglophile, into headlong retreat. The Japanese Army promptly moved into the abandoned positions. IH—Imperial Headquarters—was the Army's weapon.

The IH was established in November, 1937—in the early days of the Sino-Japanese war. Its original aims were defined as: "to advise the Emperor in exercising the Supreme Command prerogatives and co-ordinate the Army and Navy." Its members were a score of ranking military and naval officers. Civilians were to attend its sessions only by invitation—and infrequently. The move engendered much suspicion. The situation reached the point where the IH was compelled to issue an apologetic communiqué, explaining that it did not intend to usurp the functions of the civil branches of the Government. Its business, said the IH, was purely strategy.

For the next two and a half years the IH remained dormant. Many grave political decisions were made public in the form of IH communiqués, but it was obvious that they were drafted elsewhere. Still, the idea of employing the IH as a major political instrument never completely left the minds of Army wire-pullers. The European debacle provided the opportunity.

Before Prince Konoye was allowed to form a Cabinet, the Army secured his consent to a new political structure for Japan. This was its scheme: at the top stood the IH, now expanded to include the Premier. Its only other civilian was the Emperor. The IH was to decide all policies, domestic and foreign, in addition to directing the war machine. This point is worth repeating—*Japan's foreign policy was to be formulated directly by the IH*. The Premier's function was to carry out the policies decided by the IH. He was assisted by a four-man Inner Cabinet, including the Ministers of War,

Navy and Foreign Affairs. In case of necessity the Finance Minister joined his colleagues. To obviate parliamentary opposition, the Diet was shorn of parties. In their stead there was a totalitarian rubber stamp, whose function was not debate or popular representation but approval of Army-backed legislation. The Privy Council, whose job it was to advise the Emperor, still remained. But it had been "packed" by the Army's choice, Premier Konoye. Like the Government, it was no longer a stronghold of moderation but a tool of the Army junta.

At home the IH was committed to a policy of regimentation. This was to be accomplished through the iniquitous National Mobilization Bill of 1938. When Big Business protested against the Draconian demands of the law, the Army solemnly vowed not to invoke it during the China "incident." This pledge was promptly forgotten: by the summer of 1940 most of its provisions were already being enforced. Here is what the Army had been authorized to do under the law:

Mobilize arms, ammunition and other supplies, clothing, foodstuffs, beverages, fodder, chemicals, medicines, drugs, shipping, aircraft, rolling stock, vehicles, horses, communication equipment, building materials, fuel, electric power, raw materials and machinery;

Regulate the employment and disposition of labor, wages and hours, working conditions and labor disputes;

Control increase in capitalization, declaration of dividends, avenues of investment; flow of trade, distribution of raw materials and use of foreign exchange;

Control the press.

Among the first provisions enforced was the disposal of labor. Thousands of workers were moved from shoe, toy and textile factories to munitions plants. The working day was stretched to twelve, fourteen and fifteen hours. The few obsolete child- and female-labor laws were quietly junked.

Among the last provisions was the famous Article XI, placing industry and capital under Army control. Big Business

bitterly resisted its invocation, using the familiar pleas of "Lack of Incentive," "Inadequate Returns" and "Economic Uncertainty." The Army remained deaf.³

Apart from the nation's economy and foreign policy stood the treatment of Japan's greatest—and most painful—problem, China. Relations with China were removed from the province of diplomacy late in 1938. The move was not without its fireworks. The Army's determination not to allow anyone to meddle with its efforts to establish a new order in China was matched by the Foreign Ministry's reluctance to share responsibility. The battle claimed two important victims. The first was Koki Hirota, whose resignation as Foreign Minister was asked by Premier Konoye in May, 1938, when the dispute became too warm for comfort. His successor, General Ugaki, was equally obdurate, and was likewise asked to resign.

The Army insisted that China was no concern of the Foreign Office. Since the legal Chinese Government was declared nonexistent by a Japanese mandate of January, 1938, the Army maintained there could be "no diplomacy" between the two nations. The establishment of puppet régimes, it was suggested, could be handled with greater delicacy by organs other than the Foreign Office.

The Army, of course, won. In December, 1938, the Asia Affairs Board was formally installed. Its head was a general, its staff was top-heavy with army officers, and its representatives in China, curiously enough, were the chiefs of the Army and Navy espionage services. The Board's functions were of-

3. In forcing through the Article, at least one officer managed to make a name for himself. Toward the close of 1938, Colonel Kenryo Sato, head of the Army's propaganda machine, bitingly rebuked Big Business for wishing to avoid its responsibilities while "our soldiers, carrying the bones of their comrades, are advancing on Hankow in a 100° heat." The fascist press in Japan still remembers the statement, and regards it as a "historic utterance." For his achievements, Colonel Sato, in the summer of 1940, was appointed vice-chief of the Japanese "inspection mission" to Indo-China; and he promptly began to bulldoze the French.

cially described as the *formulation and execution* of political, economic and cultural policies in China. While the Secret Service dealt with politics and culture, the economic policies were carried out by two immense semi-official development companies in Central and North China.

In 1941 the Board showed signs of further expansion with Japan's drive southward and the creation of a third development company for the southwest Pacific. In the projected reorganization, the Navy—intimately concerned in the south—was to take over some of the Army's soft jobs.

THE GENERALS SPEAK

The moment has arrived to let the generals speak for themselves. The selection is wide. The Japanese officers hold the world record for volubility. From lieutenant to Supreme War Councillor, each regards himself as the guardian of Japan's greatness—and her spokesman. In my files today there are translations of scores of army pamphlets, hundreds of articles and virtually thousands of speeches, of varying degrees of vehemence, interest and intelligence. Of necessity, therefore, the choice has to be confined to authorized spokesmen—War Ministers, General Staff officials, Army commanders. A few selections have been culled from the official Army pamphlets.

What does the Army expect from the Japanese man-in-the-street? Seishiro Itagaki, War Minister in 1939, replies: "I am convinced that in times such as these, every man must be a soldier, in substance as well as in name."⁴

What does the Army think of itself? The answer comes from Gen. Sugiyama, War Minister on the outbreak of the war with China. The Army, he tells six hundred officers, "has become the pilot, rather than the spark plug of Japan's effort to advance her fortunes."⁵

4. Diet statement on February 18, 1939.

5. Speech at Toyama Army School, April 8, 1937.

What kind of government does the Army want in Japan? The answers are many. The first is by Sugiyama. The Army's "highest aim," he says, "is the construction of a national-defense State. We intend to pilot the nation toward that goal." All the "affairs of the State," he adds, "must be made to harmonize with the keynote of rearmament." Official Army pamphlets are even more outspoken. One issued in November, 1936, under the title of *Replenishment of Army Armaments and the Spirit in Which It Is to Be Effected*, says: "Unless egoistic and individualistic institutions and liberal politics and administration are overhauled and the political orientation of the nation fundamentally changed, there can be no hope for the advance of national fortunes, prosperity and the happiness of the people.

"From the standpoint of defense, administrative renovation is needed to rebuild the State on the basis of the Japanese spirit and in accordance with the requirements of modern armaments, *permitting establishment and rational operation of a totalitarian system.*"

What is the Army's foreign policy? The answers again are many, but the chorus is disjointed. Each leader appears to have his own particular foreign foe, whom he would like to annihilate for Japan's greater glory. Itagaki tells the Diet, on January 25, 1939, that Japan is preparing for a possible war with Russia. "These preparations and the attainment of the objectives of the war in China," he solemnly declares, "have close connection and must be regarded as synonymous." Sugiyama, on the other hand, feels that Britain is the main foe. His staunch adherent is Major General Muto, who today is an important member of the Imperial Headquarters.

The official Army view is that all democratic influences should be eliminated from Asia. In one of its outstanding pamphlets the War Office, in March, 1938, attacks "the predatory policy of the Occidental powers in the Orient" and the "materialistic and individualistic ideology," "Communitic agitation," and "Capitalistic aggression." While the "ideo-

logical front" with Germany and Italy is hailed, Britain, France, Russia and the United States are vehemently criticized. More than two years later, this doctrine is Japan's fundamental, immutable policy.

And finally, an opportunity for Kenkichi Uyeda, Commander of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria in 1939, to express the Army's political philosophy. Says Uyeda:

"The world is now in a revolutionary state, about to change from materialistic world dominated by unfair struggles, to a world supported principally by righteousness and morality, one with a brighter, fairer and newer outlook. . . .

"I firmly believe that our power, which is the stabilizing factor in East Asia, must be further strengthened, that a new original Oriental civilization all our own must be created to replace Western civilization and bring about a great spiritual change to be propagated among mankind throughout the world. . . .

"The principles involved in the China incident differ in no respect from those underlying the foundation of Manchukuo. . . . These principles call for the establishment of eternal peace in the Far East and the establishment of a new order in Asia. The present incident is a sacred battle for the sake of the Asiatic races and their descendants . . . for the establishment of a moral world and for the promotion of the welfare of humanity."

THE ARMY'S "STRONG MAN"

To the world without, the Japanese Army presents a solid façade. In the struggle for the Pacific its blows seem coordinated, its voice unhesitant. But this is an illusion. Probably no army is convulsed by factional squabbles more bitter than Japan's. Neck-deep in politics, the Army has become infected by its maladies. And like the politicians whom they

6. New Year's message, 1939.

despise, the Army leaders are divided into innumerable ever-warring camps.

But in the summer of 1939 Japan was treated to an unaccustomed spectacle. For the first time in the twentieth century, one man held all the Army reins in his hands. His henchmen sat in key posts. His rivals were shunted off into obscurity. His policies were the policies of Japan. Weary of the war in China, the people displayed no marked reaction. It was noted with regret that the new "strong man" had once been known as an extremist. It was noted with hope that he now advocated the termination of the conflict with China. The little man was thankful, too, that the coup—unlike others—was bloodless.

The "strong man" was General Toshizo Nishio—tall, square-jawed, muscular, with sharp eyes and a mouth that was a slit across an unsmiling face. Nishio was, in a sense, a "mystery man." There was, it is true, no paucity of information on him; no man can serve in the Army for forty-one of his sixty years and achieve distinction without his quota of press publicity and gossip. But there had grown around Nishio a cluster of half-truths and legends—some of them consciously nurtured—that had concealed the real man within.

The Army knew Nishio as the "Silent General." When he was a lieutenant, Nishio decided that words, unless they were commands, were superfluous. A man of decision, he stopped talking. To fellow officers, who regarded him as an eccentric, Nishio would laconically explain: "There is no real joy in talk." With years, silence became a habit.

When the Japanese garrison in Manchuria launched its Great Adventure in September, 1931, Nishio was a major general in charge of the Army Press Bureau in Tokyo. It is fairly certain that he had advance information of the plot. When news flashes of the Sino-Japanese skirmishes near Mukden began to pour in to Tokyo, Nishio shut himself in the office and refused to see anyone. To newspapermen clamor-

ing for news he gave a stock answer well worth being called a classic: "I see no need of wasting valuable time gossiping with reporters." The newspapermen, a Tokyo daily records, retired "abashed." The story, however, reached the ears of Nishio's superiors. Having political axes to grind, they were less contemptuous of the press. Nishio was therefore promoted to a specially established post of "Assistant Vice-Minister of War." Unfortunately, this was a political office; and silent men seldom make good politicians. Nishio himself once put this thought in the following words: "I am a poor man at wagging my tongue and deluding people. No politics for me."

He asked to be sent to Manchuria, there to take a hand in the building of a new Japanese empire. Nishio's wish was granted. Subsequently he was made Assistant Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, then engaged in clearing Manchuria of Chinese troops. He soon gathered around him a small group of men who believed with him in Japan's destiny to rule Asia. Most prominent among them were the then Staff Colonel Itagaki and Colonel Kenji Doihara, Chief of the Special Service Division (secret service). These "unholy three" became the spiritual leaders of what was to become known as "the Kwantung Army clique," whose followers were especially numerous among the ambitious younger officers.

Wistfully surveying the vast expanse of Siberia spread out beyond the border, this group began to perfect plans for an eventual war with Russia. The first step in that direction was the subjugation of Manchuria and its conversion into a powerful military base. Beginning in 1933-'34 Nishio's fledglings began to test their wings in occasional skirmishes with Soviet troops. The clashes—generously publicized—enabled the Kwantung Army to obtain larger slices of the Japanese budget, permitting still greater tests of strength with its Russian foe. When Tokyo woke up to the situation and attempted to regain control of the Army, it was already too late. Nishio's army had become a virtually autonomous military

and policy-making organ, a tail that was wagging the head in Tokyo.

Regular army promotions put Nishio in the post of Chief of the Kwantung Army's Staff. Inevitably, Itagaki became his assistant. Their functions became divided. A man of action, Nishio devoted himself to the improvement of the Army's fighting strength. Itagaki became the chief policy-maker and wire-puller. Nishio, by now known as the "Drill General," put it in this manner: "I'll do the fighting; let Itagaki handle the office work."

Had not the fates intervened, the two generals might have plunged Japan into a sanguinary war with Russia. The invasion of China, however, altered the lives and imperial plans of Nishio and Itagaki. Nishio was ordered to North China. He served there with some distinction, but was soon recalled to Tokyo to hold down the rising tempers of the young Army hot-heads. On the eve of the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact, Nishio was Inspector-General of Military Education, one of the three highest Army posts.

NISHIO'S "MACHIARELLI"

Let us momentarily drop the thread of Nishio's career to take a look at his "Machiarelli"—Seishiro Itagaki, who, at 56, is regarded as one of the most brilliant younger generals in Japan. Physically and mentally he is the exact antithesis of Nishio. He is short, flabby, fat, with smiling eyes and mouth. Where Nishio abhors politics, Itagaki revels in it. Both are fond of *sake*; but when Nishio remains glum and silent, Itagaki grows even more voluble and boisterous. Itagaki's drinking is a Manchurian legend. Once he went on a three-night alcoholic spree without once failing to appear at the morning drill, seemingly fresh and erect on his mount.

Itagaki played a sinister rôle in the Manchurian incident. In "off the record" conversations the Japanese newspapermen usually give credit for Manchuria's annexation to Itagaki

and Doihara. As the Kwantung Army's chief politico between 1932 and 1935, Itagaki also laid the groundwork for most of the Japanese military ventures in China and on the Soviet border.

The war in China briefly checked Itagaki's political activities. He was made a divisional commander and ordered to advance on the Chinese stronghold in Hsuehchow. At the dirty little village of Taierchwang, in March, 1938, two Japanese divisions—one of them Itagaki's—were cut off from their base and virtually annihilated in a week's fighting. This was Japan's first major defeat of the war. Itagaki felt the humiliation deeply, and prepared to commit hara kiri. His aides, however, persuaded him that he was more precious to his country alive than disemboweled.

A few months later Nishio pulled wires in Tokyo and Itagaki was appointed War Minister, over the head of many an indignant senior officer. In Tokyo, Itagaki soon demonstrated his superb political qualifications. He blundered often, but his achievements always overshadowed his shortcomings. And in his main job—keeping the younger officers in rein—Itagaki achieved signal success.

On both men, transfer to Tokyo had a surprising effect. Contact with State affairs and responsibility quickly sobered them. Yesterday's advocacy of an immediate and rigid regimentation of capital was shelved. Instead, the two firebrands suddenly discovered that the best way of ensuring a smooth execution of War Office plans was through handling Big Business with kid gloves.

Nishio and Itagaki were among the first Army leaders to see the rapidly widening cracks and stresses caused in the Japanese economy by the war in China. As head of military intelligence, Nishio was also becoming aware of the rising unrest in the rural areas, whence came the bulk of the Japanese soldiery. Late in 1938 Nishio and Itagaki decided to draw a new set of blueprints for the Japanese Empire. The old charts, providing for war on Russia, were to be tempo-

rarily discarded. New plans were to be drawn, with the termination of the war in China as their objective. Although it was not generally realized at the moment, the change was of the greatest import to Japanese destiny.

For the next eight or ten months, the two men quietly continued their work of gaining control of the Army administrative machinery and restraining the hot-heads. Simultaneously, Itagaki continued to press for closer links with the Rome-Berlin Axis, in the hope of forcing the democracies to cease their assistance to China. Itagaki's demands found the entire Cabinet aligned against him. Impetuously he ignored the opposition of the Cabinet and the entire nation, and sought direct access to the Emperor to obtain approval of his stand.

A major Cabinet crisis was imminent. At tea houses and in the press, the selection of the next Premier became the favorite topic. Political leaders assailed the Axis and the Army, and the super-trusts pulled the strings. There was tension in the air, such as always precedes a major Cabinet upheaval.

And then, on August 23, 1939, Joachim von Ribbentrop marched into the far-away Kremlin. In Stalin's presence he signed the Russo-German treaty. Hitler had betrayed Itagaki. The Army could no longer unblushingly advocate the creation of a Tokyo-Rome-Berlin anti-Comintern war axis.

THE COUP

For ordinary men, the blow would have been fatal. But Nishio and Itagaki were not ordinary men. They turned the crisis to their own ends. While Japan was still seeking to recover her breath from the Kremlin accord, the two generals staged their coup. Premier Hiranuma was compelled to resign, assuming responsibility for Itagaki's failure to prevent the Soviet-Nazi agreement. In Hiranuma's place the two men put a military nobody named Nobuyuki Abe. After vainly

thumbing through the recent issues of *Who's Who*, Tokyo editors could find nothing more charitable to say of the new premier than "he evokes more hope than enthusiasm."

The next step was to secure, for the first time, complete unification of Japanese command in China through the appointment of Nishio as Supreme Commander of all the troops in China and of Itagaki as his Chief of Staff. Other henchmen were put at the head of the War Office and the Kwantung Army. Nishio's rivals, such as General Sugiyama, were retired from service. The coup was complete. Either directly or through their associates, Nishio and Itagaki controlled all key posts in Tokyo and on the Asiatic continent.

With the execution of their new plans insured, the two generals were now ready to tackle the difficult task of bringing the exhausting war in China to a successful end. Against heavy odds, in the succeeding eighteen months, the two men waged their fight—Nishio through the force of arms, Itagaki through political intrigue.

When efforts to crush Chinese resistance by force failed, Itagaki talked peace. When General Chiang Kai-shek remained impervious, Itagaki turned to puppetry. In October, 1940, Wang Ching-wei was "recognized" as head of a "legal" Chinese Government and signed a peace treaty, drafted by Itagaki. Nothing was allowed to interfere with Itagaki's work. When Washington and London first began to threaten an embargo, Nishio agreed to re-open the Yangtze to foreign shipping. When public unrest made General Abe's continued stay in office inadvisable, Nishio, withdrawing his support from the unhappy man, allowed the Navy to appoint a premier.⁷

Early in 1941 it was still impossible to predict the fate of

7. Soon after his replacement by Admiral Yonai in 1940, General Abe was appointed Ambassador to "occupied" China. In this capacity he carried out Itagaki's plan for Japan's recognition of Wang Ching-wei's régime and the conclusion of a "peace" treaty. That accomplished, Abe was once again returned to political obscurity whence he had emerged a year earlier.

the Nishio-Itagaki plan of peace and conquest. The tide of war in Europe had once again led both men to back firm military bonds with the Axis. They sanctioned the attack on Indo-China—Nishio personally laid the groundwork for it—and had a hand in other expansionist schemes. But their success hinged on external factors which they could neither foresee nor control. In Tokyo their rivals were also raising their heads. In March, 1941, Nishio was made a member of the Supreme War Council. But his grip on the military organization still remained firm. As his successor at the head of the armies in China, Nishio picked General Shunroku Hata, a faithful henchman and former War Minister. A trim little man, Hata was subject to fits of Napoleonic ambition, and on at least two occasions had primed himself for premiership. But he knew Nishio's power as well as anyone—and was not prepared to take any steps without Nishio's approving nod. Yet, though his men still held the key posts, Nishio fought against time—and the bets were less than even that his plans for conquest would succeed.

NISHIO'S SPOKESMAN

Nishio's spokesman in Tokyo in early 1941 was Hideki Tojo, a sturdy bullet-headed disciplinarian, who came marching to fame along a road paved with espionage, loyalty to his "boss," and devotion to regimentation. Tojo has always been a Nishio man. When I first heard of him in the summer of 1936, he was known as the "bogey man" of Manchuria. As Commander of the Kwantung Army's gendarmerie his job was to keep Nishio and Itagaki posted on the fever charts of the younger officers. Tojo's agents, Japanese newspapermen told me, were everywhere, from my own hotel room to the isolated border outposts. In his grim red brick headquarters there were said to be the dossiers of every officer in the Kwantung Army. All feared Tojo; Tojo feared no one save Nishio and Itagaki. He was a grotesque, fearsome figure, with a

short, powerful body and a belligerent jaw. Tojo's dominant traits were lust for power and faith in Japan's mission to rule Asia. With these qualities—and patrons—Tojo's meteoric rise was assured.

In 1938, when Itagaki was put at the head of the War Office, he appointed Tojo as his Vice-Minister. In this post Tojo was expected to continue the useful tasks he had pursued earlier as head of gendarmerie. But like a cowboy in a Park Avenue drawing room, Tojo immediately stepped on tender toes. He was accustomed to dealing with Chinese puppets and errant younger officers. Tokyo, on the other hand, demanded less bellowing and intimidation, more tact and diplomatic maneuvering. Frankly, Big Business and politicians did not like this enfant terrible from the West.

The break came in November, 1938. Tojo "invited" the owners and managers of munitions plants to come to a "co-operation and self-discipline" meeting in the Tokyo Army Club. The merchants of death came, fuming with anger. What they heard was not conducive to calmness. Tojo described the activities of the munitions makers as "tardy and inadequate." He chided them for failure to "renovate living, economize and encourage thrift." Some arms makers, he charged, were guilty of placing profits above national needs, thus "often sacrificing precious lives of our soldiers, instead of steel." The Army, he added, intended to regiment every activity, from the workers' morale ("clean amusement must be provided to renovate the life of the workers") to the distribution of profits and dividends. Japan, he declared, was on the eve of a great crisis, in which she would have to tackle Russia as well as China. The Army intended to see to it that the munitions industry marched in step.

Big Business did not like the rebuke. Nor did the Army moderates, who did not believe in rubbing the munitions makers the wrong way. The necessary wires were pulled; and thirteen days after the speech Tojo, promoted out of the War Office, became head of the Army air force.

Tojo was no Goering, nor was Japan another Germany.

The air force grew under Tojo, but thirty months later Japan was still a second-rater in aerial strength. When another Cabinet crisis arose in the summer of 1940, however, politics were more important than records of achievement. Nishio and Itagaki were casting about for a War Minister whom they could trust beyond any doubt. Tojo was picked. Thus, in the eventful months of the second year of World War II, it was Tojo's voice that sounded the Army's views, warnings and demands. Not surprisingly, Tojo maintained, together with Nishio, that the termination of the war in China was Japan's most pressing problem. This was necessary not only to end the severe drain on Japan's resources, but also to permit action in the South Seas.

Tojo's views on Russia suffered great modification between 1938 and 1941. He once classified Japan's wars into two kinds: "ordinary," such as the invasion of China, and "titanic," such as the campaign that Russia and China were to wage jointly on unprepared Japan. He still fears and hates Russia; but it is Britain and the United States whom he regards as the main obstacles to the establishment of "lasting peace." Britain, he says, may court Japan's favor, but "we must realize that such gestures are nothing but a plot to defend her interests in China and can never be interpreted as a result of proper appreciation of the new situation in East Asia." As to the United States, this cagey nation is even worse, for it "insists on the observance of the various treaties of the past . . . and shows no sign of recognizing any changes in the East Asiatic scene. . . ."

Today, Tojo's tasks are to keep the Cabinet on the course prescribed by Nishio, to pursue an anti-democratic foreign policy, and to introduce Japan to the blessings of National Socialism.

THE STORMY PETREL

No chapter on Japan's military policy-makers can ignore her leading "younger officer"—Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto.

For a decade Hashimoto has been the Army's "stormy petrel." Threads of instigation—if not participation—linked him with every plot, every patriotic murder, every coup. What the younger officers felt, he voiced. What they wanted, he demanded. Apart from his secret links with various ultra-nationalist and terrorist organizations, he exerted influence through his reactionary Young Men's Party, claiming 5,000,000 members. Today he is the leading ultra-nationalist in a country where ultra-nationalism is at its highest pitch. He is feared—and treated with deep respect.

When China was invaded, Hashimoto was recalled to active service and sent to Nanking. Near there, on December 12, 1937, he ordered his batteries to shell the British gunboats *Ladybird* and *Bee* and several merchantmen. To the fiery protests of the British commander, Hashimoto first replied that he had orders to shell every ship in sight, and later said the incident was "a mistake." On the same day another "mistake" was committed a few miles away by Japanese bombers, which sank the U.S.S. *Panay* and machine-gunned the survivors. The High Command in Tokyo gave London solemn assurances that Hashimoto would be dismissed. However, between promise and performance there was a four-month gap. Only in April, 1938, did Tokyo gather courage to recall the dangerous officer.*

On his return to Japan, Hashimoto immediately plunged into politics—both legal and underground. Hashimoto's philosophy is rooted in aggression. He believes in Japan's greatness. He believes that the bullet is the solution of domestic ills and foreign problems. His program of action is simple: for the time being, make peace with Russia, seize foreign concessions in China, attack British interests in Asia. This plan, he maintains, must be declared Japan's "immutable" policy at a special meeting of the Imperial Headquarters, in the presence of the Emperor.

On July 5, 1940, the Tokyo gendarmerie uncovered a plot

* See pages 23, 27

to murder Premier Admiral Yonai. All the plotters save the leader were arrested and clamped in jail. The leader was not touched. He was Hashimoto. Nine days later Konoye replaced Yonai; and one of the melancholy prince's first official actions was to appoint Hashimoto to a fifteen-man committee drafting a new—totalitarian—structure for Japan.

Hashimoto's name creeps into world headlines with increasing frequency. Watch him: Hashimoto is the voice of the younger officers, who are political dynamite in the troubled Pacific scene.

Chapter Ten

Nippon's Mailed Fist

IN THE TURBULENT years that followed the invasion of Manchuria, Japan's armed men played havoc with the frontiers of the Pacific nations. Yet Japan's strength remained a complete mystery to the Western world. All efforts of foreign intelligence services to pry open her secrets were defeated by the loyalty of her people and the efficiency of her counter-espionage. It took a major war—the invasion of China—to X-ray Japan's military organism until every crack, every defect—and every perfection—had been exposed to the foreign eye.

With the opening shot, military attachés of all nations flocked to Tientsin, Shanghai and Nanking to watch the Japanese war machine in action. In the mine-strewn Yangtse River, in the mud of Tazang, in the mountains of the Tapieh Range, the Japanese soldier was on exhibition. The foreign agents missed nothing—and the facts were far from comforting. Japan's juggernaut was found to be sturdily constructed and well oiled.

For the first time in half a century it had failed to produce an unsullied record; but pitted against strong foes it had held its own. Between 1937 and 1941 Japan's armed men had overrun an area several times her own size, met two major foes on the field of battle, browbeaten a third into concessions without firing a shot, and challenged the democracies to a test of strength. During these years the sacred ashes of 300,000

youths, the flower of Nippon, carefully placed within cotton-draped wooden boxes, had been returned home from continental fronts. Twice that many men were hospitalized. Impressive quantities of equipment had been expended or destroyed in the war. Yet in 1941 Japan still remained a first-class military power, eager and capable of continuing her conquests.

Billions of yen were still being poured into the war cauldron to make Nippon yet stronger. The munitions industries expanded by the hour. The Army was being completely mechanized. The Navy was rushing to completion new super-dreadnoughts which would place Japan beyond challenge in the western Pacific. The air force, though far outstripped by her rivals, was being fashioned into an effective weapon. Still, these instruments of war alone would not assure Japan of success. In the last analysis, her strength rested not upon her guns and battleships but upon the brawny shoulders of her conscript. Let us take a look at him.

FANATIC IN UNIFORM

The Japanese fighting man is short, stocky, tough. In seven cases out of ten he is born in the country and works in the fields most of his youth. He has at least primary schooling. At twenty he is put through a rigorous physical examination and, together with 149,999 other youths, is picked for two years of compulsory military service. As in Russia, the barracks are a school. There the youth is given not only a thorough training in war-making but also a mental bath in the philosophy of military fascism. For 730 successive days his officers feed him with a curious compound of Emperor-worship, state-socialist ideas, feudal chivalry and faith in Japan's mission to rule the world.

The youth is taught unquestioning obedience to his immediate superiors—the intensely jingoistic lieutenants and captains, most of whom (for one reason or another) have

failed to gain rapid promotion. These embittered officers dream of Japan's imperial expansion in which every man of resolution is assured of advancement. The main obstacles to progress, in their opinion, are the profit-minded super-trusts, which must be purged. These doctrines are inculcated upon the great mass of the soldiery, already accustomed to blaming the super-trusts for the farmers' woes. The seeds of military fascism fall on fertile ground.

Thus inspired, fanatical soldiers and younger officers between 1931 and 1936 assassinated some of Japan's outstanding liberal statesmen and bankers. Generals and admirals suspected of dallying with the "plutocrats" were mowed down with rare impartiality. It is a strange commentary on the Japanese public mind that these gruesome, unheroic assassinations are generally regarded as acts of supreme patriotism. The culprits often go unpunished. The Sino-Japanese war brought amnesty to many political killers, who promptly repaired to China to advance Japan's imperial ends.

The most surprising of all endings to a military mutiny capped off the "two-twenty six" revolt of February, 1936. The uprising was staged by 1,400 soldiers and a score of younger officers. When—after assassinating three statesmen and a general—the rebels gave up their arms, the officers were court-martialed, the soldiers were let go scot-free. The official explanation was that the soldiers merely did their duty in following the orders of their rebellious superiors. But a Japanese officer in Shanghai told me: "The high command in Tokyo knew that the soldiers knew what they were doing. But the high command also knew that if it punished these soldiers for murdering—or wanting to murder—the plutocrats, it would have had to punish every man in the army."

DISCIPLINE

Apart from his readiness to murder any general who does not toe the jingoist line, the Japanese soldier is a slave to

discipline. Breaches occur only with the blessings of the "younger officers," and these misdeeds do not affect the ultimate loyalty or the military efficiency of the Japanese war machine.

Critics of Japan have found great comfort in the orgy of rapine and looting which accompanied the seizure of Nanking and scores of smaller towns and villages of China. These critics judged the Japanese by Occidental standards. Such standards are only partly applicable in the Orient. There was every evidence that the Nanking affair had occurred with the tacit approval of the younger officers and possibly, at least in the initial stages, without the knowledge of the High Command. Foreign eye-witnesses reported several cases in which the younger officers themselves took part in the excesses. At least one missionary reported seeing seven young Chinese women in the rooms of a junior officer. Other foreigners frequently received outright demands for women by junior officers.

There was no reason for doubting the view that the younger officers deliberately took all bars down at certain intervals to relieve tension, and to reward the soldiers for months of bitter fighting. Perhaps such a course was immoral. It certainly could not have taken place in the Occident. But the policy must have had its merits, for after every lapse of lawlessness at the expense of the invaded land, the Japanese soldiers emerged ready for more inhuman difficulties and constant contact with death.

In action under stress, in contact with other men and officers, the Japanese soldier displayed exemplary discipline. It could not be otherwise, for the slightest infractions of army discipline met with speedy and harsh retribution. Cannily, the younger officers excepted the field of domestic politics and the treatment of the conquered from the book of rules. As long as they controlled the mind of the soldiery, the younger officers could permit the luxury of military meddling in political affairs.

The constant dependence of the soldiers upon their immediate superiors has led to one important shortcoming—a glaring, almost Prussian lack of initiative in the average soldier. Trained in the philosophy of blind obedience to his officers, the soldier places his entire reliance upon his platoon or battalion commander. Conversely, this phenomenon has produced a superior type of officer. In his daring, courage and ability, the Japanese officer is second to none. As in the Russian army, the non-commissioned and the junior officers of Japan are well trained and capable. According to Occidental standards they are also unsentimental.

Under the dateline of "On the Foot of Purple Gold Mountain," the Tokyo *Nichi-Nichi*, in December, 1937, displayed this exhibitory news item:

Sub-lieutenants Toshiaki Mukai and Iwao Noda, who are engaged in the rare race of killing 100 enemy men, met here on December 10, each carrying his edge-nicked Japanese sword in hand.

Said Lieutenant Noda: "I have killed 105. How many have you done?"

Lieutenant Mukai replied: "I've killed 106."

The two officers laughed: "Aha-ha, Mukai-san won by one."

Unfortunately, it was impossible to ascertain which one had first passed the 100 mark. Therefore, it was decided to call it a tie and extend the competition until 150 Chinese had been killed by each.

On December 11, the race was resumed with renewed vigor.

OVERCONFIDENCE

The work of the Japanese staff officers has been of the highest order. Against both China and Russia the tactics have been sound, well considered and imaginative. In more than one important engagement in China the Japanese owed their success as much to their superior equipment as to the excellence of their staff work. Each Japanese move was preceded by thorough preparation. When the zero hour arrived the

officers knew their terrain, the mechanized units and aircraft were ready to support infantry action, the transport was in readiness, and—as often as not—the morale of the enemy had been undermined by treachery or sabotage.

On the debit side of the military ledger there has been naïve overconfidence. A Chinese colonel, paying a secret visit to Shanghai in December, 1938, told me he was certain that sooner or later a Japanese general would make a spectacular dash up the Canton-Hankow Railway into the wilderness of Kiangsi, far ahead of his transport and reinforcements. The Chinese, he said, were ready to let the division through and then cut off its line of communication—and of retreat.

The colonel's prediction did not come true in Kiangsi. But almost on the predicted hour a Japanese division made a sudden thrust towards the badly burned city of Changsha in Hunan, found its communications severed, and was decimated. Only a few of its tattered survivors were able to fight their way to the base. A year later another rash Japanese general, filled with ambition and overconfidence, led his men into a similar trap in the mountains of Kwangsi.

Through self-hypnosis the Japanese Fighting Services have convinced themselves of their invincibility. This factor cannot be ignored in evaluating Japan's chances in future encounters with her rivals. In the Army and the Air Force, much more than in the Navy, the Japanese command is apt to put accent on the daring, the spectacular—and the risky.

ARMY VS. NAVY

The Army and the Navy are bitter rivals. The roots of the enmity can be traced back to the nineteenth century, when most of the Army officers came from the proud Choshu clan, while the naval officers hailed from the no less proud Satsuma feudal group. The clan rivalry is still present. But far more important than feudal friction is their twin rivalry for control of the Government, for the larger slice of the budget, for

military glory as reflected in press headlines. An example of this feud was seen in Shanghai. On August 13, 1937, a small Japanese naval landing party in the International Settlement—barely 5,000 men—engaged an overwhelmingly larger Chinese force. The Army bigwigs in Tokyo were incensed. The original Army plans were hinged on the localization of hostilities in North China, and every effort was to be made to avoid the extension of fighting to other parts of the country. Jealous of the Army successes in the north, the Navy was obviously out to secure a few victories for itself.

But things turned out badly for the naval landing party. Within seventy-two hours it was pushed out of its positions to a precarious foothold on the very shore of the Whangpoo River. The situation was desperate. Unless help arrived quickly the landing force, and with it the few thousand Japanese civilians remaining in Shanghai, faced annihilation. The Navy appealed to the Army for succor. On August 19 Army transports, filled to overflowing with picked troops, arrived off Woosung, where the Whangpoo River empties itself into the Yellow Sea. But the troops did not land. In effect, the Army said to the Navy: "You knew we did not want to get into a new fight here. You deliberately started this. Now you can take your licking."

With their backs to the river, the bluejackets in desperation began to set whole blocks of buildings on fire, to drive the Chinese snipers back. For days hungry flames devoured the eastern portion of the Settlement, obscuring the sun and blanketing the city with ashes. The heat drove the bluejackets to the waterfront. Still no help arrived. The Army transports waiting off Shanghai made no move, while on board the idle soldiers listened to the sound of distant cannonade.

Finally, on August 23—while Japanese destroyers were blasting Chinese machine-gunners from their crude sandbag and mud outposts in Woosung—the Army began its delayed landing operations. The Navy had had its lesson.

POLITICAL DIFFERENCES

Japanese naval officers regard the Army with disdain. To them, the true guardians of Japan's great traditions and prestige are not the ill-disciplined soldiers but the hardy and well-trained sailors. When a regiment of the vaunted First Division in Tokyo mutinied in February, 1936, the High Command hesitated to call other Army units in to suppress the uprising. There was every reason to believe that the entire Army was infected with the germ of rebellion. Instead, the Navy was asked to do the job, which it proceeded to do with great relish. Eventually the mutiny was suppressed without bloodshed. But it was the heavy guns of the fleet in Tokyo Bay and the Naval landing force—rather than the troops reluctantly encircling the rebels—which put the latter in a submissive mood.

All foreign observers agree that in the Sino-Japanese war the Navy made a better showing than the Army. In discipline, in machinelike precision and in utter disregard of danger, the Navy stood head and shoulders above the "land-lubbers." Even physically, the sailors were superior to the soldiers. But the main difference between the Army and the Navy is in the field of politics. The Army is as much a political instrument as a military machine. The Navy consciously shuns politics. Japan's generals, colonels and even captains see in politics a springboard to promotion. In the Navy the admirals of the Ministry alone are allowed to stray from the narrow path of technical affairs.

Only since 1931 has the Navy's voice been heard in affairs of State. This was plotted to offset the Army's growing influence and secure an equitable share of the budget, rather than as a display of direct interest in politics. Yet even then the Navy made every effort to muzzle such of its firebrands as Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu, who once had publicly proposed to drive the white race from "our Asia."

Essentially the Army is bellicose and fascist, the Navy moderate and conservative. The Army views Big Business as a distasteful, albeit necessary, ally in its effort to build up an invincible war machine. The Navy works in intimate contact with the super-trusts, both in the field of politics and finance. In the interminable squabbles between the Army on one hand and the Diet, Elder Statesmen and Big Business on the other, the Navy has almost always sided with the civilians.

The democracies would, however, commit a fatal error to underestimate the Navy's sting. The Navy is intensely jealous of the Army, which up to now has been stealing all the thunder. The Navy, furthermore, is a firm believer in Japan's mission. When the propitious moment arrives, the Navy will strike—against Hongkong, the Philippines or the Dutch East Indies—with the same terrible efficiency and disregard for all "scraps of paper" as did the Army. If the Navy is moderate now, it is simply because it feels it is not yet ready. The new super-dreadnaughts are still on the ways. The Naval Air Force is modern but small. Another year or two are needed to convert it into a formidable offensive weapon. The Navy's supplies, made low by the hostilities in China, have to be replenished. Crews for the new men-of-war have to be trained.

Moreover, the Navy has its eye on Japan's trade balances and on the international situation. Unlike the Army, the Navy is clearly aware of the importance of sound finances in a nation preparing for war. This is why the Navy aids Big Business in battling the Army-sponsored restrictions on the export trade. Nor will the Navy take the fatal move unless Japan's major foe—the United States—is involved in squabbles elsewhere.

JAPAN TAKES TO WINGS

When the dull explosions of Chinese aerial bombs and the sharp crackle of rapid-firing Japanese naval guns marked the opening of hostilities in Central China in August, 1937, for-

eign military observers in Shanghai said China's best bet rested in her four-year-old, carefully nurtured "air force." For twenty-four hours Chinese airmen, trained by American and Italian instructors, lived up to general expectations, in courage if not in skill. But before the second day of the war was over the combined Japanese air force gave China a taste of its might.

In a terrific China Sea typhoon, with the usual gale and driving rain, more than fifty Japanese "flying fortresses" staged a series of raids upon cities, airfields and military bases in Central China. Their objectives attained, they returned to their base minus eight bombers brought down by Chinese guns, pursuit planes, and the fury of the typhoon. In succeeding weeks naval planes continued to raid airdromes in the interior of China, practically annihilating the Chinese air force and playing havoc with supply and communication lines, movement of troops, and construction of fortifications.

In Shanghai the performance of Japanese airmen was not at first spectacular. Day after day naval aircraft dumped tons of explosives upon the Chinese "Alcazar," the Railway Administration Building in Chapei, hitting everything but the target. With time, however, the Japanese naval airmen gained invaluable fighting experience. Day after day they remained aloft for hours at a time. Nanking, to give an illustration, was raided 130 times in less than 120 days. Canton was raided more than 180 times in the first six months of the undeclared war.

Between August, 1937, and the following January (as the Japanese Navy Minister revealed in the Diet in a moment of indiscretion), the Navy's airmen had made 13,000 flights. While 6,000 of these were in the Shanghai area where the engagements were sanguinary but brief, the rest involved flights to distant objectives under constant danger of attack by Chinese planes and difficult weather conditions. Within this period, so the Navy Minister proudly but probably untruthfully claimed, the Naval Air Force lost sixty-five planes while

Chinese losses reached 659 aircraft, of which 281 were destroyed on the ground.

The Japanese airmen learned, however, to handle their machines in any weather and circumstance; and their bombing and machine-gunning began to register with alarming accuracy.

Long before the Sino-Japanese war broke out, the Army and Navy had clearly defined the functions and zones of activity of their air arms. The Navy took upon itself the task of combating the Chinese air force, of destroying airfields in South and Central China and disrupting the routes of supply and communication. In the earlier stages of the campaign in the Shanghai area naval pilots also collaborated with infantry operations. One of the most terrifying sights I have ever witnessed was the "boxing" of Chinese troops retreating from Shanghai in 1937 by an artillery barrage and aerial bombardment in a predetermined area west of the city. Watching from a skyscraper, I saw the creeping barrage of exploding shells on two sides and the thunderous advance of two walls of fire and smoke mushrooming upward where Japanese seaplanes were sowing hundreds of bombs. When the operation was completed, no living creature could have remained alive within the "boxed" square.

The main task of the Army fliers, on the other hand, was to annihilate the Chinese troops and destroy defense works in North China. In the course of such activity the Japanese airmen had staged frequent raids upon Sian and Lanchow, 1,100 and 1,500 miles inland. On numerous raids the bombers made a flight of 1,200 miles with full load over an unfamiliar and rugged terrain.

General Chiang Kai-shek's decision to give battle to the invaders in the Yangtse Valley placed the brunt of aerial activity upon naval fliers. In the course of such operations in the first nine months of 1938, the naval aircraft raided 2,204 towns and villages.

There was an ominous significance in Tokyo's decision to

use Army fliers in North China and to assign naval airmen to the warmer skies of South and Central China. It was but a rehearsal for tomorrow's wars, in which the Army hoped to invade Siberia and the Navy dreamed of attacking the sub-tropical possessions and outposts of Britain, Holland and the United States. Both air branches used China as the testing ground for their equipment. The Navy's "terror of the skies"—a twin-engined pursuit plane—fought its maiden battle over Hankow in 1939. Carrying two men and eight machine-guns and capable of 340 miles an hour, this trim craft outflow and outfought the vaunted Soviet I-16 and the British Gloster Gladiator, regarded at the time as the masters of the skies.

Another machine—a ten-ton monoplane suitable for bomber duty—in 1938 had broken the world long-distance record over a closed circuit. Its mark of 7,240 miles was just 376 miles short of a round trip between Japan and the United States naval base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

This flight made such an impression in Moscow that Major Vladimir Kokkinaki, Russia's ace test pilot, was ordered to make a nonstop flight to the Far East. Six weeks after the Japanese had hung up their mark, Kokkinaki left the Moscow airfield in a light bomber and did not land until he sighted Vladivostok, 4,500 miles away. Jubilant reports in Soviet newspapers pointedly noted that this mark was eight times the distance between Vladivostok and Japan's industrial centers.

AIR STRENGTH

Japan's air force has not yet come of age. Up to about 1933 aviation had been the step-child of the Fighting Services. Because of Japan's rugged terrain, where a forced landing often meant death, fliers were regarded as doomed men. This reputation offered little incentive to ambitious youths. Official indifference, too, further hindered aerial progress. The initial exploits of flying aces in the Sino-Japanese war caught

the public fancy, however. The youths immediately flocked into the air force; and they took to flying as ducks take to water. In so doing they destroyed the myth that the Japanese were physically and temperamentally unfit for flying.

Three years of war against China and Russia have shown the Japanese pilot to be sound of eye and heart. He has further displayed good judgment and a thorough knowledge of his engine. The shortcomings of both are few but important.

Like his colleagues in the Army and Navy, a Japanese airman lacks initiative. He is merely an efficient tool, not the individually brilliant and quick-witted pilot of the American or the British flying services. Moreover, a Japanese flier will often allow his political views to overshadow his orders. More than once foreign officials in China have suspected that the "accidental" bombing of foreign property was motivated by the airmen's general dislike for the "rotten Occident." The bombing of the *U.S.S. Panay*—clearly marked with the stars and stripes—by half a dozen Japanese planes in December, 1937, has never been satisfactorily explained.*

Today, Japan no longer economizes on her air force. Vast sums are being allotted for the modernization and expansion of the two air branches, for the mass training of pilots and mechanics, for research, and for the erection of new aviation plants in the Tokyo, Kobe, Nagoya and Gumma Prefectures.

It is safe to estimate the first-line air strength of Japan at a minimum of 1,800 planes, of which 800 belong to the Army. Most military craft are stationed in Manchuria and North China, ready for action against Russia and China. Of the naval machines, probably a half have seen action between Central China and Indo-China. This is admittedly far below the strength of the Soviet or American air forces. Yet the disparity is not so great as the numbers would indicate. Russia has to divide her aircraft between two continents. The American air bases still lie too far away for effective operation

* See page 164.

against Japan. Nothing that the democracies can at present muster at the air bases in the Philippines, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies could halt the operations of Japanese aircraft massed in Formosa, South China, Hainan and the newly acquired fields in Indo-China.

Chapter Eleven

Southward Ho!

THERE WAS A time when "Southward Expansion" was a tabooed phrase in the Japanese political lexicon. Japanese newspapers mentioning it were rebuked. Cabinet Ministers, colonial officials and professional apologists vigorously denied its existence, employing the more innocent "trade infiltration." But behind this screen preparations for a drive into the southern Pacific proceeded full speed. Formosa, governed by an admiral, was being rapidly converted into a military base, along the patterns cut in Manchuria. The hundreds of former German islands in mid-Pacific were being fortified. Japanese agents, disguised as businessmen, rubber-growers, barbers and photographers, filtered into the southern areas, from Burma to Davao.

The guiding force behind the drive was the Navy. If the generals saw Japan's destiny in the west, in China and Russia, the admirals looked to the south, with its oil, tin and rubber, its rich markets, its bases which could act as springboards for new conquests. But the path of southward expansion was barred by the combined Anglo-American fleets. For the American naval arm the Japanese Navy had the deepest respect. Even greater was its regard for the sum of American warships and British bases in the Pacific.

Possibly for no other reason, the Navy between the Aprils of 1936 and 1940 vigorously opposed ties with the Rome-Ber-

lin Axis. A military alliance with the Axis, the Navy felt, entailed—at the time—certain serious risks without compensatory advantages. It was a gesture intended to offend the democracies. The naval bigwigs regarded the move as needlessly perilous. The Navy was not opposed, of course, to aggression: the admirals desired Japan's expansion no less than the generals. The difference was that the Navy then lacked the Army's opportunities.

World War II presented such opportunities, and the Navy threw caution to the winds. With anti-speed laws gone, brakes no longer seemed necessary. The Army uniforms of busy, unsmiling, peremptory callers at the Foreign Office gave place to the nattier Navy attire. Bristling diplomatic notes, which only yesterday had dealt with foreign rights and interests in China, now shifted their scene to the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Indo-China and the Philippines. The Second and Third Fleets, known as the Fleet in the China Waters, steamed far south, heading towards Indo-China.

In mid-July, 1940, the Navy calmly allowed the Army to wreck the Cabinet of Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai. Yonai was a member of the so-called "control group" within the Navy, but he was too cautious in launching Japan on the greatest adventure in her history. There were no qualms: the new Premier, Prince Konoye, was committed to a policy of southward expansion. Japan was entering a new era. Aggression in China was pushed into the background. Aggression in the south Pacific was about to start. The Navy was taking over the direction of Japan's Imperial Destinies.

NAVAL OBJECTIVES

In every nation, the fighting services pick their prospective foreign foes. The Japanese Navy's candidates for war are the United States, Britain and Russia. Today the first of these is the most, the second the least, important enemy.

In the 1930s, ambitious naval officers wrote books on

Japan's coming war with Great Britain. The best known of such works was Lieutenant Commander Toya Ishimaru's, significantly titled *Japan Must Fight Britain*. Ishimaru said:

As Japan's wisest policy is to do everything she can to avoid war with America, war with England is not so utterly absurd as most people suppose; in fact, one can see good reasons why it should occur. . . .

For Japan . . . force provides the only final solution. This is the reason why, sometime in the future, she will fight England.

Ishimaru was nearly prophetic. Japan launched war on Britain in 1937. There was no declaration of war, no termination of diplomatic relations. But Japanese guns claimed British lives. British warships, merchantmen and property were shelled. British interests were violated. By a combination of force and guile, Japan took what she wanted. And as appeasement began to undermine the British policy in the Pacific, Japan turned to the United States.

On April 3, 1938, Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote a letter to David Walsh, Chairman of the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee, criticizing proposals to establish a naval frontier beyond which the United States Fleet would not be permitted to operate. Such a plan, Mr. Hull said, "would circumscribe the activity of the Navy behind an imaginary Chinese Wall and expose American citizens to attack everywhere in the world outside this wall." The United States Government, the letter added, intended to maintain the 5-5-3 naval ratio "unless the political situation in the Pacific shall be so altered as to permit an agreement on some other basis."

The Japanese Navy immediately swung out its heavy guns. Mr. Hull's statement was interpreted as a direct challenge to Japan's supremacy in the western Pacific in general, to her southward drive in particular. In Tokyo, Rear Admiral Kiyoshi Noda, the Navy's spokesman, issued an open warning to the democracies that Japan considered the western Pacific her home waters. He said:

We cannot but watch the situation with grave concern if the American Government follows Mr. Hull's suggestions. . . .

When we say western Pacific, we mean that area in the Pacific which is necessary for safeguarding Japan's national defense, with the Japanese Navy in firm command of the sea. . . .

The American defense line is, apparently, now being extended into the western Pacific. . . .

With Japan meaning to hold herself responsible for the maintenance of peace in the western Pacific, there will be no danger of a collision with other Powers unless the latter assume a menacing attitude towards Japan. . . .

Twenty-one months passed. The United States began to lay plans for an unprecedented naval expansion. Once again alarm gripped the Navy Office in Tokyo. And once again the naval leaders assailed America's "aggressive intentions" and plans "to cross the Pacific and fight the Japanese Fleet near Japanese waters." Said one spokesman: "If the United States by these methods is trying to restrain Japan, she is wasting time, because at this stage Japan cannot retreat under any pressure whatsoever."

Washington's decision in July, 1940, to double the size of the United States Navy, was interpreted by the Japanese Navy as still another sign of hostility. So were Mr. Hull's demands for the maintenance of the status quo in the southern Pacific, the strengthening of the naval and air bases in Alaska, and the presence of the United States Battle Fleet in Hawaiian waters.

Today the Japanese Navy regards the United States as its next major foe. And it feels that, apart from American air raids from Alaska, the war will be fought in the vast, stormy, treacherous southern Pacific.

THE NAVY STATES ITS CASE

The Japanese Navy takes itself very seriously. Perhaps even more than the Army, the Navy believes in Japan's mis-

sion to convert the Pacific into her own private lake. But if the Army recognizes no restraints in its empire building, the Navy leans to caution.

The Navy is also less disposed to advertise itself. Where the Army maintains a steady outpouring of verbal and written statements on its philosophy, aims and pet hates, the Navy is more reticent. The reason for this is the Navy's belief that an officer's place is on a warship, not on a soapbox. Even the Press Bureau of the Navy Office is much less prolific than its Army counterpart. Apart from pamphlets issued annually on the anniversary of the Battle of Tsushima (Admiral Togo's victory in the Russo-Japanese War), the number of Navy publications is severely restricted.

Notable among the latter is Pamphlet No. 15, issued on New Year's day, 1939, by the Press Bureau under the comprehensive title of *Construction of a New Order in East Asia and the Imperial Navy*. Aside from its review of the rearmament programs of Japan's foes, the little booklet contains a statement of naval policy. Note in this declaration the acute mysticism which pervades all Japanese patriotic utterances; note also the xenophobia and the assurance of self-righteousness.

Some 18 months have elapsed since the fighting began in China. During this time our officers and men have advanced with amazing rapidity into the heart of enemy territory. These feats have been possible only because, by the august virtues of His Majesty and Generalissimo, our loyal and valiant fighting men have, under accurate tactical planning and superior commanding, rushed position after position with the burning conviction of invincibility. . . .

As everyone knows, behind the agitation of the Chiang régime, there are at work direct and indirect assistance and support of third powers, mainly Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and France. Particularly, the *conspiracies of Britain and the United States aimed at recovering and protecting their rights and interests are taking the form of po-*

litical interference, in disregard of the actual situation in East Asia. . . .

The establishment of a new order is the ultimate goal of our holy war. . . . It must be achieved in the face of the gravest national difficulty. In the light of our glorious history of the past three thousand years, this is a moment in which we must enter upon an epochal struggle for the radiant future of our national fortunes. . . .

Japan lacks some 38 important raw materials necessary for its further development as an industrial nation. Of these only coal, iron and salt can satisfactorily be obtained on the continent. Japan is still extremely short of cotton and wool. As for lumber, rubber and oil, they are almost entirely unavailable at present. Moreover, copper, phosphorus, potassium ore, tin, sulphides, gold, bauxite, etc. must be sought elsewhere than from the continent by way of the sea. . . .

Again, there is the question as to where to obtain the vast sums needed for the long-term construction. They can be raised only through the promotion of foreign trade by expanding the market throughout the world by way of the seas.

It is seen, therefore, that *continental expansion is not a problem confined to the continent itself but one which embraces the seas surrounding it*, calling urgently for a solid oceanic policy. . . .

Japan is situated in a position of rare advantage and in the area of future world rivalries. . . . Should she interpret the phrase continental expansion or continental construction in its narrow literal sense and forget the existence of the seas and the ocean, it would be a most serious blunder by which the people would lose the very basis of their living. The construction of a new order in East Asia would then be reduced to nothing but a dream. . . .

The mission of the Imperial Navy to enable the Japanese people to achieve their glorious task will be more important than ever. . . . Naturally, *the closest attention must be paid to the attitudes of Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia and to their feverish armament expansion, and appropriate measures taken so as to be prepared.*¹ . . .

1. All italics mine. These passages cast light on such a statement as Matsuoka's at Rome, March 31, 1941, that national leaders ought to get to know "the leaders of all countries. This would avoid many misunderstandings and do a great deal to prevent unfortunate happenings."

THE FIREBRAND: SUETSUGU

Suetsugu and Yonai are the two poles of Japan's naval policy. Directly or through disciples each helps to chart the Navy's course. Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu, retired, is the firebrand. For two decades his voice has been heard in naval counsels. For almost a decade he has dominated them. The rule of silence, mandatory for other officers, leaves Suetsugu unscathed. Suetsugu has spoken when, and whatever, he desires. He has trodden upon innumerable toes, and the sensibilities of the Naval High Command or the Foreign Office have been among the least of his considerations.

Into the sixty-one years of his life Suetsugu has managed to cram more active service—and extreme nationalism—than any other naval officer. He has been in the Navy since 1899 when, as a stripling of eighteen, he was graduated from the Naval Academy. To the numerous posts he has held since, he brought a sound knowledge of the sea, a brilliant mind, an ability to drive men hard and make them like it. The "old fogies" in the High Command feared and hated him. He was too unpredictable, too outspoken at the wrong moments. But he was also too important, too able a man to be shelved. To the rank and file of the Navy, right up to captains, he was The Voice of Japan.

In 1930, while Commander of the Submarine Flotilla, he was sent to the Naval Limitation Conference in London. The memory of Japan's "disgrace" at the Washington Conference eight years earlier still rankled in his mind. He was determined to see that Japan's "legitimate aspirations" to rule the Pacific were not thwarted. He battled bitterly and vociferously—so vociferously, in fact, that he was later accused by his foes of giving away strategical secrets in a debate with Admiral Pratt, U.S.N.

But this victory he had scored for Japan: by threatening to wreck the Anglo-American naval-limitation plan he secured

the inclusion of submarines among the so-called "defensive weapons." In this class Japan was given parity with her Occidental rivals; and she promptly started building super-submarines with a tremendous cruising radius. As Suetsugu's strategy of submarine warfare—still in use in the Navy—hinged on surprise long-distance raids, the rôle of these undersea monsters was clear. They were designed to appear off remote enemy bases and strike long before the formal declaration of war.

It was not, however, until 1933-'34, when he was given the highest post in the Imperial Navy—command of the First and the Combined Fleets—that Suetsugu became an international headline. His first move was to demand parity with Britain and the United States in all classes of warships. Deliberately ignoring the Cabinet and the Navy Office, he submitted to the Emperor a Memorial, "filled with awe" in the traditional manner but very untraditionally demanding that the Government support the Navy's demand for equality with the democracies. Under Suetsugu's name on the Memorial were the signatures of sixty fleet officers.

In January, 1938, Suetsugu became Home Minister in Prince Konoye's Cabinet. At the time he thus stated his philosophy:

The object of Japan's action in China lies in ultimate co-operation between China and Japan. . . .

Whether this means the *exclusion of the white race* or not is an important question which should mark a turning point in the history of the world.

The justice and humanity, so earnestly professed by the white race, however, will remain only lip service, unless all the colored races are emancipated so as to let them share equally the favor of heaven, and *unless the world, now dominated by the white race, is reconstructed for that purpose.*

My personal conviction is that the lasting peace of the world cannot be realized unless the colored race, now leading a miserable life under the shackles of white men, is delivered. . . .

Japan cannot permit China to continue resistance *ad infinitum*. Therefore, she will be compelled to stop the fountain-head of China's resistance, *even at the risk of a clash with Great Britain.*² . . .

To foreigners taken aback by these original views a spokesman of the Foreign Office suavely explained that the statement was made before Suetsugu's appointment to the Cabinet.

The Home Office gave Suetsugu a wide field for work and self-expression. An admirer of German efficiency and Italian Fascism, he at once initiated a series of moves designed to bring Japan on the path of regimentation. His most treasured venture was Spiritual Mobilization, an ingenious morale-boosting movement in the name of which the Japanese man-in-the-street was expected to give his life and tighten his belt for Imperial glory.

To Suetsugu, as much as to any other individual, must go the credit for erecting the foundation upon which Prince Konoye, in July, 1940, established a near-totalitarian régime. As a matter of fact it was Suetsugu who a year earlier rooted for a single totalitarian party and discussed plans for the conversion of the Diet from an organ of "debate and criticism" into one of "healthy co-operation." The constitution of the new Diet, he said at the time, "must be drawn up clearly in the light of Japan's new rôle in the Far East and with strict reference to the country's mission of extending its influence over the Asiatic continent."

When Suetsugu made these declarations they were regarded with a degree of amusement. They were no longer amusing in the spring of 1941, when Japan was ruled by a totalitarian régime and the Diet was reduced to the rubber-stamp status of the Reichstag. Because of Japan's startling progress along the path of regimentation, Suetsugu was once again becoming a totalitarian prophet, a man to watch. And because for years he had preached the advance southward and a holy war to free

2. All italics mine.

the Oriental races from Occidental oppression, he may yet be the generalissimo of such a crusade.

YONAI: MAN OF CAUTION

Yonai is Suetsugu's antithesis. Where Suetsugu is stern and aggressive, Yonai is amiable and moderate. Where Suetsugu demands sledge-hammer action, Yonai stands for caution. Where Suetsugu champions Fascism, Yonai upholds Capitalism, streamlined for war but retaining its good old-fashioned traits. It would be an error, however, to think that Yonai is a foe of aggression, Suetsugu its advocate. Both believe in Japan's mission to rule the Pacific. They differ only in the methodology. Suetsugu puts a premium on daring action and would attack the Dutch East Indies, Malaya or the Philippines at the first moment. Yonai, on the other hand, would not strike until sure of victory. He would court no encounter with the British or the American Navy except in dire emergency.

Like Suetsugu's, Yonai's career has been one of distinction. A descendant of an old and wealthy Samurai family, he was graduated from the Naval Academy in 1901, at the age of twenty-one. In a country where size is respected, he was fortunate to stand five feet ten inches in his socks, possess a pair of shoulders bulging out of a naval uniform, flash a ready and pleasant smile. His size as much as his affability made him a host of friends.

Yonai early shared with many other naval officers a healthy respect for British naval tradition and seamanship; examples which have served as an inspiration to the infant Japanese Navy. But when most of his colleagues lost their admiration for Britain he still retained some of it, injecting it into his political philosophy. His jingoist foes branded him an Anglophile—a stamp unfortunate, if not dangerous, in present-day Japan.

In the course of his career, Yonai has radiated charm, preached international amity, demonstrated a superb knowledge of Chinese coastal problems and displayed little brilliance as a strategist. For these sterling qualities the "Compromise Premier," General Senjuro Hayashi, included him in his "olive branch" Cabinet of June, 1937. Japan at this moment was actively—and secretly—building up her fleet, following the denunciation of the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty. But the world had to be led to believe that Japan's heart harbored nothing but goodwill to all men.

Yonai continued to exude charm with such success that, when Prince Konoye replaced General Hayashi, the Navy instructed Yonai to stay on. A month later Japan launched war on China, and to Yonai fell the soul-warming task of clearing China of the Occidentals. He did his job well, to the accompaniment of statements professing his friendship for the democracies. The immense progress made by Japan in her southward advance between 1937 and 1940 was also the work of Yonai. Throughout, he missed no opportunity to nibble off a base here and a base there whenever a crisis shook Europe.

Still, however, the democracies regarded him as the least evil in the Japanese Command. It was Yonai, they knew, who led the Navy's counter-offensive against the Army's proposal to conclude a military alliance with the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1939. He was an active foe of political and economic regimentation. In February, 1939—while the pro-totalitarian drive was fast gathering momentum—Yonai made this bold statement:

There ought to be a certain limit . . . to controlled economy. Control over everything, from production and distribution to consumption, can only lead to national ruin. . . .

Radical reform can only bring on chaos; it should be gradual improvement. It should be evolution, not revolution. . . .

In January, 1940, Yonai was rewarded for his moderation. The prize was the premiership—ordinarily the most coveted climax to a Japanese serviceman's career. To Yonai it came by virtue of a political ricochet, when the Army declined for the moment to bear political responsibility. Yonai filled his post with moderate success. Large purchases of rice abroad (and timely rains) helped him tide over the most important difficulties. The heightened crisis in Europe diverted public attention from other woes. But the European war also created problems which could not be handled with caution and patience. Outstanding was the expansion into the southern Pacific.

Jingoists in the Services—with Suetsugu in the lead—felt that Yonai and his Foreign Minister Arita were too lackadaisical in dealing with the democracies. Yonai's failure to order capture of the Dutch and French colonies in the Pacific seemed an untorgivable sin. In June, 1940, he was given notice by the Army. In mid-July his War Minister resigned, automatically forcing Yonai to follow suit. It was clear at the time that Yonai was destined for a long leave from the limelight. It was likewise obvious, however, that he would retain a great deal of influence on Japanese policies through his numerous followers. The season called for vigorous action, which Yonai could not supply. But in the formulation of policy underlying such action he remained a power.

Yonai's successor as premier was Prince Konoje. After a few minor reshuffles, the Navy portfolio fell into the hands of Admiral Koshiro Oikawa, a friend of Yonai with Yonai's type of mind but Suetsugu's flair for action. A veteran of the China campaign, Oikawa was accustomed to violating foreign interests. And the policy he was to pursue had been laid down by Yonai himself in a Diet statement back in 1939:

The basic policy of the Imperial Navy is to help forward national policy by securing the command of the sea and the air

in the western Pacific. I do not choose to call this policy one of "southward advance" or anything of the sort. . . .

Yonai's distaste for the term notwithstanding, one of the last acts of his Cabinet was the dispatch of his friend, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, on a tour of the southwestern Pacific "to inquire after the health" of the Japanese residents. Nomura, who in 1941 became Japanese Ambassador to Washington, was also a veteran of aggression, having lost that eye of his in Shanghai in 1932.*

Nomura's itinerary on the "health trip" included stops in the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. He was another advance agent of Japan's southward expansion.

* See page 140.

IV

THE AXIS REACHES THE PACIFIC

Chapter Twelve

Politics By Mischief

IN THE GREAT international struggle in the Pacific, the Rome-Berlin Axis plays a strange and sinister rôle. It has no Far Eastern foothold. It lacks vital trade and cultural interests. Its appearances on the stage are singularly brief. Yet—to an extent perhaps greater than that of any of its Occidental rivals—it has exerted a steadily growing influence upon the Pacific scene.

The key to the riddle is simple. It lies in the fact that the sole objective of Axis policy in the Far East is mischief. About 1936 Hitler and Mussolini decided that, if they were to succeed in Europe, it was necessary to create a diversion elsewhere. The Pacific appeared ideally suited for the purpose. There the democracies possessed vital interests which they were bound to defend. There, also, was Japan, powerful, discontented and aggressive. It was thus that Japan, Germany and Italy worked out an arrangement for synchronized pressure against the democracies. Quite possibly, in its earlier stages, the arrangement did not contain detailed plans for concerted anti-democratic action. But the three partners kept each other informed of most of their projected adventures, and this foreknowledge enabled each to fish in the water muddied by its companions.

There is serious doubt if the friendly vows exchanged by Rome, Berlin and Tokyo were genuine. *Mein Kampf* does

not list the Japanese as world rulers. Hitler showed no hesitation in junking his solemn anti-Comintern agreement with Japan when political expediency led him to the Kremlin gates. Within Japan herself there is contempt for Italy despite the steady flow of compliments from fascist tongues. In the summer of 1940 Tokyo made it plain to its partners that their refusal to sanction the Japanese ventures in the southwestern Pacific would split the Axis beyond repair.

For the purposes of practical politics, however, this undercurrent of suspicion and distrust can be ignored. The ties binding the partners are not paper treaties or vows of amity. They are very real political and military advantages, enabling the Axis members to pursue their objectives without hindrance from their harassed rivals. As long as these advantages remain—and they must remain for a long, long time—the Triple Axis may be a dominant factor in world affairs. Whatever shape the opposition assumes, the Axis arrangement retains its usefulness to its members. Sufficient proof of this had been given in the first four years of its existence, when the accord was successively directed against Russia, Britain and the United States.

But the Axis is much more than a device for mischief-making. It also provides a convenient base for the changes that must come in the wake of the current "revolution of aggression." If the Rome-Berlin bloc wins its tug of war with Britain, the world will be redivided into immense spheres of influence, at least three of which will be controlled by the Axis members. Both Rome and Berlin are too busy fighting and hating Britain to consider the danger of replacing the latter in the Pacific by their virile, belligerent, incredibly ambitious Oriental partner. Or do they perhaps expect Russia and the United States to deal with that menace when it arises? Be that as it may, opportunism is the dictators' middle name—and for the time being opportunism dictates close bonds with Japan.

A TRIPLE AXIS IS BORN

The honors for originating the tripartite Axis go to Joachim von Ribbentrop, unnamed Reichswehr generals and Colonel Hiroshi Oshima. It is not known who first conceived the idea, but all these men played leading rôles in the initial secret discussions and later overcame bitter opposition to the agreement.

Early in 1936 Von Ribbentrop, then Hitler's Ambassador to London, met Oshima, then military attaché to the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. The former was interested in the formation of a world-wide bloc to fight the democracies. Oshima wanted allies for the seemingly inevitable clash with Russia. A few of the Reichswehr leaders were called in. They were strongly opposed to the idea of an anti-Soviet military alliance. They were won over, though, by the argument that the creation of a new triple alliance would keep Moscow out of an alliance with the democracies.

The conversations dragged on through the spring and early summer. In Tokyo similar secret talks were initiated between Colonel Eugen Ott, then military attaché to the German Embassy and Nazi leader, and a few pro-totalitarian members of the Supreme War Council. Neither the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin nor his German counterpart in Tokyo knew anything of the pourparlers.

By May, 1936, the negotiations progressed far enough to let the two envoys and other leading figures in the two capitals in on the secret. The alarmed super-trusts of Japan immediately went into action. The accord with the Nazis was to them a prelude to domestic regimentation and absolute Army control. The press and the major political parties—owned or subsidized by Big Business—launched an attack on Army meddling in politics and vigorously upheld a form of government "peculiar to Japan." Without disclosing the nature of the

conversations with Germany, the Army, on the other hand, flooded the country with pamphlets urging "national unity," painting a lurid picture of the Russian and Chinese menace and appealing for "stronger defenses." The squabble grew in bitterness through the summer. At the heat of the controversy, Ott and the German ambassador journeyed to Germany to receive final instructions. Perhaps they were also to reassure Hitler that the Japanese Army could browbeat the opposition into a ratification of the accord.

The two returned to Tokyo in the late fall. On November 25, 1936, in an atmosphere of general gloom, the pact was signed. It affirmed the belief of the two nations that toleration of Communist activities "constitutes not only a danger to their peace and social welfare, but is also a menace to the peace of the whole world"; and it provided for collaboration in "self-defense." Japan and Germany agreed to exchange information on Communist activities, to plan joint counter-measures, and to invite other powers to join them. There was also a protocol providing for the "exchange of information," severe punishment of Communists and the creation of a joint anti-Comintern committee. The exchange of information promptly degenerated into joint world espionage in fields remote from Communism.

These were the immediate effects of the accord: Russia broke her fisheries negotiations with Tokyo; London voiced fears that the pact was directed against Britain, and expressed pained surprise over Von Ribbentrop's rôle; Rome spoke of "the Italo-German-Japanese association for defensive action against Communism, aiming at the preservation of the highest achievements of civilization"; and in China, Hitler was burned in effigy. Forty-eight hours after the signing of the agreement, Italy committed a "moral lapse" by recognizing Manchukuo. A year later, she formally affixed her signature to the anti-Comintern accord itself. For their achievements, Hitler promoted Von Ribbentrop to the Wilhelmstrasse, Ott

to ambassadorship. Reluctantly, the Foreign Office in Tokyo made Oshima Ambassador to Berlin.

To all those who had eyes to see, it was obvious that Hitler and Mussolini had forged a new weapon with which to battle the democracies. The liberal and courageous *Manchester Guardian*, for one, warned the British Government to take steps to offset the new working agreement among the aggressors. But such appeals produced no echoes. The anti-Italian sanctions had just ended in failure, and the Tory Government was busily courting Mussolini in the belief that he could be weaned away from his totalitarian crony in Berlin.

By the middle of 1937 the Triple Axis was in full working order and the European democracies were beginning to feel its pressure. When Japan went to war on China she was already fully insured against foreign interference; and Hitler, rather than diminish the value of a pact so useful, sacrificed Germany's very substantial trade with China, her hard-won good will, and her prospects of political and economic pre-eminence in the Pacific.

Early in 1938 Ott visited Shanghai to order the German newspaper correspondents to shed their pro-Chinese sympathies. In the summer of the same year Hitler ordered the German military mission in China, headed by Lieutenant General Alexander von Falkenhausen, to leave for home. The flow of German military supplies to China was halted, and the Japanese Army was allowed to ride roughshod over German trade interests. The loss of \$50,000,000, or even \$100,000,000, seemed a small price to pay for Japan's mischief-making.

The totalitarian idyll lasted until the early summer of 1939. In the intervening years the Germans managed to bring into Japan their own version of the "Trojan Horse." While Ott and his attachés, Colonels Matzky and Von Gronau, wooed the Japanese officers and ultra-nationalists, other agents cultivated Foreign Ministry officials, newspapermen and businessmen. In a private office in the Home Ministry sat one Herr Huber,

a Gestapo expert detailed for liaison anti-Communist work. But Huber soon gave up his original assignment, devoted his attention to the development of pro-Nazi and anti-democratic sentiment in police ranks. Representatives of the German dye trust, the heavy industries, commerce and shipping helped to establish useful contacts with the Japanese "robber barons," some of whom were not averse to trying out the Nazi system in the Japanese islands.

This smooth, efficient Nazi machine achieved wonders. Before thoughtful Japanese awoke to the presence of the "Trojan Horse" in their back yard, significant shifts had taken place in public opinion. If in 1936 a few stores displaying the swastika met with consumer boycott, in 1938 few stores failed to display it. The newspapers and politicians who in 1936 attacked Fascism with vim and ferocity, two years later held their tongues. And, what was more important, the man-in-the-street, impressed by the Axis successes in Europe and affected by Nazi propaganda in Japan, began to look with favor upon closer ties with the "sure winner" in the Occident.

The Japanese Army marched in step with the Nazi organization. For its own ends, it favored the growth of pro-Nazi feeling in Japan. Such sentiment facilitated the Army's efforts to conclude a military alliance with the Axis, regiment Japan's economic and political life and destroy the influence of the pro-democratic statesmen in the Government and Court. In the spring of 1939 Germany and Italy began to urge Japan to join them in a military agreement. Hitler and Mussolini were busily stirring up trouble in Europe, and an accord with Japan seemed a useful device for further embarrassing the democracies. Tokyo, on the other hand, heard rumors of an Anglo-Soviet agreement, designed to offset the anti-Comintern pact.

The Japanese Army's demand for an alliance with the Rome-Berlin Axis met with very stubborn opposition within the Government and the Court. At the height of the campaign, in May, 1939, Tokyo received discomfiting reports

of secret Nazi-Soviet conversations. However, an understanding between Stalin and Hitler seemed monstrous, and the Army went ahead with its pro-Axis plans. In mid-August, 1940, the battle was won and the Emperor sanctioned a military alliance with Germany and Italy. Four days later, without notifying Japan, Von Ribbentrop journeyed to Moscow and signed the fateful non-aggression pact with Molotov. The Axis had betrayed Japan.

TOKYO RETURNS TO THE FOLD

The agreement in Moscow was a bitter blow to the Japanese Army.* While the moderates gloated, the Army forced the Premier to resign and withdrew within its own shell. Momentarily Nipponese opinion swung against Germany, and the Tokyo press spared no adjectives in lambasting the Nazis.

The commencement of World War II, however, caused another change of mind. Contrary to what was expected of them, the Nazis did not break their ties with Japan. Impervious to abuse, Major General Ott and his aides continued to woo public opinion. They had also initiated a new line of argument: Japan, they said, did not have to fight Russia; rather, she should patch up her differences with the Soviets and turn instead toward the south.

With Moscow publicly vowing its desire for peace and amity with Japan, Tokyo began to find sound sense in the Nazi argument. The military advocates of anti-democratic action added their voices to the new pro-Soviet chorus. Moreover, after the lightning German victory in Poland, most of the Japanese rulers began to think that the democracies were facing defeat. While there was still a chance, these men felt, Japan should once again climb atop the Axis bandwagon. The rewards were to be not only immunity from Russian attack, but also an opportunity to share in the spoils of war.

As yet Japan moved slowly. The Nazi victories taxed im-

* See page 90.

agination, but there was still the possibility that once the German troops came face to face with the French Army and the Maginot Line their advance would be halted, and the war be converted once again into a test of endurance. The collapse of the Low Countries put an end to the hesitation. Naotake Sato, a moderate gone reactionary, was empowered to begin conversations with the Axis governments for Japan's re-entry into the totalitarian bloc.

A temporary hitch was caused by Japan's actions in Indo-China. Hitler was reported to be incensed by the Japanese attempt to profit by German sacrifices without contributing to Germany's success. But, Hitler being a keen-witted politician, the estrangement was brief. When Sato called on German leaders with Japan's requests and demands, he found them in a receptive mood. The first expression of this was Germany's declaration that she had no interest in the fate of the Netherlands Indies and—by implication—that Japan was welcome to them.

Another inkling of the community of minds was the profession of Axis faith in Berlin and Tokyo within a few days of each other. As if by pre-arrangement, both capitals called for the redrawing of the world map, with Japan controlling the Pacific. Thus Germany gave her Japanese friends what she did not have, and what she could not help them get except by trouble-making in Europe.

In July, 1940, the frankly pro-fascist régime came to power in Tokyo. Even before its leaders could make the traditional journey to the Ise Shrine to report their appointments to the Imperial Spirits, new secret negotiations were launched with Ott in Tokyo and with Von Ribbentrop in Berlin. To obscure the talks, the German and Italian press bureaus dragged across the trail of foreign newspapermen the herring of Spanish entry into the war.

By this time America's aid to Britain began to reach alarming proportions. Even more serious was the specter of Anglo-

American collaboration, seemingly leading to an open military alliance. The conclusion of the U. S.-Canadian defense accord was followed by the exchange of fifty American destroyers for valuable British bases in the Atlantic. There were definite signs of increasing intimacy between the United States and Australia. If matters were allowed to follow this course, the American declaration of war on the Axis seemed only a matter of months.

Hitler and his aides now decided to resort to the tried device of a tripartite Axis, which was used with such success against Britain in 1937-'39. Luck once again was with Hitler, for the general situation virtually pushed the Japanese leaders into his arms.

Japan's new aggressive moves in the southwestern Pacific compelled Washington to adopt a firmer policy in the Orient, a policy whose essential features were close collaboration with Britain and increased assistance to China. Aware of Japan's difficulties, Hitler thereupon made an offer to her leaders. If Japan entered into a military alliance with the Rome-Berlin Axis, he said in effect, the latter would facilitate her imperial advance by threatening the American interests in the Atlantic at the required moment. Furthermore, such an alliance would be an added assurance to Japan against the threat of a Russian attack. In return for this, Tokyo would not be required to digress an inch from its decided course. All it would have to do would be to continue to keep the Pacific in a turmoil, as it had been doing since 1931, and thus force the United States to keep her fleet in the Pacific. Perhaps, subjected to such pressure, the United States might even curtail her assistance to Britain for the sake of strengthening her defenses in the Far East.

The arrangement seemed convenient to all the participants. Japan accepted it. With secrecy preserved to the very last hour to enhance the dramatic effect of the gesture, the new Axis pact was signed in Berlin on September 27, 1940. Hitler

witnessed the ceremony, heard the speeches extolling the Axis contribution to world peace, said nothing. Photographs, as usual, showed him rubbing his hands in satisfaction.

The alliance concluded, the German Embassy in Chungking promptly communicated to the Chinese Government Japan's new peace terms. Germany undoubtedly had had a hand in their formulation, for they displayed unwonted concessions to Chinese pride. One of the more important concessions was a promise to withdraw Japanese troops from the occupied territory before formal peace talks were launched.

It is the despair of every journalist that when history emerges from its shrouds of secrecy it is too aged to merit headlines. In this case, as in many others, nothing will be known for years of the diplomatic maneuvers that attended the German move. But it is interesting to speculate on whether or not Britain's decision to reopen the Burma Road in October, 1940, in the face of Japanese threats, was expressly designed to check the German moves in China. This much, though, is known with a fair degree of accuracy: pointing to the reopening of the Burma route and the increasing American assistance, China turned down the German-Japanese proposals.

But the rebuff did not dishearten Germany. In Chungking, German officials continued to woo the few high officials known to be playing with fascist ideas. Nazi envoys poured into Tokyo by the score, and along with them came military and technical experts to serve with the Army, the secret police and industry. Japanese merchantmen carried an ever growing quantity of strategical materials from Mexico, South America, the Dutch East Indies, to Vladivostok for transshipment to the Reich. Against this background, Japanese spokesmen continued to warn the United States that her entry into the war would compel Japan to come to the aid of the Rome-Berlin Axis.

The year 1941 brought new evidences of Axis harmony. Military and technical commissions envisioned under the war

pact of September, 1940, were organized. Japan sent a military mission to Germany, with the chief of the air force at its head. General Oshima was re-appointed Ambassador to Berlin—admittedly at the insistence of the Wilhelmstrasse. In March, 1941, just a few days after his arrival in Germany, he journeyed to Vienna to attach his signature to the treaty forcing hapless Bulgaria into the Axis. Later that month, according to plan, Matsuoka himself made a much-publicized visit to Berlin. Each of these events in itself was relatively unimportant. But their intent was mischief; and in their sum they tended to create that atmosphere of tension and uncertainty in the Pacific which the Axis considered desirable for its ends.

V

PAWNS AND PUPPETS

Chapter Thirteen

Enter Puppets

IN THE FIGHT for the Pacific no political weapon has enjoyed greater success than puppetry. The credit for perfecting this ancient device belongs to Kenji Doihara, a roly-poly, drink-loving, brilliant Japanese Army officer known as the "Lawrence of Asia."

A few days after the seizure of Manchuria in 1931, the Kwantung Army's secret service assigned Doihara—then its ablest agent—to organize "public support" for Japan among the Chinese gentry in Mukden. Adroitly combining threats with bribery, Doihara promptly lined up a group of Chinese—many of them nondescripts—and placed them in nominal charge of the city. While Doihara and his aides ruled Mukden, the puppet officials issued passionate manifestos to their co-nationals, extolling Japan and urging co-operation with the invaders.

From Mukden Doihara moved on to other cities. In each he unseated the established Chinese authority and placed in power adventurers ready to do his bidding. The puppets' task was not only to destroy the will to resist but also to represent Manchuria in negotiations with the powers. They had thus become a screen behind which the Japanese Army conducted its campaign to drive foreign interests out of Manchuria.

In 1932 Doihara took another step ahead. A central pup-

pet government was set up in Hsinking; and it promptly announced Manchuria's severance from China. The officials obediently signed treaties "permitting" Japan to station troops in the region, and legalizing the Japanese control of what Tokyo described as the "New State." Even earlier, Doihara had engineered the escape of Henry Pu Yi, the young and timid ex-Emperor of China, from his residence in Tientsin to Japanese-governed Dairen. In 1934, after careful coaching, "Hank"—as he was known to foreign newspapermen—was enthroned as Emperor Kangteh, in a colorful ceremony held upon a weedy hillock near Hsinking.

In the summer of 1936, when I went to Manchuria to get first-hand information on the anti-foreign drive, puppet administration was already a well-oiled, smoothly running machine. High puppet officials sat in magnificent Japanese-erected buildings and signed documents brought to them by their efficient Japanese "vice-chairmen" and "advisers." The entire system was run by the State Council, staffed by Japanese officials specially detached for the duty from administrative posts in Tokyo. There were swarms of these experts, and they were all kept busy devising new anti-foreign decrees. Some of the regulations they drafted severely curtailed the travel and residence of non-Japanese subjects. Others dealt crippling blows to foreign enterprise, to the benefit of Japanese concerns. British and American tobacco and oil companies, which once had done a land-office business, now were being squeezed out in the face of futile protests from Washington and London. Japanese monopolies, assisted by puppet officialdom, were clamping an unbreakable hold on Manchurian economy.

Everyone knew that Manchuria was ruled not by the impotent, frightened Emperor Kangteh, but by the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. It was generally admitted that the Chinese officials were corrupt, inept bureaucrats, who kept their posts by Japanese sufferance. Few people, apart from curious visiting newspapermen, ever bothered to call on

the puppet officials. Yet all that mattered little. The puppet régime was a *de facto* authority, whatever its origin or backing; and neither foreign diplomats nor businessmen could ignore its existence.

In 1933 Moscow, while refusing to recognize the Japanese-created empire, negotiated with it on the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Later San Salvador, Poland, Italy and Germany, for economic or political reasons, extended *de jure* recognition to Manchukuo. In 1937 the puppet state even became a full-fledged member of the anti-Comintern Axis, then stretching from Hungary to the Hokkaido. Puppetry was proving its worth in Japan's struggle with her rivals. And success invited experimentation farther afield.

DOIHARA MOVES SOUTH

In 1934 Doihara, by this time elevated to the command of the Kwantung Army's Special Service Section (secret service) *, began to branch out into China proper and Inner Mongolia. Doihara's avowed goal was "Manchukuoization" of the five northern Chinese provinces. The Chinese Government's shrewd counter-maneuvers wrecked Doihara's plans. After months of frustration he finally decided to content himself—for the moment—with the establishment of a small autonomous puppet state at the gates of Peiping. In November, 1935, a new régime, modestly styled the East Hopei Autonomous Anti-Communist Government, was set up in the town of Tungchow. Its first Chief Executive was one Yin Ju-keng, educated in Tokyo and married to a Japanese woman.

On a hot August day in 1936 a Japanese newspaperman, Ando, took me to interview Yin. A drive through Tungchow was a poor introduction to the new government. A dirty little town, Tungchow was stunned by its sudden conversion into a center of political intrigue. Japanese secret servicemen, adventurers and smugglers swarmed in its hotels and

* See pages 80, 156.

inns. With them had come Japanese and Korean dope-runners and prostitutes. Tungchow had also become the headquarters of officially backed contraband rings, whose truck caravans, guarded by gunmen, streamed through the dusty streets in an endless procession.

Over this whirlpool sat Yin, smiling benignly and sipping tea in his tiny office in an old Confucian temple. The gates were guarded by ill-garbed boy-soldiers, snapping to attention before every Japanese. In the courtyard, in the shadow of a moss-draped, disintegrating pagoda, Japanese civilians haggled loudly over cups of tea and junior Japanese officers barked contemptuous orders at officials of the puppet régime. Yin himself was a picture of politeness and confidence. He greeted my guide as an old friend and immediately plunged into an exposition of his views on Wang Tao—the Kingly Way.

Japan and China, he maintained, must work in intimate collaboration, with Asia's rebirth as the goal. In co-operation with Japan, rather than in nationalism borrowed from the West, he saw the solution of China's problems. He also had warm thanks for the aid given to "my government" by Japanese military, banking and trade "advisers."

I still treasure the photographs given to me by Yin and my guide, Ando. In July, 1937, when Japanese troops invaded North China, Yin's puppet army revolted, attacked the Japanese garrison in Tungchow and massacred scores of Japanese and Korean dope-peddlers, smugglers and prostitutes. With a dozen screaming women, Ando was captured in a hotel and marched to the execution grounds. As the mutineers leveled their guns on the quarry, Ando dashed to a wall near by, vaulted over, and disappeared into the fields. Four nights later he reached the walls of Peiping and was hauled over on a rope. Yin was less lucky. The Japanese secret service suspected him of complicity in the uprising. He was arrested, thrown in jail and subjected to a "strict examination"—Oriental for torture.

In December, 1937, the Japanese gendarmerie announced

that Yin had been found not guilty and that he would "soon" be released. He was never heard of again. Another announcement said a part of his fortune would be used to defray the cost of a magnificent memorial "to comfort the spirits of the 220 Japanese killed at Tungchow." Late that month, Yin's successor paid ¥1,200,000 and "officially" apologized to the Japanese Army for the Tungchow incident. The following day he dissolved the East Hopei régime. The newspapers carried no political obituaries.

As long as Yin's "government" lasted, however, it was an important pawn in the Japanese imperial game. Through pressure on the terrorized Chinese administration in Peiping, the Japanese command secured a tacit recognition of Yin's independence. The little puppet state in East Hopei became a wedge with which Japan pried open the gates of North China. In Yin's heyday in 1936, Japanese goods smuggled through East Hopei reached as far as Nanking. Foreign cargoes legitimately brought into North China rotted in the warehouses of Tientsin and Peiping, while store shelves sagged under the weight of contraband. The Chinese Customs organization in the northern ports was completely demoralized. Foreign firms, unable to compete with the smuggled Nippon-made commodities, began a mass withdrawal from North China.

THE PUPPET SHOW EXPANDS

Manchuria, East Hopei, Peiping each supplied invaluable experience to Japanese political wire-pullers. It was only natural, therefore, that when hostilities spread to Central China, the Army should expand its marionette show. A puppet régime was set up in Shanghai under a shyster lawyer. In Nanking, while the Japanese troops were still ransacking the city, an unloveable old rogue, nicknamed "Sammy the Auctioneer," was put at the head of the so-called Peace Maintenance Commission. Two months later, to the lusty *Banzai!*

of Japanese officers and newspapermen, Sammy's régime was replaced by the more pretentious "Reformed Government," headed by a retired, impecunious Cantonese politico. Even earlier, a "Provisional Government" had been established in Peiping with the participation of the Anfu political clique, the tale of whose corruption found its way into history books back in 1918-'20.

Both governments were of course enthusiastically greeted by the populace, whose ardent patriotism was rewarded by a fee ranging between Ch. \$0.20 and \$0.40 per supporter. In a story popular at the time, a curious American onlooker asked a strangely silent marcher the reason for his apathy. The reply was: "I was paid twenty cents to cheer till noon. It's one o'clock now."

But whatever humor there may have been in the situation was quickly dissipated. The northern régime promulgated a new tariff favoring Japanese importers, and introduced a new currency theoretically linked to the Yen. What foreign trade had weathered direct Japanese military restrictions could not survive the new shocks. In Shanghai, the puppet régime took over the Customs and began to tighten its stranglehold on the International Settlement.

Bitter foreign protests were without avail. Japan calmly disclaimed responsibility for the actions of her puppets and counselled the powers to negotiate directly with the new administrations. Anxious to save the remainder of their tremendous investments in "occupied" China, the embattled foreign nations had no alternative. From Peiping to Canton foreign consular officials and business men established contact with the innumerable puppet régimes. For many of the little "foreign islands" in a sea of Japanese-invaded territory, amity with the puppet officialdom meant unhindered supply of food, water, fuel and power. In at least two notable instances, in Hankow and Tientsin, foreign recalcitrance was punished by the Japanese with a blockade, which in the northern city involved the use of electrified wire.

The obvious success of local and regional puppet régimes invited the employment of similar methods on a still larger scale. Late in 1938 Doihara, by now lieutenant general assigned to special political tasks on the continent, returned to the limelight with a plan to establish a "federal Chinese Government" capable of concluding a peace treaty with Japan and of excluding foreign interests from China.

Doihara's first choice for the post of Puppet Number One was Marshal Wu Pei-fu, a retired warlord and one of the most amazing figures in the history of post-revolutionary China. Once the ruler of half of China, Wu in 1937 found himself living on a small monthly handout from the puppet régime in Peiping. Yet he was too much of a patriot to take part in the Japanese schemes. Thus, for a year and a half, he played a crafty game with Doihara, refusing to commit himself and yet, by his very silence, preventing the Japanese from selecting another and more willing man.

In the fall of 1939 Wu turned down the final Japanese proffer. He died two days later, of blood poisoning caused by "tooth infection." It was generally assumed that teeth had nothing to do with his death. But even before he died, Japanese agents had established contact with Wang Ching-wei, the cherubic-faced leader of the Kuomintang party.

No other figure in recent Chinese history has equalled Wang's political gyrations. He was in turn hated and venerated, hunted by assassins and extolled. In the early twenties Wang's fiery pamphlets were regarded by the youth of the country with an almost religious awe. In the spring of 1940 infuriated Kuomintang members in Chungking circulated chain letters soliciting funds for the murder of Wang.

Wang became a revolutionary more than three decades ago. In 1911 he directed a plot to assassinate the Prince Regent of the Ching Dynasty. In a letter to a fellow conspirator, on the eve of the bombing, Wang described himself as a "faggot with which to heat the kettle." The plotters were caught. Wang was clamped in jail. He was not released until the downfall

of the monarchy, when he again plunged into underground work. A brilliant writer and rabble-rouser, he soon became a confidant of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, "Father of the Chinese Revolution."

When General Chiang started his famous northern drive in 1926, Wang was by his side, heading a tremendous propaganda organization. Yet, although they fought together, they nursed a dark hatred for each other. Chiang feared Wang's intrigues. Wang was jealous of Chiang's victories. For the next decade they alternately quarreled and made up. This decade was marked by the steady growth of Chiang's popularity and by an equally steady drop in Wang's. When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, Wang counselled caution; and for this he was promptly branded a Japanese tool. In 1935 a patriot took a pot shot at Wang that nearly killed him. With the bullet imbedded in his body, Wang went abroad on what the Chinese described as a "political mission." During his tour of Europe he made protracted visits to Germany and Italy, and became imbued with deep respect for the cultural and disciplinary qualities of totalitarianism.

When the first news of General Chiang Kai-shek's kidnaping by radical officers in Sian in December, 1936, was flashed abroad, Wang rushed home to take over the reins of government. Ill luck, however, dogged him. General Chiang was released in thirteen days, and after the customary public apologies resumed his place at the head of the government.

Wang's appointment as "Deputy Chief of the Kuomintang" on the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war deceived no one in China. He had become a political "has been," lost in the shadow cast by General Chiang. To a man of Wang's insatiable ambition this was fate worse than death. He decided on a desperate move. In October, 1938, a few days after the fall of Canton, Wang secretly fled to Tongking. His wife and closest associates preceded him, assassins followed. On a dark night gunmen broke into his home in Indo-China and shot his

secretary. Wang escaped. The killers were captured, but the French authorities were not anxious to trace the crime to its source in official Chungking.

At first cautiously, later with his old vigor, Wang began to demand the immediate cessation of the Sino-Japanese hostilities and a joint crusade against Communism. Japanese emissaries began to trek to Wang's headquarters. So much progress had been made in the negotiations by the spring of 1939 that in June Wang paid a personal visit to Tokyo, to put finishing touches on his deal with Japan. Wang's longest interview was with Prince Konoye. The prince and his Chinese visitor dispensed with interpreters and for three and one-half hours exchanged views on the future of China. When Wang finally left him, Prince Konoye told newspapermen that Wang—the superb actor—wept bitterly when he spoke of the deterioration in the Sino-Japanese relations, “contrary to the bequeathed will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.” Wang, Dr. Sun's last secretary, wrote the will himself.

From Tokyo Wang proceeded to Shanghai, where he ensconced himself in well-fortified headquarters and continued to chart, with the aid of Japanese military advisers, the course of his régime. By the end of 1939 the general outline of the plan had become apparent. Through his press mouthpieces and over Japanese-controlled radio stations, Wang began to “demand” the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from China, return of the seized railways and the Customs administration to the Chinese, and the treatment of China on the basis of complete equality. Japanese military and diplomatic spokesmen, properly instructed, made noncommittal but friendly comments. The Japanese press began to describe Tokyo's latest puppet as a valiant champion of Chinese independence. Wang was acquiring what in the Orient is known as “face.”

But, lest the credulous Japanese public misunderstand Wang's real position, the Tokyo *Miyako*, a leading jingoist daily, offered this comment:

Equality of footing of which Mr. Wang Ching-wei talks requires a clear definition. . . . Equality, as Japan interprets it, means that she will not put duress, as the victor, on China in arranging for peace. It does not imply that the relative positions of Japan and China will be exactly the same after the conclusion of peace as it was before the outbreak of the hostilities. . . .

Supposing that [Wang's régime] insists on readjusting China's relations with Western powers as it pleases, regardless of the Japanese point of view. Japan will find it impossible to allow this. . . .

The assignment given to Wang by his Japanese taskmasters was threefold. First, he was to sign a series of agreements with Japan, providing for the termination of the hostilities, joint defense against Communism (enabling Japan to keep her troops in China), major economic concessions and political advantages in North China and Inner Mongolia. Second, he was to take over the Herculean task of pacifying the rural areas, both by force and guile. Third, he was to help the Japanese military to browbeat foreign powers into the recognition of Japan's privileged position and support of her ambitious economic schemes—on fear of retaliation by the puppet régime.

These terms were embodied within a secret agreement signed by Wang and his "boss"—Lieutenant General Itagaki—on December 30, 1939, at Wang's headquarters. The following day a special military courier carried a copy of the treaty to Tokyo. Wang, meantime, proudly presented one of his aides, a former high Chinese official named Kao, with another copy. Kao at once realized the possibilities of the document, and twenty-four hours later was aboard a foreign liner bound for Hongkong. The treaty was reproduced in the colony's leading Chinese daily.

The publication of the agreement had far-reaching consequences. Japan's aspirations were publicly exposed. Chinese morale took an up-swing. The prestige of the puppet régimes reached a new low. Wang himself assailed Kao as a "traitor,"

but made no great effort to deny the authenticity of the published document. The reason for his reticence was not made plain until eleven months later, when in a public—and well-guarded—ceremony in Nanking, Wang signed his “peace pact” with Japan. The terms of the accord were almost word by word identical with those published by Kao.

The ceremony caused widespread ripples. In Tokyo, Foreign Office spokesmen announced the “end” of the forty-month war in China. In Chungking the Chinese Government offered a \$6,000 reward for Wang’s head. Foreign correspondents flying from Shanghai to Nanking in Japanese Army planes observed the twisted skeleton of a passenger train and the smoking ruins of villages near by. The train had been wrecked by guerillas, and seventy-five Japanese and puppet officials en route to the ceremony perished in it. The villages were set on fire by the Japanese troops. In Washington the Treasury announced it would grant China a \$100,000,000 loan to purchase munitions and stabilize currency.*

The conqueror’s terms to his puppet were harsh. In the honeyed words of the preamble they were described as “political, economic and cultural co-operation”; but the fiction of cordiality was destroyed as soon as one hurdled the preamble and plunged into the text of the accords to which Wang affixed his signature. The agreements were:

MILITARY

1. Japan was to station troops permanently in North China and Inner Mongolia for “joint defense against all destructive operations of Communistic nature.”

2. “Temporary” garrisons were to remain in all other areas in China. These were to stay there on the tenuous pledge of withdrawal two years “after the firm establishment of peace and order.” The Japanese Army was to be the judge of whether order was firm or not.

3. Japan was to station naval units in China, “in accordance

* See page 88.

with previous practices in order to preserve common interests." This, in effect, meant perpetuation of Japanese naval bases in China.

ECONOMIC

1. The resources of North China and Inner Mongolia, and "especially the mineral resources required for national defense," were to be developed "jointly." Japanese subjects were to receive from China "positive and full" facilities for such activities.

2. Japan and Wang agreed on "especially close co-operation" in promoting trade in the lower Yangtse Valley and between Japan and North China and Inner Mongolia.

3. Under an "understanding," Wang was to collect taxes in Japanese-occupied China. All Chinese industrial, mining and commercial undertakings seized by the Japanese were to be returned to their owners, unless those enterprises were "of enemy character or under *special circumstances*." The latter presumably meant railroads, telegraph and Chinese Government establishments.

4. Wang's China was granted autonomy in the control of foreign trade, *except where this might infringe on the principle of economic co-operation with Japan*. Foreign businessmen driven from Manchuria and North China recognized the sinister ring of this phrase.

RETALIATORY:—Wang agreed to pay compensation for damages to the rights and interests of Japanese subjects as a result of the war.

Wang thus presented to Japan on a platter all that she had been seeking in China for four preceding decades. He did so with protestations of his patriotism and of yearning to restore peace in China. But Japan could not benefit by the terms of Wang's concessions until Chinese resistance had been crushed. And to Wang the Japanese Army entrusted the job of undermining this resistance.

His strategy was simple and unoriginal. The same strategy had been employed before him by Hitler and Mussolini. Wang magnified the moneyed groups' fear of Communism and promised them the return of their property seized by the invader. To the masses he offered peace and bread.

The moneyed class was the easier to win over. Its wealth was concentrated in a few coastal centers, where it was at the mercy of the Japanese. Apart from their dependence on the invading Army's goodwill, the bankers and industrialists of Shanghai, Tientsin and Hankow genuinely feared that Japan's defeat would signify a corresponding gain for the Chinese Soviets. Similar fear burned with an even fiercer glow in the hearts of many members of the Kuomintang, the ruling Nationalist Party. The Kuomintang had fought the Chinese Communist Party for a decade, and it was difficult for it to take the Soviets in as bedfellows—albeit for as good a reason as the Japanese invasion.

But even the support of Shanghai's bankers and of the more reactionary factions of the Kuomintang availed Wang little. The backbone of Chinese resistance lay in the villages, in the masses of hard-suffering, hard-hating peasantry. And all Wang's oratory and economic pressure could not offset the general anti-Japanese feeling or the superb propaganda and organizational work carried out by the Communists. Wang's failure on this front could not be concealed. In 1941 Japanese publicists openly admitted that Wang had not lived up to Tokyo's expectations. The Japanese Army shaved off some of his authority in favor of lesser puppet luminaries who wielded influence in one section of the population or other. But Wang was kept on, for he alone among the puppets still possessed a lustrous past, a brilliant mind, capacity for and experience in leadership. And he alone could be effectively employed to tighten the Japanese noose around the throat of foreign interests in "occupied" China.

With the recognition of Wang's régime as the legal government of China, Japan intended to make him her main anti-

foreign instrument. Through his control of currency and the Customs, of trade channels and communications, of police and taxes, he was to continue the process of squeezing foreign nationals and interests out of the "occupied" territory.

Wang could not be dismissed with a sneer as a run-of-the-mill puppet. In 1941 he was one of the most important pawns in Japan's daring game in the Pacific. If he succeeded in carrying out only a fraction of his assignment, the harm done to Japan's rivals would still be immense. And the best proof that the powers did not underestimate Wang's importance was the grant of the largest loans ever given China by Russia and the United States within a week of Wang's recognition by Japan. The two nations' antidote to puppetry was expensive, but both preferred to take no chances. In the fight for the Pacific, half-hearted measures meant defeat.

Chapter Fourteen

Genghis Khan's Pastures

OF ASIA'S INTERNATIONAL battlefields none is so bleak as Mongolia. Once the base of world conquerors, it is today an arena in which Japan and Russia are locked in a desperate struggle. No longer a united people, the Mongols themselves are disease-ridden, impoverished and frightened victims of a foreign power-play. In the contest Mongolia has already been split into four segments, each separated from the others by border outposts and skilfully stimulated hatreds. Clockwise, these areas include the Soviet Outer Mongolian Republic, the Japanese-dominated puppet states in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and, in China's northwest, the region still controlled by the Chinese National Government.

To each subdivision the ruler's hand has assigned a specific function. Outer Mongolia is a belt of armor protecting vital spots in Siberia. The Khingan Mongol provinces safeguard Manchuria's exposed western flank. Inner Mongolia is a wedge Japan hopes to drive to Soviet Turkestan. And barring Japan's westward advance lies Chinese-controlled Mongolia, across which camel caravans carry military supplies from Russia. Upon all these areas war has already left its imprint. The Mongol nomads have witnessed sanguinary clashes in their pasturelands. And thousands of them had taken part in the battles under the command of alien officers. Let us take a look at these wars, at the men who fought them, at the battlefields and the issues.

CHINA REVIVES GENGHIS KHAN

Until 1937 China had been an active participant in the struggle for control of Mongolia. Her warlords ruled the Inner Mongolian provinces, her tax collectors gathered taxes, and in the councils of Mongolian tribal chiefs Nanking's voice was dominant. China's policy in Mongolia was not wise. It completely ignored the Mongols' welfare and sought to further the interests of Chinese landlords, traders and money lenders. Mongol princes were snubbed. The Mongols' appeals for self-government were rejected. The average Mongol stock-breeder saw himself retreating before the steady encroachment of land-tilling Chinese colonists. Popular resentment offered fertile soil for intrigue.

Soon Japanese and Soviet agents appeared on the scene. A few of the stronger princes began to challenge Chinese authority. In 1935-'36 there were important uprisings which the Chinese warlords never successfully crushed. With the opening shot of the Sino-Japanese war in the summer of 1937 Japanese troops were rushed into Inner Mongolia, and with the aid of Mongol princes they quickly cleared the region of Chinese forces. For the next two years China made little effort to regain the lost territory. A few Chinese Communist units staged attacks on the southern fringes of the Japanese-held area. General Ma Chan-shan, whose death in battle was once jubilantly, if erroneously, reported to Emperor Hirohito by his General Staff, roamed the Mongolian plains with a small force of guerilla cavalymen. Further west Chinese regular troops sought to halt Japanese advance.

But in the summer of 1939 China decided on a bold move. Two generals, accompanied by mounted guards, were ordered into the heart of Inner Mongolia on a secret mission. Two months later the generals recrossed the Great Wall on their way back to Free China. This time, however, they rode at the head of a long caravan and made no effort to conceal their movements. The caravan now included a detachment of

Mongol horsemen, rows of long-robed priests, Mongol officials holding ancient weapons, and, finally, two mules carrying caskets covered with bright red and yellow silk. As the caravan, raising clouds of fine, yellow dust, passed through villages and towns of Free China, it was ceremonially welcomed by officials and military officers.

A little later, in far-off Chungking, the Chinese Government announced that the remains of Genghis Khan, "Emperor of all Men, Scourge of Mankind," had been disinterred from their resting place in Mongolia and removed to a secret hide-out in Shensi. The corpse, the announcement said, was accompanied by the traditional tomb guards who were to watch over the remains at their new resting place in China's northwest. When the war is over, it was added, the remains would be returned to their original place and the tomb would be completely rebuilt.

The announcement received wide circulation throughout China—and especially Inner Mongolia—and was often greeted with scepticism and derision. A British daily suggested that the remains were those of a minor Mongol dignitary and not of Genghis Khan, whose burial place was a closely guarded secret. The Japanese described the announcement as "hot-weather fantasy." But whether or not the silk-draped caskets contained the bodies of Genghis Khan and his empress was immaterial. What really mattered—and the Japanese knew it—was that the Chinese had scored a master-stroke in the game of wits and gore in Inner Mongolia. Though dead for eight centuries, Genghis Khan was still the most powerful unifying force in all the Mongolias. By "kidnaping" him the Chinese made him their ally in the struggle with Japan.

JAPAN WOOS PRINCE TEH

Japanese Army officers first appeared in Inner Mongolia in 1934, when a few of them made rounds of the Mongol tribes, met princes, made friends, judiciously distributed money and

arms. The reports brought by these men to the Kwantung Army headquarters in Manchuria indicated that Prince Teh, the most powerful of all Mongol rulers, was ready to break with the Chinese Government, which had failed to meet his demands for autonomy. Consequently a stream of Japanese emissaries began to pour into Teh's camp, cajoling, threatening and bargaining over terms. These envoys were followed in 1936—many months before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities—by the delivery of arms to Teh's picked army. The Prince began to use a Japanese airplane for his trips to Mongolian strategic centers, and smiling Japanese officers—"advisers"—began to follow wherever he went.

Teh himself is a remarkable figure. At forty-one he is today the most influential Mongol in all the Mongolias, whatever flag they display for the moment. The ambition that once led him into sharp disputes with the Chinese now makes him putty in Japanese hands. His "advisers" give him wide latitude, feed him on a steady diet of flattery, and keep a wary eye on him. Teh dreams of succeeding Genghis Khan in the history of his people, and he plays the Japanese game as long as it suits his own ends. Although they hate the Japanese, the Mongols venerate Teh.

Morose and uncommunicative with non-Mongols, Teh becomes transformed among his own tribesmen. Reputedly suffering from syphilis—the scourge of Mongolia—Teh is still a powerful man. Not infrequently he forgets his rôle of a spectator and plunges into the ring to take on the victorious wrestler. He is a dead shot and, like all Mongols, an expert horseman. For trips to his tribal grounds, where he keeps his wife and two children, Teh uses an airplane—now piloted by a Japanese officer.

Teh and the Japanese are playing a shrewd game with each other. Teh knows that his new allies are dangerous, and that they can unseat or even destroy him as soon as he parts ways with them. The Japanese, on the other hand, realize Teh's tremendous drawing power and are willing to give him the

illusion of independence which he so greatly treasures. In 1938 Teh and "Marshal" Li Shou-hsin, an ex-Manchurian bandit heading the Mongolian Army and Japanese-paid chaperon of Teh, visited Tokyo. Both were sumptuously wined and dined by Government and Army officials, received by the Emperor, and granted bejeweled decorations. Teh the soldier was impressed, for to him the Japanese Emperor was the head of Asia's most powerful war machine.

When Teh is asked what he thinks of Japan and of his own people's future, he emphasizes his desire to co-operate with Japan. With Japanese aid, he says, the Mongols will regain the glory of their ancestors and form a new Great Mongolia, embracing all the areas now controlled by China, Japan and Russia. "In due time," he adds, "Outer Mongolia, now under the Communists and without that freedom beloved of Mongols, will be reunited with their brethren in the great program of Mongol revival."

His avowed interest coincides with Japan's. His puppet state of "Meng Chiang"—just as the neighboring Manchukuo—provides a buffer between Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia and China. It also provides an invasion route into Russian-controlled territory. When the time comes for a Japanese-Soviet showdown, Japan will have in Inner Mongolia a mobile force of 40,000 men. These will be supported by Teh's cavalymen, who today are being assiduously trained and equipped by Japanese officers for future battles. "Efforts to strengthen national defense are directed towards fulfilling Mongolia's mission as an anti-Comintern state rather than toward maintaining domestic peace and order," explains the authoritative Osaka *Mainichi*.

The Japanese control the Inner Mongols through the so-called "Autonomous Government of the Mongolian Borderland," having its seat in Kalgan and headed by Teh. The actual head of the régime is a High Japanese Adviser. Under this "central" régime there are three semi-autonomous administrations, the most important of which is Teh's own

"Autonomous Government of the United Leagues of Mongolia," with its seat at Suiyuan City. While the central régime in Kalgan controls financial and economic affairs, its subdivisions enjoy control of all other functions. Prince Teh is flanked in Suiyuan City by "Marshal" Li, who has an independent army of 3,000 men from Manchuria. Actually, of course, the real master of Mongol destinies in the area is the head of the Japanese secret service.

Inner Mongolia's economy is dominated by the vast Okura interests, which have an iron grip on the wool trade. Steady inroads into this near-monopoly are now being made by Okura's arch-rivals, the super-trusts of Mitsui and Mitsubishi. The stranglehold obtained by these three Japanese companies on Mongol business has resulted in complete exclusion of foreign interests from the region. Only a very small fraction of the wool, skins and furs sold in Paotou, Kalgan and other trading and caravan centers now goes into foreign hands. Foreign travel in Inner Mongolia has been forbidden.

Today Inner Mongolia's destinies are shrouded in mist. The Mongols may be willing to travel the same road with the Japanese as long as the latter aid in reviving Mongol strength and nationalism. When the nomads discover, however, that they are mere pawns in the empire-building game now being played in Asia by the Japanese military, there may be a revolt to which both China and the Soviets will not remain indifferent.

BOLSHEVISM COMES TO MONGOLIA

There are no border outposts to mark the frontier between the Japanese-controlled Inner and the Soviet-dominated Outer Mongolias. The population there is sparse, and often a trip of a hundred miles can be made without encountering a man. But farther north, where Mongolia melts into the Manchurian landscape, there are signs of activity. From well-camouflaged earthen pill-boxes atop hillocks, sentries peer down

upon the grassy plains below. Cavalrymen and armed trucks pass on their patrols. Above hum the motors of Soviet and Japanese planes, watching the movement of enemy troops. Here lie Nomonhan, Tomsk, Lake Buir and other hills, towns and lakes that have made headlines during the past four or five years.

Beyond this border belt spreads the Outer Mongolian Soviet Republic—the No- (Non-Soviet) -Man's-Land, the sole gates to which lie on Russian territory. What little is known of the country comes from Moscow, which is reluctant to part with any information on one of its major footholds in East Asia. The republic covers an area of 900,000 square miles, or more than the combined areas of pre-war France, Italy and Germany. For 1,740 miles Outer Mongolia borders on Russia. In the east it fringes Japanese-occupied Manchuria, while in the southeast and southwest it skirts Inner Mongolia. With the Japanese armed wedge penetrating ever deeper into Inner Mongolia, Red Mongolian troops today face Japanese forces and their puppets along a 2,100-mile border. This fact, above all else, molds the destinies of the young Soviet republic.

Outer Mongolia rests upon a high plateau. Its climate is dry, with sharp variations in temperature and with severe winters. These factors affect vegetation, and thus predestine the nature of the country's economy. A vigorous campaign by the Communists to launch large-scale agricultural projects notwithstanding, Outer Mongolia still remains a land of animal husbandry.

No less important is the stratification of Mongolian society. Even today, nearly two decades after the revolution, one out of every five Mongols—men, women and children—is a priest. Their number is constantly decreasing, but they still form a powerful, articulate and reactionary group. The lazy, corrupt lama seeks to hold the balance of power in the republic. He answers the attacks of the Communist Government by plotting with Japanese agents, who constantly drift across the border.

Japan finds another ally in the rapidly dwindling army of feudal lords. For nearly a decade after the revolution, the princes continued to enjoy their near-absolute power over the life and death of the arats—petty livestock-breeders. The revolution overturned the social appletart and put the arats in power, which they are now employing to root out the last vestiges of feudalism.

A group with uncertain loyalties are the Chinese traders and usurers, on whom the Mongol Government is waging merciless war. This numerically small faction once wielded enormous power and for a time—notably in 1919—worked hand in glove with the Japanese. For many decades the huge Chinese trading houses lived off the country like leeches. Every form of chicanery had been used by these concerns to hoodwink the hapless arats. Most of the political and economic gains made by the Chinese were secured through generous loans to the princes. Later, naturally, principal and interest were wrung from the arats.

However, when Chinese monarchy collapsed in 1911, the princes took the lead in the anti-Chinese campaign. The drive culminated in an extraordinary conference of Mongol princes, who decided to secede. The Living Buddha, the head of the Mongol Lamaist Church, was given absolute secular authority and a mission was dispatched to Russia to ask for aid against China. St. Petersburg was in a receptive mood. The desired assistance was granted, but on terms which made of Outer Mongolia a vassal of Tzarist Russia. Japan then stood on the sidelines, for in 1907, under a secret treaty, she had agreed to the region's inclusion within the Russian sphere of influence.

World War I, however, changed Tokyo's mind. At first it worked in Outer Mongolia through the Chinese traders. When revolution broke out in Russia and the new Soviet Government abrogated all Tzarist treaties, Japan turned to White Russian officers; and during the next four years a long succession of Russians and Chinese carried the Japanese colors

in Mongolia. Leading among them was Baron Ungern-Sternberg, a sadist also known as the "Mad Baron." The excesses perpetrated by his troops and puppet régimes soon caused an adverse reaction in Mongolia.* Working in complete secrecy, a small band of patriots, led by one Suhe Bator, began to prepare for an uprising. In February, 1921, the group, now known as the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, held its first congress in Kiachta, on the Russian side of the Mongol border.

With the princes, lamas and arats equally incensed over Baron Ungern's terror, a united front was quickly formed. While Mongol guerilla units, armed with Soviet weapons, were drifting into the Ungern-controlled territory, a congress of popular representatives elected a provisional government on March 13, 1921. Its first act was an appeal to Moscow to aid the Mongols against the "Mad Baron." Moscow was willing to help.

With the strengthening of their influence, the Bolsheviks were turning their eyes to the restless Orient. Moreover, Red secret agents on Baron Ungern's staff reported preparations for a Japanese-supported drive on Russia. The Mongolian appeal supplied the needed opportunity for action. Soviet troops marched across the frontier and, aided by the Mongol guerillas, quickly dispersed the White Russian units. Baron Ungern was caught at night in a forest, meekly submitted to a trial by a Red tribunal, and was sentenced to death. In July, 1921, Urga was occupied and a revolutionary government set up. The Soviet troops, however, remained on Mongol soil for three more years, until the last White Russian band had been wiped out.

Assured of Russia's support and aware of China's impotence, the new government promptly plunged into the work of wrecking the old order. A bitter war was declared on the White Russian and Chinese trading houses and the feudal clique closely allied with them. Tokyo and Peking gave what

* See page 98.

help they could to the princes, the lamas and the entrenched Chinese commercial interests. But the fervor of the arats and the strength of the Soviet garrison prevailed.

The crucial point of the struggle was reached with the death of the Living Buddha in May, 1924. With his passing, the rightist elements lost the outstanding defender of their interests. The leftists, on the other hand, decided to utilize the moment to seize all power. The rival forces met in a Great Hural (congress) in November, 1924. On the twenty-fourth of that month the young revolutionary party forced through a proclamation of the Outer Mongolian People's Republic and a program of social and political reforms. Outer Mongolia, as it is known now, was born.

The feudal groups went underground and continued to fight the new régime. To accept the revolutionary program meant to give up the influence accumulated in a thousand years; the right to collect taxes, an opportunity to thrive on tribute from the masses, the right to give religious education to the male youths—all the attributes, in short, of a feudal-theocratic régime. Little mercy was displayed by either rival. There were abortive revolts, wholesale purges and murders galore. Russian history was duplicated in Mongolia. When the government ordered socialization of the livestock industry, the princes—rather than dedicate their animals to socialism—slaughtered them. This was followed by mutinies—apparently with external inspiration. The ruthless suppression of the uprisings supplied the grimmest chapters in Mongolia's history since the days of Genghis Khan.

At this juncture Moscow stepped in. Rebellions in Outer Mongolia made it poor armor for Russia. Japan had just invaded Manchuria, and the danger to the Soviet borders was greater than ever. Consequently the Mongol officials received orders to soft-pedal their socialist zeal. While the largest cattle-breeders had already been eliminated, the vast majority of the medium livestock-owners was allowed to survive. Outer Mongolia, in the words of a Soviet spokesman, became a

"bourgeois-democratic republic of a new type." With cattle-breeding the sole possible basis of the economy, private property, of course, stayed on.

JAPAN BATTLES THE SOVIETS

But all these squabbles, revolts and purges remained hidden from the world by an air-tight wall of Soviet censorship. It took a good-sized war to make a breach in this wall. War came in the middle of 1935. The Kwantung Army's patrols in Manchuria's frontier Mongol provinces began to make incursions into Outer Mongolia. The incidents were inevitable. Even the best of friends would have disagreed had they lived along a border that lost its way in a grassy plain and a succession of lakes. The Kwantung Army and the Outer Mongolian Republic were very far from being friends.

To the Kwantung Army's ambitious younger officers, Outer Mongolia presented not only a menace but also an attractive field for imperial expansion. With two million restless Mongols of Manchuria enviously eyeing their Sovietized brethren across the border, Japan could not remain indifferent to the steady strengthening of Outer Mongolia. On the other hand, this Soviet republic seemed to offer tempting possibilities for a daring cavalry or mechanized raid to Lake Baikal.

The first Japanese incursions were in the nature of reconnaissance. When firm resistance was offered by the Mongol-Russian outposts, the Japanese patrols were enlarged. The mutual strengthening of the border forces rose to a pitch where scores of airplanes, tanks and armored cars began to take part in the border clashes.

Unable to pierce the Mongolian defenses without precipitating a first-class war with Russia, Tokyo resorted to political means. Shortly after the fierce Khalkha clash of January, 1935, the puppet Manchurian Government proposed a conference to delimit the boundary between the two countries. After four months of dickering on the procedure, the dele-

gates of the puppet governments in Hsinking and Ulan Bator, accompanied by Japanese and Soviet "advisers," finally reached the dusty little Manchurian border town of Manchuli to iron out their problems.

It at once became clear that nothing was further from the delegates' minds than conciliation. The Outer Mongols refused to live in the town. Throughout the talks they remained in their well-guarded Soviet railway cars. They also displayed admirable persistence in rejecting all demands for the opening of regular diplomatic relations with the Manchurian puppets. The Manchurian delegates—including a conspicuous sprinkling of Japanese, described as "Manchukuo officials"—displayed a startling belligerence in pressing their proposals for peace. All through the conference the Kwantung Army continued to make sortics into Outer Mongolia.

With the Mongols insisting that the conferees should confine themselves to a settlement of border disputes and the Manchurian officials demanding the inauguration of diplomatic relations, the two delegations finally seized upon a particularly bitter frontier clash to terminate the talks on November 25, 1935. The following morning a spokesman of the puppet régime in Hsinking told the press:

The true nature of Outer Mongolia has hitherto been a mystery because of her policy of seclusion. . . .

We hereby wish to declare that we shall henceforth regard her as a dangerous region lying contiguous to our territory. . . . We are determined to settle the outstanding issues . . . independently and according to our own disposition. . . .

With reports of new border clashes streaming into the Army headquarters, alarmed Ulan Bator rushed its Foreign Minister Gendun to Moscow. He was given a demonstratively sumptuous reception and a pledge of armed support. To make its stand even more unequivocal, the Kremlin resorted to the unorthodox procedure of an interview between Joseph Stalin and Roy Howard, head of the Scripps-Howard

newspapers. At the meeting Stalin issued a warning to Japan that any attempt to violate Outer Mongolia's territorial integrity would instantly bring Soviet Russia to its aid.

Tokyo at once went through all the customary gestures of indignation and formally asked Moscow if Outer Mongolia had become a part of the Soviet Union. To this comical—considering Japan's own record in Manchuria—inquiry, Russia replied that she had been bound with Outer Mongolia since November, 1934, by a verbal agreement for mutual support against armed attack, and that the accord had been embodied in a new protocol providing for Soviet military aid to the Mongolian Republic.

The announcements sobered up both Tokyo and Hsinking. Outer Mongolia did not yet seem a sufficiently attractive reward for a full-dress war. Thus Japan readily took up Moscow's proposal to form a committee to deal with the border disputes. In October, 1936, the Manchuli talks were reopened.

The new conference was a facsimile of its predecessor. After twenty-one listless sessions, the delegates departed for home for year-end holidays. Although it was agreed to resume the pourparlers in January, 1937, the Mongolian delegates did not reappear until mid-May. A few more meetings were held, but without any results. The frozen-faced Mongols marched from the railway cars to the hotel, where the talks were held, reiterated—for the *n*th time—their stand, and shuttled back to the railway carriages. The Manchurian delegation, divided into two sharply dissimilar groups—Mongolian and Japanese—stayed at the hotel, where the Japanese did their drinking and the Mongols their thinking.

The Japanese kept their Mongolian colleagues under close observation for fear the latter might turn faithless. The chief Mongol delegate to the 1935 conference was later found to be in cahoots with the Soviet secret service and was duly executed, along with three other high Manchurian officials. The conversations broke up on the eve of the Japanese invasion

of China in July, 1937. There were no regrets either in Tokyo or Moscow.

Japan's war in China enhanced Outer Mongolia's importance in the Asiatic struggle for power. Japan could not forget that Outer Mongolia supplied a convenient springboard for a Soviet attack on Manchuria. Russia was equally aware of the possibility of a Japanese offensive across the Mongolian republic. Since 1937, too, the Soviets have been supplying China with trucks and munitions by way of Outer Mongolia. One of the important objectives of the Japanese drive westward in Inner Mongolia has been to sever this arms route.

When the Japanese Army decided to create a diversion on the second anniversary of the war in China, Outer Mongolia was picked as the battleground. The clash of 1939 was the most serious encounter between Japan and Russia in thirty-five years. Probably 100,000 troops took part in the battles which raged through the summer; in some instances more than 200 airplanes participated in air encounters, while Japan claimed that its fliers had shot down 1,400 Russian craft during the "incident."

Starting as an ordinary border affray in the cattle-breeding country off Lake Buir, the fighting soon developed into a first-class war. The *Japan Times and Mail*, the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office in Tokyo, frankly admitted late in June, 1939, that:

It is now made definite that the Soviets and Outer Mongolia on one side and Manchukuo and Japan on the other are at war. This state of affairs is indisputable despite all efforts to belittle the significance of the military incidents in the border zone or despite any camouflage to make them appear as small border skirmishes with little political significance. . . .

This statement was echoed by spokesmen of the Kwantung Army, a large portion of whose strength was thrown into the fray.

After a month of silence Moscow also began to take a serious view of the clashes. The Russian chargé d'affaires in Tokyo was recalled and the embassy's brass plates were ostentatiously removed. Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet Foreign Commissar, sternly warned Japan that Russia's patience was "at a limit."

The Kwantung Army scored initial victories by massing its first-line aircraft and picked units along the Outer Mongolian border. Later, however, when the Mongolian border guards were reinforced by Soviet mechanized units, new fighters and bombers, and masses of infantry from Siberia, the tide of war turned. In September, 1939, a Russian general offensive made a breach in the Japanese lines, and only the armistice declared on September 19 checked the advance of the Soviet troops. The armistice was arranged by the vice-chief of the General Staff, rushed from Tokyo to prevent a major disaster.

With the general "betterment" in the Russo-Japanese relations, uneasy peace returned to the border area. A special commission went ahead with the demarcation of the frontier, and border markers were erected in the Lake Buir area. Cattle-herders were ordered away from the frontier grazing lands. The rival commands put their hot-heads on a leash. Yet the peace was not permanent. Momentarily the Soviet-Japanese rivalries had been subordinated to wider interests. But the political and military differences between the two nations are too wide to be bridged. And when friction is renewed, the first sparks will fly in Mongolia.

This today is Mongolia's fate: to be a helpless pawn in a game of power politics, a battlefield and an invasion route.

Chapter Fifteen

Back Door to Asia

SINKIANG IS RUSSIA's back door to China, Tibet and India. Nominally a Chinese province, Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) is today Moscow's most important pawn in the struggle for Asia. It is ruled by Soviet diplomatic and military officials, garrisoned by Red troops, financed by Soviet loans. Its policies, armed forces, economy and education are under complete Soviet domination.

Like Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang is carefully screened from curious eyes by both China and Russia. Visits to the province are dangerous and difficult. Moscow sternly declines visas for travel in it. Chungking, almost as unbending, weeds the applicants with a careful and heavy hand. Infrequent press reports of Sinkiang usually deal with plots, revolts and purges. Much of this is Japanese propaganda, much a reflection of the region's gory background and cataclysmic present. Even more than Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang is a border outpost, with the tension and uncertainty of one.

But the walls that divide Sinkiang from its mother-country are rapidly crumbling. With the closure of China's "life-line" through Indo-China in the summer of 1940 and the continuous Japanese air raids on the Burma Road, Sinkiang had become the most important gateway to the war-ravaged country. Public morale apart, almost all that China needed for successful resistance had to come from Russia through this province.

Sinkiang is much more, however, than a mere point of transit. Geography has made this border area a pivot of Asiatic power politics, a potential powder box. Consider Sinkiang's position. On the west, for nearly 700 miles, the provincial boundary fringes Soviet Turkestan, with its new strategically important Turk-Sib Railway, its new military bases, its vast expanse of new cotton plantations. On the south lies Tibet, where Chinese, British and Russian agents are fighting for control of the "roof of the world." From Tibet and India, British political agents branch out into southern Sinkiang, into such cities as Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan.

To the British, Sinkiang is a springboard for a Russian thrust into India. Before 1917 British agents fought Tzarist officials in the province; and today, despite Bolshevik disclaimers of imperialist aspirations, the British fight Soviet influence in Sinkiang with undiminished vehemence. Although unmarked by any tangible lines, Sinkiang is at present divided into two spheres of influence, with the British political agent in Kashgar holding sway over the southern part of the province and the Soviet Consul-General in Tihwa (Urumchi) controlling the larger central and northern portions. Another source of worry to Britain is the Afghanistan bottleneck, which forces its way between India and the Tadjik Soviet Republic to touch the Sinkiang border. Afghanistan is also a major Anglo-Soviet battlefield, and the bottleneck supplies Soviet agents with a gateway to the disputed kingdom.

In north Sinkiang, Soviet influence is challenged by Japanese agents, filtering through the Chinese lines in Inner Mongolia. Japan has been casting covetous glances upon Sinkiang for almost a decade, and in 1935-'37 there was a very active Japanese military mission stationed at Hami. Foreign travelers returning from north Sinkiang at the time reported that the mission, controlled by the Special Service Section of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria, was busily importing arms into the area and distributing them among the Mo-

hammedan malcontents. Smaller missions, usually consisting of one or two officers and a radioman, were also spread over the area, gathering information and fomenting discontent.

The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937 brought this activity to a sudden halt. All the missions were hurriedly withdrawn. Instead, however, the Japanese special service sections in Hsinking and Tientsin began to dispatch to Sinkiang specially trained Chinese and Mohammedan agents, loaded with money, to spy and to seek ways and means of cutting the Sino-Soviet arms route. A high Chinese official who visited Tihwa in 1939 asserted that the remittances of the Japanese secret service in Tientsin for subversive work in Sinkiang reached Ch. \$3,000,000, while Ch. \$10,000,000 additional was said to have been appropriated for the purpose. Scores of Japanese agents—usually masquerading as traders—were also reported to have been arrested with vast funds in their possession.

Simultaneously with this underground campaign, the Kwantung Army began to exert military pressure from without. One of the important objectives of this move was to encourage unrest among the millions of Mohammedans inhabiting the northwestern Chinese provinces of Kansu, Chinghai and Ninghsia, and Sinkiang itself. For once, however, the Kwantung Army failed. Its troops never reached the Sinkiang border, while the anticipated Mohammedan uprising did not come off.

Because of its importance in Russia's strategy and in China's resistance, Sinkiang looms large in the military and economic plans of the Kwantung Army and the General Staff in Tokyo. Prince Teh's puppet régime in Inner Mongolia—with a near-comic disdain for the factual—claims sovereignty over Sinkiang. In Tokyo hundreds of college students are receiving special training in Sinkiang's principal dialects, geography and problems. Japanese Mohammedans are being sent to Inner Mongolia to await a propitious moment for a

"visit" to Sinkiang. The Japanese youth units now being recruited for work in seized territory are officially described as "The Labor Corps for Work in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang."

MOSCOW'S PUPPET

The history of Sinkiang since 1932 is the biography of its governor, General Sheng Shih-tsai. Sheng is ambitious, able, keenly aware of political realities. A typical Chinese warlord, he dances to the Soviet piper with the skill of a fanatical Communist. The link between him and his Soviet backers is their hatred of Japan. But Sheng received his education in Tokyo, speaks fluent Japanese, and in his youth was saved from the executioner's noose by the Japanese Army.

Sheng was born in 1893 in Manchuria, the happy hunting ground of bandits and warlords. His family was poor, but managed to send him to lower schools. When the time came to go to college, richer members of the clan helped; and in 1917 he went to Japan to study political science and economics. Sheng, however, was too much of a patriot to be a good student. Every Sino-Japanese dispute found him aglow with nationalist fervor. In 1919, when Chinese delegates at the Versailles Conference protested against Japan's infamous "Twenty-One Demands," * Sheng manhandled those of his Chinese schoolmates who refused to leave school in a demonstration of patriotism.

About this time, Sheng—according to a friendly biographer—decided that China's salvation lay in armed force. He entered a military school in Manchuria, displayed no great talent but much gumption, was graduated at the appointed time with the rank of lieutenant. His first commander was a General Kwo, a strict disciplinarian. Kwo took a great liking to this spunky youth, rapidly promoted him to captain

* See page 107.

and major, obtained for him a government stipend to study military science at the Tokyo Military Academy. Sheng returned to Japan.

His studies, however, were cut short by Kwo's decision to stage a revolt. Sheng was recalled home and given a responsible post. Unfortunately for him, Kwo's plans miscarried. The generals whom he expected to aid him turned against him. The rebellion was crushed and Kwo was strangled. Sheng fled to Japan. The victorious generals immediately appealed to Tokyo to extradite him to Manchuria, where he could be despatched to his ancestors.

With an eye to Sheng's potential usefulness, the Japanese Army interceded. Sheng was allowed to remain in Japan and complete his education. During this difficult period Sheng's friends gave him occasional loans and moral support. Among them was one Chiang Kai-shek, a rising revolutionary. Sheng still signs his letters to Chiang with a pious "your pupil."

Friendship with Chiang also gave Sheng his next appointment. In the new Nationalist Army which was just launching its drive northward under General Chiang's command, Sheng became chief of the military strategy section. He did his work well, but without exceptional merit. When the campaign ended, he was transferred to the Advisory Section—the refuge of undistinguished generals. This sinecure failed to satisfy Sheng. He was still young, and the prospect of ending his days in Nanking did not seem a happy one. Sheng looked about him. Advancement, it seemed, was possible only in the borderlands, where cunning and ruthlessness still nursed high reward. But any attempt to poach upon another warlord's preserves demanded money, which Sheng did not have.

Luck came to Sheng's rescue. In 1929 a high Sinkiang official came to Nanking to look for an army officer. No one will ever know what strings Sheng pulled to bring himself to the attention of the official. He was nominated, and after

some initial difficulties—the Sinkiang Governor did not want a Japanese-educated officer—gained his appointment.

Sheng's first months in Sinkiang were not happy. The Governor snubbed Sheng, cut his salary to the bone, gave him an unimportant post. Sheng bore his trials with patience, studied the lay of the land, made friends. This humility finally won the Governor over. Sheng was made Chief of Staff, later Commander-in-Chief.

The appointment came on the eve of grave events. The Governor, Sheng soon discovered, played his game without skill and with much greed. Sinkiang's potentially most dangerous groups were the White Russians and Mohammedans. The Governor maltreated the first, overtaxed the second.

The Mohammedans, who lived in the Hami region, maintained a state of permanent feud with Urumchi (Tihwa). There were bloody uprisings, which were put down with extreme cruelty. In 1931 the fires of revolt were kindled anew by a scheme to institute a new system of taxation. A divisional general sent to the area to put the "reforms" into effect promptly made the tax retroactive to 1930, pocketing the difference. Another source of Mohammedan unrest was the appearance of famine refugees from neighboring Kansu Province. The Governor, in an outburst of generosity, ordered the Chinese officials to supply the refugees with Mohammedan land.

The final spark was provided by the traditional young and beautiful woman. A Chinese tax collector in Hami fell in love with a Mohammedan maiden and decided to marry her. The Mohammedans could tolerate the tax, but *this* was an insufferable insult. The romantic tax collector was killed. With him died eighty innocent refugees from Kansu. The Governor was not disposed to treat the loss of a tax collector lightly. Two generals, accompanied by troops, proceeded to Hami and put scores of Mohammedans to death without trial. The revolt spread. Mohammedan cavalymen from the neighboring Chinese provinces rushed to the aid of their

co-religionists. These fighters were more than a match for the ill-equipped, ill-trained Sinkiang troops.

Meanwhile, revolts flared up in other parts of the province. In Tihwa, packed with refugees, rice became scarce. When the Governor ordered the sale of his own stocks of rice—at famine prices—unrest reached a near-explosive stage.

The backbone of the garrison consisted of White Russian soldiers who had fled to China after the Bolshevik revolution. These men felt that they were underpaid and maltreated by the Governor. A plot was hatched with high Chinese officials of the provincial government and on April 12, 1932—a red-letter day in Sinkiang history—the Russians stormed the Governor's headquarters. A little too quick for his foes, the Governor scaled the wall, escaped into the city. His equally corrupt brother was shot.

After protracted haggling, General Sheng was offered by the rebels the post of "Provisional Defense Commissioner." He promptly accepted the offer and proceeded to make the post permanent. To be assured of long tenure, he had to make a deal with Russia. He had no choice. For its prosperity as well as for its peace, Sinkiang depended upon neighboring Russia. For his part of the bargain, Sheng adopted a Soviet-dictated six-plank platform. This provided for war on imperialism, amity with Russia, racial equality, honesty and frugality, peace and rehabilitation. Not the least important of these was the racial equality plank, specially designed to regain the friendship of the Mohammedans. Today there are in Sinkiang nearly 2,000 State-controlled Mohammedan schools, with 130,000 students. In these schools the three R's are mixed with a generous share of Soviet propaganda.

With help from Soviet experts who had worked on Russia's Five-Year Plan, Sheng instituted a Three-Year Plan of his own. Among the recorded achievements of the first year of Sheng's plan were 3,600 miles of road, three power plants, two flour mills, two soap-manufacturing works, gasoline storage

tanks, scores of Soviet-supervised agricultural and stock-breeding experimental stations, twenty irrigation projects and twelve hospitals. In that year 400 youths were sent to Russia for advanced training. The cost of the Three-Year plan—5,000,000 rubles—was loaned to General Sheng by Moscow at four per cent per annum.

In the following years, Soviet instructors and military equipment were "lent" to the Sinkiang provincial army. Educational experts were brought from Russia to direct the entire school system. Russian banks opened branches in Sinkiang cities to aid in the industrial development of the province. Russian experts were put to work, studying Sinkiang's economic problems.

Almost inevitably there has been opposition to the sovietization of the province. Though Sinkiang is roughly a third the size of the United States, its population is only 3,500,000. These are split into at least fourteen major racial and tribal groups, each of which warmly hates all others. Apart from this friction, neither the Mohammedan mullahs nor the reactionary officials, nor many of the traders, took kindly to the Soviet innovations. Both the British and the Japanese have done their best to wreck the Soviet program. There have been plots, sabotage, assassinations. With these Sheng has dealt ruthlessly. There has been a steady succession of purges, in one of which the vice-governor himself was discovered to be a Japanese spy.

Despite the intrigues and opposition, however, Soviet influence is paramount. It must remain so, if only to protect the vitally important Soviet Turkestan.

When Moscow learned in 1937 of the massing of armed men for thrusts across the border, Soviet aircraft promptly bombed cities in the British-dominated southern Sinkiang. Soviet garrisons in strategic centers in the province and the proximity of major Soviet bases also bind Sinkiang to Russia.

But equally as important are the arguments of economics and geography. Sinkiang is as easily accessible on the Russian

side as it is not on the Chinese. A web of new highways and the Turk-Sib Railway today link the province with every part of the Soviet Union. Over these roads Russian goods pour into Sinkiang, and the provincial exports go to Russia. Were these roads cut off suddenly, Sinkiang's entire economic structure would collapse. The province would find itself without manufactured goods, without money, without expert advice and—most probably—without peace.

Sheng is thus under a pressure which he cannot resist. Chungking wants him to play Moscow's game, if only to keep the Soviet military supplies pouring into China by way of Sinkiang. Russia knows its own economic and military strength in the province, and demands of Sheng prompt compliance with her wishes. This compliance Sheng—a Chinese warlord with a Communist tinge—gives to full measure.

Chapter Sixteen

Japan's Ally

THE LITTLE KINGDOM of Thailand (Siam) is today Japan's sole Asiatic ally in the struggle for the Pacific. The choice was voluntary. The Thai rulers early foresaw World War II, calculated the contestants' chances, analyzed their own objectives—and decided to hitch their star to the Rising Sun.

The rewards of the decision have been rich. Thai patriots saw the magic Japanese wand transform into reality their dream of regaining the territory lost to France in the past seventy years. Thailand's infant nationalism has been given a tremendous fillip. The Thai war machine, with Japanese assistance, has begun to assume a measure of striking power which permits Bangkok to cast sly glances at the country's borders with Burma and Malaya.

But with initial success came awareness of serious perils ahead. The Thai leaders found their new ally exacting and aggressive. What Bangkok intended as an understanding between two equals with similar aims has gradually degenerated into a lopsided arrangement, with Japan assuming a commanding position. In 1941 Thailand unhappily finds herself forming the spearhead of the Japanese advance south ward. Her armed forces have become the vanguard of the Japanese war machine. Her diplomacy has been made to dovetail Tokyo's. Her Capital has become the center of

Japanese intrigue for entire southeastern Asia. And, fearfully, her leaders contemplate the possibility of Thailand's conversion into a huge Japanese military base for a final test of arms with the democracies.

In a sense Thailand was betrayed by Hitler. The Thai leaders confidently counted on his victories. However, they underestimated both his pace and Japan's quickness in seizing the opportunities opened up in Asia. Japan in China was an acceptable ally. But when Japanese tanks rumbled into Indo-China, Tokyo had suddenly acquired a big stick whose persuasive qualities Bangkok could not ignore. The near-collapse of Thai economy, as a result of the world war, supplied Japan with another stick.

More than once during the sanguinary Thai-French conflict of 1940-'41 the leaders in Bangkok have felt the need of a respite, of a moment to regain control of the situation and to think. But the relentless Japanese pressure permits no delay. Japan is in a hurry, and Thailand has to adhere to Tokyo's time schedule. The kingdom is not yet a puppet, such as, for instance, Inner Mongolia. It still is pursuing the objectives it originally set out to attain. Its government and people are still free of foreign domination. But Thailand has felt herself maneuvered into a position where she has to play Japan's game, not her own.

Little is known of the treaty bonds under which the two nations collaborate in aggression. In 1938 British intelligence agents vainly sought confirmation of reports that Bangkok and Tokyo had exchanged secret memoranda pledging concerted action in case the Czechoslovakian spark set off a European conflagration. Late in 1939 other unconfirmed reports said the understanding had been expanded into a detailed formal agreement. In Tokyo it was merely admitted that a treaty of commerce and amity had been renewed.

Only on December 23, 1940—when major hostilities were already in progress on the Thai-Indo-China border—did

Bangkok announce that it had signed with Tokyo a pact of "amity and mutual respect for territory." The five-year accord provided for consultation on all matters of "common interest." In Tokyo, the Government spokesman cryptically commented that the treaty was a "valuable contribution toward political progress in East Asia."

THAILAND TURNS AGGRESSOR

Consultation on matters of common interest long antedated the treaty. And when Thailand decided to strike at Indo-China in the fall of 1940, the move—if not directly inspired by Japan—had her full encouragement and support. By this time Japanese troops were already in control of northern Indo-China, and table-banging Japanese colonels in Hanoi were demanding bases in the southern provinces. Any border trouble obviously tended to make Hanoi more susceptible to Japanese pressure.

The original Thai demands sought the retrocession of the Indo-China "Sudetenland"—parts of Laos State severed by France from Siam nearly half a century ago. Bangkok also wanted a formal pledge that "if and when" France gave up Indo-China, Laos and the kingdom of Cambodia would revert to Thailand. Vichy indignantly rejected both demands. Events at first moved slowly. Both Thailand and Japan awaited the reaction of London and Washington. But late in November, 1940, when it became clear that the democracies were not prepared to give Indo-China vigorous support—the only support that could matter—Thailand struck. The border skirmishes rapidly developed into a full-dress war, with aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery taking part.

Within a fortnight Thai troops had occupied some Indo-China frontier districts and bombed Vien Tiene, the capital of Cambodia. While the French command at the front caustically complained that the Thai aircraft "seem to be flown by men with plenty of war experience," in Tokyo

Foreign Minister Matsuoka summoned the French Ambassador and offered to mediate the dispute with Thai. The tough Governor of Indo-China, Admiral Decoux, promptly rejecting the generous proposal, suggested innocently that he welcomed mediation by a *neutral* nation.

The Thai offensive gathered momentum. By January, 1941, Thai troops numbering 80,000 and displaying surprisingly new and plentiful equipment were hammering on the thin French lines. When the French defenses caved in, Matsuoka—for the second time—summoned the French envoy to offer mediation. By this time a strong Japanese fleet was anchored off Saigon, fresh Japanese “replacements” were pouring into northern Indo-China, and more troop transports were reported off Haiphong. Another rejection was obviously inadvisable. From Vichy came urgent orders to Decoux to accept the Japanese offer. Thai delegates, brought to Saigon in a Japanese bomber, joined French officials aboard a Japanese cruiser to sign a Japanese-drafted armistice agreement. Later Thai and French delegations proceeded to Tokyo to accept Japan’s “disinterested” verdict.

The war in itself was unimportant. A few thousand square miles of rice land and jungle changed hands. In Thakhek, Savannakhet and a few other border towns with unpronounceable names, the French flag and uniforms gave place to those of Thailand. All else remained as it had always been—the language, the hates and sympathies, the squalor, poverty and disease.

But behind this screen the great international struggle begun in Manchuria a decade earlier continued with ever-increasing bitterness. With the exception of Russia, all the great Pacific powers took part in the Thai tug of war. And in this little-publicized behind-the-scenes conflict Japan—not Thailand—emerged the winner over her rivals. Once again hesitation and uncertainty had proved to be the democracies’ greatest foes. Both Washington and London clearly realized the danger of Japan’s entrenchment in Thailand; but they

had neither a well-defined policy of action nor the willingness to take risks. As soon as Japan's hand became apparent behind Thailand in November, 1940, the late Lord Lothian—fresh from a visit to London—approached the State Department for an exchange of views. Britain's stand at the time was that while every possible step should be taken to hinder Japan's progress in Indo-China and Thailand, Tokyo's intrigue should not be allowed to deflect attention from the vastly more important conflict in Europe. The State Department reluctantly agreed.

Thus, in the succeeding two months, Washington made a series of pin-pricking moves, all of them exasperating rather than hampering Thailand and Japan. First came the State Department's order to halt the delivery of sixteen American bombers ordered by Bangkok a year earlier. Tokyo promptly stepped into the breach and replaced the undelivered aircraft with its own Army bombers, whose insignia had been painted over. Next came stern, if unofficial, warnings to Bangkok and Tokyo to behave. The warnings, of course, were ignored. Still later the British and American Ministers in Bangkok approached the Government with a proposal whose outlines still remain vague. According to Japanese reports—very vigorously denied in Washington—the democracies offered Thailand a pact of mutual assistance. More probably, the bait waived before the Thai Government was partial satisfaction of the territorial claims against Indo-China, economic assistance and help in equipping the army.

The efficient Japanese secret service in Bangkok knew of the proposals before the envoys had returned to their legations. And lest the Thai leaders falter, the Government spokesmen and the controlled press in Tokyo at once launched an attack on Thailand as a "British puppet"—of all things,—and warned her that any efforts to play the democracies' game would be promptly "liquidated." The campaign was as brief as it was virulent. Never tempted by the Anglo-American proposal, Thailand turned it down.

By January, 1941, the State Department in Washington saw the urgent need of action if Japan were to be halted before she reached the border of Malaya. Reports from Indo-China told of Japanese offers to end the war if the rubber and tungsten earmarked for the United States were diverted to Japan. From Bangkok came information of shiploads of Nippon-made munitions pouring into the country, of Japanese military advisers attaching themselves to the Thai army, of feverish activity by the Japanese super-trusts. Thai economic, political and military missions were engaged in highly mysterious negotiations in Tokyo. In great secrecy, therefore, the United States approached the Governments of Indo-China and Thailand with offers of good offices in settling the border dispute. Having vainly tried to enlist American aid for months, Indo-China welcomed the offer. Thailand remained uncommunicative.

The counter-stroke to the American move this time came not from Tokyo but from Berlin. To Germany, Japan's continued advance towards Singapore was an integral part of the world-wide Axis strategical pattern. Any delays in Japan's march in the Pacific meant added British strength in Europe and Africa. Equally undesirable from the Nazi point of view was the strengthening of American influence in southeastern Asia. Accordingly the Wilhelmstrasse simply notified Vichy that it was opposed to the United States' mediation in Indo-China. Marshal Pétain's Government at once obediently instructed Admiral Decoux in Saigon to reject the American offer and accept Japan's.

Matsuoka delivered the post-mortem on the defeat of the democracies. Speaking in the Diet on the day Bangkok and Saigon agreed to Japanese mediation, he said: "The acceptance of our offer by the two governments is only natural. It is recognition of the fact that the area involved in the hostilities lies within Greater East Asia, which is under Japan's leadership."

In Washington there was a distinct let-down. In London,

British spokesmen protested "off the record" that the Thai episode was unimportant compared to the Battle for Britain. Others argued that no decisive action could have been taken against Thailand for fear of provoking Japan into action even more drastic. As a consolation, it was pointed out that the defenses of Singapore had been greatly strengthened, and that invasion of Malaya would now prove very costly. But all this was beside the point. The Battle for Britain was admittedly important, but so was the battle for the British Empire. And Japan's entrenchment in Thailand and Indo-China could only be compared in gravity to Italian control of Egypt.

The situation was especially pathetic because Thailand is particularly sensitive to British economic pressure. Britain did not have to bluster or send warships to Bangkok or bomb Thai cities. Eighty-five per cent of Thailand's foreign trade passes through British hands, ninety per cent of Thailand's financing is done through British banks, and Thai currency is still closely related to the pound sterling. With such powerful weapons Britain could easily bludgeon Thailand into toeing the line—and then see if Japan wanted to fight for the control of the kingdom. Had this been done in November, 1940, the odds are a hundred to one that Tokyo would not have given a thought to the idea of war on Britain.

But the verve and decision which characterized British operations in Africa were conspicuously lacking in the Pacific. Britain was too preoccupied with the events in Europe; the pressure of the British investors in Thailand—who feared confiscation of their property—was strong; the massing of Japanese troops had its intended effect—and Britain missed her opportunity. Japan was allowed to continue unhampered and score another important victory.

THAILAND'S "STRONG MAN"

Japan's "ace in the sleeve" in the struggle with the democracies is Thailand's young dictator, Major General Luang

Bipul Songgram—ambitious, ruthless and both nation- and race-conscious. Apart from being the leader of the nationalist movement, he is the benevolent patron of "Asia for Asiatics" groups, many of them subsidized by Tokyo. Like Mussolini, of whom he was a warm admirer (at least, until the disastrous Libyan campaign of 1941), Songgram today holds every important post in the government. He is Premier, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

Songgram won his first headlines in June, 1932, when he led a small, closely-knit, tight-mouthed group of armed men in a coup d'état. The revolutionaries seized all government buildings and key services, and presented shy, eye-ailing King Prajadhipok with a demand for constitutional reforms. Wisely the king accepted the rebels' terms, sweeping away the idle, parasitic top layer of Siamese society and establishing a national assembly.

In the revolt Songgram was flanked by two other leaders—an obscure German-trained army colonel, Phya Bahol Bolabayuha Sena, and a young French-educated lawyer, Luang Pradist Manudharm. After a few reshuffles Phya Bahol became Premier, Luang Pradist took the Foreign portfolio and the then Colonel Songgram took charge of the Defense Ministry. The task was to Songgram's liking, for through it he could control the army—the most powerful single force in the State.

The three leaders were essentially mouthpieces of the middle class. Their goal was to curtail the power of the royal family and its henchmen, to seize control of the Assembly, to break down the walls of feudalism. But while agreed on their objectives, the members of the revolutionary triumvirate differed radically on the methods to be employed. Brilliant, humorless Luang Pradist preached a far-reaching social revolution which would destroy all shackles, domestic and foreign. Colonel Songgram, at the other extreme, maintained that Thailand's future lay in the destruction of the

Pacific status quo and that, for this reason, complete divorce should be sought from Britain and France. On Premier Phya Bahol—moderate, energetic, popular with the petty bourgeoisie—fell the responsibility of keeping his two colleagues from flying at each other's throats. Phya Bahol's own program provided for collaboration with the democracies and extensive domestic reforms.

The years between 1932 and 1934 were years of tremendous difficulties. The aristocracy bitterly resisted the curtailment of its power and privileges. The main Buddhist precept—"Thou shalt not kill"—was forgotten in a series of sanguinary revolts. But by 1934 Songgram had solidified his grip on the army, the political opponents were clamped in jails, and public support was crystallized. With this preparation the Government embarked on an ambitious program. Education became a fetish. The populace was promised universal enfranchisement after ten years of "tutelage." For the first time in the nation's history, improvement of agricultural methods, transportation and health became planks in the Government's platform.

But while his colleagues concentrated on domestic problems, Songgram turned his attention to rearmament. He managed to earmark a fourth of Thailand's annual budget for the modernization of the fighting services. Young men were dispatched abroad for military training. Special missions followed them to purchase war equipment. Significantly, most of Songgram's missions went to Italy and Japan. One of the earliest orders placed abroad was for fourteen warships in Italy. They were delivered in 1938, and three years later some of them were sunk by French warships in a naval engagement. Japan also received lucrative orders for gunboats and training vessels, most of which were delivered in 1937-'38. Orders for bombers and guns were impartially divided among Japan, Italy, England and the United States.

Late in 1934 Songgram also prevailed on his colleagues to establish closer relations with the "have-not" nations.

The trend was in sharp contrast with the policies pursued by King Prajadhipok, who never concealed his pro-British sympathies. This diversity of view must have played its part in the growing friction between the King and the new régime. In 1935 the conflict flared into bright flames. The Government asked the King's assent to the execution of the opposition leaders. The monarch, then in England, turned the request down and abdicated. On the eve of Prajadhipok's abdication, a lone man approached Colonel Songgram as the latter was leaving a football game, took careful aim and shot him twice. It was the first attack of its sort in seventeen years. The name of the assailant, for reasons unknown, was kept secret. Songgram was taken to the hospital but did not die.

King Prajadhipok was succeeded by his nine-year-old nephew, Prince Ananda Mahidol. The prince, born in Heidelberg, was the son of a Siamese nurse from Albany, New York, and Doctor Prince Mahidol, who received his medical training at Harvard and the Johns Hopkins. The boy was proclaimed "Supreme Arbiter of the Ebb and Flow of the Tides" and "Possessor of the Twenty-Four Umbrellas"—and allowed to remain in Lausanne, Switzerland.

Meanwhile, the triumvirate continued to play the Franco-British and the Japanese-German blocs against each other. Cautious Phya Bahol, however, made every effort not to alarm the democracies—whose troops then lined Thailand's borders—by undue demonstrations of affection for Japan. For these pains he was promptly branded by the extremists a "tool of British imperialism." His position was made doubly difficult by the steady southward advance of Japanese influence. The invasion of China in 1937 and the subsequent retreat of the democracies before Japanese pressure clinched the Thai nationalists' determination to align their country with Japan.

With Japan's progress on the Asiatic map, Colonel Songgram's influence grew. With the imminent fall of Canton and Hankow—and the seeming collapse of Chinese resistance

—Songgram decided to act. In October, 1938, Singapore heard rumors of a plot to overthrow the Government. Bangkok denied the reports, but admitted that "certain difficulties" existed within the administration. A few weeks later a skilfully prepared dinner sent Songgram, his wife, daughter and a few friends to a hospital. The poison plot remained secret for a month, until the British Foreign Office—assured that the Colonel would survive—sent him a message of sympathy. Thus encouraged, Songgram left the hospital, forced his two colleagues to retire, and became the nation's "strong man."

The change was not painless. The so-called "elder statesmen" in the outgoing Cabinet refused to co-operate with the new Premier. A few army generals displayed even greater recalcitrance. With them the Colonel dealt without mercy. A laconic communiqué in January, 1939, announced the discovery of a military plot to restore King Prajadhipok, and the "retirement without pension or gratuity" of fifty generals. But even this stern action failed to check the unrest. A few months after the outbreak of World War II, Songgram's secret servicemen discovered two more plots, involving his own ministers and a few princes. Twenty plotters were shot, many more were imprisoned, a few escaped to Malaya.

In these muddled political waters foreign intrigue enjoyed lush growth. As in neighboring Burma, Japanese propagandists began to buy out newspapers and nationalist leaders, open radio stations, subsidize so-called "Pan-Asiatic" groups. Though on a smaller scale, the Germans duplicated the campaign—with emphasis on the radio. The agents of both powers joined hands in an extensive anti-British—and, in 1941, anti-American—campaign. The British counter-offensive lacked punch.

The campaign against the democracies was encouraged by Songgram. Back in 1937 he delivered a radio address picturing the outbreak of a war between the Axis and its foes. In such a conflict, he said, the Japanese Navy would attack

Singapore, thus placing Siam in an "awkward" position. The speech set the pattern for his subsequent oratory. In defending his war budgets before the National Assembly, Songgram invariably argued against reliance upon Britain. Gradually he began to couple these appeals with references to Japan's growing power and friendly feelings toward Thailand.

Today General Songgram backs collaboration with Japan without any reservations. Such bonds, in his eyes, seem to assure Thailand's greatness and his own continued tenure of office. And to the counsels of his more cautious advisers—who look into the future with fear and uncertainty—he lends no ear.

SONGRAM'S PEOPLE

Songgram's main dangers are the Japanese invasion and the threat of a domestic explosion. He is very much more worried by the latter than by Japan. Like almost all other countries of southeastern Asia, Thailand combines incredible poverty with immense untapped natural resources. Probably eighty per cent of Thailand's 14,000,000 inhabitants are only a step removed from starvation. The loss of rice markets as a result of the war further sharpened the privation. One of the planks in General Songgram's program is the development of industries. But such development has been delayed by the shortage of both capital and skilled labor. The Thai people—as one observer puts it—find work necessary but distasteful. Attempts to herd them into industry have not been marked by success thus far.

Another factor contributing to general poverty is the lack of communications. Relatively few communities are able to move their products to markets—and even they, as often as not, by cart and on human heads. The remainder of the country is shut in within village boundaries and depends on barter for the necessary supplies. Cementing this primitive

economy have been the Chinese, of whom Thailand has nearly 5,000,000 of pure and mixed blood. More enterprising than the natives, the Chinese prior to 1937 controlled eighty per cent of the rice trade, monopolized the retail trade, and branched out into the rubber and tin industries. In addition, the Chinese formed an inexhaustible reservoir of money-lenders. The tragic picture found in southern China was duplicated in Siam. There are few Thai communities in which families do not pay debts running three and four generations back.

One of the results of Thailand's "face towards Japan" policy has been a relentless war on the Chinese minority. Beginning about 1937 the Government began to introduce harsh restrictions on Chinese economic, social and educational activities. Schools were closed. Chinese immigration was virtually banned. The number of Chinese workers in business undertakings was delimited by law. Large Chinese enterprises were nationalized. Chinese newspapers were closed down, to be replaced by Japanese-owned Chinese dailies. The celebration of the second anniversary of the Japanese invasion of China led to the imprisonment of more than 1,000 Chinese. While these Asiatic "Nuremberg Laws" were intended to please Japan and create a native petty capitalist class, they have resulted largely in a disorganization of rural economy and a great deal of bitterness.

The Government's efforts to speed up the growth of nationalism in the country have also provoked much opposition. The more conservative elements do not understand the new-fangled political ideas, resent the growing taxes for rearmament, and oppose the drafting of their sons for war service. In the cities, opposition to Songgram finds a ready haven in the hearts of dispossessed aristocracy, of liberals alarmed by Songgram's totalitarian ideas and friends, and of the elements allied with the British banks and trading firms. Songgram knows that he lives on a volcano, but his main hope is that nationalism—spurred on by victories on foreign soil—

will stay ahead in the race with poverty-fed discontent. The Japanese likewise realize that nationalism is their best insurance against new coups d'État which might bring the democracies back into the political saddle. For this reason they water Thai nationalism with a generous outpouring of Yen.

Meanwhile, Japan is laying the groundwork for the utilization of Thailand as a military base. Vast tracts of land have been acquired in the southern and southwestern parts of the country. A Thai military mission has been engaged in protracted conversations with Japanese staff officers. Japanese "surveyors" have for months been studying the topography of Thailand. Vast stores of military supplies have been accumulated both in Bangkok and at bases in Indo-China, whence they can quickly be moved to new Thai bases.

The strengthening of the British defenses in Malaya and Burma was a sorry answer to the Japanese preparations in Thailand, for, once the democracies allowed Japan to gain ascendancy in Thailand and Indo-China, they placed the South Seas at the mercy of Japanese bombers. Entire Malaya with Singapore, most of Burma with Rangoon, parts of Sumatra lie within a 600-mile radius of Thailand. All these will be subjected to a severe aerial punishment the moment Japan decides to go on the warpath.

Beginning tardily in 1940, Britain and the United States had been laboriously erecting a defense arch stretching from northern America to southern Asia. Japan's master-stroke in Thailand has uprooted the Asiatic anchor of the arch and placed the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and Britain's most treasured imperial possessions in dire jeopardy. Score up another victory for Japan.

VI

PRIZES

Chapter Seventeen

First Prize: China


CHINA IS MANY things to many nations. To Japan she is Asia's prize number one—the backbone of the great empire for the creation of which the Japanese jingoists are ready to risk national existence. To the United States, China has long been the cornerstone of the status quo in the Pacific. Today she is still that and, in addition, America's avowed ally in the war on totalitarianism. To Russia, war-weary, exhausted China is the next recruit in the cause of world revolution. To Germany, China is an uncertain quantity—from a possible ally to a hindrance, whose nuisance value can be tempered by skilful handling.

For centuries China has been a magnet, irresistibly attracting foreign traders, missionaries and adventurers. Half a dozen international wars have been fought on her fertile soil. Civil strife has been fanned by powers seeking to extend their spheres of influence.

The eventful years between the invasion of Manchuria and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war witnessed a jockeying for position by the four major rivals—Japan, Russia, Britain and the United States. The maneuvering was attended by armed skirmishes, underground political and economic moves, protests, bluff and a constant regrouping of the powers into blocs. Against this dark background two important developments were unfolding. The first was the steady expan-

sion of Japan's shadow over China. The other—and a parallel process—was China's "coming of age."

Paradoxically Japan's successes served to strengthen China. Every Chinese province lost to the invader welded the remaining territory. What the pleas of Chinese leaders could



ASIA'S PRIZES

China—vast, populous, almost defenseless . . .

not accomplish in decades, the roar of Japanese guns brought about almost overnight. In 1932 Japanese troops landing in Shanghai encountered only one poorly equipped and small provincial army. General Chiang Kai-shek, ensconced with his powerful forces 150 miles to the west, failed to come to its aid. But in 1937, when the Japanese Army struck in the north, General Chiang was ready to fight. Seven months earlier he had bought his freedom from patriotic kidnapers in Sian with a pledge to resist Japanese aggression. Moreover, the tide of public opinion could no longer be held in check.

All over the land the Popular Front was staging anti-Japanese demonstrations. The students—China's most articulate group—were clamoring for war. Despite the censors' blue-penciling, press headlines also screamed for a crusade "to recover the lost territory."

The prelude to war—the capture of General Chiang in a Sian suburb by his erstwhile follower, "Young Marshal" Chang Hsueh-liang—was heavily underscored with international intrigue.* The plot was backed by the Chinese Communists, who had for years been demanding a national anti-Japanese front. But once the Generalissimo had been captured, the Communists, with apparent inspiration from Moscow, exerted all possible pressure to prevent General Chiang's "liquidation" by the irate rebels. Not adverse to involving Japan in an exhausting war with China, Russian leaders saw clearly that General Chiang alone could head a nation at war.

Japan remained inactive during the twelve days of General Chiang's captivity. The military in North China made no provocative move of any kind. The Japanese press displayed an unaccustomed discretion in discussing the incident. Obviously Tokyo realized that any ill-considered gesture on its part might result in the murder of the only man who had up to that time held the anti-Japanese movement in rein.

The situation changed radically in the beginning of 1937. Despite vehement denials from Nanking, the terms of the secret agreement in Sian had leaked out. General Chiang called off his ten-year war on Communists and made peace with the powerful National Salvation groups.† Japanese pressure encountered unsuspected firmness.

Tokyo's first gesture was one of amity. A goodwill mission, headed by a distinguished banker, paid a well-publicized visit to Central China. There were the usual courtesy speeches, the usual sumptuous banquets, and—the very unusual con-

* See page 82.

† See page 99.

crete proposals for Sino-Japanese economic collaboration on terms of complete equality. As if sensing that the only alternative was war, Japan's Big Business was seeking to win over the powerful Chekiang financial clique in Shanghai with promises of handsome returns. But the gesture was wasted. The General Staff in Tokyo had already decided to strike in the north before China became too strong to tackle. The "now or never" point in Japanese dreams of hegemony over China had been reached.

Japan's strategy was mapped out by Major General Kanji Ishiharada, the wunderkind of the Tokyo General Staff. His blueprints of conquest called for a brief demonstration of armed might in North China. Light-heartedly, the plans provided for nothing more serious than minor clashes with the poorly equipped, ill-disciplined northern troops. The collapse of resistance was expected to generate in Nanking a mood receptive to Tokyo's demand for complete control over North China. The plan was hinged on two premises. First, it was assumed that the northern warlords would not resist. Second, General Chiang Kai-shek was not expected to challenge Japan's might for the sake of a few provinces over which he had never exercised anything but a purely nominal influence. As it happened, Major General Ishiharada erred in both respects. The northern troops tackled Japan's picked units, despite heart-breaking losses. General Chiang went to war.

THE WAR BEGINS

Tokyo's nemesis was the stern-faced, monocled, aged General Baron Alexander von Falkenhausen, head of the German military mission in China on the eve of the Japanese invasion.* This World War hero realized—as the Chinese Red strategists did before him—that China could not defeat Japan in a test of strength. The only hope lay in a war of attrition.

* See page 199.

The foe was to be pin-pricked in a thousand points until he slowly bled himself into defeat. While the Japanese prepared to strike in the north, the German experts drafted elaborate plans to involve Japan on other fronts, force her to send a million men to China, attenuate her lines of communication, undermine her budget and morale. Like Napoleon in his campaign of 1812, Japan was to be drawn deep into a barren and hostile land and then attacked.

Indignant protests from Japan to her anti-Comintern ally led to the recall of General von Falkenhausen in 1938. The harm, however, had already been done. Thanks to his tutelage, China was ready to meet her foe.¹

As expected, Japan's first blow came in the north. There is no need for apportioning the blame for the spark that set off the explosion. Whether responsible for the famous Marco Polo bride incident or not, the Japanese Army displayed a willingness to fight it out with the Chinese. In the fortnight following the first clash, the frightened Chinese warlords in Peiping met every Japanese demand. But the demands mushroomed until they involved a virtual "Manchukuoization" of North China.

Thoroughly inflamed by agitators, the northern troops went into action late in July, 1937. The results were frightful. In one encounter after another, heaps of bodies blanketed the battlefields in the wake of the Chinese retreat. Undaunted, new units met the Japanese juggernaut. On July 27, Chinese troops wiped out the Japanese garrison in Tungchow, the capital of the puppet state near Peiping. Three days later Chinese units attacked the strong Japanese force in Tientsin.

The conflict was spreading. Still, General Chiang refused to be drawn into the northern battle. Patriotic considerations were outweighed by the sober fact that only two single-

1. In 1941 this able general played an important rôle in German power politics in Europe, serving as commander-in-chief of the forces in occupied France and Belgium.

track railways linked the northern front with the supply bases in Central China. A far more tempting front lay next door, along the banks of the muddy Whangpoo River. Shanghai satisfied all Chinese strategic requirements. The Japanese stronghold in the Hongkew district was defended by only 5,000 bluejackets. General Chiang's best divisions were stationed in the area. War supplies were readily available. A major clash here threatened to involve other powers in the conflict, presumably on China's side. Finally the extension of the Sino-Japanese hostilities to the area increased the drain on Nippon's manpower and resources. General Chiang therefore decided to strike in Shanghai.

Considerately the Japanese Navy provided the immediate *casus belli*. The laurels of the Japanese soldiers in North China gave the sailors no rest. The Chinese war machine also inspired in the Japanese Navy nothing but contempt. The command of the Japanese Third Fleet in China was confident its antiquated men-of-war and a small landing party were fully capable of dealing with the Chinese. The rising temper of the Chinese was thus fully matched by the arrogance of the Japanese.

In the evening of August 9, 1937, a Japanese non-commissioned officer, accompanied by a bluejacket, attempted to pass the Chinese military airdrome in Hungjao, four miles outside of the city boundary. Hailed by Chinese sentries, the driver failed to stop. Chinese guns barked. The car swerved into a ditch. In the back seat was the officer, dead. The wounded bluejacket attempted to escape in a field, was chased by the sentries and bayoneted. The two bodies were then thoroughly mutilated. Forty-eight hours later four Japanese cruisers and seven destroyers quietly slipped into the harbor, began to land bluejackets and supplies.

Shanghaianders took the incident with the calmness of the doomed. With its sixty-year history of war and violence, Shanghai knew the portent of the times. Had not the Hungjao incident occurred, some other spark would inevitably

have ignited the political powder keg.² On August 14 Chinese aerial bombs exploding near Japanese warships on the Whangpoo—a bare 200 yards from my home—heralded the opening of the battle of Shanghai.

STRENGTH IN DEFEAT

In the maze of Shanghai's streets and in the mud of its suburbs, Japan lost her daring bid for Asia's first prize.* In terms of immediate advantage the Japanese had scored a smashing success. Within ninety days the invaders had erased 300,000 names from the Chinese Army rolls. The entire Chinese Navy and Air Force had been annihilated. The vaunted "Hindenburg Line," thirty-five miles west of Shanghai, was pierced by the Japanese within two or three days.

Yet the tangible elements of victory were outweighed by the intangible elements of defeat. Probably the most important effect of the Shanghai war was the incredible stiffening of Chinese morale. The stand made by General Chiang's troops against the combined might of the Japanese Army and Navy almost overnight replaced China's outmoded clan concepts with new ideas of nationalism and patriotism. In Szechuan, a thousand miles away, the natives stopped speaking contemptuously of Lower Yangtse Valley inhabitants as *Hsia Chiang Jen* (Lower River People), began to talk of "our war." Thousands of youths from every corner of China donned army uniforms and went to the front. The white heat of war melted most of the provincial lines which once split China into *opéra-bouffe* autonomous states.

2. Sino-Japanese hostilities in Shanghai were threatened on July 24, when a Japanese seaman disappeared in the city. The Third Fleet alleged that the man was kidnaped by anti-Japanese elements, and presented the Chinese authorities with an ultimatum. Three days later a Chinese boatman found the missing man a hundred miles away. The seaman claimed he had amnesia. Indications pointed to a desertion.

* See page 21.

The ability of the Chinese Army to hold the Japanese at bay in Shanghai for three months and claim from the enemy 75,000 casualties, has also given China supreme confidence. There were great dangers inherent in such faith, but there were also in it strength and the seeds of national regeneration.

Another major effect of the war in Shanghai was the destruction of the only group which could have helped Japan to entrench herself on Chinese soil. General Chiang came to power in 1927 with the aid of Shanghai's moneyed men. Described by the Japanese as the "Chekiang financial clique," these men included bankers, industrialists and shipping magnates waxing rich on Central China's trade. In the succeeding decade General Chiang's Government in Nanking derived its main support from this group, as well as from generals and great landlords.

The Chekiang clique did not want to fight Japan. War meant the destruction of property, cessation of profits, financial chaos. As patriots these men cordially hated Japan: as astute businessmen they were more or less indifferent to what was going on north of the Yellow River. All they wanted was peace, suppression of Communism, and dividends. But now strange winds were blowing. The forces of nationalism, which the Chekiang clique itself had unleashed through the industrialization of Central China, defied all restraint. Western political ideas were taking root. Five years of agitation by Communists and other anti-Japanese groups were also having their effect. The political tug of war between the peace-loving money-makers and the propertyless, articulate Communists, army officers and students gave victory to the latter.

Still the Chekiang clique retained great power. If they could not prevent the war, they hoped to check its disastrous spread. But this was not to be. The first action of the Japanese Fighting Services in Shanghai was to blow up Chinese mills, set city blocks on fire, sink merchantmen, confiscate Chinese cargoes. Japanese airmen went on an orgy of senseless

destruction. The Chinese moneyed men were terrified and alienated. They were also deprived of the source of their political power, which could be employed in the cause of peace with Japan. The reaction was almost automatic. The Chekiang clique stepped out of the Government. The anti-Japanese elements stepped in. China was definitely committed to a policy of resistance to the bitter end. Poetic justice claimed its own: the Japanese bombs dropped on Chinese property exploded Japan's hope of victory.

ORGY IN NANKING

It took the Japanese Army exactly one month to march the 150 miles to the moss-covered walls of Nanking. Within were 50,000 Chinese troops commanded by General Tang Seng-chi. With Japanese guns shelling the city from near-by mountains, General Tang proudly announced that he would die at his post. Twenty-four hours later he decamped from the city with his staff officers to safer regions across the Yangtse. Reliable foreign testimony indicates that the troops in Nanking genuinely believed they would fight the enemy unto death. But when the Japanese tanks launched their final attack on the city gates, the Chinese soldiers found themselves leaderless. Panic set in. Frightened men shed their army uniforms in the streets and sought refuge where they could. When the Japanese pincers closed in on Nanking, there was almost no resistance. The fall of the city was so precipitous that vast Chinese Army stores remained within its walls. Trustingly, most of the population also stayed.

What followed is now a tragic chapter in Asia's history. All men suspected of being soldiers were killed. Many were tied together in batches of fifty, sprinkled with gasoline and set on fire. In Shanghai, I met an educated Chinese, formerly employed by a German concern in Nanking, who miraculously escaped from a human bonfire. As the flames severed the

rope, he rolled down into a ditch and played possum. Hundreds of other Chinese were used for bayonet and sword practice by Japanese soldiers.

Less than forty-eight hours later the victors turned to new pursuits. Small groups of soldiers began a house-to-house search for "snipers." The men were often accompanied by army trucks to carry away the valuables. In the course of the two-month search, according to a survey made by American doctors, 12,000 women between the ages of eight and sixty were raped. While the soldiery thus disported itself, the Japanese command awaited peace moves by the chastised Chinese Government. The delay was another costly error. Instead of pleading for mercy, General Chiang reformed his disorganized troops and set up a new line of defense.

Meanwhile, news of the rape of Nanking swept through the battle lines to every hamlet in China, arousing the people to a new pitch of anti-Japanese fervor. When Tokyo finally awoke to the realization that General Chiang intended to fight on, the Japanese forces were faced by a strengthened and a refreshed foe. Apparently in retribution for failure to hold his men in rein, Lieutenant General Prince Asaka, Commander of the Nanking force, was sent home. To preserve his princely escutcheon, Tokyo also dismissed other commanders, including General Iwane Matsui, who headed the Central China campaign.

DEFEAT AT TAIERCHWANG

In February, 1938, the invading army—still desperately pursuing the will-o'-the-wisp of hegemony over China—launched its third major drive. The new objective was the dusty city of Hsuechow, sprawled at the intersection of railways running from Tientsin to the Yangtse River and from the China Sea far west into the interior. The old Grand Canal weaves its way through the plains near by, while to the north is the treacherous Yellow River. Entrenched in this

area, behind another "Hindenburg Line," was a Chinese army 400,000 strong.

To the General Staff in Tokyo, Hsueh looked like a gigantic mouse trap. Sharp simultaneous thrusts from the north and south, it seemed, would catch the Chinese in the plains between the Tientsin-Nanking Railway and the sea, thus enabling the Japanese aircraft to massacre them at will. To ensure the success of this scheme Tokyo threw into the fray a tremendous number of fast whippet tanks. Travelling at forty miles an hour across the dusty plains, these steel monsters played havoc with Chinese lines of communication and isolated units.

The quarry was cornered. The Japanese Army was poised for the killing shot. Two powerful columns were racing toward Hsueh, the southern along a railway line, the northern across a swampy plain. At the spearhead of the northern force came the picked divisions of Nippon's famed generals, Rensuke Isogai and Seishiro Itagaki. In their haste the two units far outdistanced their transport. Chinese resistance was weak, and plentiful supplies could, no doubt, be found in Hsueh. Success of the gamble, moreover, meant glory and promotion for the generals.

On March 27, 1938, the two divisions entered the little village of Taierchwang, close to the Grand Canal. In the path was a small Chinese force, which obstinately refused to yield ground. Entrenched in fortified farmhouses, the Chinese hurled back attack after attack.

Generals Isogai and Itagaki decided to slow down, to wear the Chinese out and to allow the supplies to catch up. Meanwhile, a strong Chinese force, avoiding detection by Japanese aircraft, made a wide detour and cut the road between the two Japanese divisions and their base. The hunters were caught in the trap which they had planned for the Chinese. The Japanese fought valiantly. They always do. Supplies, however, were running low, casualties mounted, and the ground did not favor effective defense. When the reinforce-

ments finally arrived a fortnight later, the two divisions had lost about 25,000 officers and men.*

Hsuehchow was taken on May 20, 1938, but the victory at Taierchwang had softened the blow for the Chinese. Taierchwang supplied a stimulant whose effects were felt throughout the next year.

The Japanese did not tarry long in Hsuehchow. The mistake made in Nanking was not to be repeated. Moreover, the Chinese main body, by virtue of forced night marches, had escaped from the enemy ring into the rugged mountains to the west. The Japanese command therefore decided to push westward along the Lunghai Railway, and then veer south along the railway linking Peiping with Hankow. The advance was slow but steady. Another Japanese division—commanded by that master of espionage, Kenji Doihara—ran into difficulties but extricated itself with heavy losses. But when the battlefield moved up to the Yellow River, the Chinese effected a brilliant stroke. The river dykes were breached, and within two days the Japanese found their path of advance blocked, their mechanized equipment mired in Chinese mud. The Japanese withdrawal resembled a rout. It was a flight from nature rather than from man, but the losses in equipment were staggering. The drive was abandoned, and the Chinese once again won a badly needed breathing spell.

The General Staff in Tokyo had to draft new plans. It was finally decided to advance on Hankow up the Yangtse River. Foreign military experts computed that the change of plans had cost Japan 100,000 lives and three expensive months.

The new advance was painfully slow. The Chinese defenses were well constructed; the Japanese lines of communication were repeatedly severed; and the attacking troops had to march across swamps and over mountains. In capturing one Chinese mountain stronghold in Tchan the Japanese lost 20,000 men. Comparable losses were suffered in other points

* See page 158.

where the invading army could not employ its mechanized equipment and had to rely on the bayonet.

Meanwhile, a Japanese force was landed in South China. Canton was occupied within thirteen days. Treason, provincialism and cowardice played their part in this dark episode. The commanding warlord in Canton retreated without battle, in the wise belief that a warlord with his army intact was a far better man than a defeated hero. Although the slow progress of the Japanese armada to the landing point was reported daily for a week by Shanghai newspapers, no preparation was made to meet the invaders. The armed peasantry, whose photographs had graced the rotogravure sections of every Sunday journal abroad, were conspicuous by their absence.*

On October 26, 1938—five days after the fall of Canton—Japanese units entered Hankow. The city had by this time been cleared of its population, industrial equipment and military supplies. Only a few badly wounded, dull-eyed soldiers awaited their doom on the straw-blanketed railway station platform. The Chinese Government, announcing that it would fight on, had moved its seat to Chungking.

GUERRILLA WARFARE

The beginning of 1941 found a million Japanese troops locked in deadly combat with three times that many Chinese soldiers and guerillas over a front stretching halfway across Asia. Unhappy men, women and children were being driven daily from their hearths and fields by the tide of war. Peaceful towns and villages were going up in smoke and dust. And perhaps even as these lines were being written, a school, a factory or a foreign mission lost somewhere in the vastness of China was being bombed by Japanese airmen on one of their routine morning raids.

* See pages 56, 59.

What was happening in China could best be visualized by drawing a huge triangle, its sides linking Peiping in the north with Canton in the south and Shanghai in the east. The triangle was known under many names. To patriotic Chinese it was "Lost Territory," which must be recovered from the alien invader. To the Japanese it was the prize of three years of sanguinary hostilities, a territorial return on an imperial investment of 250,000 lives and billions of yen. The triangle was a theater of war, the locale of an economic revolution and a problem in politics. Within the triangle lay the area overrun by the Japanese. Outside was Free China, where the embattled Chinese Government had its headquarters, where new industries were being built up to provide the material base of resistance, and where new armies were being trained and equipped for future battles.

The Japanese were fighting on two major, two vastly dissimilar fronts, and with greatly dissimilar weapons. The forces operating along the sides of the triangle were charged with the task of checking Chinese thrusts from Free China, and their methods were those of war. Here occasional victories, such as the capture of Nanning, were interlarded with reverses as disastrous as the unsuccessful drive on burned-out Changsha in September, 1939, or the fiasco in the mountainous Kwangsi Province thirteen months later.

On the whole, the Tokyo General Staff was content with remaining relatively impassive on this front. Beyond the line linking Peiping with Canton lay rugged country in which the Japanese could not employ their mechanized equipment. Farther advance westward had to be pushed with small arms, in the use of which the Chinese excelled, on a terrain favoring the defender.

Japan's other war was being fought within the triangle. Here the purpose of the invading armies was to crush the guerillas, to pacify the populace and to launch, as soon as possible, the exploitation of the economic resources of the seized area. Of necessity the gun and the bayonet were comple-

mented here by economic pressure, political intrigue and intensive propaganda. It was also here—and not along the sides of the triangle—that Japan was to win or lose her bid for the control of China. Japanese strategy on this all-important front up to 1941 had been simple—and unsuccessful.

When Nippon's armies poured into China in 1937, their first move was to occupy the important cities and channels of communication. The theory was that with the cities, trunk railways and rivers in Japanese hands, the population—which must transport its produce to the markets—would soon be forced to its knees.

Tokyo, however, reckoned without the guerillas. What happened was a mild revolution in China's rural economy. Anti-Japanese organizers went into the countryside and issued a dictum: "Produce only what you can consume." The result was startling. It hurt the Japanese in their most vulnerable spot. For decades the Japanese empire-builders had been dreaming of converting China into a gigantic farm, supplying Nippon's hungry mills with the needed raw materials. Yet the first result of the invasion had been a disastrous drop in the flow of these supplies to Japan. North China, for instance, had always been regarded as the future source of all the raw cotton Japan required. But as soon as the war started, guerilla organizers in the vast area stretching south of Peiping banned the planting of cotton. That year Japan's mills received from North China but a fraction of the cotton they had in 1936. In 1940 there was practically none.

But the guerillas had done more than that. They proceeded to train the population in the use of arms and began to set up little arsenals for the manufacture of firearms. They reorganized rural government for war-time efficiency and launched a campaign of anti-Japanese education. Their most helpful aides were the Japanese themselves. Like the German Junkers, the Japanese military believed that force solved all problems. From the very first day of the war, therefore, they had been seeking to bludgeon the Chinese into the bliss

of Sino-Japanese political and economic "co-operation." The indiscriminate Japanese bombing of towns and villages, the wholesale maltreatment of the population and the utter disregard for civilian life and property fertilized the ground for the seeds of unity, nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment sown by the guerilla organizers.

Within a few months of the opening shot of the war, it had become dangerous for Japanese soldiers to venture away from the strongly-defended towns and railways. Occasional punitive expeditions and daily bombing raids produced negative results. The General Staff in Tokyo suddenly realized that while its armies had overrun half of China, this nominally occupied territory was still in Chinese hands. At least 100,000,000 people lived in the four largest "guerilla empires" spreading between the Great Wall and the Indo-China border. About a half of this number were in the tremendous North China plain, between the two trunk railroads radiating southward from Peiping. From these bases strong guerilla forces made frequent sorties upon isolated Japanese garrisons, supply trains, market towns and railways. A few punitive expeditions sent by the Japanese command into the heart of the "guerilla empire" in Hopei Province burned their fingers so badly that the effort had to be given up. A dozen armies sent to wipe out the Communist guerilla units in rugged Shansi were decimated, without achieving success.

There matters rested at the start of 1941. Despite the painful blows suffered by China, the Sino-Japanese tug of war was still a stalemate. And victory—barring a civil war in China or a great betrayal without—remained out of Japan's reach as long as she was unable to conquer and rule the "guerilla empires" within the triangle. Tokyo had realized this long ago. It had tried propaganda on the obstinate Chinese farmers. But propaganda loses its power of seduction when accompanied by the crash of exploding bombs. The dispatch of a large army to occupy and hold the entire area within the triangle had been ruled out. Japan's slender coffers could

not afford the maintenance of such a force. The experiment with puppets had likewise failed.

BROKEN ARMOR

But China also drank of the cup of bitterness. The better half of the country, including all important ports and industrial cities, had been seized by the invader. In the greatest migration since Genghis Khan's days, forty million Chinese had been driven from their homes to the cold inhospitality of the remote West. Thousands of towns and villages, hospitals, schools and power plants had been razed by Japanese explosives. At least three million young men had been killed or maimed—four times Japan's casualties.

While nationalism had been nourished by the invasion, provincialism, corruption and treason remained deeply rooted. Selfish considerations continued to affect the strategy and tactics of many Chinese military leaders. While the battle lines remained largely unchanged in the past three years, the Japanese could still advance at will—if they wished to pay the price in blood and cash. Such a price—\$1,000,000—was paid in 1939, when a bribed Chinese force withdrew by prearrangement from a strategic pass guarding Nanning, capital of Kwangsi Province.³

Little progress had been made up to 1941 in the industrialization of Free China. The fault was not the Government's. Reaping a golden harvest in Shanghai, China's patriotic bankers refused to risk investments in the wild West. Inadequate transportation facilities hindered the shipment of vitally necessary machinery. Moreover, normal economic activity was impossible under a daily shower of TNT. The industrial centers erected in Szechuan and Yunnan supplied enthusiastic

3. The victory proved to be empty, for in 1940 the Japanese withdrew from the province when they discovered they could not maintain their lines of communication. Tokyo's facile explanation was that the new air bases in Indo-China made further occupation of Nanning unnecessary.

Chinese apologists with admirable "copy." Far less comforting was the output of steel and iron, urgently required for armaments. The new arsenals sprinkled over the "guerilla empires" and Free China could perhaps meet the needs of partisan warfare, but they were entirely inadequate in equipping China for an offensive by regular troops.

Far more important, however, than all these was the renewal of political cleavage within China. The secret of China's successful resistance lay in national unity, with all factions from Communists to ultra-conservative Kuomintang members joining in the effort. But about the middle of 1939 the Communists began to expand their physical strength and influence. The process was inevitable. The Communists had a superior organization, extensive experience in the technique of propaganda, an attractive program--and courage. The exploits of the Eighth Route Army, so ably described by Agnes Smedley, Edgar Snow and Evans Carlson, form an epic unrivalled in the history of modern warfare. The youth of the land was drawn to the Red banners by the daring of the Communist leaders and their patriotism. The peasantry was attracted by promises of land, low taxes and protection from bandits, pseudo guerillas and petty warlords.

The Kuomintang Party bitterly resisted these inroads on its territory and influence. In this opposition the Kuomintang derived its support from the regional military bosses, the large landlords and the industrialists of the coastal belt. Throughout 1939-'41 there had been a long series of armed clashes between the Communists and various provincial armies. General Chiang Kai-shek himself, although an enemy of Communism, maintained relative impartiality. Though he kept the Red armies on a starvation diet, he strongly resisted all efforts to erase the Red hue from the united front.

Through these years of friction Moscow's attitude remained the paramount issue. The Chinese Communists were obviously in high favor with the Kremlin, for they never swerved from the so-called "Stalinist line." Yet there had

been no evidence of Russian military or financial assistance to the Chinese Red armies—and the political pressure on Chungking to “make up and love” the Communists has never been heavy. World War II seemed to give Moscow a dominant voice in Chungking. And the Kuomintang conservatives never doubted that this voice would be raised in behalf of the hated Reds. The thought of further Communist expansion was terrible to harbor—and it drove many an old Kuomintang member into Wang Ching-wei’s fond embrace.

The Communists themselves brought the crisis to a head late in 1940—apparently with Moscow’s blessings. The Eighth Route Army asked permission to leave the barren snow-swept Shansi Mountains for the rich Yangtse Valley, where it intended to sever the Japanese Army’s most important communications line—along the river. The request was a red rag to the Kuomintang. The Yangtse Valley has always been its stronghold. It had required seven costly campaigns to dislodge the Communists from there; and the Kuomintang conservatives were not prepared to let the Communists back into the old pastures.

The Kuomintang had a still better reason for complaint. Another Communist army, the Fourth, was gradually spreading out in the Shanghai-Nanking area, and even armed resistance by local warlords did not seem to discourage it. General Chiang knew of the ruffled Kuomintang tempers in the region, but could offer little comfort; the international situation was turning against China and nothing could be permitted to happen that would alienate Russia. In this difficult hour Washington came to General Chiang’s aid. First Britain was persuaded to reopen the Burma Road. Next came a large loan, supplies of arms and aircraft, and finally, China’s formal inclusion among the United States’ allies. Did Washington time its moves intentionally to spike the Communist game? There was no authoritative answer, but this much was certain: were the American moves deliberate, they could not have been better timed.

Chiang now acted with great decision. The Eighth Route Army was told to stay where it was. The Fourth was ordered to march at once to the guerilla territory north of the Yangtse—where the Kuomintang had neither influence nor interest. When the Fourth ignored the order, it was attacked by regular troops, 4,000 Communist soldiers were killed, 2,000 captured. Among the latter was the Army's commander and all his staff officers. Then everybody in Chungking, Washington and Tokyo sat back and awaited Moscow's reaction.

Moscow took its time. For two weeks there was no official word, while the Soviet leaders weighed the next step. Then came a Tass communiqué, hinting at the possibility of civil war in China, and—what was more important—a renewal of the long-delayed negotiations with Japan. Soviet leaders were giving Chungking and Washington a warning that they would not allow the suppression of Communism in China. In Chungking, General Chiang promptly declared:

I exercised Christian forgiveness unto seventy times seven with the recalcitrant new Fourth Army, but it continued to give out false reports vilifying the Central Government and taking arbitrary action. . . .

In China today there is absolute unanimity of purpose among all armies and the people in resistance against Japan; hence there is absolutely no ground for disagreement or civil war. . . . My action was dictated solely by a desire to strengthen Chinese resistance; hence it was a blow at Japan. . . .

Nonetheless, civil war remained the darkest cloud on Chinese political and military horizon in the spring of 1941.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

Fate will play a nasty trick on General Chiang if it allows another civil war to mar his record. For he has now become established as a great unifier of his people, a leader beyond challenge or reproach. When Chiang formed the Nationalist

Government in 1927, the country was split into innumerable segments, each ruled by a warlord. It was as if the forty-eight states of the Union suddenly became independent, formed their own armies, issued their own money, and began to war on each other to see which State Governor could amass more territory, wealth and power. In 1927 Chiang was himself no more than a regional warlord, ruling only three or four provinces. However, he possessed a rare quality which his rivals lacked. He thought not in provincial but in national terms. His Government was the first enlightened, modern administration China ever had. This local régime promptly called itself the *national* government, issued a *national* currency backed by sound reserves, organized a *national* army, and instituted *national* reforms.

It was a magnificent bluff—and it worked. The bankers and the traders, the landlords and the farmers wanted nothing so much as peace. Wherever Chiang ruled there was peace. They wanted a sound national currency, new railways and highways, a relatively honest and efficient government. Chiang and his aides supplied all these; and gradually Chiang's rivals began to recognize some of his achievements. Under the pressure of their own merchants, they replaced their own worthless banknotes with Chiang's currency. They let Chiang's teachers, doctors and highway builders come in and do their work unmolested. They felt that as long as Chiang's troops were kept out of their domains, all was well. It was a naïve belief. Chiang's weapons were ideas, which penetrated all provincial walls.

Chiang is a reformer who does not look like one. He is tall, unhealthily lean, clean shaven, unsmiling. In 1923, I saw him address a revolutionary mass meeting. He spoke in a calm monotone, made no gestures, wore a mask of utter indifference. A gramophone record would have been more inspiring. But it would be unfair to judge Chiang by this performance. Having dealt with masses all his life, Chiang does not like them. He is no rabble-rouser. He is a calculating,

scholarly, brilliant politician, who deals with the masses through middlemen. Couple this with great personal courage and a belief in his Mission—with a capital M—to lead and unify the nation, and you have Chiang's picture.

On into the 1930s his rivals still kept his troops out. But great was their surprise when Chiang began to visit them—alone—to talk things over. Chiang was unfair to the warlords, for he forced them to act honorably. Every one of them would happily have poisoned him—as they poisoned one of his first German military advisers—but none dared. Chiang's defense was public opinion, and no warlord cared to meddle with this mysterious quantity. And since Chiang claimed to be the *national* leader and was, in fact, the strongest warlord, all his rivals pledged loyalty to him. Later, when one after another they fell into difficulties—a civil war, a Communist attack, a famine—Chiang would remember the pledge, send his troops in to help, and soon enough the warlord was no more. He was probably touring Europe, while in his *yamen* sat one of Chiang's lieutenants.

Such, though, was the power of public opinion that Chiang himself miscalculated it. For nine years he had been waging a relentless war on the Communists who first put him into power. For five of these years he had been studiously ignoring the steady Japanese advance over Chinese soil. He knew that the anti-Japanese sentiment was strong, but he felt that the Communists were a more immediate foe. When he learned in December, 1936, that the anti-Communist campaign in the northwest was lagging, he flew there to reprimand the commanders. Instead, he found himself kidnaped by his subordinates, who demanded the cessation of the anti-Communist drive in favor of a national campaign of resistance to Japan. Chiang was incredulous. He, the kidnaped, refused to allow the kidnapers to talk to him until they repented. And while insisting on a change in the Government's policy, they treated him with respect and care, for they knew that he alone could lead them in war.

Chiang was released through the intervention of Mme. Chiang, an outstanding member of one of the world's most amazing families—the "Soong Dynasty." She took a plane to Sian and began the negotiations which her husband was too proud to initiate. During these tense days Mme. Chiang had no other protection than her courage and W. H. Donald, her Australian adviser who accompanied her. Thirteen days after the coup the Chiangs, Donald—and the kidnaper—took to the air again, on their way back to Nanking. Chiang resumed power. The kidnaper was put on trial. It was truly a fantastic spectacle, staged by magnificent actors.

True to his pledge to the kidnapers, Chiang reversed China's policy. He felt that it was still too early to fight Japan; but when the Japanese troops moved into North China seven months later, he ordered resistance. For the sake of this resistance he made peace with the Communists, whom he hated; sacrificed his work of economic reconstruction; and withdrew 1,600 miles into the interior. Today he still devoutly believes in victory through Japan's defeat or exhaustion, still believes that China is fighting the democracies' battles, and is still determined to see that China ceases to be but a prize in the fight for the Pacific.

Chapter Eighteen

Treasure Box of Asia

HIGH UP ON the list of prizes coveted by Japan stands the Netherlands Indies—rich, populous and inadequately defended. Like Manchuria a decade earlier, this orphaned Dutch colony is a powder box that may explode at almost any moment. Its name looms large in the international headlines and diplomatic notes. Its problems cause headaches in the world chancelleries and general staff offices. Within its gates foreign agents weave wide-strung intrigue, while in sight of its shores the warships of Japan, Britain and the United States steam in anxious anticipation of each other's moves. And in Batavia diplomats, military officials and trading houses of almost every great power bid for the East Indies' output of tin, oil, quinine, scrap iron and rubber.

No one power possesses the answer to the colony's problems. The German conquest of Holland created them, but an overwhelming Nazi victory alone can give the Wilhelmstrasse a deciding voice in determining the colony's future. Washington seemingly remains aloof, but it is to American war supplies, financial aid and the great United States fleet that the East Indies look with hope. Britain is making every effort to avoid a crisis in the islands; but it is she who must finally fight for the East Indies, for they lie in the heart of her Pacific empire. Last comes Japan, dazzled by her opportunities for conquest and determined to possess all she can see.

Japan's interest in the Netherlands Indies is not new. Since World War I, ambitious naval officers and imaginative ultra-nationalists in Tokyo have nursed a secret desire to add the colony to the ocean-wide Japanese empire. When Japan launched her great trade drive of 1929-'34, this dream was converted into a veritable offensive. Bleached and unbleached piecegoods, cheap galoshes, toys and mirrors became a wedge for prying open the colony's gates. Behind the goods came the Japanese retailer, the inevitable barber and curious photographer, the rubber-grower and the mine concessionaire. With them came the great shipping and trading concerns, the diplomats and the Navy. It was the prelude to conquest by trade, a blitzkrieg through dumping.

The subsidized Japanese trader undersold all his competitors, the subsidized Japanese merchant marine carried the ever-growing flood of goods in its bottoms, the Navy and the diplomats sought to translate the trade gains into political advantage. The Japanese Navy's interest in the East Indies became especially deep, for the Navy discovered there a fabulously rich reservoir of crude oil for its men-of-war. Figures on naval oil consumption are a jealously guarded secret, but back in 1934 the commander-in-chief of the East Indies armed forces claimed the Japanese Navy bought seventy-seven per cent of its oil from the Netherlands colony. War in Europe and the restrictions on the shipment of American oil must have enhanced this dependence.

The Hague became genuinely alarmed. The Manchurian episode was still too fresh in mind to admit of taking Japan's professions and moves at their face value. In 1933 Batavia suddenly passed so called "crisis ordinances," crippling the Japanese trade. Tokyo tried intimidation, but without success. In 1934 the Japanese began to negotiate. The pourparlers were protracted and acrimonious. Batavia was willing to trade with Japan, but wished to put the commerce on a reciprocal basis. The questions of quotas, import tariffs and freight rates produced months of wrangling. Finally in

December, 1934, accord was reached. The delegates of the two nations went happily to the conference hall for the final session, to exchange last friendly vows.

The head of the Japanese delegation, Nagaoka, faced the chairman of the Netherlands mission, congratulated both nations on the success of the talks. Then, after a pause, he said: "We hope that the outer possessions of the Netherlands Indies are to be developed jointly by the Japanese and the Dutch." The "outer possessions" are all the islands of the Netherlands Indies save Java. The Dutch official reddened, rose solemnly and banged his gavel on the table. The meeting was adjourned.

The breakdown of the 1934 pourparlers had distressed Tokyo. Yet it did not allow this anguish to halt its plans either for trading with the East Indies or for laying the groundwork for their conquest. The conference was not resumed until 1937, when representatives of the great Java-China-Japan Lijn and a Government-sponsored Japanese shipping combine met in Tokyo to find a way to end a disastrous rate-cutting war.

It required no prophetic gift in 1937 to see what Europe was heading toward. It was equally clear that such a conflict would expose all Occidental possessions in the Pacific to Japanese pressure; and Japan proceeded accordingly. Streams of oil continued to pour into Japanese tankers. By hook or crook—including the use of falsified trade marks—Nippon-made goods continued to enter the East Indies. And an ever-growing fleet of sturdy Japanese trawlers began to fish in the colony's territorial waters. The situation became so serious that early in 1938 the colonial government took drastic steps against these vessels "in order to ascertain their real purpose." In The Hague, the official press bureau said the crews of the boats included "men of a superior class." Many of the ships halted by the coast guard carried "personnel much larger than usual in these waters." Others were said to have complete geodetical equipment and powerful radio sets. On encounters with

coast guards these vessels invariably sought to disappear from sight, even at the risk of a few shots across the bow.

In Amsterdam a Government spokesman pointedly announced that the presence of the Japanese fishing boats in the East Indian waters compelled the Netherlands to intensify her naval and air rearmament in the colony. Friction persisted until the outbreak of World War II. There were several agreements, notable chiefly for the ease with which they were broken; there were frequent encounters between Dutch patrols and Japanese fishermen; but trade, although badly dented by the invasion of China—and the subsequent boycott of Japanese goods by the colony's 1,200,000 Chinese—slowly recovered.

The Japanese attack on China sent shivers down official spines in Batavia and The Hague. The defense expenditures immediately rose by sixty per cent. Light cruisers, small submarines and fleet torpedo boats were placed on the runs in Holland. Bombers and flying boats were bought in the United States and Germany. In 1938, \$46,000,000 was spent on the colony's little army of 40,000 men—three fourths of them natives. Parallel to rearmament, the East Indies tightened their bonds with Britain. Netherlands men-of-war began to visit Singapore, while the Dutch newspapers pleaded for a British fleet to fill this powerful base. Unofficial Dutch observers were reported sitting in on joint Anglo-French defense conferences in the key points of the southwestern Pacific. Links were also established with the neighboring Philippines.

The outbreak of the Second World War increased the tension. The crisis had arrived, and both Japan and the Dutch East Indies knew it. Still, Japan was not prepared to make the fateful plunge until she could see the turn of the tide in Europe. She protested such moves as Batavia's decision to build three battle-cruisers and a 40,000-ton floating dock in Soerabaya. But her ire was greatly mollified by the knowledge that it took three years at the least to build the

warships—and that opportunity for conquest would arrive much sooner.

In February, 1940, Tokyo denounced its treaty of arbitration with the Netherlands. Despite an involved explanation, the gesture was obviously intended to clear the decks for action at the first moment. The next move came in April. Either through her intelligence service or through Nazi official sources, Japan learned of the impending invasion of Holland. Promptly Foreign Minister Arita announced that Japan would not permit any other power—meaning Britain and the United States—to take steps affecting the status quo in the Netherlands Indies. The Navy had a hand in this statement. Later the Army, also through the Foreign Office, issued another warning to Britain to attempt no aid to the Dutch colony.

In May, 1940, in four tragic days, Hitler's forces overran Holland. The victory brought jubilation in Tokyo, a new move in the battle for the East Indies. Arita summoned foreign envoys, once again informed them that Japan would not allow the extension of the European hostilities to the East Indies. The implication this time was so plain that Washington became alarmed. Without awaiting official notification from Tokyo, Cordell Hull warned Japan to keep her hands off the East Indies; and he gave her a stern little lecture on international morality and treaty pledges. Adding weight to his voice was the roar of guns aboard the American battle fleet maneuvering off Hawaii.

It is very likely that Japan actually planned to invade the East Indies in May, 1940. It is also possible that the massing of the United States Fleet in the Pacific thwarted these designs. But through the month Hull and Arita kept the world entertained by exchanging belligerent notes professing high regard for the political integrity of the East Indies.

Its aggressive designs partly checked in the Netherlands colony, Tokyo proceeded on a tangent to play havoc in French Indo-China. To the East Indies, Japan applied a treatment

of threats, economic pressure and promises of security, "if . . ." Prince Konoye's inauguration as Premier in the summer of 1940 brought with it a momentary danger. General Koiso, proffered the post of special envoy to Batavia, agreed to accept it only if his program of the mailed fist were adopted. The more cautious elements won. Koiso was shelved in favor of Ichizo Kobayashi, who, although an ardent admirer of Naziism and its blessings, put business above military glory.

Kobayashi arrived in Batavia with a well-staffed mission, conferred at length, and won minor economic concessions. Its eye on the marching Japanese troops in Indo-China and on the extremist elements in Tokyo, Batavia was careful not to incur Japan's displeasure. The most important Japanese gain was Batavia's consent to increase Japan's annual quota of oil from 494,000 to 1,800,000 tons. But the Dutch administration refused to supply Japan with the badly needed high-octane gasoline for aircraft. Five months earlier the British Government had signed up the entire output of aviation gasoline for its needs in Australia, Malaya and India—and Batavia refused to break the contract. Tokyo's demands for increased Japanese immigration and for opportunities for investment were rejected.

The Japanese delegation returned home distinctly chilled by its reception in the East Indies. There were complaints against British and American intrigue, against the uncompromising Dutch stand, even against the indigestible food and hot lodgings supplied by the Dutch. Once again the Tokyo press demanded a "stern lesson" to the East Indies, and once again the jingoists found good cause for lambasting the democracies. Tokyo, however, held its hand. Its alliance with the Axis had somehow failed to intimidate Britain and the United States; and Tokyo was uncertain of their reaction to new aggression in the Pacific. Moreover, the strengthening of the Dutch colony's defenses seemed to make invasion a risky venture.

Next, unsuccessful Kobayashi was ordered to stay home, and Kenkichi Yoshizawa, known in China as "the old fox," was ordered to Batavia to renew the negotiations. Yoshizawa was a career diplomat, known as much for his moderation as for his persistence. Japanese newspapers, astonished by the recall of this aging moderate to active duty, consoled themselves with the thought that he would wear the Dutch delegates out—or, to use an expression employed by one daily, "convince the Dutch of the unreasonableness of their views." To make it plain to Batavia that Yoshizawa had the full backing of the Japanese Empire, the Tokyo Foreign Office staged a one-week campaign of indignation over the "persecution" of Japanese nationals in the East Indies.

But even Yoshizawa could not convince the Dutch that their best bet was in "co-operating" with Japan. He was still negotiating in January, 1941, when a few jingoist members of the Diet demanded his return on the grounds that Batavia was "making a fool of Japan's 'Greater East Asia' policy." Foreign Minister Matsuoka refused to break the *pourpailers*, declaring that economic forces would compel the East Indies to come to terms with Japan. But he also declared that the Netherlands Indies and Indo-China came within Japan's sphere of influence—with the consent of her Axis partners. The Dutch refugee government in London promptly informed Tokyo that it rejected "any suggestion of having the Netherlands Indies incorporated in a new order in East Asia under the leadership of any power whatsoever." Tokyo made sure that the rejection extended to Britain and the United States, and then declared it would ignore the Dutch note. The East Indies, Tokyo said, were still within Japan's bailiwick.

Undeniably the East Indies' position early in 1941 was precarious. If attacked by Japan, it had to rely mainly on its own resources. Britain and the United States could offer assistance only at the cost of an open war with Japan—and in the spring of that year there was anxiety in both Washington

and London to avert a break with Tokyo. Thus Batavia, aiming as fast as the American defense program permitted, sparred for time.

BATAVIA'S HEADACHES

But while preparing for war, the East Indies feared and loathed it. Few Dutch administrators doubted that the war, whatever its outcome, would bring with it a succession of headaches, many of them defying remedy. The first of these was the position of the East Indies in the disintegrated Netherlands Empire. Prior to World War II, the Sumatra and Java tobacco, sugar, tin, oil and tea led the standard dividend papers on the Amsterdam Beurs. Yet the colony profited but little by it; the products of the islands went forth to all corners of the world, and the profits went to the investors in Holland. Once the Netherlands fell under German control, however, the profits returned to the East Indies, and the colony began to wax rich and independent.

While lip service continued to be paid to the refugee government of Queen Wilhelmina in London, Batavia begrudged both its obedience and its contributions to the "national" treasury. There appeared hints of refusal to pay for the rehabilitation of the Netherlands if and when the country is freed of the Nazis. And many an administrator in Batavia expressed his belief that the bonds between Holland and the colony had been permanently severed. But such severance could only mean attachment to another power. Encircled by British possessions, the East Indies naturally tended to look to Britain for protection and aid. There were many in Batavia who viewed with favor unofficial proposals for a federation embracing Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. And if German victories would have precluded closer bonds with Britain, the United States seemed to offer an equally acceptable ally and support.

Each day of war in Europe tended to enhance the East

Indies' dependence on the United States for war supplies and purchases of raw materials. A change in political affiliations was bound, however, to have a terrific impact upon the East Indies' sixty-odd millions of Malays. Up to now these millions have lived in subjection to the colony's 250,000 Dutch men, four fifths of whom were of mixed blood; about 1,200,000 Chinese, who controlled the retail trade and banking; and the German and Japanese communities, numbering each about 7,000 persons. The Malays were ignorant, poor and discontented.

The loving devotion of the natives claimed by the Dutch was a myth. The Dutch had given the Malays work and schools and roads. But they have barred the natives' advancement and refused to grant them self-government. Despite the high walls erected around the East Indies, the natives heard—and took close to heart—the voice of independence in the Philippines and India. They also listened to Communist and nationalist agitators and, at least once in recent years, rose in armed revolt, which the Dutch suppressed with great severity.

The only force cementing this mass of malcontented humanity in 1941 was fear of Japan and Germany. The Malays knew what happened in Manchuria, China and French Indo-China. They did not want it in their own land. Therefore they vowed loyalty to the Batavia administration, joined the armed services—and hoped that out of the battle for the Pacific would emerge a happier tomorrow. And the colonial administrators knew that they possessed neither the suppressive strength nor the cohesive power required to hold the natives in check in a serious crisis.

For the most immediate headache—the Japanese invasion—the East Indies felt themselves well prepared. Japan had obviously missed her opportunity for seizing the East Indies in the early summer of 1940, when the colony was relatively defenseless. The Japanese Army instead struck in Indo-China and gave the Netherlands Indies the respite it so badly

needed. By 1941 the colony had enlarged its army, navy and air force, strengthened its defenses against invasion and air raids, expanded its arsenals and docks, and mined all the equipment that could be used by Japan. Early in 1941 the East Indies possessed a well-trained army of about 60,000 men, a reserve of about 50,000 men, nearly 500 warplanes, three cruisers, seven destroyers, fifty fast torpedo boats, and about a dozen submarines. The defense program provided for 2,000 first-line planes by the end of the year, but it was doubtful if the number would reach one thousand.

But even with the existing strength, the East Indies could successfully resist Japanese attack for many months. Japanese aircraft could bomb cities, ports and oil fields in the East Indies, but they could not seize and hold any territory without paying a disastrously high price for the victory. And once footholds were obtained on the islands, the colony's troops would have blown up bridges, railroad stations and tracks, oil wells, port facilities, warehouses and government buildings and retired to the mountains to wage guerilla war while Dutch bombers and submarines played havoc with Japanese troop and supply transports. It was this strength rather than American and British pressure that led Tokyo to a course of negotiation rather than invasion in 1940-'41.

The Netherlands Indies were not Indo-China—and Tokyo could not permit itself the luxury of failure.

TIN, RUBBER, STRATEGY

The American concern in the fate of the East Indies could be written in six words: Tin, Rubber, Strategy, the British Empire. The first two signified America's dependence upon the Netherlands Indies for the basic elements of industry and defense.

In the summer of 1940 Government officials in Washington discovered in dismay that the available stocks of both materials would not last a full year *under normal circumstances*.

Emergency powers were hastily conferred upon the Federal Loan Administrator to permit the purchase of large stocks in the Netherlands Indies and Malaya before war flames enveloped either these areas or the United States herself. Two specially formed Government corporations made arrangements to buy 150,000 tons of rubber and half that much of tin—above the normal commercial purchases. But America could not go through a major war, even with the accumulated reserves. The question of safeguarding the tin and rubber routes to the Far East thus became a matter of prime national concern.

Perhaps equally important was the problem of quinine. The United States is dependent upon the East Indies for her supply of this vital product. So great was the Government's concern in 1940 that it listed quinine in the Strategic War Materials Act and bought 800,000 ounces for its reserves.

Necessary as these commodities were to the United States herself, it had become even more important to keep them away from Japan. In the summer of 1940 it became obvious that Japan, together with Germany, was America's implacable foe. Therefore, all that benefited Japan hurt the United States. The same situation applied with an even greater sharpness to Britain. In the East Indies, Japan could obtain all the vital materials needed by her war machine. Naoki Hoshino, the leading Japanese economic planner, once frankly told the press that with the addition of the Indies, the Japanese-dominated bloc would be the world's strongest in resources and manpower. He could have added: "in naval and air bases." Gradually, thus, it had become an essential part of the American and British foreign policies to thwart the Japanese advance in the East Indies—by peaceful means if possible, by war if nothing else availed.

Both the democracies gave substantial aid to the harassed Batavia administration. Britain, which already was harboring the Queen of the Netherlands, facilitated the passage of Dutch refugee Army and Navy officers, and especially of pilots,

from Europe to the colony. She had also, as noted, contracted for the entire East Indian output of high octane gasoline. Australia made it clear she would give armed assistance to the East Indies the moment they were attacked. In the critical weeks of the invasion of Holland, Washington took the initiative in forestalling a similar invasion of the East Indies. When the threat of invasion arose anew later in the year, Washington sent the Pacific Fleet into secret maneuvers off Hawaii and cannily refused to deny inspired rumors the ships had been ordered to Singapore. When the crisis passed, the fleet reappeared—in Hawaii.

With the defense industry already swamped with American and British orders, Washington allowed a Netherlands military mission in the summer of 1940 to acquire 370 war planes in the United States. Plans were also discussed for economic assistance to the East Indies—the most effective way of aiding the colony to withstand the Japanese pressure. Anglo-American backing had so stiffened the Batavian attitude in its crucial negotiations with Japan in October, 1940, that the *Tokyo Asahi* bitterly commented: "There is little sense in trying to reason with the East Indian Government as long as the Anglo-American policy remains what it is. Perhaps the language of bombs would be better understood. . . ."

Early in 1941 it began to seem as if bombs *would* provide the solution of the problem. Japan intended, come what might, to control the islands; for in them she saw a promise of greatness and security. Britain could not allow Japan to carry out her plans, for the Netherlands Indies lie astride the great imperial routes between the Pacific Ocean and Europe. The United States was determined to maintain the status quo in the islands, for, once that were disrupted, the entire scheme of American defense would shatter to bits. Thus the East Indies became in 1941 one of the major battlegrounds in the struggle for the Pacific—and in the wider conflict between the democracies and the totalitarian bloc.

Chapter Nineteen

Japan's Indo-China

IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA, in the months following the fall of Paris, Japan scored another momentous victory over her rivals in the Pacific. Every weapon employed was drawn out of the well-stocked arsenal upon which Japan had relied in the preceding decade. There were direct armed action, naval demonstrations, diplomatic and economic pressure, threats and protests, intrigue, subsidized revolts and the use of figurheads. Yet, though each of these devices was painfully familiar to the remaining democracies, they could not halt the Japanese advance. Britain awaited a German blow and could spare neither thought nor effort for her woes in the Far East. The United States felt herself unprepared to resist Japan by the force of arms. Her hands free, Japan established a foothold in northern Indo-China, and from there slowly pushed southward—until the French administration in Saigon was her helpless tool and her bombers were within a three-hour flight of Singapore.

What took place in Tientsin and Shanghai and Canton years earlier now was duplicated in Indo-China. The colony's ports and lonely frontier outposts, its consulates, hotel lobbies and government offices became hatcheries for little plots, which, compounded, produced a power-play of magnitude unparalleled in the Pacific since the invasion of China in 1937. Japan began to lay plans for a blow in southeastern Asia

shortly after the outbreak of World War II. She predicated her strategy on Nazi victories—and though Hitler's successes exceeded Tokyo's fondest expectations, the Japanese Army was ready to strike when the opportune moment arrived. Three months after the German invasion of Poland, Japanese troops in South China smashed their way to the border of Indo-China. The Japanese command in Canton jubilantly announced that the "frontier situation is under complete control." Simultaneously infantry, aircraft and men-of-war began to be massed in the Island of Hainan, a mere 150 miles from the coast of Indo-China.

Then came a two-month series of air raids upon the Chinese section of the French-owned Haiphong-Yunnan Railway—a narrow-gauge, poorly equipped line upon which in 1939 fell the burden of keeping China supplied with war materials and carrying her vital exports. Sandwiched between raids and threats were military ultimatums for the cessation of all shipments to China. One of these secret notes was followed by air attacks of such severity that even Washington found it necessary to file a strong protest with Tokyo. Paris, naturally, was incensed. Indignation, however, occasionally finds itself out of step with diplomacy. For warring France, the early spring of 1940 was no time to pick quarrels outside of Europe. Paris meekly classified the Japanese attacks as "local incidents," and took no action.

French hesitation emboldened Japan. Paris was officially "requested" to "give recognition to the fact that a state of hostilities on a large scale exists in China." This vague demand, as the British had discovered in the summer of 1939, could cover wide territory. Suspension of aid to China, surrender of vital Indo-China bases to Japan—it might mean almost anything. The process of intimidation reached its climax soon after the Dunkerque debacle. Twenty-four hours before the fall of Paris the Japanese command in South China announced that it could not "condone aid given to Chiang Kai-shek by the authorities in Indo-China who are unable to

take cognizance of the new state of affairs in East Asia." In Tokyo the spokesman of the Foreign Office bluntly declared that French aid to China "must be wiped out."

Powerful political groups in Tokyo, including the now extinct Seiyukai Party, bravely demanded the "protective" occupation of Indo-China, somewhat in the manner of the "protective custody" accorded by the Gestapo to its foes. Finely attuned to the voice of jingoism, the Foreign Office reacted promptly. The Ambassadors to Berlin and Rome informed Hitler and Mussolini that Japan "expects to be consulted on the future of Indo-China," and that "in view of Indo-China's close military and economic links with Japan, both Germany and Italy are expected to refrain from any alteration in the colony's status that would be contrary to Japan's interests."

Japan felt confident that the masters of Realpolitik would readily accede to her "requests." Said the well-informed *Asahi*: "Though France has capitulated, the Democratic bloc still controls the seas with the British and American navies, and Germany and Italy will find it wise to depend silently on Japan's powerful fleet in the Far East." Although Hitler apparently gave no open blessings, Japan proceeded as if he had. Tokyo clearly realized that, together with Moscow, it was one of the biggest trumps in Hitler's hand. It was determined to take full advantage of this favorable position.

At Bordeaux the distressed French Government could give no thought to the Pacific. The crisis in Indo-China was dwarfed by the immensity of the French collapse. Therefore the French Ambassador in Tokyo, a peace-lover and a scholar, was given carte blanche. The envoy had lived in Japan long enough to sense the danger. One evening in June he called at the Foreign Office and announced acceptance of the Japanese demands. Secretly elated, the Japanese officials threatened, warned and demanded. Before midnight the exhausted, nerve-wracked Frenchman made these concessions:—

A solemn pledge not to "impede the Japanese armed forces

in establishing a lasting peace in East Asia"; a formal recognition of Japan's "specific rights" in China; permission to station Japanese "inspectors" in Indo-China to see that no supplies were sent to China.

The date was June 19, 1940. Forty-eight hours later, in a memory-haunted, weatherbeaten railway restaurant car at Compiègne, unhappy French envoys met German generals and signed the armistice. Tokyo read the headlines, decided it could increase its tithe. The French concessions were accepted, followed by new charges and ultimatums. Ahead of the lone minesweeper which was to bring to Indo-China the forty Japanese inspectors arrived a mighty fleet. The entire 1,600-mile coast of the French colony was put under a blockade. Hanoi's pathetic protestations that no more shipments to China were being allowed through were countered with cries of "lie" and threats to take armed action.

Two days before his resignation Premier Paul Reynaud instructed Georges Catroux, Governor-General of Indo-China, to humor Japan. Marshal Henri Pétain confirmed the order and replaced Catroux with Vice-Admiral Jean Decoux, giving him authority to act independently. Before his departure for London, where he promptly announced plans for an anti-Pétain revolt in Indo-China, General Catroux promised to aid Japan in securing peace with China. On the same day, a Japanese army plane landed in Hanoi. Out clambered two tough little Japanese officers, Major General Issaku Nishihara and Colonel Kenryo Sato, one of the Army's most belligerent empire-builders. The press announced that the officers were an economic mission, come to negotiate a trade agreement with now marketless Indo-China.

Within a week the masks were off. The Army's envoys, forgetting economics, began to press for purely military concessions. Similar pressure was exerted upon the French Government at Vichy and the French Ambassador in Tokyo. The relatively modest demands of June, 1940, were forgotten in September. The spokesman of the Japanese command in

Cauton declared, in effect, that "Indo China is sadly mistaken if it hopes to gain Japan's amity by merely halting the passage of China-bound goods." In a still more ambitious vein, leading ultra nationalists in Tokyo called for the "liberation of Indo-China's oppressed natives from the French yoke."

By this time two Japanese Foreign Ministers, Arita and Matsuoka, had already specifically included Indo China within Japan's "lebensraum." Stern warnings from Washington and more discreet notes from London had been tabled by the Japanese Foreign Office. Japan's new series of demands sought the cession of naval and air bases, free passage for Japanese troops over the railway to China, and the right to garrison key points along the line. Governor-General Decoux battled against overwhelming odds. Secret overtures to Washington and London brought no promises of armed aid against Japan; British assistance, even were it forthcoming, would have brought automatic Japanese retaliation. Faced by the threat of a flanking attack by Japanese units moving through Indo-China, the Chinese command announced its plans to invade the French colony. A plot of De Gaullist followers in Saigon, though discovered in time for suppression, added to Admiral Decoux's difficulties. And on top of these came a wave of native uprisings in southern Indo-China, plus a Thai invasion.

Both the revolts and the Thai attacks were engineered by Japan. For months there had been reports of activities by Japanese agents in the vicinity of Saigon and along the Thai border. The Hanoi Government discreetly branded them as "Communists," but few were fooled. The "Fifth Column" in the troubled area was reported to be directed by Japanese-trained Buddhist monks, who advocated the overthrow of the French administration and alliance with "Asiatic peoples." Native unrest supplied fertile ground for such propaganda, and for a moment it looked as if the French administration would lose control of the situation. In November, 1940, at least twenty large-scale uprisings were reported in a single

week within a 100-mile radius of Saigon. Only the daily bombing of rebel villages and the mass execution of the disaffected broke the backbone of the rebellion. When a Japanese general arrived in Saigon to "study" the rebellion—and see if the French "needed help to maintain order"—he met with disappointment. Order had already been restored.

The French administration had less luck in coping with the Thai menace. Hanoi never had any illusions as to its chances of successful resistance or to the identity of Thailand's guiding spirit. The Indo-China troops found their Thai foes equipped with Japanese guns, tanks and bombers. And though its field forces were outnumbered and out-equipped, the French command dared not weaken its garrisons in the coastal cities for fear of Japanese coups. Tokyo's offers of mediation also bore an ominous ring to Hanoi, for it was obvious that Japan would demand a generous reward for its peace-making. The Japanese Minister to Bangkok thoughtlessly announced that Tokyo's sole motivation was a desire for "peace and stabilization in East Asia." Within forty-eight hours his assurances were belied by demands for economic, political and military concessions filed in Hanoi and Tokyo. And at the peace conference in Tokyo in the early spring of 1941, both Thailand and Indo-China were described as Japan's collaborators in freeing East Asia of the "white peril."

When the French delegates signed the "peace agreement" in March, 1941, they signed away a part of Indo-China to Thailand. Japan was the chief mourner—and the sole heir to the remainder of the once-French colony.

WHAT DOES JAPAN WANT?

Why does Japan covet Indo-China? There are three answers: rice, raw materials, strategy. Together with Siam and Burma, the colony is one of Asia's three leading exporters of rice. Ninety-five out of every hundred inhabitants of Indo-China derive their livelihood from rice. The colony's peace-

time favorable trade balance of nearly \$24,000,000 rests on rice. Prior to 1937 France bought sixty per cent of her colony's annual output. China and Japan came next in that order. The Sino-Japanese war, however, increasing the usual shortage of the staple in the Orient, reversed the position of the buyers. In the near-famine years of 1939 and 1940 Japan's purchases of Indo-China rice soared to record figures. With the French market lost as a result of World War II, with the entire China coast under Japanese domination, Indo-China had become painfully dependent upon increased purchases by Japan.

Tokyo was clearly aware of its ability to make or break the colony's economy. It held this advantage over Hanoi in demanding ever-growing concessions. But threats to buy rice elsewhere were merely a bluff. Control of Indo-China assured Japan of a full rice bowl, and she was not going to give it up. Also, Indo-China is an important producer of rubber. In 1938 it sold to the United States \$6,750,000 worth of caoutchouc. Japan's purchases in 1939 totalled only \$100,000—but Tokyo was ready to employ unorthodox means to increase the amount. One of the scores of demands presented to Hanoi in 1941 sought transfer to Japan of all of the season's rubber earmarked for the United States. Under competent and energetic guidance, such as Japan could easily supply, Indo-China can well become a major producer of rubber, rivaling Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. And rubber is a sinew of war. Moreover, Indo-China also produces iron ore, zinc, tin, coal and wolframite, the source of tungsten. In 1939, of Japan's purchases of about \$6,000,000 in Indo-China, coal accounted for nearly a half. But this low figure reflected French failure to develop the colony's other resources, rather than any lack of natural riches.

Japan's economic blueprint for Indo-China was revealed in a candid article by Takeo Tazawa, a Foreign Office expert, in a popular Japanese magazine late in 1940. The plan, shorn of its high-sounding phrases on Japan's concern for the na-

tives' welfare, provided for the following:—1. Closure of French-owned industries in Indo-China manufacturing competitive goods, such as sugar, textiles, soap, cigarettes, pottery, wine—and especially matches and bicycles. (“We shall be compelled to respect the welfare of the natives rather than the interests of some French factory owners.”) 2. Cessation of imports from France. (“Because there is no alternative left for the French colony than to buy necessary goods from Japan, the desire for continued imports from the mother country will be ignored.”) 3. Reduction of tariff rates, to accommodate Japanese products. (“If the rates are slashed, more Japanese goods will be imported, and the customs revenues will thus be increased.”)

Tokyo thus wants Indo-China to fill the rice bowls of Japan, to supply the munitions plants of Kobe and Nagoya with coal, rubber and tungsten, and to become another exclusive market for Nippon-made goods. But even more than for its riches, Japan wants the colony as a springboard for new aggression. Just as Manchuria supplied the foothold for the invasion of China, so is Indo-China intended as a foothold for new adventures in the southwestern Pacific. Already Japanese bombers take off from their new bases in northern Indo-China for raids on the new Chinese war industry in China's southwest and on the Burma Road. The shadow cast by these bombers, as well as the steady southward advance of Japanese troops along the Thai-Indo-China border, have a salutary effect on Bangkok's policy. Following the Thai-French peace conference in Tokyo, Thailand was no less a member of the Japanese constellation than Indo-China.

In Burma and Malaya—both within striking distance of Indo-China—there is economic distress, unrest, a yearning for a change. Hundreds of Japanese agents have been operating in Burma since 1938 in an effort to stir up a campaign against Britain and China. These activities were intensified a hundredfold after the invasion of Indo-China. When *Der Tag* arrives and Japanese troops take the road to Mandalay, they

will find the ground well prepared by their advance agents. And it will be only a short trip across the Gulf of Siam to Malaya from the newly acquired bases in southern Indo-China.

AID THAT NEVER CAME

In its losing contest with Japan, Indo-China pinned vain hopes on American assistance. Like China and the Dutch East Indies, Indo-China believed that its strategical importance in the struggle for the Pacific would force Washington's hand.

Hanoi sought hope in the headlines of yellowing newspaper files. Since 1938 Washington had given every indication of acute concern for the safety of Indo-China. When the Japanese Army seized Hainan and the Spratley Islands, off the Indo-China coast, American protests were as vehement as those of the more closely concerned Britain and France. Early in 1940, when the Japanese began a merciless aerial hammering of the Haiphong-Yunnan Railway, Washington readily agreed to a French plea to use its good offices with Tokyo. To mediation the United States added its own stern protests, which pointed out that the railroad carried Chinese goods consigned to America. The severest raid, incidentally, coincided—almost to the minute—with the delivery of Washington's bitterest protest to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

Later, when Japan presented her sweeping demands to Vichy and Hanoi, it was Washington whose remonstrances were loudest. Many observers believed that American warnings alone delayed the Japanese invasion of Indo-China until the fall of 1940. American interest in Indo-China was more than sentimental. By the accident of geography, this colony—larger than England and France together—lies in the heart of one of the world's richest areas. The mastery of Indo-China carries with it control of vital raw materials, of important sea routes and of major naval bases. Washington could

seemingly no more tolerate Japan's supremacy in Indo-China than it could in China. Each Japanese advance spelled further shrinking of free markets, another victory for the totalitarian forces. Nor could the United States—it seemed—calmly regard Japan's acquisition of naval and air bases in an area upon whose control by a democratic nation hinged both the old and the new balance of power in the Pacific. Indo-China formed one of the vulnerable spots in the American Alaska-to Burma defense arch. Entrenched in the colony the Japanese could block any American defensive scheme before the United States had time to acquire sufficient bases.

Britain's concern over the drama in Indo-China seemed to Hanoi to be even deeper. In Japanese hands the colony was a dagger that could be plunged either west, as far as India, or south into Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. In Hanoi's belief, Indo-China was a British imperial rampart whose fall under Japanese domination presented a grave peril to the Pacific approaches to the British Empire. Hanoi's analysis was not wrong. To both Britain and the United States Indo-China was of great importance. Hanoi's error lay in underestimating the two democracies' anxiety to avoid a showdown with Japan as long as possible. London and Washington, buying "time out" in the Pacific, were using Indo-China as a down payment.

When Japan first struck in Indo-China, three possible moves "short of war" were open to the democracies. These were: dispatch of troops and warships to Indo-China to match the Japanese forces; establishment of a De Gaullist administration in Hanoi through a coup d'État; and the immediate dispatch of American aircraft and men-of-war to Singapore. Tokyo could have countered any or all of these moves by the outright occupation of entire Indo-China. This would have been a challenge which neither Britain nor the United States—unwilling as they were—could have ignored without a grave loss of prestige, and possibly of territory. The two democracies had a much better opportunity to check Japanese designs

in Thailand, where there was no direct contact between the rivals; but this chance they muffed.

Tokyo, early sensing its foes' difficulty, acted with an abandon which it would not have permitted itself were there the slightest possibility of retaliation. Yet the Japanese empire-builders knew they were nearing the danger line in the early spring of 1941. They began to display unaccustomed circumspection; and Hanoi, meantime, still waited in sullen desperation for assistance which could not come.

LESSON IN HELPLESSNESS

Indo-China's helplessness had its roots in the same evils that sent France to her downfall—inertia, overconfidence, refusal to look ahead and reluctance to combat aggression. Indo-China had been preparing for war since 1939. By the time Paris fell, however, in June, 1940, nothing had been accomplished. As in Europe, the poison of lethargy had had its deadly effect. Magnificent plans remained on paper. Men in high posts preached appeasement. Industry remained unable to meet the demands of rearmament; and what little money there was, was spent on butter while aggressors spent it on guns.

Immediately after the seizure of Hainan by Japan in February, 1939, Edouard Bosquet, vice-chairman of the Naval Commission of the French Chamber of Deputies, proposed an extensive defense plan. Fresh from a tour of Indo-China, Bosquet felt that Japan and Thailand were working hand in glove, that when the invasion came, Indo-China would be caught in deadly pincers. His two-fold program provided for: first, the immediate strengthening of the fortifications at Tourane, Haiphong and other coastal points; and second, the concentration of a large force of aircraft and submarines at the coastal bases. But even this important championing failed to defeat the inertia within the French Government. On the Japanese invasion of Hainan Island, the Ministry of Marine

ordered a few gunboats and aircraft to the Orient. Fifty bombers were bought in Holland, but only a few had been delivered. A large air base was established at Tourane and a number of emergency fields were built throughout the colony—but there were no airplanes for them. Some defensive preparations had been made at both Saigon and Haiphong, the two major ports, but they were on a scale that could deter no invader.

In the three years between the Japanese invasion of China and the German invasion of France, about \$155,000,000 was spent to strengthen Indo-China's defenses. This amount was a drop in a bucket—and even this drop was unwisely expended. The bulk of the money was poured into the fortification of Camranh Bay, the increase in the army personnel and the belated establishment of defense industries. Camranh was intended to become a French "Singapore." It was felt that this base, lying 100 miles north of Saigon, was sufficiently remote from Hainan to insure a degree of safety from Japanese bombers. In February, 1939, the bay was closed to all but French warships and work was launched on the fortifications. Camranh was also to be the site of the Gnome-Rona aircraft plant, scheduled to produce annually 150 planes and 400 motors. But the French Government—in the face of all danger signals—refused to be rushed. The work progressed at a leisurely pace even after the outbreak of World War II—and when the Japanese Army invaded Indo-China in the fall of 1940, neither the aircraft plant nor the fortifications were even half ready.

The same refusal to recognize the urgency of the situation was demonstrated in the expansion of army ranks. Despite the ominous advance of the Japanese war machine towards the Indo-China borders, the colony's army in 1939 consisted of 22,000 men, half of them brought from France; a regiment of the Foreign Legion; eight squadrons of obsolete aircraft and some field artillery. On the invasion of Poland, semi-trained natives were drawn into the army, bringing its

strength to about 100,000. The natives, however, were poor material. Both against the Japanese and the Thai armies they made a sorry showing.

So much for the colony's military defenses. But there were other cracks in Indo-China's armor that foreshadowed serious trouble in a crisis. The most important of these was native unrest. Discontent was a chronic state among the colony's 23,000,000 natives--and the French colonial administrators believed more in repression than correction. For the economic ailments that wracked the colony's body they had no remedy. Once before, native troops had risen in rebellion, but that was back in 1930 and the French administration had forgotten it. The Japanese, however, remembered the uprising and put a lot of thought and money into fanning the growing unrest. Their first dividend on the investment was the wave of revolts in 1940. Their next might be a native puppet régime and native assistance in setting Indo-China's neighbors on nationalist, anti-Occidental fire. Japanese political agents were counting heavily on the support of 120,000 Annamites who had been sent to work at French munitions plants at the outset of the war. Seventy thousand of them had actually witnessed the conquest of France. On its return home with tales of defeat, treason and disorganization, this army--under Japanese guidance--could have the political potency of dynamite.

For Burma and Malaya and the Dutch East Indies--and especially the Philippines--Indo-China was a tragic lesson in unpreparedness. Some of them, and in particular the East Indies, early realized the portent of events in Indo-China and began to arm at a forced pace. Almost all others watched in fascinated horror--and awaited their turn. When every minute was precious, there were argument, paper planning, and half-hearted preparations for defense. And meanwhile Japan, alert and superbly armed, prepared to strike a new blow whenever opportunity offered itself. Japanese bombers were massed on Indo-China bases as far south as Saigon. Japanese

men-of-war rode the waves off Saigon and Camranh Bay. Japanese troop transports awaited at Hainan and Formosa the call to sail for a landing operation in the south. In Hanoi, Japanese officers demanded more coastal bases. In Bangkok other Japanese officers negotiated with the Government for the use of air bases in Thailand.

No one knew where the blow would fall. Singapore and Manila, Burma, Malaya and the East Indies were in the grip of fear and rumor. And in conquered Indo-China there was only a gloomy expectation of counterstrokes from Japan's foes.

Chapter Twenty

Doomsday in the Philippines

IN THE FILIPINO political calendar doomsday comes on July 4, 1946. According to schedule, on that day the Philippines will sever the last of its non-economic links with the United States, become a full-fledged member of the family of nations—and join the long list of prizes in the fight for the Pacific.

For half a century Filipinos have looked forward to their Independence Day. That it may come, hundreds died in bitter revolts against Spain and the United States. But with the goal in sight the Filipinos are now gripped by fear and foreboding. Two factors conspire to produce this fear: Japan and sugar.

Thirty years ago, when Manuel Quezon and the sugar lobbyists made Washington Philippine-conscious, Japan was still a second-rate naval power. But she was gaining strength almost as fast as the Filipinos were nearing freedom. When Japan gained supremacy in the western Pacific as a result of the Washington Conference of 1921, the Manila politicians for the first time became aware of the potential menace to the north. The fight for independence, however, went on as before. On March, 24, 1934, President Roosevelt signed the Tydings-McDuffie Act, granting independence to the islands after a ten-year period of transitional government. On No-

venber 14, 1935, Quezon was inaugurated as President of the Philippine Commonwealth.

But by this time Japan's shadow had become ominously long. Manchuria was already in her hands. "Manchukuoization" was in full progress in North China. Manila took heed. There seemed to be little sense in gaining independence from the United States, only to lose it to Japan. Quezon asked President Roosevelt for assistance. As a result General Douglas MacArthur, retiring Chief of Staff of the United States Army, was detailed to the Philippines. In June, 1936, he announced a defense plan to "give pause to the most ruthless and powerful." A Citizens' Army was created. New, fast torpedo boats began to patrol coastal waters. New equipment was acquired. In a few spots defense works were erected.

While these preparations were in progress, Japan launched her war on China. Within three months Japanese bluejackets had been landed on little islands off the South China coast and began to build air bases. By the spring of 1939 these bases had already crept past Manila towards the South Seas. Manila was stunned. A decade earlier the prospects of Japanese domination were of more or less academic interest. Now Japan was the Philippines' neighbor—and a most pressing problem to Filipino statesmen. Independence no longer seemed the prize it was. Under the new conditions it spelled insecurity, possibly even alien invasion. Exploratory talks were held in Washington. But the sugar lobby which helped Manila to gain independence was in no mood to reverse its stand. Congressional isolationists likewise thought the Philippines a good riddance.

Manila politicians now embarked on the difficult course of appeasement, tempered by spurts of independent action. Quezon made a highly mysterious pilgrimage to Tokyo. In an interview at the time, I vainly tried to get from him a clear definition of the Philippine-Japanese problems, and of the purpose of his trip. Quezon cagily kept repeating diplomatic

clichés on the "traditional" friendship between the two "Asiatic peoples" and assurances that the journey was for his health alone. Oriental diplomats, however, do not visit Japan for their health; and the glee exhibited by the Japanese press undoubtedly reflected the sentiments of the Foreign Office. The trip was followed by other friendly gestures. Early in 1939 Quezon asked the National Assembly to enact a new immigration law free of discrimination against Orientals—meaning the Japanese.

"Ours is an Oriental country," said Quezon. "We are an Oriental people. We belong to the same racial stock as some of those excluded by our laws." This oration brought plaudits from the spokesman of the Tokyo Foreign Office, who pointed out that "Mr. Quezon has been constantly striving for the improvement of the Japanese-Philippine relations." A few months later Quezon visited Davao and made a fervent plea for Japanese-Filipino co-operation in the development of the islands. Davao is the center of the Japanese population and activity in the Philippines, and Tokyo has long regarded it with a near-proprietary air.

All these gestures of amity were highly welcome to Tokyo. As long as the Philippines remained linked with the United States, Japan did not intend to make any provocative move. It was clear that until the Commonwealth gained independence Washington would regard the islands as a part of the United States, and would protect them from aggression. On the other hand Tokyo was anxious to stake its claims—valid after July 4, 1946. It found the desired opportunity in the spring of 1940 when Manila—in one of its periodic changes of heart—decided to curtail the influx of the Japanese. A new immigration bill cut the annual quota of every nationality to five hundred. This was in pointed contrast with the average annual entry of between 2,000 and 2,500 Japanese. Tokyo at once filed a very strong protest.

The situation became so strained that Francis B. Sayre,

United States High Commissioner in Manila, visited Tokyo to smooth things over. On the eve of his arrival, the Foreign Office grimly warned that while Japan recognized the principle of racial equality, she insisted on a "special consideration" for her own nationals. The law, the statement said, would have to be enforced "with an eye on Japan's position." The declaration caused a flurry in Manila, but the Assembly passed the law, 67 to one. Tokyo immediately answered with a demonstrative rejection of unofficial proposals to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Philippines. The Japanese spokesman said, in effect, that Philippine foreign relations were being handled by Washington until 1946, and "after that; we'll see."

In July, 1940, the new Cabinet of Prince Konoye enunciated its "Greater Asia" doctrine. The Philippines were not listed by name among Japan's prospective vassals, but it was made clear that the Commonwealth would be drawn within the Japanese-controlled "co-prosperity sphere" as soon as the Stars and Stripes were lowered over the islands.

PROBLEM IN SUGAR

For one of every six Filipinos sugar provides the daily bread. Remove sugar from the Philippine economy and you have a calamity. When the Filipino politicians clamored for independence, they gave little thought to this question. The world was at peace, and markets lost in one country could seemingly be found elsewhere. Moreover, the readjustment of the bases of economy appeared to be an easy matter. As soon as freedom was won, however, the sugar problem thrust itself upon Manila like a skeleton at the feast.

Under the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the United States agreed to allow the annual entry of 850,000 long tons of sugar duty free between 1941 and 1946. The day the Commonwealth became independent, however, its sugar was to be barred

from the United States. The arrangement spelled a death decree for the Philippine sugar industry. Excluded from America, that sugar had to find markets in the Far East, where the Japanese product from Formosa and the Dutch from Java already enjoyed a secure foothold. The rich plantation and refinery owners in the Philippines talked of "readjustment"; but this was merely a synonym for ruination.

Unfortunately for the Philippines, sugar was not the only commodity adversely affected by the Independence Act. Coconut oil, cordage, cigars, tobacco, canned pineapple and numerous other products right down to pearl buttons and embroidered blouses were made subject either to quantitative limitations or a graduated tariff. The Filipinos were to get the independence they so eagerly wanted, but only at the cost of their entire economy. They were to be free—but very hungry. Quite naturally, a general realization of this fact led to a cooling-off of nationalist ardor. But there was an even darker shadow on the horizon. The economic distress ordained by the Independence Act was to lead inescapably to a major social upheaval—possibly a revolution.

Poverty, distress and land riots are a familiar tune in the Philippines. Agrarian labor, which forms the bulk of the population, is particularly restive. On the Friar Estates—huge land grants to the Catholic Church, dating back to Spanish domination—the debt-burdened, desperate tenants have for years been on the point of rebellion. In the lean year of 1938 the rice and sugar sharecroppers went on the warpath; and they were quickly joined by city labor. That year there was armed insurrection in Luzon. There was sabotage in the sugar-cane fields and mills, mass theft of crops from fields and warehouses, collective refusal to deliver the landlord's half of the crops, and harvesting in defiance of court orders. The Philippine Constabulary had a busy time that year—and special appropriations were made for its strengthening in the trouble spots. But the race between

distress and police repression invariably brings defeat to the latter. When the islands lose their markets for sugar, coconut oil and cordage, no Constabulary will be able to keep the unrest down.

If other leaders of the independence movement have been blind to the danger, Quezon has not. Following the riots of 1938, he put through a Tenancy Law, forbidding any planter to fire a tenant without the express permission of the Government. This measure was largely ineffective, as was Quezon's attempt to set a peso-a-day (fifty U. S. cents) minimum wage for industrial workers. Quezon's new strategy is to gain control of labor through political alliance with unions and through the acquisition of dictatorial legal powers. But neither regimentation nor speeches are remedies for the terrible ailment that will strike the Filipinos on their Independence Day; and if the United States washes her hands of the Philippines, Quezon or his successors will have no alternative to allying themselves with Japan.

To Tokyo the distress in the Philippines is sweet tidings. It means an opportunity for intrigue—such as that now in progress in Indo-China and Burma—and a political trump card. Japan's trade with the Philippines is unimportant compared with the United States' \$100,000,000-a-year business with the islands. In 1938, 9.58 per cent of the Philippine imports came from Japan and 6.5 per cent of the exports were shipped to that country. In dollar-and-cent terms, Japan exported to the Philippines \$16,000,000 in 1937; \$12,500,000 in 1938; and \$8,000,000 in 1939. The drop was caused as much by the "sales resistance" of Chinese shopkeepers in the islands as by Japan's own export difficulties. But—and this is important—Japan is rapidly solidifying her influence in the Philippine economy as a result of World War II. Almost every ounce of the islands' exports of iron ore goes to Japan's munitions industry. The same applies to other metals needed by Japan. And Japanese planters, meantime, are rapidly

cornering the Philippine production of hemp—which, incidentally, is on the United States' list of strategical raw materials.

The empty dinner pail of José Rubio, a sharecropper in Luzon, Mindanao or any other of the Philippines' 7,000 islands, is no news item for headlines. But the combined emptiness of the dinner pails of sixteen millions of José and Joselita Rubios is a major factor in Pacific politics.

QUEZON—THE SPELLBINDER

José Rubio's fate lies in the hands of Manuel Quezon, the islands' ablest statesman and political boss. Quezon is a picturesque figure. He is small, vigorous despite his sixty-three years, sharp-featured. He has a high forehead, long hair combed back, arching bushy brows, and a smiling mouth. In dress he is as loud as he is meticulous. He loves glitter, acclaim, cheering masses magnetized by his speeches. In a phrase, Quezon is a compound of Hollywood star and Tammany boss.

Quezon has been fighting for independence for more than four decades. In 1899 he took part in a revolt against the United States. When the uprising was crushed he turned to law and politics. By 1906, thanks to sharp wit and political acumen, he was already a provincial governor. A year later Quezon made his national début, becoming the Floor Leader of his party in the first Philippine Assembly. By this time he already bossed a smooth-running political machine and enjoyed moderate fame for his oratorical ability and striking clothes.

All through these years Quezon's battle cry has been "Independence." In speeches, in writings, in political deals, his objective has invariably been the islands' freedom. Therefore, when the time came to appoint the Philippines' first Resident Commissioner in the United States, he was the natural choice. Quezon arrived in Washington in 1909. Within six months

he spoke a crisp, fluent English; within a year he appeared on the floor of Congress to deliver an impassioned plea for independence. With the years Quezon became one of the most astute and influential diplomats in the Capital. He established close bonds with Congressmen; and Presidents, including Wilson, were among his friends.

In 1916 Quezon returned home to reap a political harvest. With his machine in full working order, he had no trouble in winning presidency of the Senate. In close collaboration with his friend, Governor-General Harrison, Quezon quickly put the Philippine administration into business and began to replace American officials with Filipinos; and in the following two decades he fought a successful battle for independence. With some governors, such as General Leonard Wood, he quarreled bitterly. With others, such as Paul McNutt, he has been able to work in concert. But each year Quezon's masterly hand was guiding the Philippines closer to their goal.

Once the battle was won, however, Quezon, as has been said, found himself in a very difficult position. He was astute enough to know that the problems created by Japan's aggression, by World War II and by the Philippine divorcement from the American market could not be solved by speech-making. The magic slogan of independence had lost its magic. A misstep would spell disaster both for the Philippines and for Quezon's personal fortunes (both being equally dear to him), and the only solution acceptable to Quezon would be one that provided for a secure, prosperous Philippines—headed by Quezon. Together with the rapidly expanding group of "revisionists" in Manila, he realized that the only escape from Japan and starvation lay in sacrificing some of his gains on the independence front. If the islands could somehow turn the clock back a decade and return to the American fold until the crisis had passed, the Philippines could survive the storm. But public admission that independence was no longer welcome meant to Quezon a political suicide. He simply could not go back to the people who

idolized him for making them free and tell them that he had misled them for four decades, that freedom now was worse than useless.

Thus began a double campaign: one to make Quezon strong beyond challenge, the other to "educate" the people into a willing relinquishment of independence—should this become necessary. With the aid of his steam roller in the Assembly, Quezon won the power to control farming, industry, wages, profits, hours of work, distribution of labor, transportation, public services, rents and prices of prime commodities. Next the Assembly obediently voted a constitutional amendment giving Quezon two more years in office—until November, 1943. Thus buttressed, he began to advocate the abolition of the political parties and "curtailment of individual liberties in the interests of the common good."

The "educational" campaign was conducted through the Philippine Civic League headed by José Romero, former floor leader in National Assembly and long a member of the Quezon political machine. The League's motto is a "realistic re-examination" of the independence problem, first suggested by McNutt. Handsome, able and anti-Japanese, McNutt wanted to "freeze" the Philippine situation as it was prior to World War II, with the United States in control of currency, trade, foreign relations and defense. Quezon's official stand on the McNutt plan was that he "would not object" to an indefinite postponement of independence if some sort of dominion status, similar to that of Canada, could be arranged, with the United States controlling foreign relations and defense alone. The League itself—with Quezon's blessing—made clear that it would be satisfied with much less, in the belief that the day the United States stepped out of the Philippines "some Asiatic country" would step in.

Quezon's utterances since the outbreak of World War II have slowly progressed from flirtation with Japan to formal appeals for American armed assistance. Early in 1940 he declared that "it is better to face the risks incident to independ-

ence" than remain unfree. "If we are conquered by another nation, that conquest would be temporary. . . . It is shortsightedness and fear that are making some of our people want Philippine-American relations to continue. . . ." However, as Japan marched into Indo-China and began to threaten the Dutch East Indies, Quezon changed his views. "Theoretically," he now said, he favored re-examination of the independence question: "I believe sincerely that there is a solution of the question other than that of the Independence Act." And in a message to the Assembly early in 1941, Quezon announced that he had asked Washington to appropriate certain Commonwealth funds for the defense of the islands, under American direction. "Our defense," he said, "rests with the United States, but the Philippine people are ready to do their share if the country becomes involved in war."

Actually Quezon was still marking time. Early in 1940 it had seemed as if Washington would embark on a policy of appeasing Japan while war in Europe remained in a "make-believe" stage. But the collapse of France, Japan's adherence to the Axis, the conquest of Indo-China, American aid to Britain and China—all these were straws in a wind whose direction could not be mistaken. The United States was embarking on a course of vigorous action, and it was obvious that she would contest every Japanese step in the southwestern Pacific. This policy seemed to supply Quezon with the solution he so desperately sought. Washington was to be allowed to draw the Philippines into its "defense belt," with Quezon constantly reiterating that independence could not be abandoned. He could thus seemingly both ensure protection of the islands from Japan and protect his own domestic political fences, and, if the ill winds blew themselves out before 1946—well, the Philippines would still have their independence.

Quezon's course demanded skilful tight-rope walking, but no one in Asia possessed better qualifications for the task. And the millions of José Rubios, still spellbound by Quezon's

oratory, hoped fervently that he would lead them into the promised land of independence—but not at the cost of starvation and alien attack.

WASHINGTON RECONSIDERS

With the Pacific aflame, Philippine independence today is as much of a problem to the United States as to Quezon or to Manila's José Rubios. When President Roosevelt signed the Independence Bill, there had been a sigh of relief in Washington; as long as the Philippines remained under the American flag they presented a problem in defense and diplomacy, and neither the Navy nor the State Department was eager to handle it. This feeling persisted long after the invasion of China in 1937. The views of such men as Admiral Harry Yarnell or High Commissioner McNutt, who maintained that the changed circumstances made the retention of the Philippines necessary, were ignored. Although Washington still presented a stern front towards Japanese aggression, it reiterated its intention to live up to the letter of the Independence Act. On the one hand Washington was trying to frighten Japan into an abandonment of her ambitions; on the other, it was leaving to its fate one of the prizes coveted by Japan.

The spokesman for Washington at this time was High Commissioner Sayre. Although reputed to have been given his post at Quezon's insistence, Sayre at once fell out of step with the Filipino politicians. There were many reasons for the discord. A career diplomat, Sayre—unlike many of his predecessors—did not have to build up a record of hearty backslapping that could be exhibited in subsequent political campaigns in the United States. For seven years legal adviser to the Siamese Government (1923-'30), and later a Harvard professor of law, he could study Philippine problems with an academic detachment which seemed intolerable to the Filipino politicians, to whom the issue of independence was heavily lined with passion. Finally, as Assistant Secretary of

State, Sayre drafted much of the economic legislation which underlay the Independence Act. This legislation had required careful consideration, and he could not reconcile himself to the thought of sacrificing any of it to political or military factors—or to compassion for the Filipinos.

When Sayre first sensed a change of mind in the Philippines after the outbreak of World War II, he began to warn the Manila leaders that the United States would not change her mind on independence. The American people, he said, would also refuse to pay indefinitely the cost of the Philippine defenses. But Sayre reserved his strongest comments for Quezon's hints of the desirability of dominion status for the Commonwealth as well as for Quezon's efforts to make himself a "little fuehrer." Repeatedly Sayre declared that the Filipinos wanted the impossible—"to eat the cake and have it." When Quezon's machine committed "irregularities" in the campaign of 1940, Sayre minced no words in reminding Quezon that the Philippines were still a dependency of the United States, and that its form of government was still democratic.

Likewise, with the progress of World War II, there developed a steadily widening gap between Sayre's views and Washington's policies. In the world-wide anti-totalitarian front, the Philippines became an important outpost, a base to be defended at all costs. The possible seizure of the islands by Japan ceased to be a local problem. Now such conquest signified a major breach in the democratic defenses, a signal victory for the Axis. In a left-handed confession of political and military shortsightedness prior to World War II, the defense leaders in Washington vied with one another in protestations of readiness to protect the Philippines against "any" foe. In a typical statement, Secretary of the Navy Knox early in 1941 told a Senate Committee: "We have calculated and studied the problem [Philippine defense] and admitted the difficulty of it. But it has never been thrust aside." Colonel Stimson, Secretary of War, was even more outspoken, bluntly declaring—in response to a question on the Philippines—that

"wherever there are Americans, we shall give them full protection."

These statements were backed with action. The United States Asiatic Fleet was reinforced with submarines. Naval bombers were flown from Hawaii. Late in 1940 two pursuit groups were sent to the Philippines from the United States and equipped with some of the 110 planes originally ordered by Sweden and withheld by Washington. In February, 1941, the Army announced that it would take in 5,000 Philippine Army reservists for a year of additional training. At that time the total strength of forces available for the defense of the Philippines included nearly 12,000 American troops and Philippine Scouts, 30,000 troops of the inadequately trained Philippine Army and 150,000 reservists, with slightly in excess of 100 planes. The naval forces included three cruisers, thirteen destroyers, eighteen submarines and two squadrons of naval patrol planes, in addition to the Philippines' own fleet of "Q-Boats." The shores of the Philippines were inadequately defended, with the exception of Manila Bay, guarded by its powerful fortifications at Corregidor.

These and other, more secret, preparations provoked much indignation in Tokyo. The newspapers, with obvious inspiration from the Navy Office, declared that plane assembly plants were being erected in the Philippines by Army engineers; that Boeing bombers, capable of round-trip flights to Tokyo, were being massed at Philippine air bases; and that 100 heavy tanks and 1,100 armored trucks and heavy guns had been brought to the Philippines following Japan's entry into the Axis. Obviously, even if the Japanese reports were correct, the defense of the islands from Japanese attack was a Herculean task. A large expeditionary force from Hainan and Formosa could have little difficulty in effecting a landing in dozens of strategically important spots. But Washington now regarded the defense of the Philippines as a part of the Pacific defense pattern, of which Singapore and Australia were the mainstays. In the event that British bases in the

Pacific were opened to American warships and aircraft, the movement of Japanese landing forces to the Philippines, and their provisioning, would be in constant peril.

In the spring of 1941 the question of the Philippines *as such* could be reduced to these elements: the United States could get along nicely without the Philippine sugar or hemp or pearl buttons; the United States could sacrifice her rich trade with the islands; the United States could, finally, unburden herself of the thankless task of "tutelage," for the Filipinos could govern themselves as well as the Chinese or the Thailanders. However, in a war-troubled world these now seemed unimportant considerations. The only important factor was the struggle with totalitarian forces—and in this struggle the Philippines were, figuratively speaking, a bastion of freedom. Once the islands fell into Japanese hands, the American Alaska-to-Burma defense arch would be breached, thus forcing the United States perilously to shorten her defense lines.

For no other reason than grand strategy, therefore, the United States had had to resume and continue the protection of the Philippines. The move was admittedly distasteful. The considerations of self-defense, however, made squeamishness dangerous. The defenseless Philippines could display either the Stars and Stripes or the Rising Sun—and it was important that it be the former. For once in the history of the United States, freedom was a liability that could be dispensed with for the common good.

VII

THE AMERICAN STAKES

Chapter Twenty-One

Accent on Asia

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY is traditionally a compound of bluff, hardheadedness and sentimentalism. In the Orient, as in Europe, Uncle Sam has always been a Sir Galahad with the mentality of a horse-trader. The two have been so closely interwoven that often it was difficult to say where goodness ended and business began. Both flourished in peace, and both eagerly sought it.

Whenever America's rivals fell into one of their periodical squabbles, Washington tried to pour oil on the troubled waters. When a weak Oriental nation was gobbled up by a major power, the State Department waxed indignant and threatened the culprit with the burning force of public opinion. Americans had well-defined views on morality and international behavior, and took pride in airing them. But while there was indignation and diplomatic bluster in high places, the banks, the oil and tobacco concerns, the automobile and steel industries continued to trade with the aggressor as if nothing had happened. Thus an inconsistency developed. Between America's avowed policy and the actions of her businessmen there appeared a seemingly unbridgeable gap. The bolder the transgressors grew, the wider was the gap. Becoming aware of the discrepancy, the transgressors proceeded to pay little heed to Washington, to the so-called "voice of enraged public opinion," to the rules of international law.

To be effective, a foreign policy must be backed by a Big Stick. In the Pacific, Washington's weapon in the pre-Hitlerian days was bluff. At one time or another since the First World War, Washington has threatened to enforce economic sanctions, form international power blocs and use force against the treaty-breaker. Almost at no moment, however, was it actually prepared to wield its biggest Big Stick, the navy. Thus appeared the second inconsistency: America threatened, but did not intend—perhaps was unable—to back her threats with force.

Between the two world wars of our lifetime, Japan has been the chief transgressor in the Pacific. To Nipponese leaders the United States presented herself as a conglomerate of profit-minded traders, a navy presumably incapable of operating in the western Pacific, and an official Washington uttering idle threats. The only insurance taken by Tokyo against the unforeseen was a canny accentuation of the differences between the United States and her possible allies. The best example of this was displayed in 1937-'39, when Japan's shabby treatment of British and French interests in China was placed in a deliberately sharp contrast with the relatively friendly attitude towards America. Reduced to the essentials, this policy meant that when the killed foreigners and bombed property were American, the apologies were prompt and the compensation occasionally paid. The Britons received neither. The stratagem was petty, but it helped in a little measure to keep Washington and London apart when they should have been together.

It is the general belief that the American policy in the Pacific has traditionally been one of isolation. This is wrong. Washington has for decades been playing the game of power politics with the skill and intentness of any of its rivals. The only difference between the American policy and, say, that of Britain was in method. The United States built no Oriental bases comparable to Singapore, subsidized no local warlords, coveted no spheres of influence. But the motivation was

identical—trade and strategy—and the results were essentially the same.

Isolationism was merely a political war cry. Congressmen shouted it in Washington. Main Street made it a fetish that supposedly kept John Doe from going to another war to save the world for one thing or another. But in the American policy in the Pacific there was no trace of isolation, only a painful effort to escape by all means involvement in the squabbles of others. Thus developed the third inconsistency. Despite appearances, the distance between the State Department and Capitol Hill could not be covered in a ten-minute walk. It required months of careful maneuvering, political bargaining, the molding of public opinion. The State Department was internationally minded, the Congress sectional and narrow-minded. Between the two there could be only compromise, not complete understanding. Neither Henry L. Stimson in 1931-'32 nor Cordell Hull in 1937-'39 had the assurance of Congressional backing. Their notes to Japan were biting and ominous, but they could frighten no transgressor who knew that the two gentlemen commanded no backing.

It was simply not Realpolitik. Theodore Roosevelt's precept, "Speak softly but carry a Big Stick," had been reversed between 1920 and 1940. America still played power politics—but with no better weapons than scorching words. It was not the fault of the State Department or any President or Congress; rather, each contributed to the blunders and inconsistencies of the American policy; and the penalty was paid in Manchuria in 1931, in devastated China proper in 1937, in Indo-China in 1940. Other peoples paid it together with the Americans. And the blunders in the Pacific in a very tangible manner paved the unhappy road to the Second World War.

FROM WASHINGTON TO MANCHURIA

The First World War left America with a tremendous war machine, an economic crisis, a bad taste in the mouth and a

determination to halt the Japanese aggression in the Pacific. It also left Britain deeply dependent upon her American ally for support in her own and world economic rehabilitation. Washington for the moment called the tune, and London sang accordingly. Britain's relations with Japan were not of the best, though the two were still linked by an alliance. To the British mind, Japan's aggression in Asia while her rivals were engaged in a life-and-death struggle was "not cricket." There was bitterness in London and a desire to shear Japan of some of her new gains.

Around 1921 the State Department and the Navy began to evolve a new design for the Pacific. This scheme recognized Japan's emergence as a great power, established the principle of America's own vital interest in the Pacific, and sought to create a new balance of power. Russia and Germany—two of the major rivals for supremacy in the Orient—had by this time been eliminated from the scene. France and Holland remained unimportant. The division of power in the Pacific thus resolved itself into two camps—the Anglo-American bloc and Japan. The fulcrum was China.

The problem of the Pacific could at the moment be reduced to two elementals—navies and China. In 1921 Japan, Britain and the United States possessed eleven, thirty-two and seventeen battleships, respectively. In terms of Pacific strategy that meant that no power could singly challenge Japan in the western part of the ocean. Japan's relative position would be further improved in 1924, when she would have seventeen additional battleships as against thirty-three each for her two Occidental rivals. Neither Washington nor London entertained any plans for attacking Japan. It was felt, however, that the relative strength of the three navies should be kept at a level where Japan's ventures into transgression could be thwarted by the combined Anglo-American navies. There was also a desire to avert a ruinous armament race.

The goal of the two Western powers was to save China from Japan. It was felt in Washington that if Japan were assured of supremacy in the western Pacific, she would readily aban-

don most of her war gains in China. The stimulus for an agreement covering these important issues was supplied by Canada and Australia. These two British dominions had become closely attached to the United States during the war. They therefore felt with especial keenness the necessity of ending the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which could be turned against their best friend. These views were given an energetic airing at the Imperial Conference in London in 1921. Readily yielding to this pressure, Downing Street decided to call an international conference to settle the thorny Pacific issues. But Washington acted first, and in November, 1921, representatives of nine powers—Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, China, the Netherlands and the United States—met in Washington to establish formally the new balance of power in the Pacific.

Considering its importance, the conference was a tame affair. One reason for this was the general realization that an agreement was necessary to avert heavy armament expenditures and perhaps new bloodshed. Another reason was America's overwhelming strength. If the United States could not attack Japan in 1921, she was at least potentially capable of outbuilding any power or combination of powers. There was little argument, therefore, when Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes proposed the limitation of navies to the pre-conference level. This meant some painful scrapping of warships under construction, and would reduce the navies of the United States, Britain, Japan, France and Italy to the ratio of 5-5-3-1.7-1.7. This ratio was finally accepted by the powers, but only after a comprehensive agreement was reached for the limitation of fortifications in the Pacific area. Washington agreed not to build new defenses in the Aleutians and the Philippines. It was further decided that should any power transgress in the Pacific, Japan, Britain, France and the United States would consult each other on punitive steps. This provision was apparently intended to protect Japan against the Anglo-American bloc. As such it was cold comfort, for France would not have joined Japan.

The importance of the Four Power Treaty to Japan lay in its strict limitation of her foes' navies and fortified bases. Equally important was the Nine Power Treaty, transforming the Open Door principle from a pet American policy into an accepted international doctrine. Under this treaty Japan pledged herself to respect the territorial and political integrity of China proper (Manchuria was left under her heel) and disgorged some of her war gains—notably the rich Shantung Province once dominated by Germany. In a sense, the conference represented a victory for Japan, for it made her the undisputed mistress of the western Pacific. On the other hand, it grouped all the other nations against her were she to attempt new aggression. This, at the moment, seemed an effective bar to Japanese expansion; and the Japanese people interpreted it that way. The Japanese delegates on their return home met with a storm of abuse and reproach.

The greatest gainer, apart from China, was the United States. She had shattered the Anglo-Japanese alliance (although the British delegates supported Japan against the United States on many major points). She had unloaded the burden of protecting the Open Door principle upon the shoulders of other Pacific nations. She had ensured the territorial integrity of China and Siberia (though Japan did not evacuate the latter until October, 1922). She had, finally, established a new balance of power in which she was a dominant figure.

All was well, and peace descended upon the Pacific—a peace marred only by civil wars in China, by a Sino-Soviet clash and by Japanese incursions into Shantung, assertedly to maintain peace.

STIMSON BATTLES JAPAN

The Pacific idyll lasted until 1931. By then the brush of time had considerably altered the picture. China had finally become unified under the National Government headed by

General Chiang Kai-shek; Japan had strengthened her grip on Manchuria, whose rulers for decades had been her puppets; and Russia had reappeared as a Pacific power—a power still incapable of a major rôle, but well able to hold its own against any attack. In 1925-'27 her agents threatened to disrupt the Pacific equilibrium by turning China Communist. This ambitious project had, however, been thwarted by the combined efforts of Britain, the United States and the Chinese moneyed groups.

The changes had not been in the international scene alone. Within Japan, for instance, there had developed a feeling that the hour for expansion had arrived. Some believed that Manchuria was on the verge of joining hands with the rest of China. Others saw the imminence of the sovietization of Manchuria and a subsequent onslaught on Japan. Still others believed that the decadent Occidental powers, which had inflicted so many bitter slights upon Japan, could no longer halt her imperial progress. Japan's industrialization was advancing in seven-league boots and she grew rich, strong and greedy.

In September, 1931, a Japanese army on the continent struck in Manchuria. The moment was well chosen. America and Europe were in the throes of a severe economic depression. The League of Nations, regarded as the international policeman, did not include Russia or the United States, two of the four great Pacific powers. The burden of enforcing the League's dictum fell upon Britain, least disposed to plunge into any costly armed or economic contests. There was also this important difference: there were only words in the Occident, action in Japan. Action won.

Washington, however, was not prepared to allow the collapse of the structure it had erected ten years earlier. The attack on Manchuria was exactly the act against which the safeguards of the Washington Conference had been designed. The championing of international morality was assumed by Henry L. Stimson, the then Secretary of State. Although born

in New York, this able statesman somehow fits the accepted picture of a New Englander. At times, in those days, he was a cool-headed Yankee trader, determined to get the better of any bargain. At other times he was an idealist, consumed with the fire of indignation over international injustices. Unfortunately, the trader seldom saw eye to eye with the idealist. Stimson remained consistent solely in his denunciation of aggression. But international transgressors shed hostile words as a duck sheds water.

Only seventy-two hours after the fateful railway explosion in Manchuria on that dark September night in 1931,* Stimson informed Japan of America's profound concern over Japan's violation of the Nine Power Treaty. A week later the heavy wheels of the League machinery began to turn and Japan was asked to withdraw her troops from the occupied areas. As expected, Tokyo ignored the request. In the first few months of the war, the State Department marched in step with the League. Stimson the idealist explained the reason thus: "If any controversy should arise with Japan . . . if that controversy took place between her and the League, it would present the picture of an issue between Japan and the whole world. It would thus give maximum effect to world public opinion." Moreover, while the Nine Power Treaty wisely foresaw the possibility of imperialist clashes, it provided no machinery for the settlement of such disputes. Stimson felt that the elaborate procedure provided by the League Covenant deserved a chance.

When the League invited Washington to send an observer, the State Department, braving the general American distrust of the Geneva institution, appointed one. Through this representative the State Department unofficially had a hand in every League move.

The American policy of these months was a succession of blunders. Colonel Stimson overestimated the power of public opinion, sadly underestimated the Japanese Army's deter-

* See page 109.

mination. Possibly he sincerely believed that the Kellogg-Briand pact and other pious accords of the optimistic 1920s had made morality the basis of international relations. Possibly he felt that other nations, fearing similar aggression elsewhere or desiring to uphold the Pacific status quo, would band up against Japan. If he did, he was soon disillusioned. There was fear abroad and an anxiety to preserve the Pacific status quo. But the clamor for action came from the countries which did not have to bear its costs. Britain and France, which alone would have had to fight the aggressor, displayed little enthusiasm.

There was a distinct cooling off in Washington, but Colonel Stimson made another attempt to organize a united anti-Japanese front. Confidential overtures were made to Paris and London for a joint refusal to recognize the fruits of Japanese aggression. When these overtures were placed in cold storage, Colonel Stimson assumed the leadership in enunciating his famous "non-recognition doctrine." This notable contribution to the political lore of the Pacific was contained in identical notes sent to China and Japan on January 7, 1932. They barred any concessions secured under duress, warned Japan against violating American rights, demanded the maintenance of China's territorial and political integrity, and upheld the Open Door policy. Although Tokyo rejoined with the establishment of a puppet régime in Manchuria, Stimson continued to trumpet his doctrine.

By February, 1932, Britain the appeaser and Japan the aggressor seemed nearly equally villainous to the American eye. It appeared necessary to keep reminding both that they had signed the Nine Power Treaty and were pledged to uphold it. Such a reminder was supplied by Stimson on February 23, in a lucid letter to the late Senator William E. Borah. In this statement the Secretary of State pointedly recalled that the United States had given up her naval supremacy in 1922 in exchange for guaranties with regard to China. There was also a broad hint that Washington might reconsider its under-

takings if the other signatories broke their pledges. Years later Colonel Stimson stressed the importance of the letter in these terms:

It was intended as a message of encouragement to China; as an explanation of policy to the public of the United States . . . as a *gentle reminder to the Conservative Party, which was now in control of the British Government, that they, through Lords Salisbury and Balfour, were joint authors with us of the Open Door policy and the Nine Power Treaty*, and, finally, as a reminder to Japan, that if she chose to break down one of the group of treaties arrived at at the Washington Conference, other nations might feel themselves released from some of those treaties which were as important to her as the Nine Power Treaty was to us.¹

The letter turned the trick. A fortnight later Britain guided through the League a resolution based on Stimson's doctrine of non-recognition. There was, however, little sincere desire to chastise Japan. The Tory point of view was voiced, in the accepted manner, by *The Times*, which ridiculed the American "apprehensions" that the puppet régime in Manchuria would favor Japanese interests to the detriment of others. *The Times* also denied the existence of Chinese political integrity, either in 1922 or in 1937. Both of these arguments were at once gleefully picked up by Japan, and figured prominently in her diplomatic utterances.

To Stimson's pained amazement, the Tories went even further and actively blocked American efforts to censure Japan and form an anti-Japanese front. And as Colonel Stimson had learned by then, America alone could not punish Japan. Thus America's weakness and Britain's appeasement played hand in hand, losing for them their best chance to halt Japan's adventures. Had there been greater boldness the two nations could have strangled Japanese ambitions with nothing more dangerous than economic sanctions. It must be remembered that Hitler at this time was still a powerless, hysterical putsch-

1. *Italics mine.*

ist, and Italy a member—if unhappy—of the democratic camp. However, a similar opportunity did not occur again. Up to 1938 there still were occasions—breathing spells between European crises—when action could have been taken. But by that time London was even less disposed to get into Pacific squabbles.

In 1934, when Japan went a step further on the road of aggression by denouncing the 5-5-3 naval ratio, her dockyards were promptly barred to visitors, and work was launched on new men-of-war. The status quo in the Pacific had been irreparably upset.

INVASION OF CHINA—AND AFTER

The old status quo was gone, yet Washington continued to delude itself into believing that the good old days would somehow, some time, return. Having entrenched herself in Manchuria, Japan began to squeeze foreign interests out of her puppet state. The oil and tobacco interests were the first victims. Japan's jump across the Great Wall was accompanied by the incredible spectacle of officially sponsored smuggling and opium traffic. American and British traders, exporters, industrialists and shipping concerns felt the heavy boot of the invader. The Open Door was being slammed. American rights were violated with abandon. Puppet régimes mushroomed in one province after another.

Washington contented itself with notes, which newspapers, with a singular lack of imagination, invariably described as "firm." Replying to some of these notes, Tokyo deigned to give facetious assurances of high regard for America and the Open Door. Others were nonchalantly relegated to the wastepaper baskets of the Foreign Office.

Hitler was already in the saddle in Berlin and secret couriers were journeying to Rome and back. Still, the Axis design for aggression was incomplete. If Britain and the United States wanted to take action against Japan, they still could.

They did not. Appeasers in London wooed Japan, while in Washington the hands of the Navy and State Departments were tied by a short-sighted, isolationist Congress. As in France, five or six years later, pro-German publicists shouted "We won't die for Danzig," so did many misguided souls in Washington in 1934-'35 shy off from helping China. They came to regret it in 1941.

With her Occidental rivals unwilling to challenge her, Japan decided in 1937 to add North China to her growing domain. The conflict spread first to the Yangtse Valley, later to the south, until, by the end of 1938, the front stretched 2,000 miles across the face of China, while the entire coast, from the Great Wall to Indo-China, was under an air-tight blockade. Neither Britain nor the United States had ever suffered such losses or indignities without going to war to defend their interests. One of the first pieces of property shelled and seized by the Japanese was an American-owned university in a Shanghai suburb. Three years later, it was still in Japanese hands. Millions of dollars invested by Americans in industrial plants, schools, missions and hospitals went up in dust and smoke. Mountains of American-owned goods perished as the result of Japanese restrictions. Many hundreds of American nationals were driven from their homes and jobs, and scores died. American treaty rights were violated, with or without apology.

On December 12, 1937, came the sinking of the *U.S.S. Panay*.^{*} For a less serious offense—the sinking of the *Maine* by hands unknown—the United States had gone to war four decades earlier. But the "We won't die for China" spirit reigned in Washington. When Tokyo made prompt apologies and paid \$2,214,007.36, the United States promptly wrote the *Panay* off her balance sheet.

The voice of the United States in those troubled winter months of 1937 was a succession of discordant notes. In October, President Roosevelt, in a speech in Chicago, made a

^{*} See pages 164, 178.

plea for the "quarantening" of aggressors. It was a vigorous declaration that should have had a terrific impact upon Japan. It did not, for the simple reason that the President's vigor was not matched by the State Department.

The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war now placed Cordell Hull in the same predicament in which Stimson had found himself six years earlier. Unaccountably Hull failed to profit by Stimson's errors. For six months after the opening gun, Hull continued to nurse Japanese sensibilities in the belief that the "moderates" in Tokyo would check the army. In those months the Japanese Army laid waste or seized most of China's great cities, violated every international treaty safeguarding China, and inflicted immense losses upon foreign powers. The excesses evoked from the State Department well-mannered lectures on the sanctity of treaties, of resort to peaceful negotiation for the settlement of disputes, respect for international law, and non-interference in the internal life of other nations. These were all sound principles. On such principles rested law and peaceful international intercourse. Such principles lay at the base of American government and policy. Yet, as a Chungking editor pointed out years later, "You cannot lecture on law to a burglar robbing your neighbor's house."

For six years the press headlines had given clear indication of the Japanese Army's program of conquest and its iron-bound control over the Government. It seemed idle in the seventh year to believe that reproaches would reform the sworded man. Firm action—not necessarily military—could alone sway the conquerors. The political education of Hull, however, was much speedier than that of Stimson. After the initial mildness, American policy began to stiffen. China was given economic assistance. Japanese efforts to undermine Chinese currency and tariff schedules were effectively sabotaged by American officials and business men. Maneuvers to dislodge Western influence from foreign concessions in China were repeatedly thwarted.

The hero of this period—1938-'39—was a tough little vice-admiral, Harry E. Yarnell, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet. With Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson² migrating from one Chinese capital to another, Yarnell became the recognized leader of the American counter-offensive. With Yarnell's blessing, American marines in Shanghai kept the Japanese plainclothes men out of their sector—without silk gloves. His drastic action in Amoy held the Japanese, intent on seizing the Kulangsu foreign settlement, stalemated for months.* He was a firm believer in the efficacy of force, and he never hesitated to display it. The daily Japanese ultimatums were greeted by him with the equivalent of "Come and get it." At least once, in the wake of a particularly obnoxious Japanese demand, the heavy guns of his flagship, the *U.S.S. Augusta*, were reported to have been trained on the Japanese flagship a quarter of a mile away. That may not have been a true story, but it explains Yarnell. Put on the retired list in 1939, Yarnell immediately began to advocate immediate aid to General Chiang. When World War II broke out, he coupled Britain with China, and proposed an immediate war on Japan when the latter marched into Indo-China. In 1941 he was recalled to active duty.

Instead of waiting for Neville Chamberlain to modify his policy of appeasement in the Orient, Hull now took the lead in opposing Japan. Each Japanese violation of American rights was followed by a sharp American note, and by growing support for China. This assistance was still small in terms of dollars and cents, but it kept up Chinese morale in the most critical hours. And possibly it kept the European appeasers—anxious to come to terms with Japan—in line. Hull was cannily taking advantage of the increasing public awareness of international issues. Isolationism was already displaying the fissures that led to its disintegration in 1940. Moreover,

2. In 1941 Mr. Johnson was unaccountably demoted to Minister, sent to Canberra. His post was taken by Clarence Gauss, former Consul-General in Shanghai.

* See page 30.

sympathy for China was soaring by leaps and bounds. In 1937, according to a Gallup poll, a boycott of Japanese goods was favored by a minority. In 1939 two out of every three voters backed it. By the beginning of 1940 the ratio had grown to 27 to one.

With this inspiration President Roosevelt took the first step towards retaliation. On July 26, 1939, he denounced the American-Japanese treaty of commerce and navigation, which stood in the way of restrictions on Japanese trade. The date was significant. Three days earlier the British Ambassador in Tokyo signed an agreement recognizing Japan's belligerent rights in North China and pledging non-interference with her campaign. This accord was in effect a replica of the Munich "peace for our time" pact. But in addition to betraying China, Britain in this document signed the death warrant of the Nine Power Treaty of which she was one of the major signatories. To give the Tory government a well-deserved slap in the face as well as to bolster the faltering Chinese morale, the President promptly dealt a counter-blow to Japan.

The Japanese were frightened. They could neither prosecute the war in China nor maintain their industries without the steady flow of American scrap iron, steel, oil, ferro-alloys, copper and automobiles. Their subsequent efforts to placate the United States were pathetic. A heavy official hand restrained the Japanese press, ever ready to lambast a foreign power. Government spokesmen and paid apologists spoke of "traditional" amity between the two nations. The Japanese authorities in China hastened to settle as many disputes as they could. Finally, as her trump card, Japan promised to reopen the Yangtse River to foreign navigation—presumably as a reward for the renewal of the trade treaty by Washington. The State Department remained noncommittal, and informed Tokyo that the trade would have to be carried on a day-to-day basis. The promise to open the Yangtse was then forgotten. Twenty months later the river remained barred to all but the Japanese vessels.

Still, Washington hesitated to employ the economic sword which it had unsheathed. There was great clamor for an embargo on raw materials destined for Japan, but nothing was being done. In January, 1940, the Senate actually started to study the embargo issue. It was shelved, however, in the heat of the pro-Finnish agitation. A similar fate befell Colonel Stimson's proposal to ban the export of iron ore, scrap iron and aviation gasoline. By this time France and Britain had withdrawn from China to fight their battles in Europe, while Russia made peace with Japan. The Japanese Army stood poised for a plunge into the southwestern Pacific. And the United States, for the second time in a quarter of a century, stood virtually alone in Japan's path.

U.S.A.: 1940—

World War II played havoc with American political views and moves. Under the skilful guidance of the Roosevelt-Hull team, public opinion divorced itself from ostrichism—that form of isolationism which upholds democracy in one country and lets “the devil take the others.” Steadily—and at a rapidly accelerating pace—the Americans began to take deep interest in the British and Chinese and the Greek battles for freedom. Aggression ceased to be an abstraction and Hitler a near-comical figure. Out of the blood and the suffering of millions abroad, the American people began to regain a true appreciation of the principles upon which their own political system was based.

The unmistakable change in public opinion found an immediate echo in American policy. The years 1940 and 1941 were to witness a succession of steps designed to help the victims of aggression, both in Europe and Asia. To China this transformation from a Cinderella into a princess was especially important. In the summer of 1940 China's resistance reached the lowest point in the three-year war with Japan. China was seemingly forgotten by some of her friends, betrayed by oth-

ers, exploited by still others. Distress, hunger and disease stalked the land. Her coffers were empty and her reserves of munitions were drawing close to the danger line, when, at this desperate hour, President Roosevelt and Mr. Hull came to China's aid.

First it was a trickle of small loans, backed by Chinese tungsten and wood oil. Then, in mid-October, 1940, Washington persuaded London to reopen the Burma Road and promptly began to bestow its gifts with a generous hand. There was a \$100,000,000 loan, half of which was to be used to maintain Chinese currency.* Next came arrangements for the dispatch to China of 100 military aircraft and various equipment. Still later the President ordered Lauchlin Currie, one of his administrative assistants, to visit China as his "eyes and ears." On a smaller scale this assistance was duplicated in other Pacific areas, notably in the Dutch East Indies, Malaya and Australia.

But most important of all, of course, was the passage of the lend-lease bill in mid-March, 1941. Together with Britain and Greece, China was to be the chief beneficiary of American military and economic assistance. China needed both arms and money—but even more significant to her was the fact that she had finally been recognized as a full-fledged ally in the war on totalitarianism.†

On the other side of the balance was a series of blows designed to force Japan to curb her aggression. By the summer of 1940 many strategic materials—including aviation gasoline—were barred from Japan. As the year progressed, the embargo was extended to scores of other vital items—among them machine tools, iron and steel, without which the Japanese war machine could not function efficiently. The economic noose was being drawn so tight that early in 1941 a few Japanese leaders already were frankly admitting that the country was on the brink of an unprecedented economic crisis.

* See pages 88, 219.

† See page 122.

Simultaneously with these moves, President Roosevelt designated Russia as a "friendly nation" and ended the "moral embargoes" on the shipment of machine tools and aircraft to that country. When the ban on the sale of warplanes to the Soviets was lifted early in 1941, Mr. Hull denied that Moscow was being "bribed" to stay out of war, but explained the move as an effort to "iron out small difficulties." Whatever the explanation, Washington's advances were watched with bated breath in Tokyo, to which the success or failure of the political romance was a matter of life or death.

These three steps—aid to China, restrictions against Japan and wooing of Russia—formed an essential part of Roosevelt's "arsenal of democracy" program. All three were also the United States' answer to Japan's open adherence to the aggressor bloc. The tripartite military alliance of September, 1940, had been an open challenge to the United States to cease assistance to the beleaguered victims of aggression or take the consequences. The attempt at intimidation failed. Washington's response was enhanced aid to Britain and China, further restrictions on Japan, and "urgent advice" to American nationals in the Far East to return home. This, more than anything else, showed Japan that the United States had come to the end of her patience. There—on the brink of an open rupture—Japanese-American relations hovered early in 1941.

The most tragic feature of the crisis was the absence of avenues of peace. Peace was the constant leitmotif in Tokyo, but it was not in the Japanese empire-builders' minds, nor in their terms. Tokyo's so-called "peace overtures" to Washington were invariably predicated on American acceptance of Japan's supremacy over entire East Asia. In the same breath in which they "pleaded" with Washington to come to an understanding, the Japanese spokesmen urged the United States to "give recognition to the realities of the situation." Even as late as 1941 there was a passionate desire in both Washington and London to avert a clash with Japan. But this could not be achieved without recognizing Japan as mis-

tress of China, Indo-China, Thailand, the Dutch East Indies—and perhaps Malaya and the Philippines.

No other terms were acceptable to the Japanese military. This was one of the most important reasons for the continued American-Japanese friction. But there were many others. Some of these, such as Japan's war on American rights and interests in the Far East, her naval policy, her aggression in China and other areas, have already been discussed elsewhere in this book. Of the plethora of other issues, Shanghai was one of the most troublesome.

Shanghai has for decades been the pivot of American business and cultural activities in the Orient. American investments in that great city alone were estimated in 1937 at \$250,000,000. The Japanese invasion, however, put these investments—and, indeed, the entire American position in Shanghai—in jeopardy. This was accomplished by direct action, as well as by indirection; by restrictions on trade and travel, by the use of puppet currency, taxes and "laws," by widespread gangsterism. Some of Mr. Hull's bitterest notes to Tokyo dealt with the problem of Shanghai. But these notes remained without effect, and the Americans continued to be squeezed out of their last foothold in China. When the United States made half-hearted attempts to protect her interests by the use of the Marine Corps regiment stationed in Shanghai, the Japanese spokesmen and press screamed "aggression." One such crisis was provoked by the Japanese in the summer of 1940 when U.S. Marines attempted to take over a sector left by withdrawing British troops. With the Japanese Army threatening armed action, Washington held the Marines back and allowed a Shanghai Volunteer Corps unit to patrol the district.

One aspect of the struggle was the fight for the control of the Municipal Council which governs the Shanghai International Settlement. With the Settlement traditionally dominated by Britain, the Council until 1941 consisted of five Britons, two Americans and two Japanese. For years the Japa-

nese have clamored for increased membership on the Council, but without success. Following their failure to carry the election in 1940, the Japanese began to resort to strong-arm action. Thus, late in 1940, a Chinese band—later identified as gunmen in the employ of the puppet régime—attacked the British chairman of the Council. He escaped, but in 1941, at a meeting of taxpayers, he was shot by a leading member of the Japanese community. The Japanese press condoned the attack as an expression of righteous indignation over "Occidental oppression."

With Shanghai in ceaseless turmoil, it could easily supply the spark for the explosion in the Pacific—and in Shanghai the zero hour was set for the early summer of 1941. But in that spring and summer there were numberless points in the Pacific where the friction between the democracies and Japan could develop overnight into a full-sized war. From China southward, every country on the Pacific map was a potential battlefield; and on the outcome of these battles, almost as much as on the fighting in Europe, hinged the final outcome of the titanic struggle between the two great camps—the Democracies and the Triple Axis.

VIII

ZERO HOUR

Chapter Twenty-Two

Showdown

JAPAN HAS BEEN at war with the world since 1931. In the course of that decade she has bartered three hundred thousand lives and twenty billion yen for an empire stretching from the Amur River to Saigon, in Indo-China. It has been a costly barter, and many a Japanese empire-builder today wishes the clock could be turned back to 1930. Historical and economic processes, however, are inexorable. Japan can return to 1930 no more than she can halt her aggression. She has created a vicious circle out of which there is no escape. Her adventures have pitted her against the democracies; and the democracies, after years of hesitation, have deprived her of certain vital supplies. To get them Japan must embark on new conquests, which must inevitably plunge her into new conflicts with the democracies. Today her hunger for oil and rubber and rice is further sharpened by the temptations offered by World War II.

While waging war on China, Japan has been feverishly arming for an "all-out" fight with her major foes. Her preparations have been canny and methodical. She denounced the naval treaties which curbed her naval expansion. She established bases throughout the western Pacific. She fortified the mandated islands. She modernized her Army and poured millions into the expansion of her air force. She finally entered into military compacts with fellow-aggressors

and peace compacts with the powers she did not, for the moment, choose to fight.

Today Japan is ready. Until the middle of 1943 her navy will have no peer in the western Pacific. In the southwestern Pacific, whose domination she now seeks, effective opposition has been undermined by the Second World War. Japan knows her hour has arrived, and she will strike tomorrow, next week, perhaps next month. And when she strikes, her foe will be these United States. This is why the moment is of such deadly urgency.

What are Japan's blueprints for the showdown? How does she expect to fight the United States, and win?

The answer is supplied by Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu, the probable Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese naval forces in the next war.¹

Suetsugu assumes that the Japanese-American battles will be fought in the western Pacific, the scene of Japan's aggression. The United States Fleet, he says, can follow three routes of attack on Japan. The main line of advance runs from San Francisco to the Philippines by way of Hawaii, Midway and Guam. This, Suetsugu says, is the easiest course, "but it is precisely the course straddled by a vast network of Japanese defenses"—from the Kuriles in the north to the Spratley Islands in the south. Suetsugu doubts if the American Fleet would follow this route, for "it would be like poking its nose into a trap." The second line hugs the Aleutians and Kamchatka and then veers to the Kuriles and the Hokkaido. This, Suetsugu notes, "is the shortest course, but it is foggy throughout the year and both naval and air operations on a large scale are impossible."

The only route open to the United States Fleet, according to Suetsugu, runs to the south, from Hawaii around the Japanese mandated islands to New Zealand, Australia, Manila and Singapore.

1. In *Keizai Joho, Seikeihen* for January, 1941. For a detailed sketch of Admiral Suetsugu see above, Chapter Eleven.

The reason why the American Fleet has not yet sailed for the western Pacific, Suetsugu believes, is because the bases along the route have not yet been completed. But even when the work is finished, it is doubtful, in Suetsugu's opinion, that the American naval command would send the fleet into a major base like Manila or Singapore, where it could be blockaded by submarines and ceaselessly attacked by aircraft, and where the men would suffer from the tropical climate. "Even if I were the Commander of the United States Fleet," Suetsugu says, "I would not attempt such a reckless move." Thus, Suetsugu deduces, American naval operations would be confined to raids by smaller units—which, presumably, the Japanese Navy will be able to destroy without difficulty.

It is a mistake, he declares, to think that the Japanese Navy is inferior to the American. Of the United States battleships, he says, only seven have been "really" modernized. All—presumably ten—of Japan's capital ships have been reconditioned. The Japanese dreadnaughts, he points out, "have the finest guns and torpedoes conceivable. The air force has had three years of experience in actual warfare. . . . Aircraft design is being constantly improved. There can be no doubt that in actual fighting experience, the Japanese naval arm is far superior to that of the United States. Thus, the Japanese naval strength is equal, if not superior, to the American. . . . In a pitched battle in the Pacific, the Japanese fleet will not be defeated."

The problem of refuelling the Japanese armada is quite simple, Suetsugu says. The Dutch East Indies have all the oil Japan desires, and it is easier to bring the oil to the Japanese bases from the East Indies than from the United States. Suetsugu adds:

We have a right to ask the East Indies to co-operate with us . . . and to ask them for the materials needed for our common prosperity and existence. Germany and Italy recognize Japan's hegemony over East Asia and are supporting the establishment of a new order there. There is no cause for

hesitation. It all depends on Japan's own determination. . . .

The United States, Suetsugu finally points out, has "an Achilles' heel or two." Within her own walls, he says, there is little unity. Without, in South America, there are many good air bases which could be used by German aircraft. If once the Nazis extend their influence to western Africa, they can fly their bombers across the Atlantic for operations in the western hemisphere.

Suetsugu's is an optimistic picture. With only a few American raiders in the western Pacific, Japan—in his belief—can continue her conquests and carry on her trade without interruption. Both he and other Japanese strategists are confident Manila and Singapore, the two major Anglo-American bases, can be easily reduced in the opening months of the war. This reasoning is based on solid premises.

All Pacific strategy is dictated by distances. The effective cruising radius of a fleet is between 2,000 and 2,500 miles. West of Pearl Harbor the only base in which the navies of the democracies can find adequate accommodation is Singapore. If the United States sends her battle fleet to Singapore, she assumes two major risks. The first is that of exposure to enemy blows on the long voyage west, in waters infested with enemy submarines and constantly within the radius of attacking bombers. The second is that with the bulk of the Navy massed in Singapore, the American home waters will remain with inadequate protection. Once in Singapore, the American fleet would find itself locked in by Japanese submarines and mines and constantly attacked by Japanese bombers based on airfields in Indo-China and Thailand, 600 or 700 miles away. If the fleet were to venture north, in a search for the Japanese Navy, it would have to run the gauntlet of aerial, submarine and destroyer attacks from Saigon all the way up the Asiatic coast.

But Suetsugu deceives Japan when he treats lightly the

danger presented by American and British raiders. More than Britain, Japan depends upon imports to feed her people and industries. China can provide some of the needed supplies—but not many. Russia might agree to supply some of the needed foodstuffs, minerals and oil—and the Japanese press has already unsubtly hinted at the desirability of such a friendly action. But even if Moscow decides to help Japan, such aid will not be on a large scale. The bulk of Japan's imports must come from afar, along routes easily severed by air, undersea and surface raiders. Already suffering from a shortage of shipping, Japan would feel acutely the loss of her merchantmen. The iron and steel famine, already grave, would make the replacement of sunk merchant vessels and warships extremely difficult, if not impossible. Within three months all of Japan's export industries would have to shut down, within six there would be famine in the land; and munitions plants, lacking raw materials and electric power, must of necessity curtail their output.

Japan's strategy provides for lightning blows at the Philippines, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. All these blows might be successful. But the victor would find all supplies destroyed and all equipment wrecked; and in the East Indies the wreckage will include the oil wells. And even with these bases captured, the British and American raiders, fueled and equipped in Australia, New Zealand and Hawaii, can continue to play havoc with the Japanese "life lines." Suetsugu and his colleagues are aware of these perils. They pin their hopes on Axis victory in Europe—which would presumably knock Britain out and plunge the United States into a full-dress war in the Atlantic—and on Russia's benevolent neutrality. Even if England survives 1941, the Japanese believe, she will be in no shape to resist the Japanese advance in the western Pacific, and would soft-pedal American reaction. War in the Pacific, Suetsugu would be the first to admit, is a gamble; but greatness is the reward of the daring alone.

JAPAN'S FOES: U.S.A.

The United States Navy has long been gearing itself for the contingency of a clash with Japan; the preparations took a long jump ahead in 1940, when the Battle Fleet moved to Hawaii. And in 1941, when opposition to Japan's adventures became the United States' avowed policy, the Navy's three-point program of preparedness provided for: first, bringing the fleet up to its maximum strength by expanding personnel and modernizing obsolete warships; second, establishing new and strengthening old air and naval bases all across the Pacific; and third, launching the greatest shipbuilding program in world history.

In the Navy Department this chart gave solid comfort to the officers responsible for the defense of the United States and drafting the naval policies:

(Rate of growth—end of the given year)

	1941	1942	1943	1946
battleships	14	14	20	29
cruisers	35	41		87
aircraft carriers	5	7		18
destroyers	176	189		378
submarines	115	128		180

When this fleet is ready no nation will dare to challenge American rights and interests in any part of the world.

But America's rivals will not wait. In 1941 Japan had only ten battleships to the United States' fourteen. But the U. S. Naval Intelligence had unimpeachable reports in 1940 that eight super-dreadnoughts were under construction in the Japanese dockyards, while work was about to start on four others. It was on the basis of these secret reports that Charles Edison, the then Secretary of the Navy, challenged Japan in May, 1940, to exchange naval information with this country. A fortnight earlier Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval

Operations, had used these reports as the basis of his plea for new men-of-war. If the reports were correct, then up to 1943 Japan will enjoy a considerable superiority in fire power—a great incentive to political and military adventures.

The shipbuilding program—tremendous as it is—may be further expanded before 1946 to cope with the developments abroad. The seizure or destruction of the British Navy, a sudden spurt in the Axis shipbuilding program, the appearance of new war techniques—would each compel Washington to alter its plans. In 1941 naval strategists in Washington already were considering the construction of super-cruisers, displacing 20,000 to 26,000 tons and armed with twelve-inch guns, and of super-dreadnoughts reaching as high as 55,000 tons. Such drastic changes in the accepted designs would delay the completion of the program—with a resultant effect on the fight for the Pacific.

But today bases play a more important part in the Pacific struggle than warships yet unbuilt. The entire conflict can be described as a race for bases; and the number of such bases, their position on the map, and their facilities must decide the course of any war-to-be. The United States Fighting Services spent tens of millions of dollars in 1940-'41 on their Pacific bases, and were allocating even more for 1941-'42. Let us look at these stepping stones of war.

The Hawaiian Islands afford America's most powerful base, and are the pivot of the defense line in the Pacific. Since the outbreak of World War II immense funds have been poured into the expansion of its facilities, strengthening of its defenses, enlargement of its garrison. The lessons of the war in Europe had been taken to heart. For example, all Hawaiian oil and ammunition dumps had been sunk underground. A few officers in Hawaii think it is not only America's but the world's most powerful base.

Yet, Hawaii has two vulnerable points. These are the presence of 150,000 Japanese and the shortage of food. While many of the Japanese are of the second and third gen-

eration born on the islands, and are thoroughly American in ideology and loyalty, many thousands are not. These still retain all their native characteristics and owe allegiance to Japan. The Navy allows no Japanese to enter its yards. The Army reluctantly employs a few. But in case of war this potential "Fifth Column" can cause untold harm. As far as food is concerned, Hawaii has to import most of its foodstuffs, and a widespread submarine blockade would soon put it on a starvation diet. Air transports could possibly be used to ferry food from California, but the cost would be prohibitive. The Navy, however, may find the solution in the cultivation of food staples on the islands.

Pearl Harbor, where the Fleet is stationed, is protected by tall mountain ranges on two sides and by batteries of twelve-inch stationary and eight-inch mobile guns on the third. Any foe within 30,000 yards of the island will fall within the range of these mammoth guns. But long before the enemy warships come that near, aircraft from a score of fields will spot and bomb them. On Oahu Island lies Hickam Field, the Army's greatest airfield. If it is destroyed in a surprise raid, Army planes will soar from at least thirteen other well-equipped fields to challenge the attacker. The Army has also been experimenting with the transportation of troops to outlying islands. On one such trip late in 1940, 110 fully equipped Army machine-gunners landed on an island and promptly "cleared" it of all "invading forces."

The Navy has been branching out even farther afield. When the Fleet left for Hawaii in March, 1940, it was accompanied by 500 planes. The Navy hopes to have eight times that number before 1943. For the use of these aircraft the Navy has been feverishly building landing fields on numerous little islands sprinkled between Hawaii and the Philippines. The schedule of work on these bases in 1940 read as follows: Pearl Harbor, to be completed December, 1940; Kaneohe, December, 1940; Palmyra, July, 1941; Johns-

ton, August, 1941; Midway, December, 1941. Midway Island, Johnston and Palmyra form the first screen of defense for Pearl Harbor. But farther west naval engineers today are rushing to completion air, and often submarine, bases on the outward defense screen formed by Wake, Howland, Canton, Jarvis and other tiny islands. So many of these "listening stations" are being built—and so close to the cluster of the Japanese fortified Marianne and Caroline Islands—that Washington prefers to keep a discreet silence on its work.

Right in the heart of the Japanese mandated area in the South Seas lies Guam. This little island has for years basked in the limelight, for the Navy's repeated efforts to convert it into an air and submarine base have been persistently turned down by Congress. In 1939 Congress rejected an appeal for \$5,000,000 to fortify the island, on the ground that such action would be interpreted as a challenge to Japan. Moved by this touching attention, Japan's spokesmen have in turn threatened to punish the United States if the base were built and ridiculed the thought of a base encircled by Japanese-controlled islands. The classic Japanese comment came from Yonai. Said he: "I pity the United States, if it is foolish enough to fortify Guam."

Now the time is running short, much too short to convert the island into a powerful base. But early in 1941 Congress passed an appropriation of \$4,700,000 to transform Guam into an advance listening post, with facilities for the Navy's big patrol bombers and lighter warships, and with secure air raid shelters. The approval followed an outspoken appeal of Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, to Congress to "totally disregard" Japan's objections. The Navy took the grant, let it be known that for \$75,000,000 the island could be converted into a first-rate air and submarine base and for \$200,000,000 into an advanced fleet base, and wistfully recalled the three-year-old Hepburn report. This report, submitted by a Naval Board of Inquiry in 1938, urged the estab-

lishment of a base at Guam, declared that such a base would:

1. Assure practical immunity of the Philippines against hostile attacks;
2. Impede, if not actually deny, extensive hostile naval operations to the southward;
3. Reduce to its simplest possible terms the defense of Hawaii and the continental coast of the United States; and
4. Enable the fleet to operate with greater freedom in meeting emergency conditions that might arise in the Atlantic.

In a move still more important than the establishment of a base at Guam, Congress in 1941 appropriated \$8,100,000 for the conversion of sleepy Samoa, deep in the southern Pacific, into an advanced naval outpost. Lying astride a line linking Hawaii with Australia, Samoa was destined to be an important outpost in the British-American defense arch in the Pacific. Naval circles in Tokyo quickly interpreted the decision to arm Samoa as a proof of the United States Navy's intention to use the southern route—Admiral Suetsugu's third line of offense—in attacking Japan.

Another important cluster of Pacific bases lies in Alaska. These are a new wrinkle in American strategy. A few bases existed before the outbreak of World War II, but neither Army nor Navy paid any attention to them. As a matter of fact, the entire Army force in Alaska in 1939 comprised 200 men—and not a single plane. The change came during the Russo-Finnish campaign, when the potentialities of large-scale operations in sub-zero weather suddenly dawned upon the Army Command.

Even more important was the realization of the extreme vulnerability of the American Northwest to aerial attacks. From Eskimos in Alaska came reports of the construction of a large Soviet air and naval base at Big Diomedé Island, in the Bering Strait. Another base had long existed on the Komandorsky Islands, in the Bering Sea. Other reports, brought in by the Naval Intelligence Service, revealed the

building of a similar base by the Japanese at Paramushiro Island, off Kamchatka. Consider the distances: From the tip of the Aleutian Islands, where the Navy plans an air base at Kiska, it is roughly 250 miles to the Komandorsky Islands and 700 miles to Paramushiro. The Big Diomedes is just a few miles off the Alaska coast.

As soon as the Army and Navy agreed on the need of fortifying this "Achilles Heel of national defense"—as the late General William Mitchell described it—they swung into action. By 1941 unbelievable progress had been made. The Army was building two major bases, at Fairbanks and at Anchorage. Seven hundred men, working day and night in three shifts, completed the \$7,000,000 Fairbanks base before the end of 1940. Its feature was concrete runs of exceptional length—some as long as a mile and a half. These will enable tremendous bombers—many times larger than those now employed—to take off on raids with full load. The Army was planning to use Fairbanks for experiments with sub-zero flying. The Anchorage base, 600 miles west of Juneau, employed 1,500 men. Although Congress had appropriated only \$12,700,000 for the work, the base was expected to cost fully \$27,000,000 before it was completed. In the summer of 1940 its garrison was brought up to 1,350 officers and men. Both of these bases were anchored to the great \$18,000,000 McChord Field in Tacoma, which was expected to displace Hawaii's Hickam Field as the greatest Army air base in the world. From here, reinforcements were to be rushed to Alaska in an emergency.

The Navy was building three major bases and planning a fourth—at Kiska. The bases under construction in 1941 were at Sitka, Kodiak and Dutch Harbor, near Unalaska. Beginning with Sitka, which lies only thirty miles from Juneau, the remaining bases stretched west along the Aleutians at intervals of about 750 miles. The appropriations for the naval bases at Kodiak and Dutch Harbor exceeded \$5,000,000, and much more was expected to be spent on them later on. The

three naval bases were to be anchored to the Sands Point naval and air base, near Seattle. The mushroom growth of such bases put emphasis on the rôle assigned to aircraft in the struggle for power in the Pacific.

In the summer of 1940 America's leading military expert placed "comfortable operating radii" of mass bomber squadrons at 500 miles (i.e., a 1,000-mile journey for a raid), with a 1,200-mile limit. Yet such was the progress made by aviation in that year of war that a few months after his statement the Navy began to receive the first of "fifty or more" thirty-ton flying boats with a cruising radius of "more than 5,000 miles." And before the year was over the Army sent into trial tests the million-dollar B-19, which had a radius of "more than 6,000 miles," with a bomb load of twenty-eight tons. The Army's thirty-four-ton B-15's had a radius not much shorter. Today the 2,350-mile flight from the mainland to Hawaii is regarded as a routine hop for two- or three-year-old naval flying boats. With the craft built under the new defense program, the radius will be stretched thousands of miles. And—it is only 1,500 miles from Guam to Tokyo.

If the Government's 50,000-plane program is carried out, the map of the Pacific will be redrawn. Japan, Formosa, Hainan and Saigon—and, what is more important, Japan's lines of communication—will be subject to constant attack. And though the Japanese Air Force is adequate to meet the demands of today in East Asia, it will be woefully weak when the theater of war spreads and the quality and quantity of its enemies' aircraft rise.

JAPAN'S FOES: BRITAIN

The United States will not face Japan alone. Whether England survives the Nazi storm or falls, British bases in the Pacific will be open to the American Fleet, British pilots will fly American aircraft, and British warships will patrol the sea lanes together with the American. If England falls and her

fleet withdraws to Canada to lick its wounds and prepare for new Atlantic operations, the United States will fall heir to the resources, loyalties and assistance of Australia, Malaya, Burma, the Dutch East Indies—and even perhaps India.

Although in March, 1941, Britain was still the world's mightiest naval power, her strength in the Pacific was insignificant. When German sea raiders, apparently equipped and fueled at Japanese bases, appeared in the Pacific, they had only three cruisers, an aircraft carrier and a few submarines and destroyers to elude. If Japan openly attacked any part of the British Empire in the Far East, Britain would undoubtedly detach a battleship or two, a few cruisers and a few submarines for duty in the Far East. But this force would be used not for offensive operations but to guard Singapore and the Empire routes between Australia and Suez. Such an attack would endanger American defense lines and sources of strategic raw materials, and would most probably bring the United States into the war.

Britain's strength in the Pacific rests upon two imperial strongholds: Singapore and Australia. Officially opened in February, 1938, the \$55,000,000 Singapore naval base saw few major naval units in the first three years of its existence. The tremendous drydock, built to accommodate the largest warships afloat, stood unused. The large barracks and the hangars at the airfields remained empty. Only late in 1940, when the tide of Japanese aggression rolled to the border of Malaya, did London awaken to the danger. Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, who has been with the R.A.F. since 1912, was appointed Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, with responsibility for the defense of Hongkong, Malaya and Burma. Together with this hard-headed, lean, enterprising officer came powerful reinforcements in aircraft, air force personnel, infantry, artillery, engineers and auxiliaries. From Australia came other strong units of the air force. From India came a division of infantry and a stream of British "volunteer" officers. From the United States came,

in increasing numbers, heavy bombers, capable of ranging far into the Japanese sphere of influence. Hundreds of anti-aircraft guns, brought from Australia and England, formed a ring around Singapore.

When Japan imposed her will on Thailand and Indo-China early in 1941, detachments of the Australian Air Force were rushed to the northern tip of Malaya to check the expected Japanese raids from new fields just across the border. Permanent and temporary defense works were erected along the shoreline to guard against landing attempts. And more infantry units were brought from New Zealand, Australia and India to strengthen the garrisons in Malaya and Burma. According to the best advices, upwards of 150,000 effectives with full equipment were based on Singapore by mid-February.

But far exceeding Singapore in importance in the struggle for the Pacific was a new force: Australia. World War II gave Australia an incredible shock. It ruined Australia's trade—the annual exports to the countries overrun by Germany up to the fall of Paris alone totalled \$100,000,000—but it has boosted her heavy industries. In 1941 Canberra's chief worry was not how to expand production but how to keep check on its mushroom growth. In the fall of 1940, of Australia's 2,000,000 wage-earners, 450,000 were employed in heavy industry. At that time the Commonwealth was spending \$2,000,000 daily for defense, and the figure was still soaring. This money was used to equip a large army, to produce munitions—tanks, guns and bombs—both for Australia and Britain, to construct fifty small men-of-war, of which twenty were for Britain, and to build an estimated two planes a day. By the middle of 1941 Australia expected to boost the production to three a day, one of which was to be a bomber. This was in addition to more than 200 airplanes bought by the Commonwealth in the United States in 1939-'40, as well as to the scheduled production of Pratt & Whitney engines.

The industrial effort made by Australia was without precedent. Under the plans formulated by the Imperial General Staff in 1938-'39, Britain was to supply the bulk of the Commonwealth's military needs. The German victories quickly reversed the position. Australia became not only Britain's larder but her arsenal as well. In the painful process of gearing its industries to Britain's growing demands, the Commonwealth received great assistance from the United States. This came mainly in the form of machine tools and patents.

Paralleling the industrial expansion was the growth of Australia's armed forces. By the summer of 1940 the Commonwealth already had 100,000 men fighting in the Near East, Africa and Europe. At that time, enlistments in the air force alone reached 90,000, of whom 27,000 officers and men were already in active service and 12,000 others in advanced stages of training. About 20,000 officers and men served in the Navy. The Home Army's strength reached 300,000 in March, 1941. And it was the indomitable Australian force which scored such spectacular successes over the Italian Army in Libya in 1941.

Though lagging behind the aircraft industry, shipbuilding also recorded great advance. In 1941 Australia's dockyards were humming with work on warships of all sizes, from cruisers down. With the British dockyards under Nazi aerial hammering, this was a factor of paramount importance. Sydney, where lies the great Cockatoo Island Dockyard, capable of building heavy cruisers, was to be expanded into a huge naval base. Officials in Canberra talked of Sydney as a "Second Singapore," which could offer a safe haven to the Commonwealth's own fleet—as well as to those of Britain and the United States.*

On a smaller scale Australia's achievements were duplicated in neighboring New Zealand. By the end of 1940 this, the smallest of Britain's dominions, had sent 1,500 airmen to fight the Empire's foes. Today New Zealand's own air force

* See page 68.

comprises more than 7,000 fliers. In spring of 1941, the Dominion put into operation two exceptionally well-equipped air bases near Auckland. New Zealand's army in 1940 exceeded 80,000 men.

Giving all aid she could to England, Canada paid less attention to the Pacific than did the other dominions. But she worked in close collaboration with the United States Fighting Services, built the necessary roads to link Alaska with the United States, prepared to construct a few air bases along the Pacific coast. And when Japan joined her Axis partners in a military alliance, Canadian Army units were shifted west, to guard the Canadian shores from Japanese attacks.

The incredible expansion of the dominions' war organizations was of international importance. It supplied Britain with industrial and military bases, safe from enemy bombs. It also tipped the scales in the southwestern Pacific in favor of the British Empire. In 1940 this process was still scarcely distinguishable. But in 1941, and increasingly in the years thereafter, the armed might of the dominions would play a major rôle in the struggle for the Pacific.

THE NEUTRAL: RUSSIA

Soviet Russia occupies a unique position in the Pacific. For more than a decade she has shied away from quarrels in areas not immediately contiguous upon her territory. Her policy was to welcome squabbles among her rivals, for they insured tranquility for her own borders. Russia's moves during those years were made in the frontier belts, from Turkestan to Changkufeng, on the Siberian-Korean frontier. In some of these areas the Soviets were content to hold their lines against enemy infiltration. In others, as for instance in the Chinese northwest, they pushed outward to widen the protective buffer.

But parallel with this process Russia has been stretching northward, into the Okhotsk and Bering Seas and beyond,

into the Arctic. Great publicity has been given by Moscow to the flights across the North Pole, to the cruises of its great ice-breakers and to efforts to open an Arctic route between Europe and Asia. Small mention, however, was made of the new bases in the North Pacific, of the mass settlement of Communist youths in new towns in the Far North, of new air and shipping lines. The first inkling the world had of these activities usually came in the form of orders barring certain sea patches to foreign shipping, or in the lists of labor and military decorations awarded for achievements in the militarization of the Far North.

Both Washington and Tokyo were vitally interested in these developments, although until 1940 both ostensibly displayed little interest in them. A booklet published in Moscow by the Central Bureau of Soviet Regional Research dealt with the issue in these words:

Both Japan and the United States have economic interests in the Russian North; but this area has another significance for them too, in connection with their rivalry in the Pacific. The strategic significance of the North Pacific, particularly the Russian North, seems to be disregarded, and unreasonably, too. There is the vulnerable spot of Japan, so far as her population subsists on Russian fish, an important item in the Japanese food supply.

American cruisers or destroyers could easily stop this supply by blocking the Kamchatka fisheries and intercepting Japanese fishing boats. . . . The local population, under a foreign leadership, could attack Japanese canneries and fisheries, and completely destroy this Japanese industry. As there are deposits of excellent coal in the Siberian northeast . . . coaling stations might be established there that could supply a coal-burning squadron of American destroyers operating in the North Pacific. . . .²

Reports from sources not always accurate credited Russia with the intent of opening these bases to U-boats. German submarine commanders were said to have spent much time

2. *The New York Times*, March 19, 1940.

on undisclosed missions at these bases. Such development—at least in 1941—was open to serious doubt. More certain was the belief that the bases had been established for the two-fold purpose of protecting Russia's strategic interests in any great Pacific war, and of safeguarding the Pacific approaches to the vital Arctic route to Europe. From these bases Soviet submarines and aircraft—and especially the former—could stage raids upon the shipping lanes of the northern half of the Pacific, whether her foe were Japan or the United States. It was partly in response to this move that Washington rushed work on the five great air bases in Alaska and the Aleutians.

The question of Russian aircraft and submarines based on Vladivostok has been discussed elsewhere in this book.* With a passing mention of large-scale Soviet military preparations in areas adjoining Tibet and India, one must turn to another aspect of Soviet strategy—Communist propaganda.

Whatever the outcome of the war in China, Communism has established a permanent foothold in that country. The reason for this is as much general distress, which nourishes extremist panaceas, as the excellence of the Communist organization. As in Russia twenty years earlier, Communists in China have shown an incredible capacity for self-sacrifice, a genuine patriotism and a fanatical faith in their own righteousness. In a vast nation torn by war and hunger and poisoned by corruption, they have displayed a singleness of purpose, honesty, and a well-oiled, rigidly controlled organization. In a chaos they supplied leadership. Amid confusion they offered a logical and popularly attractive program. If China—somehow, at some distant future—wins her fight with Japan, the Chinese Government will have on its hands a long and difficult struggle with the Communists. If Japan wins, her puppet régime will have to undertake the same task—and under much greater difficulties.

This situation must be considered in any new conflict. Wherever the scene of the international struggle for power

* See pages 89, 93.

shifts, Communism will find a welcome haven. In Indo-China and Thailand, in the Netherlands Indies and in India herself, the usual misery and discontent will only be accentuated by new wars. Asia's millions will find in Communism an outspoken and plausible champion of their interests—and thousands will join its banners. Through these thousands the Communist International, from its headquarters in Moscow, will play a vital rôle in the struggle for power. The fact that the Kremlin will probably remain neutral in the battle between Japan and the democracies; the fact that its weapons will be explosive ideas rather than bombers and submarines; the fact, finally, that its objectives differ from those of the other combatants—all these will not detract from its influence on the fight for the Pacific.

THE FIGHT IS ON


The battle for the Pacific is on. Now, in the second year of the 1940s, it has been in progress for a decade; and it has been a "shooting" battle. An American warship—the *U.S.S. Panay*—has been sunk by Japanese bombers. British men-of-war have been shelled by Japanese batteries and British troops machine-gunned by Japanese planes. Twenty thousand Japanese troops fell in a single border war with Russia. Hundreds of French troops were killed in battles with the Japanese, and probably thousands died in the border war with Thailand. And in China the war casualties are counted not in thousands, not even in hundreds of thousands, but in millions. Technically, the Pacific was at peace because the wars were all "undeclared"—and the democracies feared their spread.

Today the patience of the democracies is being exhausted as fast as Japan's appetite is growing. At almost any moment may come one overt act that will start a "declared" war merging all other Asiatic wars into one tremendous holocaust. This in turn will automatically become part of the World

War pattern. The stakes in the fight for the Pacific will be different from those in Europe, but the general division of the combatants will be the same—the forces of totalitarianism against those who, to a varying degree, uphold individual liberty, tolerance and democratic government.

The Pacific conflict thus will pit the United States, Britain, China and the dominions against Japan and her European bedmates. In geometrical terms the democracies' objective will be to enclose—and crush—the Japanese defense arch within a much wider democratic arch, drawn across the map of the Pacific from Nome to Chungking. Indo-China and Thailand fell under Japanese control because that arch had not then fully hardened. But the East Indies, next on the list of Japan's victims, might yet be saved if the democracies speed up the forging of the arch into an aggression-proof barrier. The forging process will include the fortification of Pacific bases, a defense agreement between the United States and Britain, the pooling of British and American footholds and resources, the arming of the dominions, further economic and military aid to China, and new economic restrictions against Japan.

This, early in 1941, was the picture of the Pacific on the eve of the great showdown. Britain's fortunes of war in Europe must seriously affect the progress of the defense preparations in the Pacific. If she survives, the democratic arch will become solid and invulnerable. If she buckles under the Nazi blows, Japan will grow bold and put her aggression into high gear. Japan might even anticipate the Nazi attack on England with her own thrusts at the British imperial outposts in Asia; but such aggression, as the sons of the Samurai well know, would jeopardize major American economic and strategic interests and draw the United States into the conflict.



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